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Foreword
Structural transformation in Africa is a hot topic. And the reason for this
rising concern is clear. The movement of workers from low- to high-
productivity employment has contributed far less to growth in Africa than
in other fast-growing developing regions. Historically, industry—particularly
manufacturing—is the sector which economies have relied on early in the
process of structural transformation. However Africa’s experience with
industrialization has been disappointing, causing observers to question the
durability of its growth prospects. Concurrently, changes in transport costs
and IC technology are shifting the boundaries and concept of industry.
Manufacturing—‘smokestack industry’—has been understood as the main
driver of structural transformation; but today a wide range of services and
agro-industrial products have emerged.
To look in depth at the emerging developments, the Brookings Institution
and UNU-WIDER launched a joint research project entitled Industries without
Smokestacks: Implications for Africa’s Industrialization,with the remit of helping
African policy makers develop a better understanding of industries without
smokestacks and their potential to contribute to growth-enhancing structural
change. This book delivers the crystalized and refined results of that entire
research project.
I ammost grateful to the book’s many contributors for their authorship, and
to my fellow editors, Richard S. Newfarmer and John Page, for their analytical
and editorial skills. The book is an advancement in the field of structural
transformation providing essential reading and analyses for economists, pol-
icy makers, and scholars of development.
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the support and financial contribu-
tions to its research programme by the governments of Finland, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. Without this vital funding our research and policy
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Industries without Smokestacks and
Structural Transformation in Africa
Overview
Richard S. Newfarmer, John Page, and Finn Tarp
1. Introduction
Structural transformation in Africa has become a hot topic. Over the last five
years, the African Development Bank and the UN Economic Commission for
Africa have expressed concerns about the pattern and pace of structural
change in the region. The African Union (2015), in its Agenda 2063: The Africa
We Want, has called for the economic transformation of the continent, and
the Africa Center for Economic Transformation has published its first Africa
Transformation Report (ACET, 2014). The reason for this rising concern is clear.
Structural change—the movement of workers from lower to higher product-
ivity employment—has contributed far less to growth in Africa than in other
fast-growing developing regions (McMillan, Rodrik, and Verduzco-Gallo 2014;
de Vries, Timmer, and de Vries 2013).
Historically, industry, particularly manufacturing, is the sector on which
economies have relied early in the process of structural transformation.
Africa’s experience with industrialization, however, has been disappointing.
In 2014, the average share of manufacturing in GDP in sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) was about 10 per cent, unchanged from the 1970s. Not surprisingly,
Africa’s slow pace of industrialization has caused observers to question the
durability of its growth prospects (Rodrik 2014).
At the same time, changes in transport costs and information and commu-
nications technology are shifting the boundaries of industry. When today’s
system of economic statistics was first drawn up there was little confusion over
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what industry was: mining, manufacturing, utilities, and construction. Of
these, manufacturing—‘smokestack industry’—was regarded as the key driver
of structural transformation. Today, a wide range of services and agro-
industrial products, including horticultural products, has emerged. These
activities have many features in common with manufacturing.1 They are
tradable and have high value added per worker. Like manufacturing, they
benefit from technological change and productivity growth. Some exhibit
scale and agglomeration economies (Ebling and Janz 1999; Ghani and Kharas
2010). We call them ‘industries without smokestacks’.
In 2015, the Brookings Institution and UNU-WIDER launched a joint
research project entitled Industries without Smokestacks: Implications for
Africa’s Industrialization. The objective of the project was to help African policy
makers develop a better understanding of industries without smokestacks
and their potential to contribute to growth enhancing structural change.
This book presents the results of that research. It is structured in three main
parts. Part I presents seven essays that survey core aspects of tradable services
and agro-industrial value chains at the global level. Part II consists of nine
country-level studies from Africa. Part III examines the opportunities for and
constraints on more rapid growth of industries without smokestacks offered
by Africa’s regional communities. This introductory chapter reviews common
themes, and a concluding chapter explores the implications of the studies in
this volume for public policy at the national, regional, and global level.
2. The Problem of Structural Transformation in Africa
One of the earliest ‘stylized facts’ of development economics is that
low-income countries have large differences in output per worker across sec-
tors. Structural transformation—the shift of labour from lower productivity to
higher productivity ‘modern’ sectors—is, therefore, often a key driver of
growth (Lewis 1954; Chenery 1986). When strong within-sector productivity
growth combines with rapid movement of labour into higher productivity
sectors—the pattern of structural transformation seen in East Asia over the last
fifty years—very rapid growth of output per worker is the outcome (McMillian
and Rodrik 2012).
Because it is a relatively labour-intensive, high productivity sector, industry
is historically where workers have first moved in the course of structural
transformation (Chenery 1986). Industry is also a powerful engine of within-
sector productivity growth. There is evidence that modern manufacturing
1 See, for example, Baumol (1985) and Bhagwati (1984).
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industries—unlike agriculture or traditional services—converge to global
best practice productivity levels ‘unconditionally’, regardless of geographical
disadvantages, poor institutions, or bad policies (Rodrik 2013). Between 1950
and 2006, about half of the catch-up by developing countries to advanced
economy productivity levels was due to rising productivity within industry
combined with structural transformation out of agriculture (Duarte and
Restuccia 2010).
With this pattern of structural transformation, economy-wide growth
depends crucially on the pace of industrialization and its capacity to absorb
labour. The contribution that structural-change canmake to sustained growth
is necessarily self-limiting. The low-income elasticity of demand for agricul-
tural products makes a movement of labour out of agriculture inevitable
during the process of development. The labour that is released has to be
absorbed in other activities. If productivity is not growing in the other sectors,
economy-wide growth ultimately will stall. Historically, where manufacturing
has stagnated, and structural transformation has mainly involved reallocation
of workers into lower productivity sectors, aggregate per capita income growth
has lagged (Duarte and Restuccia 2010).
Because it has the greatest differences across sectors in output per worker,
Africa is the developing region with the most to gain from structural trans-
formation. However, despite two decades of solid economic growth, this
potential for structural transformation has not been fully realized. In fact,
from 1990 through 1999, structural transformation in Africa was ‘growth
reducing.’ Africa’s higher productivity sectors, includingmanufacturing, failed
to generate enough jobs to absorb a rapidly growing labour force, and the share
of workers employed in high productivity sectors declined, reducing aggregate
growth of output per worker (McMillan, Rodrik, and Verduzco-Gallo 2014;
de Vries et al. 2013). Labour in Africa began to move from agriculture into
more productive employment after 2000, but 80 per cent of workers have
moved into retail trade and distribution (deVries et al. 2013), not into industry.
Mia Ellis, Margaret McMillan and Jed Silver examine the case of structural
transformation in Tanzania in detail in Chapter 15. They find that that close
to 80 per cent of Tanzania’s growth in labour productivity over the period
2002–12 is attributable to structural change. However, the structural change
that took place was primarily due to growth in employment in small manu-
facturing firms and retail, wholesale, and food and beverages services in the
informal economy. Services productivity in Tanzania is relatively high at
3.5 times that of agriculture, while average labour productivity in manufac-
turing is more than seven times that of the agricultural sector. Services prod-
uctivity in Rwanda was even higher—manufacturing labour productivity was
five times agriculture but services were more than ten times agriculture,
according to Ggombe andNewfarmer’s unweighted calculation in Chapter 16.
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This structural shift from agriculture to services differs from the develop-
ment experience of other regions. In a recent paper, Rodrik, Diao, and
McMillan (2017) find that growth-enhancing structural change in Ethiopia,
Malawi, Senegal, and Tanzania has been accompanied by negative labour
productivity growth in non-agricultural sectors of the economy. Ellis, McMil-
lan, and Silver find that within-sector productivity growth was negative in six
out of ten modern sectors of the Tanzanian economy in 2002–12. Rodrik et al.
suggest that in contrast to East Asia, where both structural change and within-
sector labour productivity growth contributed strongly to overall growth,
structural change in African countries may be drivenmainly from the demand
side by external transfers or increased agricultural incomes. As incomes rise,
demand increases for a range of ‘urban products,’ including simple manufac-
tures and services. Under these circumstances, labour productivity in the
modern sector may decline, as less productive firms are drawn into production
for the domestic market. In Chapter 16, Ggombe and Newfarmer find that
productivity in four of eight non-agricultural activities in Rwanda declined
somewhat between 2005–14, as the urban labour force grew.
Another difference that distinguishes Africa from Asia’s pattern of structural
transformation concerns underlying demographics. Between 2000–16, for
example, the labour force grew by 0.8 per cent in East Asia and 1.6 per cent
in South Asia—while in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) it grew far more rapidly
at 2.9 per cent annually. The median age in Africa is 18, seven years younger
than in South Asia (Fox et al. 2017). Because jobs created in off-farm activities
were insufficient to absorb these rates of labour force growth, labour had no
choice but to stay on the land or seek informal employment. Expanding
population pressure on the land weighs heavily on labour productivity in
agriculture, and evenmodestly higher wages off farm are likely to be sufficient
to entice young workers to move.
One symptom of this phenomenon has been ‘premature urbanization’.
Demographics have accelerated rural-urbanmigration such that Africa is likely
to reach 50 per cent urbanization rates at half the per capita income levels that
Latin America did, and one-third the levels of East Asia. Since many of these
new workers lack skills and jobs, their productivity in the urban economy is
likely to be quite low. Many low-income migrants are earning a living in
household enterprises and SMEs, a trend that is likely to continue (Fox et al.
2017). Clearly, a major challenge for African governments is to promote the
growth of higher value-added activities capable of absorbing the large numbers
of unskilled and moderately skilled workers leaving agriculture.
The export-led, mass manufacturing model used with great success in Asia
over the past fifty years represents one potential path for Africa toward struc-
tural transformation and job growth. However, changes in manufacturing
technology and in the global market for manufactured goods may pose new
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challenges. The first wave of industrializers such as Britain and Germany had
more than 30 per cent of their labour force in manufacturing before industry
as a share of GDP began to fall. On average, countries across all income levels
now have a lower manufacturing share than before, and they reach their peak
employment and value-added shares at a lower income than in previous
decades (Rodrik 2016; Ghani and O’Connell 2014). Hallward-Dreimeier and
Nayyar (2017) show this phenomena was even greater for employment shares
(Figure 1.1). These trends allow more limited space for employment-creating
industrialization. At the same time, changes in the global economymay create
an opportunity for a different path of structural transformation.
3. A Different Path: Global Trends, Opportunities
and Constraints
As Africa enters its next phase of development, it confronts a global economy
substantially different fromprevious ‘late industrializers’. On the onehand, the
exceptionally buoyant trade environment of the 1990s has given way to a
slower growth environment for world trade in the new century. World trade
Peak manufacturing share of total employment (1950–2012),
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Figure 1.1. Has Africa’s manufacturing peaked too soon?
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growth had ranged between 1.5 and 3.0 times world income growth for nearly
twodecades prior to 2000. Since the turn of the century, there have been several
years when world trade has grown at about the same pace as world income
(see Hoekman 2015). On the other hand, many of the forces that have contrib-
uted to this slowdown inworld trade have created new opportunities for Africa.
Particularly since 2000, technological change has accelerated, lowering the
cost of communication and, no less important, creating new forms of commu-
nication such as internet platforms and smart phones. By lowering the costs of
cross-border financial transactions, it has opened theway for digital commerce.
Technological change has also lowered the cost of shipping via sea and air, as
well as passenger air travel. The essays in Part I of this volume suggest that four
global trends present new opportunities for Africa: a revolution in trade in
services, the marked change toward ‘servicification’ of manufacturing produc-
tion, the rise in global value chains, and major developments in technology
markets may permit Africa to leapfrog to transformative technologies. In each
of these four areas, major progress in technology and rapid reductions in costs
are creating new opportunities for Africa; consider each in turn.
3.1. A Global Services Revolution
Economists have traditionally viewed services as the quintessential ‘non-
traded’ activity. This meant that trade in services depended on the physical
movement of service providers or customers to the location in which the
service was to be given. As Bernard Hoekman argues in Chapter 8, the need
for such movement has been declining as the result of changes in technology
that allow many services to be digitized and provided across borders through
ICT networks.
Since the 1980s, global trade in services has grown faster than merchandize
trade. Service exports from developing countries have almost tripled in the last
ten years, growing by 11 per cent annually (World Bank 2010). Modern service
exports (computer and information services, financial services, business ser-
vices and communication) are also growing much faster than traditional
service exports such as travel, tourism and transport.
While sub-Saharan Africa trails other developing regions in the growth of
services exports, they have nevertheless grown at about 10 per cent per year
between 1998–2015. This is more than six times faster than merchandise
exports. Exports of services are about 11 per cent of the total exports of the
average SSA country, so the potential for expansion exists, although levels vary
widely across countries.2 Importantly, services trade is particularly relevant
2 Excluding South Africa from the average.
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for Africa’s many land locked countries where, unlike in goods trade, transpor-
tation costs do not significantly raise export costs.
Modern services are a critical input into downstream industries—and as
such a potential driver of productivity gains in other sectors. For example,
telecommunications are vital to the operations of manufacturers, service
providers, and primary products suppliers. Most large businesses, even in the
poorest countries of Africa, now have websites. These form an essential win-
dow onto the firm’s goods and/or services for the outside world, and as such
are vital for sales. Financial services are crucial to business efficiency across all
aspects of the economy. These services and a multiplicity of others—ranging
from retail, real estate, and business services to engineering, architectural,
consultant, accounting, computer and ICT and legal services to name a
few—are essential inputs into all other sectors of the economy.
The impact of services on manufacturing productivity is considerable.
At average level of services use, a 10 per cent increase in services productivity
is associated with an increase in manufacturing productivity of 0.32 per cent
in Burundi, 0.41 in Kenya, 0.34 in Rwanda, 0.67 in Tanzania and 0.55
in Uganda (Hoekman and Shepherd 2015).
3.2. The ‘Servicification’ of Manufacturing
Bernard Hoekman describes in Chapter 8 the trend toward ‘servicification’
of global manufacturing. He argues that much of manufacturing is undergo-
ing a process of servicification, involving a focus on the provision (sale) of
the services that are generated by products as opposed to simply the fabrica-
tion and sale of tangible goods. Distinguishing between manufacturing and
services sectors is rapidly becoming less meaningful. For example, back office
operations and accounting, which were previously integrated components
of manufacturing enterprises can now be spun off and subcontracted. At
the same time, services sector firms have become larger, providing a range
of specialized services; e.g., engineering design work, legal services, and
accounting.
These changes in the boundaries of manufacturing are in part responsible
for the ‘premature deindustrialization’ described above.3 Historically, the
relationship between manufacturing and per capita income has had an
3 Dani Rodrik (2016) coined the term ‘premature deindustrialization’. It should be recognized
that even though the share of manufacturing in GDP may be falling (and pre-maturely), the sector
may be growing. Hallward-Dreimeier and Nayyar (2017) point out that for all developing countries
with data, some three-quarters had falling shares of manufacturing in GDP in 1994–2014, but only
12 countries had contractions of themanufacturing sector. Most of these experienced war or severe
social conflict (e.g. Syria). The only African country among the 12 was Zimbabwe; see Hallward-
Dreimeier and Nayyar (2017: 55–7).
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‘inverted U’ shape as shown in Figure 1.2. In the early stages of development,
growth in income is associated with very rapid increases of the share of
manufacturing in total employment. As incomes and real wages rise and skills
develop, the relative importance of manufacturing peaks; countries moving
toward upper middle-income levels diversify into more skill-intensive activ-
ities, including services.
As a result of servicification interacting with technological advances
in production, this historic relation has changed. The average share of manu-
facturing in national output—for all countries at all levels of national
income—has fallen steadily over the last four decades (Figure 1.2). Where in
the 1980s, average shares ofmanufacturing in GDP peaked at nearly 20 per cent
of GDP, in today’s world the average peak is about 14 per cent.
3.3. The Rise of Global Value Chains
Services out-sourcing is only one part of the story. Another part is off-shoring
and the emergence of global value chains (GVCs). In many manufacturing
and service activities, a production process can be decomposed into a series of
steps or tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006). Sharp declines in trans-
port and communication costs have enabled companies to relocate selected
tasks to low-wage countries around the world. One indication of this fragmen-
tation of production is the rising proportion of world trade in intermediate
inputs. Trade in intermediates, according to Miroudot et al. (2009), amounted
2010s





























Figure 1.2. Manufacturing as a share of GDP on average declines over four decades
Source: Authors’ calculation from WDI (April 2017).
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to 56 per cent of goods trade and 73 per cent of services trade in OECD
countries in the period from 1995 to 2005.4
While this trendmay bematuring—and in that sense has contributed to the
slower world trade growth relative to income after 20005—it has also given rise
to productivity gains. Based on a panel estimation covering thirteen sectors in
forty countries over fifteen years, Mattoo et al. (2017), found that participa-
tion in global value chains is a significant driver of labour productivity. An
increase by 10 per cent in the level of global value chain participation
increased average productivity by close to 1.7 per cent.
The essays in Part II show the extent to which value chains are already
taking root in Africa. Tourism and horticulture are prime examples. In
Chapter 4 Jack Dailey and Gary Gereffi describe the structure of Africa’s tour-
ism value chain. Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal all actively participate in global
horticultural value chains. In manufacturing, even though tariffs and other
border barriers remain substantially higher than in ‘factory Asia’, the great
majority of firms that export are also substantial importers (Spray 2017; Spray
and Wolf this volume; von Euxkull 2016).
Baldwin (2011) has argued that the increasing role of GVCs in world trade is
a double-edged sword for developing regions like Africa. On the one hand, it
has created an avenue through which countries can industrialize at a much
earlier stage of development, as lead firms choose to off-shore fragments of the
production value chain to countries where labour is cheaper or where other
locational advantages confer a competitive cost advantage on the whole
GVC.6 Participation in GVCsmay also allow suppliers in developing countries
to meet standards and regulations that allow access to rich country markets;
it may permit imports under privileged tariff treatment for intra-firm trade; or
it may facilitate use of network technology that would not otherwise be
available. However, the second consequence is that in a world of GVC-
dominated trade in which production is allocated to the location with lowest
cost, countries that try to industrialize through import-substitution policies
behind high tariff walls are unlikely to ever reduce their costs to the point of
being competitive on global markets.
The rise of global value chains has contributed to the reduction in the role of
manufacturing. Baldwin, et al. (2014) argue that the ‘smile curve’ across pro-
duction stages has substantially deepened over time (Figure 1.3). Out-sourcing
4 To arrive at these numbers, they looked at disaggregated trade statistics for major products and
crossed these findings with findings from input-output tables. They found that intermediate goods
trade is growing at about the same pace as all trade, so the trend did not affect the final composition
of OECD merchandise trade. Services exhibit a different pattern, as services intermediates were
indeed a faster growth segment of the market. These shares are considerably larger than those
found in other studies, arguably because of their more comprehensive methodology.
5 See Hoekman (2015). 6 See Puga and Venables (1996).
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and off-shoring of production to low-wage countries has meant that the value
added share in manufacturing has declined relative to services-based tasks
such as design work, R&D, and marketing, often associated with lead firms.
GVCs are also important outside manufacturing. The transport of fresh
fruit, vegetables, and flowers over long distances became possible with the
development of ‘cold chains’ linking production and consumption points.
Lead firms that coordinate vertical supply chains dominate the industry.7 Daly
and Gereffi highlight in Chapter 4 the importance of lead firms that connect
customers and service providers, including both global and national enter-
prises, in Africa’s tourism value chain.
3.4. Disruptive New Technologies
The fourth and final change in the global environment referred to above is
that the pace of technological innovation and diffusion is accelerating—
creating vast opportunities to leap-frog and in some cases capture first mover
advantages. Sally Murray in Chapter 2 points to clusters of technology that
offer a range of new and unprecedented applications in Africa. She argues that
some have the potential for overcoming distance through e-commerce, mobile
money, business process outsourcing (BPO), and lowering transport costs (for
example drones). Others are critical to increasing labour productivity—access to
distance education and ICT, as well as new technologies (GMO crops). Some,
particularly solar power, have the potential to reduce energy costs. The bottom
21st century value chain
1970s value chain
Stage’s share of











Figure 1.3. The changing relationship between manufacturing and services
7 See Humphrey and Memedovic (2006).
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line is that Africa has abundant opportunities to adapt newly created tech-
nologies to its own situation (mobile money and drone transport), develop
and expand technologies that make intensive use of Africa’s resource endow-
ments (solar power), and use these to create new and unforeseen sources of
competitive advantage. In some cases, these new technologies will allow
Africa to leap-frog technologies in the high-income countries, most likely in
network industries where the high fixed cost of investments constrains adop-
tion of latest technologies in richer economies.
4. Africa’s Emerging Industries without Smokestacks
In Africa, three major sectors have benefited from the global changes
described above: agro-industrial and horticultural value chains; tourism; and
business and trade services (including information- and communications-
based (ICT) services and transport and logistics). These activities are among
the most rapidly growing sectors of the global economy and are increasingly
important across a wide range of countries in Africa.
4.1. Agro-Industry and Horticulture
Emiko Fukase and Will Martin point out in Chapter 5 that one of the stylized
facts of structural transformation is that while the share of the agricultural
sector in an economy typically declines with economic growth, the share of
agro-processing in GDP tends to increase. Consumption shifts from starchy
staple foods to foods such as vegetables, fruits, meats, and food products that
make use of more services. They also note that lower transport and commu-
nication costs have created new opportunities for developing countries. Once
efficient logistics are in place, countries with suitable agro-ecological condi-
tions can potentially produce high-value products, such as cut flowers and
fresh vegetables, which formerly needed to be produced near their point of
consumption.
Between 1988 and 2014, world agricultural exports expanded from US$83.4
billion to US$1,532 billion. Bulk agricultural products accounted for a small
and declining share of world agricultural exports—decreasing from 25 per cent
in 1988 to 17 per cent in 2014. By contrast, processed and semi-processed
agricultural products accounted for almost three-quarters of global agricultural
exports in 2015, and horticultural exports accounted for around 12 per cent of
global agricultural exports in 2014.8
8 See Chapter 5 in this volume.
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Fukase andMartin find quite distinct differences between African and global
patterns of agricultural trade. Bulk agricultural exports dominate. The share of
processed and semi-processed agricultural products in Africa’s agricultural
exports rose, but only to 35 per cent by 2014. The share of horticultural
exports on the other hand more than doubled, from around 10 per cent in
1988–9 to 22 per cent in 2014. Fukase and Martin suggest that the relatively
low share of agricultural processing in African economies reflects their rela-
tively low incomes. In addition, they argue, Africa faces tariff escalationwithin
many value chains in its export markets.
Ethiopia has achieved extraordinary success in flower exports making the
country a global player in the sector. In Chapter 9, Mulu Gebreeyesus finds
that over the period 2002–8 the number of flower farms grew about sixteen-
fold. Ethiopia’s 2015–16 cut flower exports reached about US$225 million
making the country the second largest cut-flower exporter in Africa. The
successful discovery of the flower industry in Ethiopia was a result of private
entrepreneurs’ experimentation, supported by active government efforts to
identify and remove bottlenecks to the sector’s growth. Despite Ethiopia’s
well-documented success in cut flowers, exports of fruits and vegetables
have remained marginal. Gebreeyesus argues that the lack of export dyna-
mism in other horticultural products is attributable to several factors—among
them the standards to enter developed country markets are more stringent in
the fruits and vegetables sector than in the flower sector, and flower exports
are better suited to air transportation.
Horticultural exports from Senegal were modest up to 2003, but starting in
2004, exports to Europe have grown rapidly, averaging increases of 20 per cent
per year. In Chapter 13, Philip English argues that one of the keys to the early
expansion of the sector was the availability of high-speed ships to bring goods
to northern European markets. The sector was able to shift from air to mari-
time transport, significantly improving its competitiveness. Integrated multi-
national companies handle production, processing and exporting—selling
either to wholesalers or directly to supermarkets.
Export of processed horticultural products (mainly fruits and beverages)
has become increasingly significant in Ghana. Export earnings from the
agro-processing industry increased from US$181.1 million in 2004 to about
US$902.5 million in 2011. In Chapter 10, Nkechie Owoo and Monica
Lambon-Quayefio give a detailed description of the fruit and juice processing
value chain. Export production depends on four large fruit processing com-
panies that employ capital intensive imported technology for fruit juice
processing and run large commercial farms.
Haroon Bhorat and others show in Chapter 14 that over the period 2000–14
horticulture exports outperformed aggregate export growth in South Africa.
They show that the relatively rapid growth in horticulture products was driven
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by the intensification of existing export relationships and low exit rates from
export markets, relative to other agriculture products. They suggest that this
rapid and persistent growth is partly due to the rapid growth of South African
FDI in the retail sector across Africa.
4.2. Tourism
Daly and Gereffi in Chapter 4 argue that tourism is an important driver of
economic growth around the world. In 2014, the tourism industry provided
an estimated 277 million jobs and accounted for about 9.8 per cent of global
GDP. In part, the development impact of tourism receives too little attention
because it is hard to measure. Ellis, McMillan, and Silver make the point in
Chapter 15 that the tourism sector is made up of several different industries
including but not limited to accommodation, food and beverage, transporta-
tion, and culture, sports, and recreational services. Thus, while it is possible to
track tourist arrivals, estimates of their direct and indirect effect on output and
employment are necessarily imprecise. The country studies suggest that they
can be substantial.
In 2014, 9.5 million tourists visited South Africa, by far the most in
SSA. Tourism constitutes around 3 per cent of GDP and has been growing at
the same rate as the economy as a whole. Bhorat and others estimate that the
number of jobs dependent on tourism was approximately 680,000 in 2014.
They further find that about 36 per cent of jobs in the food and beverage
industry in South Africa are directly related to tourism, and that four
industries—road passenger transport, food and beverage, retail and trade and
accommodation for visitors—are responsible for 83 per cent of tourism-related
jobs. Bhorat and his colleagues argue that tourism is an important source of
shared growth in South Africa. Many of these jobs are low-skilled, located in
towns where there is little other economic activity, and have a higher-than-
average representation of women and youth.
Ellis, McMillan, and Silver estimate that in Tanzania tourism generates over
US$1 billion in direct annual foreign exchange revenues and contributes
directly and indirectly approximately 14 per cent of GDP. Its share of employ-
ment was about 3.2 per cent in 2012, larger than both transport and business
services. They find that during 2002–12 the sector grew at roughly the same
rate as GDP and employment, and productivity increased by approximately
50 per cent.
Tourism is Rwanda’s largest single export activity, accounting for about
23 per cent of total exports in 2016. Overall tourism receipts have grown by
22 per cent per annum over the last ten years. However, they appear to have
levelled off since 2012. In Chapter 16, Gigombe and Newfarmer suggest that
the main driver of tourism, gorilla trekking, is reaching full capacity and the
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country needs to develop additional attractions to keep the sector growing.
Recently, government priorities have focused on meetings and conferences
with an aim of making Rwanda a conference tourism hub within the EAC and
African region.
Gebreeyesus finds that Ethiopia’s number of international tourist arrivals
tripled during 2005–13 from 227,000 to 681,000. International tourist and
travel receipts also tripled over the same period. In 2015, the travel and
tourism sector contributed about 11.3 per cent of GDP and 9.8 per cent of
employment. Antonio Cruz and Fausto Mafambissa find in Chapter 12
that tourism in Mozambique has been growing at an annual average rate of
9.1 per cent, which is higher than GDP growth. English documents the rise
and decline of the tourism sector in Senegal. In the 1980s, Senegal was second
only to Kenya in SSA in terms of tourist arrivals. However, by 2010, it was no
longer among the top ten destinations. In 2015 tourism receipts accounted for
about 11 per cent of total exports. The share of international tourism in GDP
was about 4 per cent in 2000 and declined toward 3 per cent in 2015.
The country studies paint a portrait of an industry with substantial poten-
tial, and one that has not yet achieved its full promise. Despite a plethora of
published tourism strategies, the country studies suggest that most govern-
ments are failing to implement them effectively. Perhaps the most dramatic
case is Senegal where English argues that scepticism about the development
impact of tourism by its long-time president Abdoulaye Wade resulted in
neglect of the sector, including a failure to collect basic statistics. In 2009,
Ethiopia’s government launched a tourism development policy; most of the
initiatives included in the policy document are still in the process of imple-
mentation. In Tanzania the government has attempted to pursue a ‘high-
value low-density’ (HVLD) tourism policy, designed to make Tanzania a
‘high-end’ tourist destination that caters to a very wealthy clientele. However,
the quality of tourism services in Tanzania is currently too low to make this
policy feasible.
4.3. Business and Trade Services
Developing countries are closing the connectivity gap—defined in terms of
the extent of internet access and speed—with more advanced economies at a
remarkable rate. There have been pronounced gains among developing
and emerging economies, mostly centred on mobile telephones. In Europe
in 2010 total fixed and mobile broadband subscriptions were 54.1 per 100
inhabitants. This rose to 107.8 in 2015. In Africa, the gains were far more
pronounced, from 2.0 to 17.9 per 100, with the Europe/Africa ratio decreasing
from 27:1 to 6:1 in five years.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 26/9/2018, SPi
Industries without Smokestacks
14
These technologies will enable a far larger number of countries to enter
service export markets, moving beyond the traditional outsourcing model. In
Chapter 3, Claudio Frishtak writes that ‘there is an ongoing revolution in the
ICT space with implications for the way we live, interact, consume, produce
and manage firms, cities and other jurisdictions’. Frishtak suggests that
second-generation ICTs are changing the competitive landscape in ways that
lower entry barriers, and new technologies will dramatically facilitate the
production and export of services, without resort to software engineers, com-
puter scientists and highly skilled professionals.
The poster child for ICT-based services in Africa is Kenya. In Chapter 11,
Dianah Ngui Muchai and Peter Kimuyu provide a detailed picture of Kenya’s
most successful IT-based industry, mobile money transfer—a financial
product that allows users to make financial transactions via the mobile
phone. Kenya has the highest share of adults with a mobile money account
(58 per cent of the population) in East Africa. Kenya’s wide availability of
mobile devices offered a distribution technology for mobile financial services,
in particular mobile banking and mobile money transfers. Most large banks
have made substantial investments in mobile phone banking capabilities.
Mobile network carriers, credit card processors, and online personal finance
services firms were among the non-bank investors. In 2012, a carrier, Safar-
icom, teamed up with the Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) to launch
M-Shwari, a mobile service that offers micro savings accounts and credit.
Many small companies rely on mobile money for nearly all transactions or
provide a service that is a derivative of the platform itself.
Kenya was also an early entrant into the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO)
market. BPO is the contracting of a specific business task to a third-party
service provider. The most common examples of BPO are call centres,
human resources, accounting and payroll outsourcing. Following the entry
of a pioneer firm, KenCall in 2005, other firms have jumped into the market.
Currently there are fifty BPO firms operating in Kenya providing various
services such as data processing, digitization, transcription and call centres.
Nairobi’s BPO call centres are small-scale, with from ten to a few hundred
agents. A growing number of firms are offering high end services such as
software development, programming, research and development and finance
and accounting services. While KenCall has an international clientele, the
bulk of firms, are serving the domestic and EAC regional markets.
Rwanda has set the goal of being the ICT hub of the East African Commu-
nity, under the multi-phase National ICT Strategy and Plan (NICI). ICT has
expanded rapidly in recent years, attracting 47 per cent of foreign direct
investments between 2008 and 2011. It contributed 3 per cent of GDP in
2014. Gigombe and Newfarmer argue in Chapter 16 that, like many other
African countries, Rwanda has leapfrogged from twentieth century fixed-line
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technology directly into twenty-first century mobile technology. Mobile
phone subscriptions rose to 70 per cent of the population in 2014. Mobile
money was introduced in 2010, and between 2011 and 2014, mobile pay-
ments subscriptions increased from 639,673 to 6,480,449. The government
is a major consumer of ICT services. The Rwanda Development Board (RDB)
has worked closely with technology solutions companies to promote the
digitization of 100 services, including applications for birth certificates, regis-
tration and school examination fee payments. One of the main digitization
initiatives was the establishment of electronic and mobile declaration of tax
returns in 2011. Mobile payment of taxes was introduced in 2015.
Senegal was one of the earliest entrants into outsourcing in SSA. Call centres
were themain focus; companies were able to attract better qualified employees
than in France at one-tenth the cost. In 2000, there were thirty-five companies
exporting IT-enabled services. By 2016, there were only nine call centres and
they were finding it increasingly difficult to compete outside Senegal. Because
solutions developed for Senegal are well-suited to other African contexts,
export of software appears to be doing better. English argues that the decline
of the IT-enabled services industry in Senegal is closely related to the high cost
of access. The principal investor in the fiber optic cables was Sonatel, the
former parastatal privatized in 1997. Although Sonatel reduced prices signifi-
cantly in the early 2000s, it has been able to maintain a monopoly on external
connectivity, and the number of Internet service providers has fallen from
nine to two. Internet access speeds are below the average for SSA and much
slower than in Rwanda or Kenya.
Virtually all goods trade passes through a combination of air, sea, and land
transport routes. Even services like tourism rely on reliable air and sea connec-
tions. Historically, the smallmarket countries of Africawere caught in a vicious
trap of low trading volumes, monopoly transport services, high uncertainty in
the logistics chain and high transport costs. As a result of these conditions—
and ‘thick borders’ associatedwith barriers (Brenton and Izak 2014)—transport
costs overland in Africa are substantially higher than in other parts of the
world. For example, costs per ton transported along the Northern Corridor
fromMobassa to Kampala average US$8 cents per ton/kilometer, as compared
to average costs in Brazil of US$3.5 cents per ton/kilometer (Raballand 2016).
Schlumberger andWeiskopf (2014) estimate that transport costs are in general
30–50 per cent higher in Africa than other developing countries. This has
particularly affected the landlocked countries of Africa—where typically
costs (measured in days) are twice those for coastal cities—adversely (see
Arvis et al. 2010).
Reductions in transport costs, due to regional initiatives and increased
investments, have begun to break this cycle. In East Africa, port dwell, transit
and border processing times are 40–60 per cent less than a decade ago.
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Dwell times in Mobassa port have fallen from 13 to 5.8 days—while the
number of containers has roughly doubled. Transit times through Kenya
have fallen from four days to two days. Police roadblocks in Tanzania have
been reduced from 35 to eight. At the border crossing at Malaba, average
delays have fallen from 24 hours to four hours. As Raballand and others
note in Chapter 7, with lower trade logistics costs, a manufacturer can change
the source of inputs or the destination of exports or relocate production,
reconfiguring their entire supply chain to suit production opportunities or
respond to shifts in relative prices.
Air transport in some high unit value products, such as cut flowers, can offer
an alternative to overland transport. As with trucking, Africa suffers high
transportation costs because of low volumes, monopoly routes, and the pres-
ence of high-cost state-sponsored carriers. In Chapter 6, Heinrich Bofinger
notes that the region has about 100 million seats for both international and
domestic travel; Brazil, by comparison, has about the same number solely
for its domestic capacity. Similarly, the three airports serving metropolitan
Washington DC in the US handle annually almost the same capacity as all of
Africa. Lack of competition on most routes impedes the consolidation of the
market. The use of high landing fees at airports—often designed to finance
airport maintenance and expansion—drives up costs further.
This is changing. Several aggressive new airlines—notably Ethiopian and
Emirates—are promoting Fifth Freedom market access and creating new com-
petition with attendant price effects—at least in the larger markets. Ethiopian
Airlines, Emirates, and to a far lesser extent, Turkish Airlines have grown at
double-digit rates over the last decade (2007–15). Other smaller airlines—
Qatar, TAAG, Air Austral, Royal AirMaroc, and Rwandair—have also registered
double digit growth from a lower base. Rwandair, for example, has just nego-
tiated new routes to the US (New York) and Europe (London and Brussels).
This expansion has occurred at the expense of lost market share of the
majors—British Airways, South Africa Airways. Air France, and Kenya Airways.
5. The Pivotal Role of Regional Trade
In Africa, where fifteen out of forty-seven countries are land-locked, trading
with neighbours is vital. Two factors accentuate the importance of facilitating
regional trade: the high cost of transportation and the ‘thick borders’ associ-
ated with high border barriers that impede trade to a far greater degree than
in other developing regions (see Brenton and Izak 2014). Transport costs,
for example, add roughly 50 per cent on average of goods shipment into Kigali
to the landed cost of products in the Mobassa port. Tariffs and non-tariff
barriers are generally higher in Africa than elsewhere, undermining the
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competitiveness of local producers that require imported inputs into export
production. In fact, in both Uganda and Rwanda, exporters purchase three
times more imports than non-trading companies, and account for most
imports in both countries. As Chapter 18 by Stephen Karingi, Octavia Pesce,
and Lily Sommner on trade in the East African Community vividly shows, to
the extent that regional agreements lower the cost of transport and lower
intra-regional border barriers, they increase the competitiveness of Africa’s
industry.
Another reason that regional trade is important is its peculiar role in struc-
tural transformation, particularly in the development of manufacturing.
Regional agreements can provide opportunities to develop local manufactures
based on locational advantages. Superior knowledge of local tastes and con-
sumption patterns allows firms to tailor differentiated products to the local
market, often using local inputs. Similarly, transport costs act as effective
protection for production located in inland areas. No wonder products as
diverse as beer, rebars, and cement are traded intra-regionally. Hallward-
Dreimeier and Nayyar illustrated this dramatically by comparing the structure
of exports to the world market to those traded in the intra-regional market.
They find that the share of manufactured exports in total export sold to
neighbouring countries was substantially higher their share of total exports
sold to the global market.
Karingi, Pesce, and Sommer show the effects of regional agreements in
influencing this pattern. They find, for example, that while manufactures
constitute only 11 per cent of EAC total exports, they make up 42 per cent
of intra-regional exports. There are two likely channels at work that underpin
this process. The first is the emergence of intra-regional value chains, some-
times connected with final sales in the global market. Daly et al. (2016)
explore the emergence of intra-regional value chains in the EAC in agro-
processing, dairy, and tourism. A second channel may over time become
even more important: intra-regional competition, particularly in differenti-
ated consumer goods, may drive specialization and productivity gains in
manufacturing at the same time it permits diversification in consumption
patterns. Taking advantage of this channel of growth requires reducing border
frictions and fostering competition that allows the emergence of ever larger
and more competitive enterprises.
Jaime de Melo, Mariem Nouar, and Jean-Marc Solleder in Chapter 19 under-
take a comparative analysis and show that Africa has not come close to tapp-
ing the full potential of ‘deep integration’. They highlight the importance of
culture, trust, and institutions—typically ignored in analyses of regional
agreements—in determining their success in expanding trade. They calculate
an ‘average distance ratio’, and show that for nearly all of the regional economic
communities, trade costs have fallen faster in the regional agreements than
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vis-à-vis the rest of the world for agricultural products, while about half of
Africa’s regional communities show progress for manufactures. Their cross-
country regressions confirm that the membership in regional agreements
(preferential trade agreements) indeed does have a positive effect on the export
ofmanufactures and services. Furthermore, regional groupings tend to foster an
increase in new products. Overall, these findings would augur well for the role
of regional agreements in fostering ‘industries without smokestacks’. However,
results to date have been disappointing because of the lack of enforcement of
deep integration provisions and aspirations for more complete trade liberaliza-
tion. They also highlight the substantial underperformance of African regional
agreements in comparison with Asian and Latin American agreements, a topic
that we revisit in the final chapter of this volume.
6. Industries without Smokestacks: A Different
Path for Structural Transformation?
6.1. New and Different Trends for Africa’s Exports
As the studies in this volume make abundantly clear, the story of the
increasing importance of industries without smokestacks unfolds mainly at
the country level, as each country takes advantage of its particular opportun-
ities. But are the trends evident in some countries becoming important for the
continent as whole? Though data are limited and often spotty, we were able to
construct a picture of changes in export portfolios measured in current dollars
for 33 of 51 SSA countries over the period 2002–15.9 Since mineral exports,
including petroleum and mining exports, grew rapidly during the period—
and these tend to dominate export performance, particularly for the large
exporters (e.g., South Africa and Nigeria)—we have backed out mineral
exports from the calculations. In addition, we use unweighted averages to
9 Working with the authors, Victor Steenbergen (2018) put together a detailed global data set
relying on COMTRADE (https://comtrade.un.org/data/) for merchandise exports at the two-digit-
level, and the WTO (https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/trade_datasets_e.htm) for an
EBOPS-classification of services exports across all 51 SSA countries. Thirty-three countries had
sufficiently disaggregated data over the period to construct a comprehensive panel for 2002,
2007, 2012, and 2015 at the two-digit level. (In a few cases where 2015 data were missing, he
used 2014 or 2016 numbers.) He classified each HS-level and each service sector as an ‘IWSS sector’
according to whether they (a) were tradable; (b) had a relatively high value added per worker;
(c) benefit from technological change and productivity growth; and (d) had some promise of scale
and/or agglomeration economies. IWSS sectors included HS03–08; 11–24 (food processing and
horticulture); and services sectors S205–245 (travel, transportation and communication); S253–268
(financial services computer informational services, and business services). Omitted were traditional
products including agriculture, manufacturing, textiles, footwear, metal fabrication, and machinery
as well as construction services, recreational services, and government services.
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focus on changes in the non-mineral export basket of countries irrespective of
size. This exploratory exercise surfaces some noteworthy trends for the region
as a whole:
 Comparing unweighted averages across countries, industries without
smokestacks (IWSS) sectors grew more rapidly than non-mineral exports
on average and were thus becoming more important as a share of export
portfolios. This is evident in the shift upwards of the curve in Figure 1.4.
A point to note is that these curves reflect averages and there is consider-
able variation around in both years.
 Changes were most dramatic for small and medium sized exporting
countries, such Lesotho (LSO), Sierra Leone (SLE), and Burkina Faso
(BFA) (Figure 1.5). Several large exporters, even those predominantly
exporting minerals, also registered large gains in the share of IWSS activ-
ities as a share of their non-mineral export baskets—including Nigeria
(NGA), Angola (AGO), and Zimbabwe (ZWE). The changes were notable if
less pronounced in several mid-sized exporters, such as Senegal (SEN),
Ethiopia (ETH), and Kenya (KEN).
 All in all, the IWSS sectors performed better than other non-mineral
exports in more than half of the 33 countries in 2002–15, and performed
the same or better in nearly two-thirds (Figure 1.5).
 Industries without smokestacks grewmore rapidly for the average African



































Figure 1.4. IWSS sectors become more important in African non-mineral exports
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IWSS activities rose from 51 per cent of the average non-mineral portfolio
to more than 58 per cent over the 2002–15 period (Table 1.1). While agro-
processing rose slightly, horticulture held about constant, services
exports, particularly tourism and transport, were the dominant driving
force within the IWSS sectors. This was at the expense of declines in
agriculture and other (non-IWSS) services. Manufacturing held about
constant. Within manufacturing, textile tended to fall as a share of the






































































IWSS Sectors (% of Non-Mining Exports) in SSA–2002, 2015
Figure 1.5. The IWSS exports outstripped other non-mineral exports in most of SSA
Table 1.1. Industries without smokestacks are a growing segment of exports
2002 2015
Average Share of Non-Mineral Exports
Average Export Share IWSS 51% 58%
Share IWSS Agro-Processing 22% 24%
Share IWSS Horticulture 3% 3%
Share IWSS Services 26% 30%
Average Export Share NonIWSS 49% 42%
Share Other Agriculture 10% 7%
Share Other Manufacturing 33% 33%
Share Other Services 6% 3%
Source: Steenbergen (2018) a/Average unweighted share of 33 countries, excluding oil and minerals.
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While the more interesting developments are occurring at the country level
as shown in chapters that follow, the role of agro-processing, horticulture,
ICT, tourism, transport, and other services is becoming more important in
many countries across the continent—not just in a few middle-income coun-
tries but even in the small countries and large mineral exporting countries.
6.2. Implications for Productivity Growth
Resource endowments, the rapid growth of industries without smokestacks
and the possibility of ‘premature deindustrialization’ have important impli-
cations for the changing structure of Africa’s economies. It is highly likely
that, due to differences in endowments and trade opportunities, African
countries will see a higher share of extractive industries, agro-industry, and
tradable services in the course of their structural transformation than was
present in Asia’s newly industrializing economies.
The question, then, is to the extent to which these industries without
smokestacks can play the role in structural transformation historically played
by manufacturing. The answer depends on the characteristics of both existing
manufacturing and of the new activities. In cases where the manufacturing
sector exhibits little employment or productivity growth while services or
agro-industrial productivity and employment are growing, these sectors can
lead growth enhancing structural change.
Hoekman dispels the notion that services growth implies lower productivity
growth: ‘Services lend themselves just as much to productivity growth as do
manufactured goods production . . .Within services resource allocation shifts
are a driver of productivity growth in the same way as in goods-producing
sectors.’ A growing body of literature supports the view that where the service
sector has the dynamic characteristics attributed to manufacturing in the
past—strong linkages, productivity increases, and technological innovations—
it can act as an engine of growth.10 Several modern service sectors—such as ICT
services, financial services, transport, and logistics—have broadened the defin-
ition of the leading sector and contributed to structural transformation in a
number of countries, taking up the role held by manufacturing in the past
(Timmer and De Vries 2009; Lavopa and Szirmai 2014; Lavopa 2015b).
There is some evidence that in Africa services are taking up the role as the
primary source of within-sector productivity growth. An ODI team calculated
the contribution of services to annual labour productivity growth for some
twenty-five African countries over the period 1991–2013. They found that
in 15 countries, services accounted for more than 50 per cent of labour
10 See for example Lavopa (2015a), Szirmai (2012a), Szirmai and Verspagen (2015), and
Tregenna (2015).
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productivity growth. In countries as diverse as Botswana, Rwanda, Cape
Verde, and Zambia, productivity growth in services accounted for more than
80 per cent of annual labour productivity growth (Balchin et al. 2016: 14).
The Rwandan case, elaborated by Ggombe and Newfarmer, highlights the
contribution of structural change from agriculture to services to the country’s
8 per cent growth over the last two decades. Ellis, McMillan, and Silver find
that labour productivity increased modestly in informal manufacturing and
services firms in Tanzania.
In Chapter 17, John Spray and Sebastian Wolf use transaction-level data
from the value-added tax (VAT), Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) and Customs dec-
larations submitted to tax authorities to study the population of formal enter-
prises in Uganda and Rwanda between 2010 and 2014–15. They find that
service industries make up most of the top 30 industries in terms of labour
productivity in both countries: 17 out of the top 30 industries in Uganda, and
21 out of the top 30 in Rwanda. In Uganda marine aquaculture, post-harvest
crop activities, and marine fishing rank among the highest productivity sec-
tors in the economy and in Rwanda one agri-business ranks among the top 30.
Spray and Wolf find that on average firms are larger in industries with high
labour productivity, suggesting that scale is important not only in the manu-
facturing sector, but also in industries such as agri-business and services. They
also find that find that, like manufacturing, services are distinct in their
interconnectivity to the rest of the economy. Service sectors make up six of
the top tenmost interconnected sectors of the economy in Uganda and five in
Rwanda, suggesting that services are vital to knitting the economy together.
They further show that productivity growth in these sectors is strongly asso-
ciated with the performance of the economy as a whole.
7. Conclusions
Taken together, the studies in this volume suggest that a broader definition of
the higher productivity ‘modern sector’ is needed in thinking about structural
transformation in Africa. Modern, tradable services, such as ICT-based
services, tourism, and transport and logistics, have the potential for strong
within-sector productivity change and contribute to raising productivity in
other sectors of the economy. Agro-industrial production and horticulture
offer the potential for productivity growth and exports. Some of these indus-
tries have the capacity to absorb large shares of Africa’s growing urban labour
force. In short, it is possible that industries without smokestacks offer the
potential for a new—or at least complementary—path towards structural
transformation.
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That said, it is important not to overlook manufacturing, which has in
recent years been growing at more than 7 per cent per year in several countries
including Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. In
some of these economies smokestack industry may emerge to lead a more
traditional pattern of structural transformation. Even in these cases, services
will have an important role in raising the productivity of manufacturing, and
agro-industry and horticulture can also support the transformation processes
discussed here.
One of themainmessages of this book is that the successful African economy
of the twenty-first century is unlikely to look like the successful East Asian
economy of the twentieth. It will be more diverse and draw on a broader
range of high productivity economic activities for sustained growth. Nonethe-
less, significant policy challenges stand between today’s opportunities and our
optimistic vision for tomorrow. These are the subject of the concluding chapter.
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New Technologies Create Opportunities
Sally Murray
1. Framing
Almost all transitions from low-income to high-income country status passed
through manufacturing.1 Manufacturing offered certain important benefits—
it was particularly amenable to scale and specialization, supporting product-
ivity growth. Traditionally, manufactured products have been more tradable
than services, opening up more robust consumer markets. And due to higher
value addition, manufactured products have been less vulnerable to fluctuat-
ing commodity prices, and more labour intensive, than unprocessed natural
resource exports.
Many are concerned that sub-Saharan African (SSA) may struggle to develop
through this well-trodden path (e.g. Rodrik 2016; Hallward-Driemeier and
Nayyar 2018). The share of manufacturing in employment is falling globally,
driven by labour-replacing technology and a shift in demand towards services.
Furthermore, manufacturing shares in GDP typically rise at first with incomes,
peak, then decline as higher-income economies shift structurally towards
services. In light of this, Rodrik (2016) shows that manufacturing as a share
of GDP in SSA ‘peaked’ during 1970s and 1980s and has since declined as a
share of GDP (from 15 per cent to 11 per cent today). This ‘peak’ was inad-
equate to deliver high- or even middle-income status to the region.
Rodrik posits that this is attributable to SSA’s weak comparative advantage
in manufacturing, combined with openness to global trade. For Rodrik, weak
comparative advantage is here to stay and manufacturing shares will thus
continue to decline, making robust economic development and job creation
1 The author thanks Richard Newfarmer for his many helpful contributions to and overall
guidance on this piece.
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challenging. Others (e.g. Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar 2018) have argued
that modern and anticipated technologies like 3D printing, advanced
robotics, and the ‘Internet of Things’, combined with rising consumer
demand for customiation and speed, are likely to further shift comparative
advantages in manufacturing in favour of richer, higher-skilled countries, by
diminishing the importance of cheap labour and raising the importance of
proximity to consumers.
However, new technologies also create opportunities to raise the compara-
tive advantage of SSA. For example, SSA is home to many natural resources
critical to modern manufacturing, which have often been shipped to Asia for
manufacturing, thanks to the region’smore productive labour, cheaper energy
prices, more reliable governance, higher international accessibility and con-
nectivity, and development of virtuous agglomeration economies. New tech-
nologies may raise the competitiveness of manufacturing in SSA itself. This
chapter explores how technologies can overcome factors driving high labour
costs in SSA, raise human capital, dramatically lower energy prices, and dis-
rupt agglomeration economies and overcome transport costs. Technologies
also create productive opportunities in sectors beyondmanufacturing, such as
service exports, and raise living standards at given income levels.
This analysis focuses on technologies to overcome SSA’s disadvantages in
labour, energy, and distance, because these are, today, foundational to SSA’s
structural transformation. However, the scope of technological innovation is
far broader, and constantly evolving. Another analysis might have considered
technology for governance, bioengineering, blockchain, quantum comput-
ing, and so on. Furthermore, the precise form of future technologies, and their
respective impacts, cannot be known today. Indeed, it is possible that the
most important technology shaping Africa’s future in the next twenty years
has not yet been invented or conceived. However, one can say with a degree of
confidence that the three areas of focus—labour, energy, and distance—are
likely to be fundamental.
2. Competitive Labour
Competitive low-skill wages were the motivation for much global manufac-
turing to move East. Wages are typically lower in sub-Saharan Africa than in
key competing destinations (such as Asian and Latin American countries), but
are higher than expected considering income levels (e.g. Gelb 2017a). Combined
with other disadvantages such as weak agglomeration economies, high energy
prices, and poor governance, wages in SSA have thus, typically, not been
cheap enough to attract major labour-intensive industries from Asia. Several
labour-intensive manufacturers in China have begun looking to more inland
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Chinese destinations, low-wage Asian countries like Bangladesh, and robotics,
rather than SSA, to overcome rising labour costs (Gelb 2017b).
Labour costs are clearly one important factor for making labour-intensive
sectors competitive. New technologies can help overcome weak labour pro-
ductivity in SSA by reducing living costs, to reduce wage demands. As tech-
nologies like robotics and 3D printing reduce the importance of cheap labour
over skills, technology also has the potential to support step-changes in
human capital. The latter cannot be taken for granted, or delivered through
technological gimmicks, however, but requires strategic catalytic use of tech-
nology supported by low-tech complementary foundations.
2.1. Reducing Living Costs
In African cities, food, housing and transport prices are higher (by around
35 per cent, 55 per cent, and 42 per cent respectively) compared to low- and
middle-income countries elsewhere. ‘Overall, urban households pay 20 to
31 per cent more for goods and services in African countries than in other
developing countries’ (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017). This puts con-
siderable pressure on wages, making African labour expensive relative to GDP
and skill levels. New technologies present opportunities to address elevated
food, housing, and transport costs in SSA.
AFRICA’S GREEN REVOLUTION
Africa has lagged other regions in the adoption of modern agricultural tech-
nologies such as high yield seeds, fertilizers, irrigation, and genetically modi-
fied crops. China’s manufacturing output jumped in the context of the ‘green
revolution’ that released rural labour and pressures on urban food costs,
shepherded by agriculture technology adoption. Improved varieties of wheat
and rice spread rapidly, alongside investments in irrigation and increased use
of fertilizer and pesticides. Yields doubled and production tripled between the
1960s and 1990s, and low-income rural labourers moved to the cities to take
advantage of new opportunities, especially in the manufacturing sector, sup-
ported by cheap food.
Over the same period, agricultural productivity remained fairly stagnant in
Africa (FAO n.d.), and technology adoption low (FAO 2015). Rapid urbaniza-
tion is now occurring in an environment of fairly stagnant rural productivity
growth (USDA ERS 2017), raising pressures on food prices. This is exacerbated
by climate change, reducing the suitability and reliability of environments for
food production. Thus, living costs in cities, and in return wage demands,
often remain uncompetitive.
New information technologies can accelerate agricultural modernization in
SSA, by providing more tailored and reliable information to farmers at the
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right time. Higher quality satellite data, and new analysis techniques such as
machine learning, improve the ability to provide advice, inputs, and insur-
ance appropriate for Africa’s highly differentiated microclimates (e.g. Biffis
and Chavez 2017; McSharry, Swartz, and Spray 2016). Private company Olam
adopted a mobile phone-based system to cost-effectively manage over 30,000
small-holder coffee farmers in Tanzania, reducing dramatically the costs of
sending farming instructions, advice, price data, and payments. More broadly,
the proliferation of mobile phones (and increasingly, smartphones) has led to
innovations such as farmer hotlines, automated text messages with advice,
and on-demand market price information (including voice-based services for
illiterate farmers, such as ‘3-2-1’ in Malawi) (e.g. GSMA, 2017), which Africa’s
farmers have taken up at scale (e.g. Human Network International, 2016),
with big impacts on uptake of improved inputs and yields (e.g. Cole and
Fernando 2016; Casaburi et al. 2014).
SSA has also suffered under-investment in research and development (R&D)
to make appropriate improved crop varieties available to farmers (Benin et al.
2016). Genetically modified (GM) crops have been particularly neglected from
already small R&D agendas but they have considerable potential to raise yields
and food security in a context of climate change.
Genetic engineering is the direct editing of the genome of a plant to insert
DNA from other species that is responsible for desired traits (such as pest or
drought resistance, or improved nutrient content). 181 million hectares of
GM crops were planted in 28 countries in 2014, but only two countries in SSA
allowed commercial GM planting: South Africa (with 2.7 million hectares of
maize, cotton, and soybean) and Burkina Faso (with 0.5 million hectares
of cotton).
Yet GM offers substantial promise for raising SSA’s low yields, reducing the
need for pesticides and insecticides, improving nutrition, and reducing SSA’s
particularly high vulnerability to climate change.
Drought-resistant GM-maize is particularly promising for Africa. Maize is
the most widely-grown food crop, but requires substantial, reliable, water,
which climate change is calling into question. In 2016, a particularly severe
El Niño drought affected maize harvests in several countries. The maize har-
vest of Malawi, for example, fell 34 per cent below its five-year average, and
about 20 per cent of the population faced food insecurity (GIEWS 2017).
During the crisis, some countries even banned food aid that incorporated
GM maize. For other countries, GM maize varieties have been developed
that are both drought-resistance and reduce the need for pesticides.
Potatoes are also a popular staple in Africa, but at risk of late blight (the
disease responsible for the Great Irish Famine of the 1840s, which reduced
Ireland’s potato harvest by 88 per cent, causing over a million to starve to
death). Late blight spreads particularly rapidly in the warm and moist
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conditions common inmuch of SSA. Thus, preventative measures like fungicide
and metal spraying are required in high quantities, raising costs and restricting
many farmers from adequately protecting their crops. Unlike selective breed-
ing, genetic modification allows several resistant genes to be introduced into
the same potato variety, to optimize resistance. Despite political backlash,
GM potatoes resistant to late blight have in 2017 enjoyed positive field trials
in Uganda.
In June 2016, 121 Nobel laureates signed a letter of support for GM
crops, stating, ‘There has never been a single confirmed case of a negative
health outcome for humans or animals from their consumption. Their envir-
onmental impacts have been shown repeatedly to be less damaging to the
environment, and a boon to global biodiversity’ (Support Precision Agriculture
2016). However, genetically modified crops do bring risks for agricultural
ecosystems than must be managed. If research and development for GM is to
be increased, and regulation revised, it should not be done so half-heartedly.
First, the planting of pest-resistant GM crops must be carefully managed to
reserve ‘refuge areas’ for targeted pests; without this, pests can quickly evolve
to develop resistance. Bt (GM) cotton, for example, initially looked promising
for environmental protection—whereas traditional insecticides destroyed a
wide range of animals, theGMcotton’s Bt toxinwas targeted towards a specific
pest only, protecting non-invasive wildlife. The Bt cotton was planted by
7.7 million farmers in India, and 7.1 million in China, in 2014 (ISAAA 2014).
However, the seeds were so popular that farmers did not leave enough spaces
without Bt cotton, leading the targeted pests to develop resistance. Yields
suffering across India on a massive scale, causing huge negative publicity for
GM across India and China. This can be avoided by proper enforcement of
refuge areas, however. The US demands that farmers leave 20–50 per cent
of land Bt-free within 0.8 km of their Bt plantations. Especially with less coord-
inated small-holder farmers in SSA, and several governance challenges, the role
of effective governance will be particularly critical for GM success.
Second, testing procedures must also be robust—as for all new crops. For
example, the strain of cotton into which the Bt toxin was engineered in India
has retrospectively proven susceptible to whitefly, whereas local organic var-
ieties are not (Indian Express News Service 2015). Mirid bugs blighted GM
cotton yields in northern China (European Commission DG Environment
News Alert Service 2010). These losses might have been avoided with proper
field trials before commercial release of the crop. On the other hand, these
risks also result from the tiny range of GM and hybrid strains available on the
market, exacerbated by slow regulatory processes and under-investment in
R&D; with more varieties, farmers have more options if a weakness becomes
apparent with one. Again, investment in research needs to be serious, so that
many varieties can be trialled, and each trial be robust.
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Geneticmodification is by nomeans the only source of agricultural productivity
gains. Selective breeding offers some similar gains, but is far slower, requiring
several generations of breeding before the desired characteristics manifest
with the required strength. Selective breeding for one trait often also unin-
tentionally breeds out other desirable genes, and with selective breeding, a
much smaller variety of genes can be added, as theymust come from sexually
compatible organisms (e.g., maize bred withmaize). So far, selective breeding
has produced far more new crop varieties for sub-Saharan Africa than genetic
modification, however, due to greater investment in R&D and lower regula-
tory resistance. Increasing investments in R&D for selective breeding is still
predicted to have large returns (Perez and Rosengrant 2015). The particular
promise of GM derives not just from its greater speed and flexibility, but also
from the fact that the development of GM varieties has so far been so restricted,
suggesting considerable ‘catch-up’ growth potential. With policy support for
and investments in such ‘catch-up’ R&D, the quality and range of varieties
available to farmers may improve substantially.
New technologies thus have the potential to bridge gaps in Africa’s agricul-
tural modernization, multiply yields, lower food prices (as well as prices for
export and manufacturing crops like cotton), and bring new opportunities for
resilience to food security risks such as climate change. This has potential to
reduce pressure on wages and raise labour productivity, while also raising
agricultural export and processing potential.
INNOVATIONS IN URBAN TRANSPORT AND HOUSING
African countries also enjoy the chance to leapfrog straight to modern tech-
nologies to bring down their high urban transport and housing costs.
Congestion is a major source of elevated transport costs, but new technolo-
gies are helping to relieve congestion in several developing cities. The need for
individual vehicles is reduced by ride-sharing apps such as Uber, and domestic
versions for shared motorcycle taxis (e.g., SafeBoda in Uganda and SafeMotos
in Rwanda). New digital transport information tools—such as GIS devices on
buses, andGTFS- based public transit data2—make public transport easier both
to plan (for city managers) and to use (for consumers). Cheaper, and less
polluting, fuel is also available through electric vehicles: in 2016, Volkswagen
announced their plan to introduce electric cars with a ride-sharing service in
Kigali, Rwanda, to take advantage of cheap renewable grid power; Ampersand
Solar hopes to bring China’s electric bike revolution to Kigali, replacing omni-
present motorbike taxis with solar-powered electric bicycles, and reducing
deadly urban air pollution to boot. Improved urban transport will not only
2 General Transit Feed Specification.
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lower living costs (and hence wage pressures) directly, but also better integrate
now-fragmented urban neighbourhoods and labour markets for more pro-
ductive, inclusive, cities (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017).
Prefab housing technologies and ‘3D printing’ may help to reduce the cost
of quality urban housing. Though many technologies are still in the develop-
ment phase, semi-automated construction methods may support scale econ-
omies in housing supply, overcome weak local skills in architecture and
construction, and enable cost-saving structural forms not possible using trad-
itional methods. Such innovations may help developers meet often stringent
regulatory requirements at low cost, while creating ‘reliable’ uniform units
easier to value and certify. Additive manufacturing (‘3D printing’) is discussed
below in the context of manufacturing, but one novel application is 3D
printing houses. Large 3D cement printers have already been developed,
and used to ‘print’ house-like structures. These are large mechanical arms
equipped with nozzles that emit cement according to a pre-programmed
design, layering the cement progressively as it dries. It’s fast, too: a Chinese
firm, Win Sun, claimed to have ‘printed’ ten robust, concrete, houses in
24 hours, at US$5,000 per house, in 2015. TheWorld Advanced Saving Project
is working on another 3D printer—the Big Delta 12m—that can ‘print’ earth
homes with features such as cavity walls (tricky with traditional building
techniques) and coverings to improve look and durability.
2.2. Raising Human Capital
Labour productivity concerns not only wage costs, but also worker quality. No
country has achieved sustained, rapid, broad-based growth without major
investments and improvements in human capital outcomes. What’s more,
the centrality of education to growth is likely to become even more salient, as
machines are increasingly able to replace unskilled labour. Raising workers’
skills—to use technologies, and perform less ‘replaceable’ roles—will thus be
increasingly critical for long-run job-creation.
Sub-Saharan African economies are, so-far, not future-proof in this respect.
SSA has some of the lowest literacy and education levels in the world. The
quality of learning in schools continues to be extremely poor, with many
children unable to read with comprehension by the end of primary school,
and teachers often lacking the knowledge they are expected to transmit to
students (e.g. Bold et al. 2017). Parents can hardly straddle the gap, with
World Development Indicators suggest that between ten and 40 per cent of
adults inmost sub-Saharan African countries are ‘illiterate’ (unable to read and
write a basic sentence about their lives); only approximately 7 per cent of
adults have degrees, and the skills transferred during higher education often
anyway do not leave graduates job-ready (British Council 2014). Whereas
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countries in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) spend around US$7,000 per primary pupil per year, many African
countries spend less than one hundredth as much (OECD 2016). How, in such
an environment, can African economies possibly develop the human capital
required for future-proof mass employment?
E-LEARNING FOR BASIC SKILLS
In theory, smartphones or tablet computers, combined with electricity and a
good internet connection, can give teachers and students in poor, remote
schools access to international-standard resources and information, at com-
paratively lowmarginal costs. This includes dedicated learning resources, such
as scripted lesson plans, computer games for personalized learning, and free
online courses (including from top universities), as well as informal informa-
tion tools such as Google searches, Wikipedia, and YouTube tutorials. There
is already evidence for stronger demand for and engagement with online
educational resources in developing countries (Murray 2017).
Currently, available data suggests that use of such resources remains mostly
an elite activity (Murray 2017). Africa has some of the highest internet
costs and worst coverage and speed in the world, despite low incomes (The
Economist 2013a). Smartphones are unaffordable for most, and literacy is a
further challenge, particularly when an international language is required.
However, data costs are forecast to come down dramatically, with a surge in
data supply exceeding demand. Many coastal areas are set to benefit from the
completion of planned high-speed internet cables (Murray 2017). Some satel-
lites orbiting over Africa already have 80 per cent spare capacity, whichmay be
mobilized to provide affordable mass internet access (Scaturro 2016). The
internet is also reaching isolated areas through initiatives such as Facebook’s
internet.org (providing rural internet access through lasers and unmanned
solar aircraft), Google’s Project Loon (using balloons in the upper atmos-
phere), and hundreds of microsatellites launched by Tesla. In 2014, the aver-
age cost of mobile broadband3 fell by 40 per cent in least developed countries
(International Telecommunications Union 2015), and several network oper-
ators in the region recorded a 50 per cent increase in data usage in 2015
(GSMA Intelligence 2016).
Smartphone prices have begun to plummet—smartphones below US$50 are
now available (GSMA Intelligence 2016), and prices are falling while function-
ality improves exponentially. Smartphones are thus also being adopted at
progressively lower income levels, and the gap between adoption in Africa
and elsewhere narrowing (Murray 2017).
3 This is based on the example of 500 MB of prepaid handset-based data.
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The chance for e-learning to ‘leapfrog’ skill development should not be taken
for granted, even given access to data and devices, however. The full wealth of
online information and resources can also only be accessed by those fluent
in a major world language, and with the critical thinking and independent
study skills to pursue knowledge effectively. Many teachers’, students’, and
broader citizens’ literacy (especially in an ‘international language’) is too low
to make use of the best online resources.
Most studies suggest that the internet and electronic devices can improve
classroom learning, but that success depends critically on the right software
and its skilful use by teachers (Murray 2017). There are countless examples of
computers collecting dust because teachers lack skills to utilize them, and
repairs are not budgeted or planned for; computer labs being dominated by
a handful of more advanced students; and, generally, computers failing to
improve learning without the skilled stewardship of quality, well-supported
teachers (Toyama 2015). Indeed, many now argue that technology mostly
serves to accentuate what is already found in an education system—be that
good teaching or bad (Toyoma 2015). Linden (2008) found that computer-
assisted learning was very effective when used to complement a normal pro-
gramme, but when used as a substitute for a teacher-delivered curriculum,
students learned significantly less than they would otherwise have done
(Aker et al. 2010). While devices remain expensive, resources must be distrib-
uted strategically, for example targeting e-solutions to ‘teach teachers’ rather
than equipping every student with a laptop while teachers lack the skills to
make effective use of them. In many contexts, traditional textbooks in fact
offer much cheaper access to quality information, compared with the pur-
chase and maintenance costs of tablet and laptop computers, power, and
internet access.
E-learning will, therefore, be most effective if governments invest in laying
the ‘springboard’ of high-quality literacy and critical thinking skills, teacher
skills, and robust and affordable internet and power access.
ICT TO HONE MARKETABLE SKILLS
As technology advances to out-compete humans in more tasks, a particularly
important opportunity is to become a producer, rather than simply a con-
sumer, of digital content. Learning to program does not require a college
degree or even completion of secondary school; free online platforms, such
as Code Academy, can take people from zero to amarketable level of skill. Even
children can learn to code, from beginners to an advanced level with free
platforms such as Scratch. In April 2017, there were more than 5,600 Scratch
users in Kenya, 2,700 in Somalia, and 35,000 in South Africa, and Scratch’s
modal age internationally was twelve (Scratch 2017). Some more advanced
coding schools recover tuition costs by taking a percentage of students’ salary
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upon graduation, overcoming financial constraints to more formal education.
Section 4 discusses the opportunities for coders to also hone their skills (and
make their livings) serving the growing regional market.
3. Competitive Power Costs
In 2010, average generation costs in Africa were US$0.18 per kWh, and
subsidized energy tariffs US$0.14 per kWh on average. By comparison, average
tariffs in South Asia were US$0.04 per kWh, and in East Asia US$0.07 per kWh
(AfDB 2013). To compound energy high prices, many African countries suffer
frequent power outages, necessitating firms to use expensive backup gener-
ators. This makes it particularly tough for (typically energy-intensive) manu-
facturing sectors to compete with those in Asia, and for technology-reliant
sectors and tools to flourish.
However, much of the continent is also rich in sources of renewable energy:
solar, hydro, wind, and even geothermal in East Africa. With new technolo-
gies, the costs of solar and wind have been falling rapidly. Despite the plum-
meting cost of oil (by 67 per cent) in 2015, wind and solar accounted for half
of new global investment in power generation (Frankfurt School-UNEP
Collaborating Centre 2016).
Furthermore, with less ‘legacy infrastructure’ in their power generation (just
147 GW were produced in Africa in 2013, equivalent to the capacity installed
in Belgium, and the new capacity installed in China every one-to-two years)
(AfDB 2013), sub-Saharan African countries are well placed to transition
straight to renewables as their energy demand grows. Developing countries
are constructing more renewable energy capacity than their OECD counter-
parts (REN21 207), and China’s renewable energy capacity is now growing
faster than its fossil fuel and nuclear capacity (Mathews and Tan 2014). If sub-
Saharan Africa can indeed leapfrog past fossil fuels and directly to cost-
effective renewables, it can avoid the massive exacerbation of climate change
that would result frommeeting future demand through coal power, and enjoy
falling and less volatile prices at the same time.
3.1. Hydropower
In 2012, hydropower generated 84 per cent of Africa’s non-fossil fuel energy
(SciDev n.d.). Africa’s hydro projects do not particularly benefit from new
technologies, but they provide important context to the potential of improved
solar and wind technologies, and also the promise of complementary
technologies to raise competitiveness in energy-intensive industries.
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Despite the high share of hydropower generation, by 2016 Africa had
exploited just 8 per cent of its total hydropower potential (IRENA 2015).
Expansion projects already underway or planned would generate 27 GW
across Africa. Ethiopia is planning to complete a 6 GW hydropower dam on
the Nile (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) in 2018, which would triple
Ethiopia’s energy generation from 2 GW in 2016, supporting its growing
manufacturing sector and potentially providing cheap energy to export to
the Horn of Africa and East Africa.
However, many African countries have suffered over-reliance on hydro. As
well as disrupting rivers—water for settlements and crops, and habitats for
wildlife—hydro is particularly unreliable in the context of climate change.
Zambia, for example, gets nearly all its power from hydroelectricity. With
droughts in 2015, Zambia suffered daily eight-hour power cuts and a shortfall
of 34 per cent of demanded electricity. The mining industry, core of the
Zambian economy, had to cut power usage by 30 per cent (Sladoje 2016).
In 2016, Zambia ran a tender for 100 MW of solar to stabilize its power
supply; the winning bids offered US$0.06 and US$0.08 per kWh—competitive
with South and East Asian energy prices (IFC 2016).
3.2. Wind
Costs of wind power have fallen exponentially—from US$512 to US$70 per
MWh from 1985 to 2016 in Northern Europe. Costs fell by 50 per cent since
2009 alone (Liebreich 2016). This resulted from enhanced designs (especially
refined blade shapes and higher towers) that better capture wind. The capacity
factor of OECD wind turbines installed in the 1990s and early 2000s was
generally 10–20 per cent, rising to above 30 per cent by 2016 (Liebreich 2016).
The Horn of Africa, south-west coast, and parts of north-west Africa have
strong wind capacity (Vaisala 2015), and African governments are planning
serious investments. Kenya’s Lake Turkana wind farm is planned to provide
310 MW to the grid—equivalent to 18 per cent of Kenya’s energy demand in
2016, and likely to be the largest private investment in Kenya’s history
(Obulutsa 2017).
3.3. Solar
With technological refinements, costs per solar watt installed have fallen
by more than 99 per cent since 1976, and by 90 per cent since 2009 alone.
In 2016, new solar projects provided energy at or below the average grid
price in 30 countries (World Economic Forum 2016), and in South Africa
newly installed solar and wind were 40 per cent cheaper than baseload coal
(CSIR 2016).
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The inability of solar photovoltaics to generate power during darkness has
been a key weakness, demanding an alternative for evenings, which once
provided is often cost-effective to also utilize during the day. But this weakness
would be overcome by cost-effective power storage, costs of which have finally
begun to fall meaningfully. In 2010 batteries cost US$1,000 per kWh
on average, but by 2015 this had fallen to US$350 per kWh. A 2016 UNEP
report (Frankfurt School-UNEP Collaborating Centre 2016) attributes this to
the intense battery innovation and production economies of scale driven by
the electric vehicle movement. Utility-scale electricity storage increased by
50 per cent in just a year, from 160MW in 2014 to 250MWby 2015 (still small
levels overall, however). A massive new solar plant in the Moroccan desert
uses daytime sunlight to heat salts that retain their temperature for up to eight
hours. After dark, the salts are mixed with water to create steam that turns
turbines. Though more expensive than solar photovoltaics, the technology
offers 24/7 power (Nelson 2015).
With more prolonged and intense sunlight, a solar plant in Africa will tend
to produce almost double the power of a similar-sized plant in Germany
(IRENA 2016). Yet just 1 per cent of global solar capacity was installed in
Africa in 2015 (IRENA 2016). This suggests great potential for expansion.
Transmitting energy from source is a remaining challenge. Grids are not yet
extended to many areas, and where they are often require expensive upgrades
to transmit power in two directions, from new solar plants to consumers.
Solar home systems and mini-grids particularly avoid transmission costs
through localized production. But solar home systems in Africa are typically
20–100 W, compared with 3,000–5,000 W (3–5 kW) in OECD countries,
approximately doubling costs per watt through low scale economies (IRENA
2015). However, this mostly affects small firms and families; larger firms can
install larger, more cost-efficient, systems to enjoy cheap solar without the
transmission costs.
Solar lighting also has important benefits for health, rural poverty, and
possibly education. It is typically cheaper than kerosene and offers better-
quality light (ten times as bright). Researchers are studying impacts on chil-
dren’s learning, through improved ability to do homework, as well as SMEs’
income through longer opening hours. It also avoids the substantial morbid-
ity associated with kerosene’s air pollution. Solar mobile phone charges also
tend to achieve lower costs than diesel generators, since transport costs are
lower and marginal costs of power zero.
Thus, although in Africa energy costs have been a serious burden to manu-
facturing and technology-intensive industries, and households’ technological
uptake, new opportunities are presented by the falling costs of solar and wind
power, and appliance innovations that reduce the energy- or carbon-intensity
of production and consumption.




4.1. 3D-Printing Inputs to Overcome Weak External
Agglomerations And Supply Chains
3D printing, or ‘additive manufacturing’, may be disruptive for the logic of
agglomeration economies, which have so far encouraged similar firms to
cluster tightly together for easy access to inputs and consumers. Agglomer-
ation economies have put a high price on relocating from major clusters in
Asia to far less developed locations in Africa in search of lower wages. For
example, if one part of a machine breaks, a business may need to halt produc-
tion for days or weeks while the requisite part and technical expertise to fix the
machine is sourced from Asia or Europe.
Depending on the sophistication the technology reaches, 3D printing may
overcome such agglomeration effects, enabling firms to simply ‘print’ required
parts, so more complex tasks can be completed in less developed locations. In
the face of weak engineering skills and supply chains, firms could more
confidently employ sophisticated machinery and processes, knowing new
parts can be quickly printed and installed. Firms can use their own machines,
or share machines at (for example) city-level 3D printing labs.
One concern for manufacturing in SSA is that technologies like 3D printing
and robotics also reduce the costs of operating near consumers in high-income
markets (by substituting for labour), while consumers’ increasing demand for
fast-delivery and customized products raises the returns from doing so (e.g.
Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar, 2018). Will manufacturing return from
China to Europe and North America, rather than migrating to SSA? If this
trend is realised, a silver lining is the chance that manufacturing for SSA’s own
regional markets may also move ‘closer to the consumer’, after being lost to
China with the removal of protection and openness to global trade after the
1970s and 1980s, and that some manufacturing may instead move closer to
the source of materials—many of which come from SSA.
4.2. Online Service Sales
Services in sub-Saharan Africa have typically been dominated by locally-
traded activities like haircuts, grocery stands, and taxis, with limited oppor-
tunities for export or economies of scale (Diao, Harttgen, and McMillan,
2017). However, new technologies are also raising opportunities to export
productive services directly to global markets.
A major opportunity for services exports is task outsourcing. Consider
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk—an online platform for firms and individuals to
recruit remote workers to complete tasks on a freelance basis. Typical tasks
include responding to surveys, processing photos and videos, cleaning and
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
New Technologies Create Opportunities
39
verifying data, finding information, and writing content for websites. Globally,
the industry isworthmore thanUSDonebillion, andmillionsare activelyoffering
services on sites such as Freelancer, Upwork, andWitmart (Imaizumi 2016).
3D printing can also be an export opportunity for sub-Saharan Africa.
Africa’s talented entrepreneurs can create designs to be exported (printed)
around the world, as a form of online service export. Already, Kodjo Afate
Gnikou, an entrepreneur who used electronic waste to create batteries and 3D
printers in Togo, is now supporting the Made in Space programme to design
3D printers for space (Hall 2016).
Competitiveness in online service exports typically requires a combination of
fluency in an international language, cultural understanding or technical skills,
and competitivewages. This balance is reflected in the topfive countries offering
online workers: the USA, Philippines, Russia, Bangladesh, and the United
Kingdom.Although tasks onMechanicalTurk tendtobe rote andnon-technical,
80 per cent of its freelancers in 2016 were based in the US, and most others in
India. Somepopular onlineplatforms explicitly advertize that their online assist-
ants are US college graduates. China, with a large domestic market and its own
languages,has seen thegrowthof its owndedicatedonline tasking sites:Witmart
hosts millions of registered freelancers, operatingmostly inMandarin.
Why are these task sites not more accessible to providers from Africa?
Literacy is still comparatively very low, and despite colonial language legacies,
many citizens are still fluent in only local or regional languages. A shared
cultural understanding and exposure to ‘modern’ workplaces may also be
required, as suggested by the continued dominance of US-based workers for
US-based tasks. But as discussed under education in this chapter, new tech-
nologies also create opportunities for workers in sub-Saharan Africa to develop
some of the required competencies.
4.3. Online Goods Marketplaces
Exports from SSA producers, as well as domestic trade between isolated areas
and bigger cities in SSA, have been hindered by high costs and challenging
logistics of payment and shipping, and high ‘search costs’ for consumers
in finding information about products. E-commerce can help address these
obstacles. Research has shown that online sales behave almost as if national
borders and distance introduce no trade frictions at all—consumers receive
fairly equal product information regardless of the seller’s location or size, and
payment and logistics are often facilitated by the marketplace (Lendle and
Vezina 2015).
E-commerce is a large and expanding sector internationally. 10 to 15 per cent
of sales in the US and Europe are now online (ITC 2015), and business-to-
consumer online sales were equivalent to approximately 1.6 per cent of
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global GDP in 2015 (Statista 2017). In 2013, Chinese online marketplace
Taobao (parent company Alibaba) accounted for 60 per cent of all parcels
delivered in China (The Economist 2013b), and firms on Alibaba can export to
over 200 countries; indeed, Alibaba’s AliExpress is already the most popular
e-commerce site in Russia ( Jingjing 2017).
Alibaba’s founder, Jack Ma, opined that while the first twenty years of
the technological revolution were characterized by advances in technological
knowledge, the next thirty years will be characterized by a revolution in
technological inclusion (Sangwongwanich 2016). With the falling data and
device costs noted above, this could be key for empowering businesses and
entrepreneurs in less developed countries. In SSA, Jumia (founded in 2012 in
Nigeria) hosted over half a million African firms by 2017, and was the seventh,
eighth, and fourteenthmost visited site in Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya, respect-
ively, in December 2017 (Alexa 2018).
However, in SSA e-commerce has only taken off in a few countries,4 and has
not been used intensively for exports, rather servicing local domestic markets.
Remaining barriers include the lack of a common language, poorly integrated
payment systems, tariff and non-tariff barriers for exports, weak postal and
courier services (for exports, and domestic sales), expensive trade routes, and
(at present) some of the world’s highest data costs and lowest levels of smart-
phone ownership. Many of these can be addressed by governments, while
private entrepreneurs are also innovating to overcome challenges. Websites
and data providers, for example, are collaborating to reduce costs and raise
demand (online shopping site Jumia, mentioned above, is part-owned by
major data providers in most countries where it operates). Below, private
initiatives using new technologies to overcome transport and overseas pay-
ment costs are also discussed.
4.4. Transport Innovation
There are also promising signs that between robust markets of producers and
consumers, private firms have strong incentives to build logistical bridges to
facilitate trade. This has been seen in the e-commerce world, where Alibaba
almost unilaterally overcame China’s weak postal system. Cainiao, in which
Alibaba owns 48 per cent of shares, coordinates package deliveries between
different logistics operators through a software platform. In 2016, three
quarters of all packages delivered in China were processed through Cainiao.
E-commerce and courier services are also competing to bring down the cost
4 Online shopping seems less popular in other countries: in Rwanda in December 2018, the
highest-ranking online shopping site was only the 50th most popular website; in Ethiopia it was
22nd, and in Botswana 24th (Alexa 2018).
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and times of cross-border trade—Cainiao, for instance, has ten warehouses in
the US to facilitate fast delivery (Cainiao Network 2016). In Lagos, the online
marketplace, Jumia, manages a fleet of motorbikes that deliver goods to con-
sumers’ homes, larger than the delivery fleet of UPS, Fedex, or DHL (Babej 2014).
Technologies are overcoming some weaknesses in traditional logistics
infrastructure, too: Murray (2017) highlights the use of drone delivery in
Rwanda, for example, which (though seemingly not yet cost-effective for
most purposes), offers the capacity to deliver parcels to almost the entire
country from a single base within an hour. However, attempts to promote
online goods sales will likely be most powerful against a background of solid,
‘boring’ investments (Frazer 2016) in roads, ports, borders, and railways;
standards harmonization and broader regional integration; and the stronger
concentrations of people and firms in high-accessibility locations like port cities.
This reflects a broader lesson for the ‘technology revolution’—‘opportunity
dances with those who are ready on the dance floor’; where technology cannot
overcome a constraint, more traditional complementary investments must be
provided for it to operate at its full potential.
4.5. The Global Integration of E-Payment Platforms
Banks in SSA are typically expensive, slow, unreliable, and in rural areas also
extremely dispersed. International transfers are particularly expensive, and
sometimes impossible, constituting a serious cost to exports, particularly
from SMEs. Recently, however, mobile banking and online banking have
exploded in popularity, and are becoming increasingly sophisticated. M-Pesa,
SSA’s first mobile banking platform, was launched only in 2007, but by 2016
US$32.5 billion was being transferred over the platform in Kenya alone
(compared with Kenya’s $63.4 billion GDP) (Central Bank of Kenya 2017).
In sub-Saharan Africa, 34 per cent of adults have mobile money accounts,
and the number of agents and accounts grew by 30 per cent in 2015 alone.
Using mobile phones, a firm can receive payments from customers; pay
employees, suppliers, and often taxes; save; and, increasingly, even develop
a credit history and take out loans. Many of these services were inaccessible
to small firms and lower-income individuals a few years ago. Costs of inter-
national payments through mobile money are on average half of those
through more traditional channels such as banks, money transfer operators,
and post offices, and far more accessible to small and medium firms. Mobile
transfers constituted just 1.2 per cent of money sent across borders in 2015,
but this volume grew by 50 per cent in the same year (GSMA 2016). Together
with online marketplaces and payment apps competing to undercut transac-
tion costs, such trendsmay transform the ability of small andmedium firms in
SSA to take part in the global and national economy.
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Thekeychallenge formobile andonlinemoneytransfers,both internationally
and domestically, is no longer technological, but firms’ and countries’ decisions
to ensure interoperability: many traditional and e-payment platforms—whether
mobile network operators, debit cards, banks, or money transfer agents like
Western Union—cannot communicate with one another or at best charge fees
to do so, meaning users often must be on the same network and platform to
trade. However, even mobile money operators are beginning to work towards
interoperability, across networks, platform types, and national borders, despite
mobile money only being initiated in 2007 (Murray 2017). Governments and
consumers can continue to promote this agenda and dramatically raise the
efficiency of cross-border payments to African producers.
5. Conclusions
This paper has highlighted the case for optimism that SSA can benefit from
new technologies to become globally competitive in a wider range of manu-
facturing, as well as productive agricultural and services, sectors. The impact of
new technologies on economic development in SSA will depend on how far
governments create enabling environments through investments in ‘boring’
fundamentals such as infrastructure, literacy, and sound regulatory institu-
tions. That these fundamentals have so far often remained elusive in SSA
shows that technology is no ‘quick win’ or ‘short cut’. It rather raises the
stakes. Countries that get those fundamentals right can harness them as a
potentially powerful multiplier for development.
High living costs have driven up wages, contributing tomake African labour
less competitive. Innovations in transport and housing technology may
address these elevated costs. Agricultural technologies offer a chance to raise
yields, resilience to climate shocks, and nutrition, to reduce wage pressures
from food, improve health, and create new export and value-addition oppor-
tunities in agriculture. For GM in particular, greater investment in research
and approval processes, and thorough risk management thorough measures
like enforced ‘refuge areas’ for pest-resistant crops, are a priority.
Human capital is fundamental to broad-based economic development,
and a particular requirement for ‘future-proof ’ job creation. Yet education
quality has been a pervasive problem in sub-Saharan Africa. Falling data and
device costs are gradually granting low-income and isolated people access to
international-standard information and educational materials. For citizens
who are highly literate, fluent in a major international language, and have a
level of individual study skills, these opportunities can be transformative. For
citizens without these skills, the information and resources are not truly
accessible, and the huge potential gains cannot be tapped. Developing these
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core skills should be prioritized to reap the gains of e-learning, combined with
investment for broad-based access to the internet and devices.
Energy tariffs double those in Asia have seriously deterred investment in
manufacturing and other energy-intensive industries in SSA. Yet new invest-
ments and technological advances are also cutting the costs of power in a way
that is game-changing. With its superior irradiation and lack of ‘legacy infra-
structure’, solar’s potential in Africa is particularly strong, and costs of power
storage are starting to fall more significantly, meaning solar may begin to cost-
effectively supply grids and homes in the night. Governments can prepare to
take advantage of cheap solar power by upgrading grids for two-directional
power, anticipating low energy costs when negotiating tariffs and planning
infrastructure (as seen, for example, in East Africa’s pursuit of electric vehicles),
embracing solar mini-grids and home systems, and supporting solutions for
power storage.
The technologies discussed in this paper have the potential to multiply
the impacts of a solid policy framework, to deliver a more skilled and healthy
workforce, competitive wages, attractive power costs, and more efficient
access to inputs and consumers. By addressing the key causes of weak com-
parative advantage in manufacturing and ‘industries without smokestacks’,
new technologies are thus creating promising opportunities, not merely
threats, for SSA. Yet technology does not offer an easy or certain path to
development: the impact of new technologies depends unavoidably on policy
fundamentals that have often proven difficult to get right, and on the highly
uncertain landscape of future technologies. Risks should be prepared for, but
the key foundational investments should also bemade to harness the fantastic
potential of new technologies as a springboard for economic and human
development.
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1. Introduction: Moving Towards the New Economy
It is unquestionable that we are witnessing a major technological revolution,
with respect to which the medium- and long-term economic and social
implications are not yet clear. Even if one agrees with the view advanced by
Robert J. Gordon1 that the improvements in economic welfare and well-being
of earlier broad-based innovations (1870–1970) far surpasse the gains
delivered by the spate of new information and communications technologies
(ICTs), the latter is having an unmistakable effect on families, firms, and
governments.
ICTs have shortened distances; allowed for instantaneous communications
across the globe at a quasi-zero cost; improved to an unimagined degree access
to information; and led to the creation of a myriad of new business ventures.
ICTs are also promoting collaborative arrangements in physical and virtual
spaces to mobilize people, and channel resources, time, and energy to eco-
nomic endeavours, and social and political causes.2 It is important to under-
line that—as defined in this chapter—ICTs are a new set of technologies (and
platforms) that cannot be considered to be among the computers and telecom
services considered ‘state of the art’ until the mid to late 1990s.
1 See, for instance, Gordon (2016). He argues that total factor productivity (TFP) gains arising out
of earlier advances (1920–70) would be over three times that observed since 1970.
2 An ITU study concerning the impact of broadband diffusion on productivity and economic
growth concludes that the contribution is significant and tends to increase with the so-called
‘network effects’ (ITU 2012). See also World Bank (2009) and the major new World Bank (2016)
publication on the subject.
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These new technologies—as described in Section 2—are nothing short
of revolutionary. They facilitate the creation, diffusion, and use of new ideas
and products, empowering users in their capacities as citizens, producers, and
consumers, as well as managers of firms, cities, and governments. Countries
will be faced with the challenge of creating an environment that is conducive
to appropriating these technologies—no matter where generated—and ensur-
ing that their population is connected and has the means to use the available
innovations. The very concept of a ‘knowledge-based economy’3 will change:
using the new ICTs proficiently will possibly be of greater relevance than
generating them from both a production and trading perspective.
For developing countries, the new-generation ICTs open the opportunity to
at least partially bridge the gap with advanced economies, to the extent that
such ICTs will be both more affordable and user-friendly. A fundamental step
is to lower transaction costs, remove the barriers to the local supply of devices
and services, and undertake joint public–private initiatives to radically facili-
tate connectivity with the internet. The more fluid is the access to and
exchange of information, the more individuals, firms, and governments will
be able to explore the opportunity frontier in terms of ideas, markets, and
solutions to citizens’ problems.
ICTs hold the greatest promise for poorer countries. Yet the distance from
the more advanced economies remains significant, with Africa in the lowest
bracket and significantly below the world (Figure 3.1).4
The objective of this chapter is to provide a basic understanding of the
nature of emerging key ICT technologies, and establish the distance of coun-
tries and their citizens from high-quality access to the internet—the necessary
threshold one needs to cross in order to make use of such technologies.
Having crossed the threshold, there are many possibilities, including the
export of services, which were once the realm of very few developing
countries—those with an elastic supply of English-speaking skilled labour.
Following this introduction, Section 2 lists and briefly discusses the
ongoing ICT revolution and its dominant feature: connectedness and mobility.
No single study would be able to list the innovations streaming from individ-
uals, laboratories, and firms, at what appears to be an increasing rate.
3 For earlier views, see Abramowitz and David (1996).
4 See ITU (2016). The IDI—which aims to reflect ICT development—is calculated by combining
a total of 11 indicators on: ICT infrastructure and access (fixed telephone subscriptions, mobile-
cellular subscriptions, international internet bandwidth, percentage of householdswith a computer,
and percentage of households with internet access); use (percentage of individuals using the
internet, fixed-broadband subscriptions, and active mobile-broadband subscriptions); and skills
(mean years of schooling and gross enrolment ratio). For the calculation of the IDI, the indicators
areweighted (ICT access and ICT use 0.4 each, and ICT skills 0.2), resulting in an IDI value between 0
and 10. Note that the concepts of ‘access’ and ‘use’—and their components—donot have a universal
meaning and are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature.
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At this point, it is also still unclear whether such innovations will allow
developing countries to significantly bridge the distance to developed and
emerging economies, while strengthening their position in the production
and export of goods and services. Still, some early evidence shows a narrowing
trend, taking into account the dissemination of the smartphone, the multi-
purpose technology that may indeed help developing countries come closer
to the frontier.
It is axiomatic that only by accessing the internet will countries be able to use
ICT-related innovations. Access fundamentally depends on the ability to
connect to mobile, Wi-Fi, cable, radio, and other networks, using the most
efficient means—broadband (as opposed to earlier technologies, such as
ADSL-based dial-up services). In Section 3 the discussion focuses on where
countries stand with respect to access and use of broadband services and along
their quality gradient. It is unquestionable that progress has been made on
both fronts, though it appears that coverage has moved faster than quality,
quasi-universally measured by the speed at which data are transmitted. This
chapter thus describes the connectivity frontier based on two parameters—the
extent of broadband coverage and transmission speeds—and measures the
distance countries stand from the frontier and over time.
Section 4 defines the new access paradigm—the ICT foundation for connect-
ing people and markets—that will enable a far larger number of countries to
enter service export markets, moving beyond the more traditional outsour-
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Figure 3.1. ICT Development Index (IDI) by region compared with the global
average, 2016
Source: ITU (2016); reproduced here by permission.
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is how to provide high-quality, affordable, safe connection to the internet to
the vast majority of the population of developing countries.
This final section underlines the importance of creating a more open and
competitive environment to attract infrastructure investment (in terms of
fibre-optic rings and cable links, among others), and foster rivalry among
suppliers of devices and mainly services, thereby benefiting users—be they
individuals, firms, or governments—with lower prices and better-quality ser-
vices. Although important for all countries, it is critically so for developing
economies.
But governments in coming years will have to do more, namely attracting
major players such as Alphabet and Facebook, to partner in the provision of
cost-effective infrastructure and service provision. These companies have the
potential to transform the ICT environment by providing access at quasi-zero
cost in order to expand ‘viewership’, which can be made consistent with the
public interest. Governments would need to think outside of the box—while
looking for public–private partnerships—if they are to successfully steer their
societies from being marginalized by the ICT revolution and make the most
intelligent and effective use of the stream of new technologies changing the
global economic, social, and political landscape.
2. The ICT Revolution in Brief
Few would question that there is an ongoing revolution in the ICT space, with
momentous and unclear implications for the way we live, interact, consume,
produce, andmanage firms, cities, and other jurisdictions. Analysts struggle to
bring together in a coherent way the implications for humanity of the flow of
innovations due to the difficulty of establishing both their direct and indirect
effects beyond the short-term. Thus, any synthesis, as attempted in this
section, is fraught with difficulties.
One way to visualize the changes is to think about successive layers.
 The core of the ‘onion’ is the process of codification and digitalization of
information, now five to six decades old, and which allowed information
to be processed by digital computers. For many years this stood at the
centre of technological change. In the ‘computer age’, the basic relation-
ship was between people (and organizations) (P) and the machine (with
its prohibitive innards—the integrated circuit, and the software to run
and perform tasks) (M): P to M.
 The second layer was built around connectivity and mobility, promoted
fundamentally by the growing ubiquity of smartphones. It is now at
the centre of the ICT revolution. The machine functionality relies on
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applications (apps) most of which are free and immediately accessible, a
far cry from the earlier age of the computer and unfriendly software
languages. All transactions are migrating to hand-held devices: selling
and buying in marketplaces and through e-commerce; paying, borrow-
ing, and depositing with financial institutions, bank and non-bank; inter-
acting with government and other institutions; and becoming active
parts of social networks. The organization is no more at the centre, but
civil society and individual initiatives backed by an expanding universe of
opportunities. The connectivity and mobility layer may be summarized
by the notion of people to people (P to P).
 The third layer is in the making: the internet of things (IoT), allowed by the
collapsing prices of sensors, data processing, and connectivity, this time
among sensors. Although wearables drew attention, far more relevant is
the fact that the IoT technology allows all human and machine processes
to be instantaneously monitored. It might sound like the Brave New
World, but in fact has enormous implications for the sustainability of
human life on Earth, with the potential not only to measure and monitor
the footprint of human activity, but to make cities and other agglomer-
ations far more ‘intelligent’, economizing on resources and optimizing
their allocation. This would be Big Data at work. In this layer, the dom-
inant relationship is sensor to sensor: S to S.
 The final layer—the contours of which can only be sensed today—will be
driven by artificial intelligence, the ability of machines not only to operate
without human intervention, but to learn, reason, and correct ‘mistakes’
by interacting with the environment and other machines. Individual
robots are not exactly the expression of this outer layer, although they
do capture the imagination, mainly as humanoids; it is the unmediated
relationship among learning and adaptingmachines that will characterize
this ICT. In this coming era, the fundamental relationship is machine to
machine, without—costly and inefficient—human intervention: M to M.
At this juncture it is the second layer and its implications that are of most
interest. It is mobility with connectedness centred on the smartphone that will
possibly bring the most relevant changes for developing economies. What is
being observed is massive digitization of information (voice, data, images);
transmitted at increasing speeds; stored and processed at faster rates; and
the use of which—for production, trade, education, and entertainment
activities—is being carried to ever more friendly environments, causing
changes that may improve the lot of firms and entrepreneurs in developing
countries. A glimpse of ongoing transformation is captured by the projected
growth of internet protocol (IP) traffic globally, and the increase in mobile
share (Table 3.1).
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It is thus important at the outset to underline that mobile technology is
the pre-eminent multipurpose technology in the world. Its dissemination
has reached a point that one can envision that most of the population in
developing countries will have in their hands smartphones (and their vari-
ants, such as phablets) capable of connecting them to people, markets, and
services, and not radically different to those living in developed countries.
Prices are falling while the realm of potential applications is fast expanding,
with more than an estimated two million apps (!) available for Android and
iOS operating systems.5
Maybe the most important aspect is how user-friendlymost applications are,
which allows people with limited education to search for and manipulate
information, transact in multiple virtual spaces, and substitute services for
goods in economic activities.
 Information is the building block of knowledge: accessing it with the help
of search engines (Google, Yahoo, Bing, Baidu in China, and Yandex in
Russia) has already radically transformed the way people purposely strive
for economic citizenship. And the intelligent use of information is lever-
aged by distance education as it becomes more available and affordable,
allowing people to be educated and trained at a fraction of the usual cost
 Transactions that used to occur in physical settings are occurring on
virtual platforms such as marketplaces, Amazon and Alibaba being the
5 See Frischtak (2017: Table 2).
Table 3.1. IP traffic by type and mobile share, 2015 (actual), 2016–20 (projected),
petabyte per month
Global IT traffic 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 CAGR
2015–20
(percentage)
Fixed internet 49,494 60,160 73,300 89,012 108,102 130,758 21.5
Managed IP* 19,342 22,378 25,303 28,155 30,750 33,052 11.3
Mobile data 3,685 6,180 9,931 14,934 21,708 30,564 52.7
Total 75,521 88,719 108,533 132,101 160,561 194,374 20.8
Mobile share
(percentage of total)




89 91 93 95 97 98 –
Note: 1 PB (petabyte) = 1,000,000 GB (gigabytes); * includes corporate IP WAN (wide area network) traffic and IP
transport of television and video on demand (VoD). CAGR = compound annual growth rate.
Source: Based on data from Cisco (available at www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/
visual-networking-index-vni/complete-white-paper-c11-481360.pdf?referring_site=RE&pos=4&page=http://www.
cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/mobile-white-paper-c11-520862.
html) and author’s calculations.
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quintessential examples, in addition to eBay and Flipkart (the latter in
India). They perform two fundamental roles: e-commerce and, as import-
antly, hosting virtual stores at quasi-zero cost, which dramatically lowers
entry barriers
 Fintechs, capable of providing in the digital realm multiple financial
services, an instrument of financial inclusion and business transaction
facilitation, will likely capture a growing share of digital payments,
business, and consumer finance, without resort to physical banks and
branches. It is estimated that between 2016 and 2021, Fintechs will grow
at an average annual rate of 21.1 per cent, and achieve approximately
US$7 trillion in transaction value, with the fastest expansion in con-
sumer finance6
Finally, the very nature of economic activity is changing:
 With distance manufacturing, one will be able to export concepts, ideas,
designs, and prototypes—the latter helped by 3D printers—and material-
ize them close to consumers
 With fast-growing cloud computing,7 one does not need in-house or even
nearby data-processing machines and/or facilities—only connection to
such facilities irrespective of their location; and ditto for storage space, as
long as one is connected to remote storage facilities.
These technologies are convergent in a fundamental sense: they point to
facility of use and lower entry barriers, as the initial fixed costs of setting up
(and operating) a business venture or a manufacturing facility are substituted
for variable costs, namely the purchase of a service.8 To take advantage of
them, the first step is to connect to the internet, and connectedness has been
at the core of ‘digital inclusion’.
3. Access to Information and the Connectivity Imperative
It should be said at the outset that although ICTs are having a transformative
effect on a global scale, many if not most countries still face significant barriers
to their most effective use.
6 See Frischtak (2017: Figure 2). 7 See Frischtak (2017: Figure 3).
8 It is, of course, possible to make the contrary argument, as many point to an emerging fourth
industrial revolution, with intelligent systems-drivenmanufacturing based on intensemachine-to-
machine communications, the widespread use of robots, and other frontier components (see,
for instance, Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2015). This being the case, developing countries would be
left behind not only due to the difficulties inherent in using and maintaining such complex
manufacturing technology, but the fact that the process becomes more knowledge intensive and
value migrates to intellectual property products.
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First, the level of education and degree of literacy, which were once quasi-
binding barriers, have been softened by the ICT revolution through a multi-
plicity of user-friendly applications, starting with search engines and the
ability to look for answers to literally any question. Yet basic skills remain an
important lever to make effective use of such technologies and appropriate
extant opportunities. Second, trade and regulatory barriers that, if not imped-
ing, make it more difficult and costly for people to purchase devices (mobile
and otherwise), and connect themselves to the internet with the help of
broadband providers. Finally, the provision of physical infrastructure—such
as energy—is quite critical, although numerous initiatives are attempting to
simplify the requirements for the use of new-generation ICTs.
Increasingly (as argued in Section 4), integration in global information,
production, and trade networks will depend on enlightened policies and
bold public–private initiatives, as well as governments giving up pursuit of
contradictory objectives such as protecting telecom incumbents against new
service providers or raising revenues by taxing imports of devices. Aligning
policy and assuming a proactive stance to enable citizens in developing
countries to cross the access threshold is the first step to moving towards a
gradual convergence of opportunities across the digital—and income—divide.
While the convergence over the ‘digital divide’ is still in the future, the
ongoing ICT revolution launches some bridges across the development
chasm. Crossing them depends on developing countries closing in on the
connectivity frontier—defined in terms of the extent of internet access and
the corresponding speed.
Let us discuss each in turn, beginningwith the degree of broadband coverage.
In this respect there have been pronounced gains among developing and
emerging economies, mostly centred on mobiles (Table 3.2). Taking two
extremes from a regional perspective, in Europe in 2010 the sum total of fixed
and mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants was 54.1, expanding
to 107.8 in 2015; in Africa the gains were far more pronounced, from 2.0 to
17.9, with the Europe/Africa ratio decreasing from 27 to 6 in five years. There is
still a considerable gap, but progress in access seems unmistakable.
As for the proportion of individual internet users, emerging economies
have narrowed the gap with respect to the United States, South Korea, and
Hong Kong in the last fifteen years, with coverage growing at far faster
rates. Indeed, while coverage in the United States grew by 4.5 per cent p.a.,
South Africa expanded by 17 per cent p.a., and China attained a rate of
25.3 per cent p.a., with half the population still with limited use.9Quasi-universal
coverage—that is 85 per cent of the population—will likely be achieved within
the next decade.
9 See Frischtak (2017: Figures 4 and 5).
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Table 3.2. Broadband subscribers (per 100 inhabitants), mobile, fixed, and total, major regions, 2005, 2010–15
Region Type 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* CAGR 2010–15
Africa Mobile N/A 1.8 4.6 8.5 10.3 13.3 19.0 29.3 59.2
Fixed 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 23.2
Total 0.0 2.0 4.8 8.7 10.6 13.7 19.5 30.0 57.0
Arab states Mobile N/A 5.1 13.1 16.1 27.3 35.5 42.8 47.6 45.1
Fixed 0.3 1.9 2.2 2.6 3.2 3.6 4.2 4.8 16.7
Total 0.3 7.0 15.3 18.7 30.6 39.1 47.0 52.4 39.9
Asia and Pacific Mobile N/A 7.4 11.0 15.3 18.5 29.4 37.7 42.6 33.9
Fixed 2.2 5.5 6.4 7.0 7.8 7.9 8.9 10.5 11.4
Total 2.2 12.9 17.4 22.3 26.3 37.3 46.6 53.1 26.6
Europe Mobile N/A 30.5 39.4 49.1 56.1 65.6 72.8 76.6 16.6
Fixed 10.9 23.6 24.8 25.7 27.7 28.3 29.2 30.0 4.1
Total 10.9 54.1 64.2 74.8 86.0 93.9 102.0 106.6 12.0
Americas Mobile N/A 24.6 34.1 41.9 55.7 67.3 74.6 78.2 21.3
Fixed 7.5 14.0 15.0 15.8 17.0 17.5 18.4 18.9 5.1
Total 7.5 38.6 49.1 57.7 72.7 84.8 93.0 97.1 16.6
Note: * Estimated.


























It is worth mentioning that, during that fifteen-year period, sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) countries have also made major strides, with Nigeria, Kenya,
Ghana, and Senegal becoming good examples of countries growing from
very small bases. Kenya’s growth of internet use in such a relatively short
period is impressive10—as is that of Ghana, Senegal, and Rwanda. It is no
coincidence that a number of significant mobile-based services initiatives
have taken place in Kenya, for internet access and use is fundamentally a
phenomenon of the diffusion of mobile devices, mostly smartphones (and
advanced 3G/4G networks).
In this chapter, quality of access is measured by data transmission speeds.11
While average speeds have increased, the relative gap between the more
advanced and other economies seems to have widened in recent years, most
likely due to the fact that speed suffered as coverage increased: most providers
announce maximum speeds but traffic moves at far lower average speeds.
Although coverage, driven by the dissemination of mobile devices, initially
outpaced the ability of telecoms and providers to offer high-quality access,
they seem to be catching up. Increasing speed generally depends on infra-
structure investments, the return on which until recently was less attractive
unless one could find a large number of paying users willing to purchase
traditional broadband and related services. A number of public and private
initiatives targeted at developing economies are attempting to provide low-
cost, high-quality (mobile) connections in order for them to jump the speed
barrier that separates them from developed countries.
We now define the connectivity frontier as the distribution of countries
across the internet use—average speed gap (Figures 3.2, 3.3). The frontier
dynamics are captured over the interval 2008–14. The differences between
these two years provide country-specific absolute and relative movements. The
figure suggests a fast-moving frontier and confirms widespread cross-country
gains. Among developed countries, the gains are mostly concentrated in speed,
while for developing economies the period shows major strides in coverage.
For these economies, approaching the connectivity frontier is a precondi-
tion for the effective use of key technologies and platforms, capable of facili-
tating the production and export of services (and goods) which until recently
10 See Schumann and Kende (2013). A combination of government ability and commitment
to attract infrastructure investment (such as the East African Submarine Cable System sponsored
by the World Bank and the Development Bank of Southern Africa, and the East Africa Marine
System, the responsibility of the Kenyan government, with collaboration from Etisalat Emirates
Telecommunications Corporation) and to open up to a variety of service providers (as well
as device suppliers) has been instrumental in making Kenya a standout in Africa, with the
highest bandwidth per person in Africa, the fastest speeds, and one of the lowest costs for use of
the internet.
11 See Frischtak (2017: Figures 8 and 9).
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were outside their realm, or with respect to which these countries had at most
marginal participation.
Despite the importance of the dissemination of hand-held devices and





































Average internet speed (Mbps)
Figure 3.2. The moving connectivity frontier, 2008–14, selected developed economies
Source: author’s elaboration based on Akamai Faster Forward, ‘The State of the Internet’ quarterly
reports (available at www.akamai.com/us/en/our-thinking/state-of-the-internet-report/state-of-
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Egypt, 2008
Figure 3.3. The moving connectivity frontier, 2008–14, selected developing economies
Source: author’s elaboration based on Akamai Faster Forward, ‘The State of the Internet’ quarterly
reports (avaliable at www.akamai.com/us/en/our-thinking/state-of-the-internet-report/state-of-
the-internet-connectivity-visualization.jsp) and World Bank data.
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instrument will still depend on robust connectivity and the quality of ICT
infrastructure, as well as the factors that determine the intensity of use.
Obviously, the technologies and platforms discussed in Section 2 are not a
deus ex machina of trade, be it in goods or services. Nevertheless, they do
provide the first breakthrough for developing countries that might shorten
the long ascent towards relevance in world trade flows, beyond the now-past
commodity super cycle. As noted in the next section, countries would do well
to mobilize resources required for universal access and high-quality connect-
ivity, and attract providers by lowering entry barriers, in addition to under-
taking trade facilitation and related economic reforms to make sure they
capture ICT-opened opportunities.
4. ICTs and Services Trade: A Half-Opened Door
to Developing Countries
At the outset, it should be noted that trade in services is already responsible for
an estimated 25 per cent share of global trade (and 55 per cent in value added)
and is growing at rates significantly above trade in goods. It is therefore not
hard to argue for the importance of countries investing in the enabling
conditions to capture a share of this market. Among those enabling condi-
tions, it appears that ICTs will play a critical role.
When discussing ICTs and trade, it is important to differentiate between
first- and second-generation ICT-based services trade. India has been the
quintessential example of a successful trade strategy focusing on the cross-
border supply of business and other advanced services, characterized by inten-
sive use of first-generation ICTs (computers and high-speed satellite and cable
links), and high levels of transportability and tradability (see Anand et al.
2015). Grounded on a combination of an elastic supply of English-speaking,
well-educated professionals, and telecoms infrastructure that connected the
country to the rest of the world, India’s service exports have grown at a very
fast rate since the mid-1990s. By 2000, India’s exports of business services
already amounted to US$16 billion, and since then India’s share of world
service exports has tripled to over 3 per cent by 2013. A few other developing
countries such as the Philippines, which shared some of the same endow-
ments as India, followed the strategy, breaking into the cross-border supply of
business services.12
12 The Philippines and India are also at the forefront of ICT service exports, defined as computer
and communications services (telecommunications and postal and courier services) and
information services (computer data and news-related). In 2015, they made up 70.4 per cent and
67.5 per cent of total service exports. See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.GSR.CCIS.ZS?
view=map.
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Yet ICTs have moved considerably beyond computers and company-
centred technologies capable of connecting them with buyers through exclu-
sive links. This chapter focuses on the second generation of service exports,
which the ongoing ICT revolution of this decade is beginning to expand to
developing countries. The new ICT, as argued in Section 2, is fundamentally
different, for it empowers people individually, as entrepreneurs, and as small
andmedium-sized firms to break intomarkets that until now have been closed
to them. It does not mean that infrastructure is unnecessary, but new ICTs
open new doors for connectivity, including to citizens of countries with
smaller economies and lower per capita income.
A recent World Bank and World Trade Organization (2015) report noted
the importance of ICTs in encouraging trade that benefits the poor. In dis-
cussing policies to maximize the gains from trade for the poor, by ‘integrating
markets and improving the enabling environment’, the report underlines
the importance of access to (and use of, we would add) ICTs. This would be
instrumental in facilitating transportation logistics and the management of
the supply chain; in allowing for business process outsourcing (in the example
of India); and in offering online freelancing and other decentralized modes of
connecting customers and providers, and other forms of cross-border trade in
services (GATS Mode 1).13 Importantly, the report states that ‘export survival
rates appear to be significantly higher for firms participating in e-commerce
[which] is facilitating the participation of a greater number of smaller firms
in international trade’ World Bank Group and World Trade Organization
(2015: 46–7).14
Granted, the evidence is still scattered and of an anecdotal nature for the
growth in service exports from developing countries, which can be traced back
to new-generation ICT investments. At the same time, as shown in Section 2,
such ICTs are changing the competitive landscape in ways that lower entry
barriers for countries not as well-endowed as India, among others. This is what
is new. Exactly because it is new—an emerging trend—it is still little under-
stood and documented, while statistics are fraught with definition problems
and data capture.
The scope of activities in this true next-generation ‘industry without smoke-
stacks’, in which developing countries can reposition themselves, is not only
large, but also hard to anticipate, as the ICT revolution reduces transaction
13 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) defines fourmodes of supply.Cross-border
supply (Mode 1) covers services flows from the territory of one country into the territory of another
country. Consumption abroad (Mode 2) refers to situations in which a service consumer (e.g. tourist,
patient) moves into another country’s territory to obtain a service. Commercial presence (Mode 3)
implies that a service supplier of one country establishes a territorial presence in another country.
Finally, presence of natural persons (Mode 4) consists of persons of one country entering the territory
of another country to supply a service (e.g., accountants, doctors, teachers).
14 The reference with respect to e-commerce is Suominen (2014).
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costs along a multiplicity of dimensions relevant to exporters. Moreover, the
human capital requirements in the new environment are based less on
engineering and hard sciences, and more on creativity and tacit knowledge.
Even the concept of ‘user-friendly’ is changing to allow massive deployment
of new technologies that will facilitate the production and export of services,
without resort to software engineers, computer scientists, and highly skilled
professionals.
There are, however, some additional relevant considerations. ICTs in and
of themselves do not radically change a country’s comparative advantage,
but help overcome geographical, language, and other barriers that previously
isolated countries and regions. In this sense, they enhance the possibility of a
country playing to its advantages. Indeed, as markets becomemore integrated,
economic signals reach agents with less noise, allowing for more effective and
timely responses. Critically, the growing flow of information allows economic
agents to have a better grasp of available opportunities, while new platforms
in a few years have transformed the ability of local entrepreneurs to reach
consumers literally quasi-anywhere. Yet, there is considerable ‘homework’ to
be done for developing economies to profit from the ICT revolution.
One aspect that needs attention is the fact that SSA countries are to a large
degree excluded from the main discussions around ICT trade, a clear disad-
vantage for the development of the sector. Thus, for instance, both the
Information Technology Agreement (ITA)15 and the Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications Services (BTA)16 include only Mauritius and Seychelles,
and Côte d’Ivoire, respectively. It would be of relevance if more SSA countries
were actively involved in the discussions.17 After all, the potential to exploit
new ICT technologies depends on initiatives to improve the so-called enabling
environment for trade.
Among the most important are: the progressive reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers (combined with preference schemes for the least developed);
systematic efforts at trade facilitation, including improvements in procedures
for border management; and the provision of trade finance (see World Bank
Group and World Trade Organization 2015). In addition, the upgrading of
transportation and related physical and ‘soft’ infrastructure (such as trade
15 The ITA was concluded in December 1996 and includes 82 countries who are committed to
completely eliminating taxes and tariffs on ICT products, such as computers, telecommunications
equipment, semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing and testing equipment, software, and
scientific instruments.
16 The BTA is an annex to the GATS, implemented in 1998. The agreement aims to improve
telecommunications services and equipment providers by facilitating the use of public basic
telecommunication services, such as voice telephone, data transmission, fixed and mobile
satellite systems and services, and mobile data services, among others.
17 Interestingly, neither the ITU (2016) nor the World Bank (2016) mention the importance of
African countries being an active part of those agreements.
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logistics and regulations), by increasing competition in the provision of such
services, has become critical.
In a not so distant past, access to landlines meant people and businesses
were connected. Since the 1990s, connectivity has meant the availability of an
infrastructure that enabled larger businesses and high-end consumers to link
up to the rest of the world. Now connectivity needs to be understood in a
radically different way. It means high-quality (in terms of speed and stability),
universal, affordable, open and safe mobile (and desktop) access to the internet—let
us refer to this as the new access paradigm.
Infrastructure is still needed, and clearly depends on the country’s ability to
attract providers of cable and other links, as Kenya—for instance—has suc-
cessfully achieved in recent years. Historically, most African countries lack
adequate backbone services due to the fact that they went straight to mobile
networks, without investing in connectivity first. On the other hand, in
developed countries fixed-line networks came first, allowing a progressive
expansion in the infrastructure required for high-quality, fast connections.
It is likely that in 10–15 years the changes driven by ICTs will far surpass our
current ability to predict their impact on developing countries and their
ability to access markets. Yet without putting in place a set of solid, enlight-
ened, and forward-looking policies, it is unlikely that countries will be able to
capture the opportunities available in a fast-growing market. Their role will
be to attract service providers of infrastructure and services, and to create
an environment in which agents have both the incentives and the ability
to procure the means to leverage the limited resources of these countries
with some of the revolutionary ICTs, which bridge in new ways the develop-
ment cleavage.
Access is the foundation. This chapter posits that what will allow people to
acquire the skills to become ICT-literate, more active citizens, and to respond
to market opportunities, is a commitment by governments to the adherence
to the new access paradigm, facilitating the use of services. In particular, access
will be increasingly central to exploiting possibilities in export markets hith-
erto simply unavailable, bridging geographical and economic distance, con-
necting buyers and sellers of goods and services.
The relationship between access and use can be further explored with the
help of Table 3.3, which zooms in on ten SSA countries, and looks at the IDI18
(ICT access and infrastructure, use, and skills). Globally, the data suggest that
‘access and infrastructure’ are less problematic than ‘use’, and even more so
among the sample of countries considered here. Those can be divided into
three groups, with South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya at the top in terms
18 See footnote 4 for the definition of IDI.
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of IDI; Tanzania, Mozambique, and Ethiopia at the bottom; and Senegal,
Rwanda, and Uganda in the middle. Although the ‘use’ variable seems to be
correlated with per capita income, at very low levels this correspondence
seems to break down. There appears to be other ‘demand-side’ factors at work.
‘Use’ and ‘access’ are obviously closely related; after all, use presupposes
access.19 If technology—the key driver of access—can be considered exogen-
ous to the countries of our sample, the prices of services (and equipment) are
not. This is possibly the key lever. One potentially relevant policy implication
is that countries should ‘lean with the wind’ and improve access further by
opening up to competition to force prices of come down and to facilitate
access—and thereby use—of improved ICTs by broader segments of the
population.
If access is the foundation and entry point for taking advantage of last-
generation ICTs, the question for many developing countries is how to adopt
the new access paradigm and guarantee more widespread use of ICTs in the
face of scarce resources. To what extent can governments leverage appropriate
policies, partnerships, and cooperative arrangements in order to make new
technologies and platforms as widely available as possible? Although there
is no single recipe that fits all, most countries still have significant adoption
barriers, many of which are ‘self-inflicted’.
From this perspective, a starting point is an assessment of the country-
specific barriers that discourage infrastructure investment and reduce compe-
tition for the supply of devices (desktop and mobile) and the provision of
Table 3.3. IDI components, selected African countries, 2016
Country IDI Infrastructure and access Use Skills
South Africa 5.03 5.46 4.00 6.23
Ghana 3.99 4.74 3.03 4.44
Kenya 2.99 3.54 2.05 3.76
Nigeria 2.72 2.96 2.28 3.13
Average (A) 2.62 3.29 1.74 3.04
Senegal 2.53 3.59 1.64 2.17
Rwanda 2.13 2.65 1.47 2.42
Uganda 1.94 2.37 1.27 2.43
Mozambique 1.75 2.90 0.62 1.74
Tanzania 1.65 2.65 0.30 2.33
Ethiopia 1.51 2.11 0.82 1.71
Global average (B) 4.94 5.58 3.91 5.74
B/A 1.886 1.696 2.247 1.888
Source: Author’s calculations based on ITU data (available at www.itu.int/net4/ITU-D/idi/2016).
19 A simple regression for the 10-country sample shows that the ‘use’ variable is weakly related to
per capita income, butmore strongly associated with ‘access’. A one-point improvement in access is
correlated with a 0.65 gain in ‘use’.
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services. To the extent that such barriers are significant or even binding, they
need to be removed, in so far as the price—and quality—of products and
services are determinants of their diffusion. From this perspective, policy
and regulatory reform that attracts investment in key infrastructure and
facilitates entry and promote competition in both markets (devices and ser-
vices) is the first step for countries to create an enabling environment for ICTs
to fulfil their potential.
In the last few years, African countries have experienced an increase in
competition for the provision of telecom services, with the entry of new
companies into the market. All countries except Ethiopia have between
three and six operators, a significant number. Of the ten-country sample, in
six known instances market entry has occurred since 2010, with one new
entry each in Kenya and Tanzania in 2015, a far cry from the days of state
monopolies. The notable exception is Ethiopia, which has a single public
operator (Table 3.4). Market dynamism—as evidenced by shifts in the major
incumbent market shares—is more clearly observed in Nigeria, Rwanda,
Tanzania, South Africa, Mozambique, and Senegal. More generally, the land-
scape appears to be more, not less, competitive, despite a trend towards
technological convergence, which more often than not led to the overlap of
markets (despite eventual mergers). Therefore, the ability of countries to
attract new players appears to have never been as great as in the last five
years or so.
Have these indications of market rivalry translated into lower prices of
telecommunications services? Table 3.5 presents services price data for the
ten-country sample and SSA economies’ average in nominal terms and
Table 3.4. Market share of mobile operators, selected sub-Saharan countries
Country Number of providers Market share of the main
provider (percentage)
Year of last entry
2010 2016
Nigeria 4* 62** 40 2012
Ghana 6 50 48 2011
Ethiopia 1 100 100 –
Kenya 5 70 65 2015
Rwanda 3 76 46 2012
Tanzania 7 40 31 2015
South Africa 5 51 38 n.a
Mozambique 3 60 49 2012
Senegal 3 64** 55 n.a
Uganda 5*** n/a n/a 2014
Note: * Only GSM providers; ** 2012 data; *** main providers.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on national regulatory agencies.
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normalized by GDP per capita (with reference to the average of SSA countries).
Some countries stand out as high-price environments in both nominal and
normalized terms, both for fixed-line broadband access and the smartphone
basket, such as Ethiopia—a state monopoly. At the other end of the spectrum
stand Nigeria, Uganda, and Ghana, while South Africa presents a positive
picture in normalized terms.
What inferences can be drawn from both tables? First, and as expected, it
does not seem that a state monopoly is conducive to low prices. Second,
although one would need to take a closer look to establish the reason why in
some instances the presence of a large number of operators has not translated
into lower prices for all services, in general this is the case. Tanzania, for
instance, with seven operators, offers the lowest priced broadband services
and a reasonably priced smartphone basket; so does Ghana. Kenya and South
Africa—with five operators each—and Nigeria with four are also quite com-
petitive on broadband and other services, above all when prices are normal-
ized. Overall Uganda is a successful case in lowering entry barriers, attracting
newcomers, and offering competitive prices. Third, and more generally, a
competitive landscape seems to favour broader access to ICT services, and
thus their more intensive use, such as in Kenya and Nigeria. Still, the relation-
ship does not necessarily hold—as in the case of Tanzania, which is signifi-
cantly ‘below the curve’.
Consumers, in developing countries above all, should have at their disposal
the best cost–performance combination available in the market with a
minimum tariff/tax wedge: inexpensive but powerful devices such as smart-
phones, and a variety of service providers competing in national (and regional)













South Africa 5.3 1.5 15.6 4.3
Nigeria 4.8 2.9 6.4 3.8
Ghana 3.9 4.4 7.8 8.9
Kenya 2.9 3.3 21.5 24.5
Senegal 8.4 14.5 8.4 14.5
Tanzania 0.9 1.6 10.3 18.7
Rwanda 4.0 9.0 n/a n/a
Uganda 3.6 8.4 3.6 8.4
Ethiopia 7.7 19.5 21.1 53.5
Mozambique 2.9 8.7 21.5 64.3
SSA Average 12.4 12.4 67.4 67.4
Note: * Includes 1GB, 100 minutes of voice and 100 SMS (data, voice, and SMS); ** normalized with respect to the ratio
of the country’s and sub-Saharan Africa’s 2015 GDP per capita.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from Research ICT Africa (available at www.researchictafrica.net/pricing/
ramp.php).
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markets. Regional trade arrangements may require countries to agree to
regional infrastructure investments (such as in fibre-optic rings), and to open
their markets in recognition of the importance of new technologies to mod-
ernize the provision of services and spur trade.
However, governments can go further by actively engaging key service
providers such as Alphabet (Google) and Facebook, which have plans to
connect people in developing countries and more isolated regions at a quasi-
zero cost. It is their ability to rope in users/consumers—‘the more the
merrier’—and the enormous network economies of scale that are making
them the economic powerhouses of this age. To a significant degree, by
connecting people they serve the public interest. If in the process they capture
more consumers to their services, they also provide the means for low-cost
digital inclusion.
Similarly, access can be ‘traded’ for advertising time, mainly in urban areas.
In other words, such areas can be ‘wired’ and access made conditional on the
willingness of users to spend time being exposed to ads. Governments can
negotiate—in the name of their citizens—maximum free time for a minimum
advertising time. In the face of limited resources, this may be regarded as a
feasible—and pragmatic—way for cities (mainly) in poor countries to move
up the digital gradient. There will be a growing number of possibilities of this
nature in coming years, signifying one more avenue for digital inclusion and
crossing the access threshold.
A final point: policy makers need to think creatively, ‘outside the box’,
to leverage the market and attract technologies that dramatically lower the
cost of access, and recognize initiatives with similar objectives.20 If in wealth-
ier and more advanced economies local and even national governments
may have enough resources to ‘wire’ the country in recognition of the
importance of high-speed access, in most developing countries that is not
the case. Thus, in addition to removing obstacles for people to access devices
on the most competitive basis, and lowering entry barriers and promoting
competition among service providers, including infrastructure investors,
governments need to experiment with new models of public–private cooper-
ation to bring the country the new access paradigm and improve the lives of
their citizens.
20 Among themost important are the Telecom Infra Project, which look for connectivity solutions
in strategic network areas such as access, backhaul, and core and management; and OpenCellular, a
Facebook initiative for a low-cost, open-source hardware and software solution that will support
from 2G to LTE networks, amplifying mobile network signals, with each box supporting up to
1,500 connections and covering a radius of up to 10 km.
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4
Tourism Global Value Chains and Africa
Jack Daly and Gary Gereffi
1. Introduction
Tourism is an important driver of economic growth around the world,
supporting an estimated 277 million jobs, generating US$7.6 trillion in indir-
ect revenue, and supplying 9.8 per cent of global GDP in 2014.1 Its direct effect
on global GDP was 3.1 per cent, which exceeded the automotive (1.2 per cent)
and chemical (2.1 per cent) manufacturing industries, while placing it on
a similar footing as the banking (3.2 per cent) and education (3.4 per cent)
sectors. Moreover, the dynamism of the industry is not confined to any one
region: Europe remains the most visited continent in the world, accounting
for 51 per cent of all international tourist arrivals in 2014, but Asia Pacific and
Africa had the highest growth rates in visitors over the decade spanning
2005–14.
With a wide array of large animals and picturesque landscapes available
in many countries, Africa has long captured the imagination of international
leisure travellers interested in exploring regions such as the Maasai Mara,
the Serengeti, or Kruger National Park. In more recent years, the growing
diversity of experiences in countries such as South Africa has helped fuel a
record number of arrivals; Africa’s 55.7 million visitors in 2014 were a histor-
ical apex. Table 4.1 provides context for the contribution of tourism to
Africa’s economy—its direct effect on GDP, its share of total exports, and
its contribution to foreign direct investment (FDI) are all higher than the
global average.
1 The global and regional statistics cited in this chapter are compiled by the World Travel &
Tourism Council (WTTC) and the United Nations’ World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). The
WTTC data can be accessed from the WTTC website: http://www.wttc.org/datagateway/.
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While the economic importance of tourism to Africa is a central character-
istic of the continent, there is variance in its profile at both the regional and
country levels. Buoyed by the strength of the Egyptian and, to a lesser degree,
Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian markets, North Africa is the most vibrant
tourism destination on the continent as measured by visitors, overall spend-
ing, leisure tourism spending, and capital investments.2 Southern Africa has
the second largest total tourism receipts behind North Africa, with its rela-
tively high leisure spending driven by attractions in South Africa, which had
the continent’s second highest tourism revenue in 2014 behind Egypt. West
and Central Africa are both relatively insulated markets—foreign visitor
spending accounted for only 15.9 per cent of overall tourism spending in
West African countries, which is the second lowest in the world and the lowest
in Africa. Central Africa, meanwhile, has the most underdeveloped tourism
industry (as measured by total tourism receipts) of anywhere in the world.
The importance of the industry in East Africa is especially striking. While
there are many African countries where total tourism receipts as a percentage
of total exports of goods and services exceeded both the global (5.7 per cent)
and continental (8 per cent) averages in 2014, Rwanda (24.5 per cent of
exports), Tanzania (23.4 per cent), Uganda (17.1 per cent), and Kenya
(16.5 per cent) are among the most reliant on tourism (WTTC 2015). As a
Table 4.1. Global economic impact of tourism in 2014




International arrivals (millions) 1,133 55 181 263 581 51
Average annual growth rate in
arrivals (2005–14)
3.8% 5.4% 3.5% 6.1% 2.8% 4.7%
Direct effect on GDP 3.1% 3.4% 2.9% 3.0% 3.4% 2.7%
Total effect on GDP 9.8% 8.1% 8.4% 9.2% 9.2% 7.4%
Direct effect on total employment 3.6% 3.0% 3.7% 3.7% 3.6% 3.2%
Total effect on employment 9.4% 7.1% 9.6% 8.5% 9.0% 7.6%
Visitor spending share of total
exports of goods and services
5.7% 8.0% 7.0% 5.2% 5.6% 4.6%
Tourism investments as share of
total investments
4.3% 5.9% 4.5% 3.7% 4.7% 6.8%
Source: UNWTO (2015); WTTC (2015).
2 For this chapter, North Africa includes: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Niger, Sudan, and
Tunisia. Central Africa includes: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo. East Africa encompasses:
Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique Reunion, Rwanda,
Seychelles, Tanzania, and Uganda. Southern Africa includes Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia,
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Finally,West Africa contains: Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
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region, East Africa is the most reliant of any African region on foreign visitors,
with foreign visitor spending accounting for 61.4 per cent of total tourism
revenue in 2014 (WTTC 2015).
With tourism representing a very significant source of exports and foreign
investment in Africa, the industry will continue to be a major economic
engine moving forward. While there are opportunities, some characteristics
of the global industry can impede Africa’s development if policy makers do
not recognize and design strategies to alleviate many constraints for firms and
other stakeholders. This chapter explores the overall landscape of the tourism
industry and how it influences Africa’s competitiveness. It first uses the Global
Value Chain (GVC) framework to focus attention on important global dynam-
ics before elaborating the implications of those trends for African actors.3
It then discusses two approaches used to assess tourism competitiveness:
(1) econometric analyses of the determinants of demand; and (2) the identi-
fication of upgrading trajectories that have been observed in tourism GVCs
around the world. The chapter concludes by outlining policy interventions
that can be employed to eliminate the barriers that countries frequently face
when attempting to improve their positions in tourism value chains.
2. Global Tourism: A Value Chain Approach
The GVC methodology has been used to analyse the tourism industry in
various regions of the world.4 While different types of travel have been
described, this chapter is most interested in two broad categories that have
distinct actors and global characteristics: leisure and business tourism. Leisure
tourism can be defined as any trip where the tourist travels internationally for
recreation. Although there are many different types of leisure tourism (sun,
sand, and surf; environmental or eco-tourism; adventure; cultural; etc.), the
term does not describe travel to visit friends or relatives. Business tourism
involves travel internationally for professional reasons. It includes visits to
see clients, scouting trips for potential investment opportunities, and travel
for conferences. The conferences segment—Meetings, Incentives, Confer-
ences, and Exhibitions (or MICE)—of business travel is included in the
3 The GVC framework has been developed over the past two decades by a global network
of researchers from diverse disciplines to understand how globalization has changed a variety
of industries (Barrientos et al. 2011; Gereffi 1999, 2005; Gereffi et al. 2005; Humphrey and
Schmitz 2002; Kaplinsky 2004, 2010). It provides a holistic view of how industries are organized
by examining the structure and dynamics of different actors involved (Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark 2016).
4 Michelle Christian has published many research papers on the tourism industry using a GVC
lens (Christian 2013, 2015; Christian and Nathan 2013; Christian et al. 2011).
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business tourism GVC. The following sections outline the organization of
both the leisure and business tourism GVCs before pivoting to an analysis of
the African tourism industry.
2.1. Leisure Tourism GVCs
Building upon distinctions outlined by Christian and Nathan (2013), the
leisure tourism GVC can be divided into three categories of actors: consumers
(or end markets), distribution intermediaries, and service providers.5 Lead
firms assemble and package individual services into cohesive travel experi-
ences. Their power derives from the ability to draw on the capabilities of large,
global networks of service providers, while also having direct access to
consumers or travel agents (Christian 2013). Most often, these actors are
distribution intermediaries such as online portals, tour operators and Destin-
ation Management Companies (DMCs), although in some cases, powerful
individual service providers such as international airlines and hotels may act
as lead firms by bundling and selling tourism products. The identity, power,
and linkages among actors depend on the distribution channels that con-
sumers use to access the product. The dynamics associated with each are
outlined below. Table 4.2 includes a description of each actor.
DIRECT BOOKING DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL
Consumersmay choose to bypass distribution intermediaries and book directly
with service providers. Examples include leisure tourists who book vacations
directly through service provider websites (Delta or Marriott, for example) or
research excursions independently. In these instances, the flow of consumer
money proceeds straight from the customer to international airlines and
domestic transport, lodging, hospitality, and excursion businesses.
ONLINE PACKAGE DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL
The ‘Online Package’ distribution channel accounts for the industry’s most
dynamic growth in the last decade. While the global industry is largely frag-
mented, the emergence of online portals Expedia and Priceline has led to an
industry evolution. These two companies had combined sales of approxi-
mately US$100 billion in 2014 and have posted the highest growth rate of
any intermediary in all distribution channels in the last five years. Their
emergence has encouraged consolidation. That trend is likely to continue,
with Expedia purchasing rival Orbitz in 2015.
5 Daly and Gereffi (2017) provides a graphical illustration of leisure tourism value chain:
see Figure 2.
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Table 4.2. Major job profiles and skill levels in tourism value chains
Position Description Education/Training Skill level
Distribution Intermediaries
Global Tour Operator Manufacturers and wholesalers. Together with DMCs, they purchase
services from individual providers and assemble them into leisure
tourism products. Access to consumers and knowledge of local market
is most significant value addition.
Technical certification/Bachelor’s




Both inbound tour operators and DMCs can aggregate domestic
services and sell to foreign distribution intermediaries. They are
differentiated by customers: companies where the majority of sales are
directly to consumers are inbound tour operators; DMCs rely on global





Travel Agent Retailers who largely sell package tours. As a primary point of contact






Lodging Management Responsible for hotel operations, budgets, supervising quality





Airline Agents Responsible for sales and customer service including reservations,




Lodging Front Office Responsible for check in and check out, customer feedback and
assistance, and managing reservations and room assignment.
Technical diploma or certificate
programme/on-the-job training
Medium
Restaurant/ Bar Staff Operate local restaurants. Coordinate food supplies. Prepare and serve
restaurant clients.
Technical diploma or certificate
programme/on-the-job training
Medium/Low





Local Guides Lead local excursions to location-specific sites. Often must be certified. Certificate programme/on-the-job
training
Low/Medium
Drivers Responsible for transporting visitors to and from airports, hotels, and



































PACKAGE BOOKING DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL
The ‘package booking’ distribution channel includes a network of travel
agents, global tour operators, inbound tour operators, and DMCs. Beyond
questions of physical infrastructure and in-person communication, a key
differentiator between online agencies and the traditional network of travel
agents, tour operators, and DMCs is the latter’s ability to sell itinerary-based
tour packages; thus far, online agencies have largely been unable to replicate
this practice. Depending on the location, travel agents, tour operators, and
DMCs further distinguish themselves by assisting with visa applications and
the acquisition of wildlife and park permits.
Intermediaries in all distribution channels rely on service providers for
many of the experiences that travellers associate with tourism products. The
broad categories include international and domestic transport, lodging, hos-
pitality, and excursions. In terms of unit costs, the most significant inputs are
airline flights and lodging. The consumer usually encounters international
and domestic transport first before engaging hotels, restaurants, and other
destination-specific attractions. The individual service providers have ranges
of quality and scale, as well as different degrees of vertical and horizontal
integration. Some products and services fit intomultiple segments; restaurants
or food and beverage can be considered in both hospitality and excursions.
Many excursion experiences, especially related to eco-tourism, are offered
through local guides.
Globally, these distribution channels and categories of actors directly sup-
ported roughly 105million jobs in 2014 and indirectly sustained an estimated
277 million jobs (WTTC 2015). There is a wide variance in the value-creation
potential as well as the skill levels associated with each group of workers across
the value chain. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the major jobs and skills
levels associated with each. The highest employment opportunities are regu-
larly found in the service-provider segment of each chain, although these jobs
are often lower skilled.
2.2. Business/Conference Tourism GVC
Business tourism GVCs can be divided into the same categories as the leisure
tourism GVC: consumers, distribution intermediaries, and service providers.
There is further overlap between the two chains, with many of the same
service providers and distribution intermediaries active in both. There is also
frequent spillover, with business travellers regularly extending trips to experi-
ence local sights.
There are, however, important differences in the identity, characteristics, and
value-addition propositions of the leadfirms in the leisure and business tourism
value chains. The ‘Online Package’ distribution channel is used less frequently
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in the business tourism segment compared with leisure. Instead, the lead firms
in business tourism are Travel Management Companies (TMCs), which offer
travel management and analytical services that are designed to help clients
reduce costs during trips and overall demand for travel. Compared to leisure,
the global market is highly consolidated, with four leading TMCs as measured
by annual revenue: AmericanExpressGlobal Business Travel, CarlsonWagonlit
Travel, BCD Travel, and HRG Worldwide (Travel Weekly 2015).
Depending on demand for travel to a location, TMCs will either open
wholly owned subsidiaries or joint ventures, or pursue partnership arrange-
ments in new markets to manage client travel. Partnership arrangements are
the most common (Daly and Guinn 2016). There are significant differences in
the skill sets and licences that are required for local firms to participate in the
business tourism chain. To ensure adherence to company travel guidelines,
TMC affiliates are expected to collect different kinds of information for the
parent company, much of which requires some level of training. Additionally,
International Air Transport Association (IATA) certification is an obligatory
step for TMC partners.6
Finally, the MICE segment is an important component of the business
tourism value chain, providing a high value-added opportunity to increase
overall arrivals. There are two primary distribution channels for conference
events: (1) Host organizations may have internal departments that assist with
the planning of large and medium-scale meetings, allowing them to perform
many of the logistical preparations internally; and (2) consumers may engage
conference specialists or convention bureaus to stage events. National,
regional, or local convention bureaus can be instrumental in pursuing con-
ference opportunities. These bodies often depend on organizations such as the
International Congress and Convention Association (ICCA), the Society of
International Travel Executives (SITE), Meetings Professional International
(MPI) and the Professional Conference Management Association (PCMA).
Globally, ICCA is the most prominent industry association, providing more
than 1,000 public- and private-sector actors with access to the marketplace of
worldwideMICE events. ICCA gathers information aboutmeetings that rotate
among at least three countries and attract a minimum of 50 participants.
3. Africa and the Global Tourism Industry
The organization of the tourism GVC provides a context for understanding
how tourismmay drive export growth in Africa and the steps that can be taken
6 IATA is the global trade association for the airline industry and represents over 260 airlines
worldwide.
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to improve the continent’s position in the tourism GVC. Various characteris-
tics of the African tourism industry vis-à-vis the global landscape are worth
accentuating. These include the following:
1. The traditional ‘Package Booking’ distribution channel has proven to be
more durable in Africa than elsewhere
2. Low domestic demand for African tourism elevates the position of global
lead firms.
3. The pre-eminence of global lead firms influences the linkages vs. leakages
dynamics observed in Africa
4. Business tourism constitutes a greater share of overall tourism receipts in
Africa than in other locations
5. Government policy encourages bottlenecks among critical service
providers that impair African tourism.
The following sections address each dynamic in greater detail.
3.1. Package Booking
While the ‘Online Package’ distribution channel has gained in importance as
Expedia and Priceline have become the largest two companies in the travel
industry as measured by annual revenue, the ‘Package Booking’ distribution
channel remains an entrenched feature of African leisure tourism. Data on
the experience of travellers in a cluster of East African Community (EAC)
countries highlight this feature. A survey of visitors to Uganda reported that
21 per cent of leisure tourists were part of package tours, with nearly 80 per
cent of those package tourists indicating that they preferred to travel inde-
pendently when outside Uganda (World Bank Group 2013). In Tanzania, a
recent study of leisure visitors reported that 75.3 per cent were part of pack-
aged tours (Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics 2015).
The ‘Package Booking’ distribution channel continues to be popular for
multiple reasons (Daly and Guinn 2016). These include: (1) The appeal of
itinerary-based travel in a region where wildlife and parks are attractive prod-
ucts; (2) the general unfamiliarity of international tourists with the continent;
(3) concerns about the ability of inbound operators to deliver quality prod-
ucts; and (4) the difficulties associated with organizing domestic transport and
other services independently.
3.2. Global Lead Firms
With lead firms earning their position partially through their access to con-
sumers, the source of demand has implications for the composition and
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Tourism Global Value Chains and Africa
75
characteristics of tourism value chains. Domestic consumers allow national or
regional businesses to improve their positionby eliminating theneed tonetwork
and share profits with global distribution intermediaries. In a study comparing
Asian and Africa markets, Christian and Nathan (2013) noted that tourists tend
to use tour operators based in their home region because of trust issues. ‘In Asia’,
the authors wrote, ‘domestic tourists far outnumber foreign tourists, resulting in
a stronger position for national tour operators, who do not have to rely on sub-
contract relationships with global tour operators to receive clients’ (p. 15).
That is not the case inAfrica, especially regions that dependheavily on foreign
demand. While foreign spending represents roughly 28 per cent of tourism
receipts around the world in 2015, it accounted for almost 38 per cent of total
tourism spending in Africa (see Table 4.3). In individual countries where there is
a strong base of domestic tourism—nations such as China, Japan, Germany,
Mexico, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy—foreign
spending represents 10–30 per cent of total tourism revenue.
Local tour operators in certain African locations are constrained by low
levels of domestic demand for tourism. East Africa is among the global regions
most dependent on foreign visitor spending (61.2 per cent of total spending).
Kenya and Tanzania have long been prominent destinations in safari circuits,
with national parks such as the Maasai Mara in Kenya and the Serengeti in
Tanzania receiving North American and European visitors in high volume.
More recently, locations in Rwanda have become mainstays on the itineraries
of high-end, luxury clients who consider the country’s mountain gorillas a
‘bucket list’ experience. However, most of theseWestern visitors use lead firms
such as Abercrombie & Kent, Cox & Kings or Wilderness Safaris, which are
based outside the region.
3.3. Linkages vs. Leakages
The pre-eminence of global lead firms has implications for the value captured
by domestic actors who participate in the chain. With foreign tour operators,









World 4,729 1,309 3,420 27.7%
Africa 124 47 77 37.8%
Americas 1,493 297 1,196 19.9%
Asia Pacific 1,426 386 1,040 27.1%
Europe 1,552 507 1,046 32.6%
Middle East 133 72 61 54.4%
Note: All figures US$ billions.
Source: WTTC (2015).
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hotel companies, and investors often controlling supply chain decisions
and procurement opportunities, linkages between tourism and supporting
industries sometimes remain underdeveloped. The pro-poor tourism literature
advanced by Mitchell and Ashley and similar researchers investigates linkages
in extensive detail. Mitchell and Ashley (2010) conducted a broad literature
review and estimated that the empirical evidence suggests that roughly
25–33 per cent of total tourism revenue is captured by the poor in developing
countries through direct earnings and indirect multipliers in the supply chain.
Although tourism and agricultural industries have a complicated relation-
ship that is sometimes characterized by competition for land rights (Torres and
Momsen 2011), there are also thick ties between the two. Mitchell and Ashley
(2009) mapped the flow of tourism expenditures throughout the Ethiopian
economy. According to the analysis, Ethiopian tourists spend roughly US$55
million on food and beverages; of this, hotels purchased US$16 million from
6,300 domestic producers to support an estimated 25,000 farm jobs.
Many South African safari lodges also have relatively strong linkages with
the domestic food supply chain. Rogerson (2012) surveyed eighty lodges in six
distinct regional clusters to examine local sourcing of eight food categories:
(1) vegetables; (2) fruit; (3) eggs; (4) dairy products; (5) meat; (6) luxury goods;
(7) tinned goods; and (8) dried goods. The average sourcing distance was
the shortest for fruit, eggs, and vegetables. Considering the robust demand
from each location for all three goods—each lodge, for instance, ordered
250 kilograms of vegetables per week—the potential benefit for domestic
actors in each industry is significant.
While 77.5 per cent of the population of lodges in the Rogerson study
were owned by South African companies, backward linkages between tourism
and agribusiness persist in markets with foreign lead firms. Spray and Agarwal
(2016) studied linkages in the tourism industry in Rwanda, which is character-
ized byhighdegrees of foreign visitor spending and ownership.Only 3 per cent
of the total imports from tourism were from the agriculture, forestry and
fishing sectors, which suggests local sourcing suffices to some degree. Instead,
the largest imports in the tourism industry in Rwandawere related to construc-
tion: base metals, machinery, mineral products, and stone and cement.
3.4. Business Travel
Globally, 23.4 per cent of the roughly US$4.7 trillion spent on tourism in
2015 was for business travel. However, the figure was far higher in Africa than
in any other region in the world—30 per cent of total tourism spending
on the continent, compared to 25 per cent in North America, 23 per cent in
Europe, 22 per cent in Asia Pacific, and 18 per cent in the Middle East. The
significance of business travel becomes more apparent if one analyses
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individual country data. Sixteen of the top seventeen countries in the world
with the largest share of business travel in their overall tourism portfolio are
African nations (WTTC 2015).
The demand demographics associated with business travel are generally
domestically or regionally oriented. This promotes the opposite dynamic to
the one in leisure tourism GVCs—whereas the lack of local demand inhibits
the development of domestic businesses in leisure, high local spending pro-
motes the development of local and regional companies that offer inbound
and outbound services to business clients. Satguru is one of the more prom-
inent examples. The TMC, which began in Kigali in 1989, has expanded
its services to 43 African countries with more than 800 total employees and
moved its world headquarters to Dubai. Satguru serves as a Carlson Wagonlit
partner in 19 countries in Africa and accounts for more than 50 per cent of
airline bookings in multiple markets (Daly and Guinn 2016).
A high share of business travel is, in some cases, reflective of a low demand
for leisure tourism. However, the emerging MICE segment of business travel
presents opportunities to increase arrivals and drive spillovers into the leisure
chain. Within Africa, South Africa is the leading provider of international
association meetings. South Africa’s success is partially driven by its wide
network of public and private actors that have ICCA membership. South
Africa has 24 ICCA members and had 531 ICCA meetings during the period
from 2011 to 2015, far surpassing its peers (see Table 4.4).
3.5. Bottlenecks among Service Providers
The most prominent service providers are lodging and airlines. Each segment
of the chain has supply constraints in Africa. Lodging has two distinct profiles
Table 4.4. Leadings sites for international association meetings in Africa, 2011–15
Country ICAA Members ICCA Events by Year
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
South Africa 24 84 97 118 124 108
Morocco 1 23 23 30 36 36
Egypt 2 22 18 17 13 22
Kenya 4 30 29 38 24 19
Tunisia 0 8 12 18 7 17
Tanzania 2 15 16 12 6 16
Ghana 0 15 10 17 6 13
Rwanda 1 2 — 4 5 13
Ethiopia 3 10 7 8 5 12
Nigeria 1 12 7 12 6 9
Note: (—) indicates data unavailable.
Source: ICCA (2015).
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in the leisure and business chains; while small lodges and camps close to
national parks are prevalent in leisure, the lodging sector in the business
tourism value chain is populated by larger hotel companies. The more notable
regional companies include Serena Hotels, which is based in Nairobi, and
Protea Hotels, which is a South African-based company that was recently
purchased by Marriott.
Government policies sometimes restrict the availability of leisure accom-
modation. In a comparison between popular leisure tourist destinations in
Kenya and Uganda, Christian (2015) noted that a liberal concession policy
towards new properties allowed hotels to proliferate in Mombasa, while in
Murchison Falls National Park in Uganda, tight control by the Uganda Wild-
life Authority over the distribution of new licences favoured the embedded
power structure and created a scarcity of new developments.
There are significant bottlenecks surrounding the airline industry as well,
with government policy again playing a role. In a review of the EAC’s aviation
market, Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) noted that the emergence of
low-cost carriers (LCCs) could bolster tourism value chains by increasing
usage of secondary airports, distributing traffic more evenly throughout the
year, and offering lower off-peak fares. A critical step towards the development
of new carriers is the deregulation of domestic and regional air markets.
Although regions in Africa are broadly committed to the Yamoussoukro Deci-
sion to liberalize air travel, some rely on bilateral accords between states to
accomplish the targets outlined in that agreement.
4. Assessing Tourism Competitiveness
As the economic benefits associated with tourism have become more widely
recognized, researchers have attempted to identify the factors that enhance
national or regional performance in the industry. There are different meth-
odological approaches that influence findings. This section of the report
summarizes two major ones used by social scientists. The first involves the
econometric modelling favoured by economists. The second highlights
the qualitative and quantitative approach employed by researchers who use
the GVC methodology.
4.1. Econometric Analysis
The need to add to the academic literature surrounding the factors that
determine tourism performance has been recognized by a handful of econo-
mists (Crouch and Ritchie 1999, 2005; Blanke and Chiesa 2009). While
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organizations such as theWTTC publish annual Travel and Tourism Competi-
tiveness rankings that score individual countries based on major categories of
variables, thosemetrics do not test actual performance againstmeasurable data
points. Several studies have attempted to fill the breach.
Assaf and Josiassen (2012) used regression analysis to rank the determinants
of tourism performance at a global level and score individual countries. The
most important five positive factors were: government expenditure on tour-
ism; GDP per capita; the quality of airline service; the service-mindedness of
the population towards foreign visitors; and the stringency of environmental
regulations in the tourism industry. The five most important negative factors
identified in the study were: high crime rates; fuel prices; hotel prices; CO2
emissions per capita; and visa requirements. The authors then ranked the
20 countries as the best and worst performers. While no African countries
were in the top category, Senegal, Chad, Madagascar, Kenya and Gambia
ranked as the lowest five performers in the world. Mauritius and South Africa
were also in the bottom 20.
Tsionas and Assaf (2014) built upon this foundation to develop a dynamic
stochastic frontier model to measure technical efficiency for tourism markets.
Tsionas and Assaf (2015) then extended the methodology by exploring the
persistence of technical efficiency over short- and long-term time horizons.
The latter study used a variety of quality indicators broadly grouped in three
categories (infrastructure, human resource, and natural and environmental)
as well as inputs such as hotel capacity, capital investment in tourism, and
total number of tourism employees. They then analysed them against outputs
such as international tourism arrivals, domestic tourism receipts, inter-
national tourism receipts, and average length of stay. Data constraints pre-
vented many African countries from being ranked; however, Mauritius,
Madagascar, Kenya, Morocco, and Tanzania were the most technically effi-
cient African markets, while Gambia, Libya, Mozambique, Chad, and Senegal
were the most inefficient.
While Tsionas and Assaf provided a dynamic model for global tourism
performance, they did not concentrate on the characteristics associated with
Africa. Naudé and Saayman (2005) used both cross-sectional and panel data
in the period from 1996–2000 for forty-three African nations to identify
the factors that influenced demand for tourism on the continent. While
the authors detected substantial variation depending on the inbound and
outbound country, there were four overarching conclusions: (1) political
stability is especially important to American travellers; (2) communication
infrastructure as measured by internet usage is a significant consideration
for all travellers; (3) the urbanization rate has a positive correlation with
tourism arrivals; and (4) travel to Africa is not as price sensitive as devel-
oped markets.
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4.2. Upgrading in the GVC Literature
Upgrading in the GVC literature describes how actors can improve competi-
tiveness and increase benefits from participating in global industries. There are
both economic and social dimensions to upgrading: economic upgrading
describes how firms or countries can add value to production or move into
higher value activities; social upgrading encapsulates improvements in meas-
urable standards (type of employment, wages, working hours, and social
protections) and the enabling rights of workers (rights to collective bargain-
ing, freedom of association, and non-discrimination) (Barrientos et al. 2011).
Economic upgrading includes a variety of forms. Product upgrading describes
the shift into the production of higher value products or services. Process
upgrading includes improvements in the efficiency of the production systems
such as incorporating more sophisticated technology. Functional upgrading
is when actors acquire new functions or abandon existing ones to increase
overall competitiveness. Chain upgrading is when firms or countries move into
new—but often related—production activities by leveraging existing capabil-
ities (automotive parts manufacturers generating aerospace material is an
example). Finally, end-market upgrading describes incursion into new market
segments (Gereffi 2005; Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2016; Humphrey and
Schmitz 2002).
The concept of upgrading provides a useful foundation as African stake-
holders consider how to encourage the development of the tourism industry
while recognizing some of the organizational features and determinants of
demand outlined in previous sections. The following section outlines
examples of upgrading that have been observed in Africa.
PRODUCT UPGRADING
Improvements to leisure tourism products that appeal to local and regional
customers can help empower the position of domestic distribution intermedi-
aries by providing access to customers without having to rely on sub-
contractual relationships with global lead firms. An instructive example can
be found in Rwanda, where the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) formed a
Public–Private Partnership (PPP) in 2009 with African Parks, which is a con-
servation NGO based in South Africa, to manage Akagera National Park. Since
taking over, African Parks has implemented several product upgrades, which
boosted visitor traffic by 130 per cent, mostly by increasing the number of
Rwandans travelling to the park. Specific strategies and upgrades have
included improving road infrastructure to ensure that visitors can see wildlife
from their car (management believes that residents prefer driving safaris),
keeping the entry fee low for Rwandans and EACmembers, and implementing
an expansivemarketing campaign. Instead of online advertising, African Parks
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used local print media, billboards, and broadcast media inside Rwanda. Data
provided by the park in 2015 indicated that it was projected to break its record
number of total visitors (Daly and Guinn 2016).
PROCESS UPGRADING
Given the durability of the ‘Package Travel’ distribution channel in Africa,
domestic distribution intermediaries must be able to forge relationships with
global tour operators to access customers. An important process upgrade for
leisure tourism business is either to outsource marketing efforts to an external
firm or to improve its internal communications skills. Outbound tour oper-
ators and DMCs connect most frequently through travel and tourism trade
fairs or communication through email. To present their products in the most
favourable light, inbound tour operators and DMCs sometimes hire external
companies to help sell their products and improve websites. Additionally,
tourism boards regularly assist by contracting with outside marketing firms
to create location-specific marketing products.
FUNCTIONAL UPGRADING
There are numerous examples of functional upgrading within Africa’s tourism
value chains. Christian (2013) outlined the traditional trajectory in leisure
tourism value chains: distribution intermediaries often begin as service pro-
viders (local guides) before becoming local tour operators, and then they
progress to DMCs and finally inbound tour operators. While adopting these
responsibilities, they may also vertically integrate by adding lodges and/or
restaurants. Services providers may functionally upgrade by including capabil-
ities in the other input categories; hotels and lodges can add restaurants (and
vice versa) or offer tours to guests.
Steps taken by the Rwandan government illustrate how countries can
attract FDI that can facilitate functional upgrading. This can have the dual
effect of increasing the value captured by domestic businesses while also
augmenting the supply of key inputs. Wilderness Safaris, a Botswana-based
tour operator that specializes in luxury safaris, entered a joint-venture agree-
ment with Albizia, which is the parent company of Thousand Hills and Amber
Expeditions, two DMCs and inbound tour operators based in East Africa.
Together, both groups approached Horizon Group, an equity firm based in
Kigali that is wholly owned by the Rwandan government, to provide finan-
cing for investments in Rwanda. Those conversations led to the formation of
Imizi, a lodge holding company whose shareholders are Albizia, Wilderness
Rwanda and Horizon Group. In 2015,Wilderness Safaris then announced that
it planned to build two properties in Rwanda that will open in 2017. As part of
the arrangement, Wilderness Safaris will provide sales and marketing assist-
ance for Albizia’s tour operations (Wilderness Holdings 2013).




Accessing the business tourism GVC can provide reliable revenue streams for
leisure tourism distribution intermediaries by serving as affiliates of TMCs.
There are, however, potential barriers to entry for new actors. There is a high
degree of monitoring and control exerted by TMCs over their domestic affili-
ates, especially in the early stages of the relationship. Whereas links in the
leisure tourism value chain develop through marketing and networking
efforts, relationships in the business tourism GVC depend on quantifiable
data and certifications.
The MICE sector also provides opportunities for diversification. Conference
tourism has its own unique characteristics, with networks of conference spe-
cialists, conference associations, and Professional Conference Organizers
(PCOs) serving as the primary distribution intermediaries. PCOs overlap in
responsibilities with DMCs or the domestic partners of TMCs; however, there
are skills that require additional training. One of the reasons for the diver-
gence is the scale of conference events. Whereas distribution intermediaries in
the leisure and business value chains rarely deal with large groups, MICE
events can attract hundreds or thousands of delegates, which presents logis-
tical challenges that are on a scale not generally encountered in the leisure
tourism GVC.
END-MARKET UPGRADING
The ability to tap into North American markets represents end-market upgrad-
ing for African countries, with tour operators in some cases charging more for
American customers for similar packages. Despite the low volume of Asian
visitors in most African destinations, Asia can also represent an end-market
upgrade for the following reasons: (1) China is the top source market for
outbound tourists in the world and increased its spending by 27 per cent in
2014 compared to the previous year; and (2) tour operators report that Indian
andChinese consumers often travel at different times of the year than European
and North American clients, providing business during slow seasons.
5. Policy Recommendations
The tourism industry has been a popular topic among international organiza-
tions and academics, which has led to a wide range of recommendations for
policy interventions that focus on various areas, including: infrastructure
provision; regulating markets such as aviation; setting quality, training, and
environmental standards; developing border policy; and stimulating tourism
demand and investment (OECD 2014). Employing a GVC perspective for the
analysis provides insights that both reinforce the traditional orthodoxies and
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offer unique perspectives. Holistic approaches that improve the position of
distribution intermediaries and service providers should be prioritized.
Although service providers regularly offer the largest opportunity for employ-
ment in each chain, it is the distribution intermediaries who often control the
sector’s upgrading potential by facilitating links with end markets.
Policy makers can play a role in helping to overcome barriers that can
inhibit the upgrading described in the previous section. These constraints
can be broadly aggregated into the following categories:
 Access to consumers: Distribution intermediaries in many regions in
Africa are dependent on foreign consumers; travellers in these regions
are most likely to use global tour operators to arrange packages in the
region. This obstacle can be partially mitigated through both demand-
and supply-side strategies. On the demand side, efforts can be made to
facilitate product upgrades that appeal to African travellers, such as the
ones employed by African Parks at Akagera National Park after the RDB
outsourced management to the group (see Product Upgrading section).
On the supply side, tourism boards can perform direct outreach to con-
sumers in critical markets through travel and trade shows or concentrated
marketing campaigns among African-focused travel agents. Tourism
boards also play a role in boosting the communication skills of domestic
tour operators or travel agents through professional development events
and other training
 Skills training: Management, organization, communication and com-
puter skills are critical for distribution intermediaries and service providers
that seek to upgrade their position in the chain. There are international
programmes designed to teach these skills to students, with the UNWTO.
TedQual certification programme being perhaps the most prominent
example. The certification process for UNWTO.TedQual targets hospital-
ity institutions and evaluates schools based on the quality of their tourism
instruction, training, and research programmes. However, Africa only has
two schools that have earned certification—Utalii College in Kenya and
the Hotel and Tourism Training Institute Trust in Zambia. Governments
can play a role in either exploring the creation of hospitality programmes
at existing institutions, or providing funding mechanisms and scholar-
ships for domestic students to study in Kenya or Zambia
 Concession, investment andmanagement policies: As Christian (2015)
noted in her study of Kenyan and Ugandan tourism investment regimes,
government policies affect which governance models take root. Minimal
investment regulation has been observed in Kenya, encouraging over-
development in certain locations, and thereby weakening the negotiating
position of domestic service providers with distribution intermediaries.
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Kenya’s approach to tourism investments and concession areas contrasts
with EAC peers such as Uganda and Rwanda. In Uganda, the Uganda
Wildlife Authority exerts significant control over development in and
around national parks, limiting the number of concession agreements
that are disbursed. While this reduces overall employment, it empowers
the position of the service providers that are active in the country. In
Rwanda, the government, through the RDB, takes an aggressive approach
to cultivating PPPs with conservation-focused organizations that have
allowed Rwandan distribution intermediaries to functionally upgrade
through agreements with global lead firms
 Infrastructure: Infrastructure throughout African markets is a well-
known impediment. The constraints associated with air travel—
prominent market distortions, mediocre safety records, high input costs,
among others (Schlumberger and Weisskopf 2014)—were highlighted
earlier in the chapter, and road quality also remains a prominent concern
in many locations. Additionally, Naudé and Saayman (2005) detailed
how connectivity to the internet and communication infrastructure are
important considerations for travellers to Africa from all continents
 Institutionalization: Formal institutions such as ministries of tourism
and tourism boards can encourage coordination that ensures that stake-
holder interests are aligned. Rwanda provides an illustrative example of
the benefits of formalizing institutions to attract large-scale meetings. The
RDB used a loan through the World Bank to contract with the Business
Tourism Company, a firm based in South Africa, and to craft a MICE
strategy that was completed in 2014. That document led to the creation
of the Rwanda Convention Bureau (RCB). The RCB has helped to attract
more events by joining ICCA, the industry association that provides
public- and private-sector actors with access to the marketplace of world-
wide MICE events. The nascent efforts have led to a quantifiable increase
in conferences; Rwanda had thirteen ICCA events in 2015 (see Table 4.4),
which was more than its aggregated total from 2006–11. Its 2016 calendar
included high-profile World Economic Forum and United Nations Envir-
onment Programme events
 Strengthen linkages with domestic industries: Underdeveloped link-
ages between tourism and sectors such as agriculture and construction
can inhibit industry development and limit the economic benefits asso-
ciated with tourism. South Africa has taken a proactive role in addressing
these concerns through its Fair Trade in Tourism South Africa and its
Responsible Tourism guidelines that seek to maximize local economic
benefits (Spenceley et al. 2002). As part of the effort to increase linkages
and reduce leakages, the South African Department of Environmental
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Affairs and Tourism set guidelines for responsible sourcing—purchases
that are made from businesses within 50 kilometres. While adherence to
the targets has been uneven (Merwe and Wöcke 2007), the initiative
provides a foundation that can be enhanced by addressing the poor
communication and mistrust that sometimes characterizes the relation-
ship between food supply decision-makers, intermediary supplier organ-
izations, and local producers (Rogerson 2012).
6. Conclusion
This chapter has identified some of the most prominent features of African
tourism, employing a GVC framework to ground its analysis. While the
traditional ‘Package Booking’ distribution channel remains strong on the
continent, the limited domestic demand for tourism in Africa requires domes-
tic actors to rely on global tour operators to provide customers, which provides
those companies with a high degree of market power. It also poses risks that
weak backward linkages with supporting industries will cause the economic
gains associated with tourism to accrue to foreign actors.
Business tourism is also a significant component of travel to Africa—the
percentage of business tourism revenue as part of overall tourism revenue is
greater in Africa than in any region in the world. While the high share of
business tourism is in some cases a reflection of low demand for leisure prod-
ucts, business tourism provides at least two opportunities for African nations:
(1) the demand demographics associated with business travel are generally
domestically or regionally oriented, which allows for the emergence of domes-
tic companies; and (2) the emergingMICE segment of business can be targeted
to increase arrivals and drive spillovers into the leisure chain.
Policy interventions can be used to increase efficiency and facilitate eco-
nomic upgrading. This chapter identified six areas where stakeholders can
focus attention: (1) access to consumers; (2) skills training; (3) concession,
investment, and management policy; (4) infrastructure; (5) institutionaliza-
tion; and (6) linkages with domestic industries. Although these challenges
cut across Africa, nations and regions should prioritize prescriptions that align
with individual profiles.
There is variation in the tourism footprint that can be observed in different
regions and countries across Africa. East Africa’s reliance on the industry is
notable, and South Africa is a leader in institutionalization. With tourism
likely to remain a critical source for African exports and FDI, understanding
these characteristics, as well as the dynamics associated with the global indus-
try and how it links with local actors, is a critical consideration for improving
overall competitiveness in the continent.
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1. Introduction
Agricultural exports from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) include a much larger
share of bulk agricultural exports than is the norm on world markets, where
processed products have come to dominate.1,2 In looking at how Africa might
move beyond traditional bulk exports and the resource-based exports that are
also disproportionately important in Africa, a few questions appear to be key.
Should African exports move into labour-intensive manufactures of the type
that have dominated the export-led growth of Asian economies from Hong
Kong, Korea, and Taiwan (China), through China, Bangladesh, Cambodia,
and Vietnam (Page 2012; Newman et al. 2016b)? Should they pursue alterna-
tive approaches such as adding value to existing agricultural exports or
developing new high-value agricultural exports? Or should policy makers
undertake strategies to encourage entrepreneurs to look everywhere for oppor-
tunities, recognizing that it will often be difficult to find successes, but that the
rewards from identifying a highly successful export are very great (Hausmann
and Rodrik 2003; Easterly and Reshef 2010)?
Export growth is vitally important for a wide range of reasons, as it promotes
economic growth, creates jobs (Fukase 2013), and is a source of the foreign
1 This work was undertaken as part of the UNU-WIDER project Industries Without Smokestacks
(IWSS). The authors would like to thank Richard Newfarmer, John Page, and Finn Tarp for guidance
and suggestions; and Antoine Bouët, David Laborde, Jonathan Nelson, Rob Vos and participants at
the authors’ workshop in Helsinki for valuable comments. We are also grateful to the CGIAR
Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets, led by the International Food Policy
Research Institute, and to the World Bank Strategic Research Program for partial support.
2 The focus of this chapter is on SSA countries. Throughout the chapter, we use the terms ‘SSA’
and ‘Africa’ interchangeably.
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exchange needed to import goods that cannot readily be produced locally.
Domestic and international policies, however, influence both the level and
the mix of products that are traded. In recent years, the ‘trade in tasks’ in the
newwave of globalization (Baldwin 2006, 2016) appears to have been creating
new opportunities for African countries to tap into export markets, as they
enjoy many location-specific comparative advantages. How should African
governments act to influence the development of non-traditional exports,
such as those from agro-processing operations, or high-value export crops
such as horticultural products?
This chapter analyses the principal features of agro-processing and horticul-
tural exports from SSA and explores policy alternatives based on simulation
analyses. We first provide a conceptual section focusing on changing patterns
of processing and exports (Section 2). We then examine how the pattern of
exports from Africa compares with the pattern in other regions (Section 3).
Following that, we examine the directions of trade in African agricultural
exports and the patterns of protection facing, and imposed by, African coun-
tries (Section 4). Next, we turn to simulation exercises to examine the impacts
of potential reforms on exports of processed and horticultural exports from
Africa (Section 5). With this as background, we turn to consider the options
for policy makers in Africa (Section 6). The final section presents a brief
conclusion (Section 7).
2. Changing Patterns of Processing and Exports
Prior to the Industrial Revolution and the development of steam transport,
international trade was very limited because of high transport and communi-
cation costs. Some very high value-to-weight items such as spices and gem-
stones were traded over long distances, but most foods andmanufactures were
produced locally. Basic production patterns and income levels were similar
across the world.
As noted by Baldwin (2006, 2016), the first wave of globalization frequently
involved the production of raw materials in developing countries, with the
processing of those products into final manufactured goods generally taking
place through vertically integrated production processes in industrial countries.
During this phase, communications were not sufficiently well developed to
allow coordination of activities at a distance, and the capital needed for indus-
trial development was most readily available in the industrial countries. This
pattern of industrialization appeared to generate many gains from learning-
by-doing in the industrial countries and to contribute to amajor divergence in
income levels, with incomes in the industrial countries rising far above the
levels in developing countries. Developing countries, understandably, were
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unhappy with this model of industrial development and frequently tried to
develop their own integrated industrial sectors, often by creating incentives to
process the raw materials that they produced, as suggested by Alexander
Hamilton in his ‘Report on Manufactures’ (Hamilton 1791). Unfortunately,
this frequently proved to be very difficult to achieve without excessive cost
and loss to the producers of raw materials.
In recent years, changes in the costs and allocation of factors have created
new opportunities for developing countries in both industrial production and
further processing of agricultural commodities. Lower transport and commu-
nication costs have made it possible for more parts of the production process
to be conducted in different locations. Production of garments, for example,
may involve growing cotton in West Africa where agro-ecological conditions
are particularly suited; making yarn and fabric (likely using blends of cotton
and other fibres) in China; and assembling garments in Bangladesh. To exploit
cost advantages created by these developments, firms from more advanced
countries are increasingly willing to bring the capital and knowledge needed
for successful production via foreign direct investment. This can obviate the
very long process of learning otherwise needed to establish an entirely new
export activity (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003).
The unbundled approach to global value chains involves much greater
transfer of materials and knowledge than the traditional approach and hence
is more demanding of logistics. Issues such as low transport costs and smooth
customs clearance become important for the organization of production.Once
efficient logistics are in place, however, countries with suitable agro-ecological
conditions can potentially produce high-value products, such as cut flowers
and fresh vegetables, which formerly needed to be produced near their point
of consumption. In this case, the logistics and trade facilitation are also vitally
important, given the high costs of delay. African producers of products such as
green beans, cut flowers, and fresh fruit appear to have seized some of these
opportunities.
Easterly and Reshef (2010) find that exports from several African countries are
dominated by a small number of ‘big hits’ with large export shares. Whether
African exports are highly specialized or not has important implications for the
volatility of export returns because highly concentrated export bundles are
much more likely to be volatile than more diversified export bundles. Adding
processed agricultural exports to an export bundle dominated by something
else—such as resource exports—may reduce volatility. However, switching from
exporting a raw product to exporting the same product in processed formmight
not lead to a substantial reduction in export volatility, if the price received for
the processed product is heavily influenced by the price of the raw material.
Diversifying from agricultural- and resource-based products to other manufac-
tures seems likely to provide the largest gains from diversification.
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Another factor influencing export outcomes is whethermarkets are expanding
or contracting. With income growth, consumers are likely to move from
purchasing raw agricultural products to consuming products with additional
embedded services (da Silva et al. 2009). For this reason, it seems more likely
that markets for processed agricultural products will grow more rapidly
than markets for raw products when incomes rise in consuming countries.
Investigating the relationship between the share of value-added in agricultural
processing to that in total agriculture and GDP per capita, Fukase and
Martin (2016: Figure 3) finds a positive relationship between the two variables
and that Africa is not an exception. Demand for horticultural products such as
tropical fruits and fresh flowers is also likely to grow relatively rapidly as
incomes rise, potentially making the exports of these products grow faster
than staple agricultural products.
3. Global Perspective on Agricultural Processing
and Horticultural Exports
In this section, we first examine the evolution of exports from SSA and other
regions. Figure 5.1 shows the composition of Africa’s exports of goods and
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Figure 5.1. Export shares from sub-Saharan Africa
Source: Merchandise export data from COMTRADE, accessed through World Integrated Trade
Solutions (WITS) (World Bank 2016a). Exports of Services from World Development Indicators
(World Bank 2016b).
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Figure 5.1 reveals the small share of agriculture in African exports at around
10 per cent, which is lower than the 12 per cent accounted for by exports of
nonfactor services. This low share of agriculture in total exports suggests that
the opportunities for expanding total exports by processing existing agricul-
tural exports—some of which are already processed—are likely to be more
limited than where exports of unprocessed agricultural products account for a
large proportion of total exports.
Between 1988 and 2014, world agricultural exports grew from US$83.4
billion3 to US$1,532 billion while SSA’s agricultural exports increased from
US$2.7 billion to US$44.3 billion (UN COMTRADE). As a result, SSA’s share
in world agricultural exports declined from 3.3 per cent in 1988 to 2.9 per cent
in 2014. We distinguish among agricultural products using the Regmi et al.
(2005) definitions of bulk, semi-processed, and processed agricultural products,
plus horticultural products. As noted by Liapis (2011: 12), bulk and horticultural
products are tied strongly to geographic conditions, while semi-processed prod-
ucts such as sugar or cocoa products and processed products such as meat and
chocolate are less geographically linked and could potentially be produced using
inputs from other locations. With these definitions, we see a sharp difference
between Africa and the world. As shown in Figure 5.2, for the world as a whole,
bulk agricultural products account for a small and declining share of agricultural
exports—decreasing from25 per cent in 1988 to 17 per cent in 2014. By contrast,
processed and semi-processed agricultural products accounted for almost three-
quarters of global agricultural exports by 2014. Horticultural exports accounted
for around 12 per cent of global agricultural exports in 2014.
For Africa, the corresponding patterns are quite different. The share of bulk
agricultural exports also declined, but from around 60 per cent to 42 per cent
in 2014, leaving these exports still as a large share of total agricultural exports.
The share of processed and semi-processed agricultural products rose, but only
to 35 per cent by 2014. If African countries are relatively abundant in raw
agricultural goods and scarce in capital, a larger share of bulk exports relative
to processed agricultural products is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model, which predicts that countries export products that use
relatively abundant factors of production. The share of horticultural exports
rose from around 10 per cent in 1988 to 22 per cent in 2014. It seems clear
that African exporters are adjusting to changes in the world markets, but
doing it in a distinctively African way. The expansion of horticultural exports
suggests that Africa has seized new opportunities, for instance, in becoming
integrated into global agricultural value chains in flowers and horticultural
crops (Minten et al. 2009; Page 2012).
3 In 1988, agricultural exports were 9.6 per cent of world exports of goods and services, and
declined to 7.2 per cent in 2014.
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To look in more detail at agricultural exports from Africa, we consider
individual six-digit products using the Harmonized System (HS) product
definitions—the finest for which internationally comparable measures are
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Figure 5.2. Shares of agricultural exports
Source: Merchandise export data from COMTRADE, accessed through World Integrated Trade
Solutions (WITS) (World Bank 2016a).
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Table 5.1. Export shares for six-digit agricultural goods, 2013




1 23.3 59.0 39.6 37.1 32.1 22.1 13.9 7.3 12.2 30.4 12.8 7.9
2 16.9 9.9 15.7 27.6 17.6 18.6 12.6 6.2 11.9 6.8 4.7 4.2
3 15.9 7.9 6.2 4.7 5.6 8.7 6.4 5.3 9.2 6.0 4.7 3.9
4 15.0 4.5 3.2 4.5 5.0 7.9 5.7 4.6 6.8 4.9 4.4 3.2
5 6.5 2.8 2.9 3.3 4.0 5.9 5.5 4.6 5.2 4.2 3.8 2.9
6 4.5 1.4 2.3 2.4 3.5 4.2 4.5 3.4 4.2 3.9 2.7 2.8
7 2.2 1.4 2.0 2.0 3.4 3.2 4.2 2.2 4.0 3.4 2.7 2.6
8 1.9 1.0 1.7 1.6 3.2 3.2 4.2 2.2 3.5 2.9 2.2 2.4
9 1.9 0.9 1.4 1.3 2.6 3.1 4.2 2.0 3.2 2.2 2.1 2.3
10 1.4 0.8 1.2 1.1 2.4 2.9 3.0 2.0 2.9 2.1 1.7 1.9
11 1.2 0.8 1.2 1.1 2.0 2.9 2.9 1.9 2.9 2.1 1.7 1.8
12 0.9 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.5 2.3 2.4 1.7 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.8
13 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.8 1.9 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.7
14 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4
15 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3
16 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.1 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.2
17 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.1
18 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7 1.5 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1
19 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0
20 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
Top 20 share 96.2 95.5 85.4 93.5 90.2 93.0 82.2 52.7 79.8 82.4 55.9 47.8
No of exports 249 362 520 208 299 233 591 655 357 402 670 662
Nos. equiv 7 3 5 5 7 9 17 44 18 9 33 54
Share of initial
bottom 2%
46.5 10.1 2.7 7.3 15.5 68.6 8.0 0.0 7.7 12.3


























and for SSA overall. The table shows the export value share for each of the top
twenty agricultural exports, the share held by the top twenty products, the
number of agricultural exports and the numbers equivalent of the Herfindahl
Index for agricultural exports (Adelman 1969). This numbers-equivalent
measure—measured as 1
∑S2i
where Si is the share of each product in the total—
shows the number of equally distributed exports that would provide the same
degree of diversification as the observed set of exports, assuming independent
and identically distributed volatility for each commodity export.
Table 5.1 shows that agricultural exports from African countries tend to be
highly concentrated, with the largest export having a very large share of total
agricultural exports, and subsequent exports having much smaller shares. The
top twenty exports accounted for 80 per cent or more of export returns in each
of our focus countries except South Africa, and over 90 per cent in five of our
focus countries. While each country has many agricultural exports (between
208 and 655), the very large shares accounted for by the top products mean
that these export baskets are much less diversified than they might at first
appear. The numbers equivalent of the Herfindahl Index suggests that, for
instance, the 362 agricultural exports from Ghana provide the export market
diversification that would be provided by having just three equally distributed
agricultural exports. The 520 and 208 agricultural exports from Kenya and
Mozambique respectively provide little more diversification, being equivalent
to only five identically distributed products. In contrast, the agricultural
export baskets of Senegal, Tanzania, and South Africa are much more diversi-
fied, being equivalent to 17, 18, and 44 products respectively—numbers
which should provide considerable diversification.
The last two columns of Table 5.1 show the results for SSA as a group for
goods which went to the world and to SSA respectively. The exports which
went to SSA turn out to be somewhat more diversified: SSA’s top twenty
exports to the world and to SSA accounted for 56 per cent and 48 per cent,
while the corresponding indexes were 33 and 54 respectively. This may reflect
the relatively low entry costs into exporting to SSA countries reported by
Mulangu and Olarinde (2016). It may also reflect a tendency to re-export
high-value processed agricultural items—often imported from outside Africa.
Table 5.2 shows the composition of SSA’s top twenty exports for SSA as a
group to the world and to the SSA.4 Table 5.2 categorizes the SSA’s exports into
bulk (B), horticulture (H), and processed agriculture (P). In terms of SSA’s
exports to the world (first panel), the five top items are dominated by bulk
exports such as cocoa beans, coffee, unmanufactured tobacco, sesamum seeds,
4 See Appendix Table A1 in Fukase and Martin (2016) for the composition of the top twenty
exports for our ten selected countries.
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and black tea. Fresh cut flowers and horticulture products such as cashew nuts
and fresh fruit (including apples, oranges, and grapes) also made the list.
Processed agricultural goods such as cocoa paste, cocoa butter, and frozen
fish may reflect the availability of local raw materials.
The second panel of Table 5.2 reveals the quite different nature of the top
twenty exports which were traded within SSA, with a disproportionately high
share of processed goods including such items as cigarettes and tobacco,
frozen fish, sugar, palm oil, beer, soup, flour, milk and cream, and mineral
water. In value terms, nearly two-thirds of the agricultural products traded
within SSA in 2013 were processed agricultural products.
The ‘big hits’ change from one period to the next (Easterly and Reshef 2010)
and a question arises as to whether changes in the importance of agricultural
exports are driven by new products. To answer the question, we follow Kehoe
and Ruhl (2013) in constructing the set of least-exported agricultural goods
which were originally either not exported or exported only in small values.
Specifically, starting with the smallest amounts of exports including zero,
we add products to the set until the sum of their export values reaches 2
per cent of total export value in the initial period (‘bottom 2 per cent’
items). The last row of Table 5.1 shows the share of ‘new’ products, i.e. those
which were bottom 2 per cent in the oldest available years in our sample, but
made the top twenty in 2013. These statistics show that the shares of the new
products vary depending on our focus countries. While the new products
represent a large share in total agricultural exports in Ethiopia and in Rwanda,
47 per cent and 69 per cent respectively, none of the top twenty items came
from bottom 2 per cent for South Africa.
One potential explanation for the low share of processed agricultural
exports in Africa’s exports on average is the relatively low income of most
African countries. Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between processed agri-
cultural exports as a share of total agricultural exports and the log of GDP per
capita. We find a positive relationship with the rate of increase declining as
incomes rise. The African countries in the figure appear broadly to follow this
pattern. A dummy variable for Africa included in the regression failed to reveal
a significant difference between African and other countries. Thus, there is no
indication in the plot or from statistical testing that African countries are not
following a similar path to other countries.
4. Trade and Protection Patterns
In this section, we use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database
(Aguiar, Narayanan, and McDougall 2016) to capture both trade and protec-
tion, and to prepare for the simulation analysis in the next section. We find
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SSA’s agricultural exports were US$46.0 billion in 2011 of which US$21.8
billion (47.4 per cent), US$7.4 billion (16.2 per cent), and US$16.8 billion
(36.5 per cent) were bulk, horticulture, and processed agriculture respectively
(GTAP 9 database).5 The EUwas the largest destination for SSA’s exports, taking
39.6 per cent of SSA’s exports (Fukase and Martin 2016: Figure 5). Nineteen
per cent of SSA’s exports went to SSA, with processed agriculture disproportion-
ately accounting for 34.9 per cent of SSA’s total processed agriculture exports.
Columns 1–3 of Table 5.3 show the Ad Valorem Equivalent (AVE) protec-
tion (Guimbard et al. 2012) that SSA’s exports face, the AVE that SSA imposes
against its imports, and the world AVE. The last four rows show the summary
of AVE for agricultural goods. SSA’s agricultural exports face 7 per cent of AVE
in its export market (7.7 per cent, 3.8 per cent, 7.6 per cent for its bulk,
horticulture, and processed agriculture exports respectively) which were
slightly lower than the world average of 8.2 per cent, perhaps reflecting its
preferential access to certain developed countries including the EU and
the United States. The SSA’s own AVE against its agricultural imports of
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Figure 5.3. Processed agricultural exports in total agricultural exports vs per capita
income, 2011
Source: Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database (Version 9).
5 See footnote 3 of Fukase and Martin (2016) for the composition of ‘bulk’, ‘horticulture’ and
‘processed agriculture’.
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Table 5.3. Structure of ad valorem equivalent (AVE) protection, 2011















1 pdr Paddy rice 1.2 3.5 7.1 0.9 3.8 2.7 1.8
2 wht Wheat 1.3 6.6 7.0 0.0 11.7 2.5 0.8
3 gro Cereal grains nec 71.2 3.4 26.0 0.0 2.6 0.6 2.8
4 v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts 3.8 10.6 5.2 1.4 4.3 1.6 8.8
5 osd Oil seeds 7.0 4.6 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5
6 c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet 0.4 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.8 0.0
7 pfb Plant-based fibres 1.7 1.9 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5
8 ocr Crops nec 3.4 12.5 4.5 0.0 1.2 0.5 4.9
9 ctl Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 1.3 1.7 4.6 0.0 2.1 0.2 1.3
10 oap Animal products nec 2.6 7.7 3.3 0.0 2.5 0.6 5.3
11 rmk Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
12 wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons 16.7 0.0 21.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2
13 fsh Fishing 3.7 10.3 2.7 1.8 2.7 1.0 9.8
14 cmt Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, etc. 33.7 12.6 13.9 1.9 54.0 11.7 7.8
15 omt Meat products nec 5.0 12.3 13.0 2.5 19.1 2.1 5.9
16 vol Vegetable oils and fats 8.0 12.5 9.3 0.0 2.3 1.1 10.1
17 mil Dairy products 10.9 10.3 7.9 2.0 23.9 1.1 10.9
18 pcr Processed rice 5.7 9.9 16.6 0.8 15.8 7.2 7.4
19 sgr Sugar 9.1 15.6 12.5 1.2 43.8 12.3 23.4
20 ofd Food products nec 4.8 14.8 6.0 0.9 7.3 1.8 11.0
21 b_t Beverages, tobacco products 13.4 16.9 8.7 4.3 6.7 1.0 15.9
22 Others Non-agriculture 1.1 8.0 2.3 0.0 1.4 0.6 5.2
Total 1.7 8.7 2.9 0.1 1.8 0.7 6.1















Bulk 7.7 7.4 8.3 0.1 1.8 0.7 3.3
Horticulture 3.8 10.6 5.2 1.4 4.3 1.6 8.8
Processed agriculture 7.6 13.6 8.6 1.3 11.1 2.4 12.6
Total agriculture 7.0 12.2 8.2 0.8 7.3 2.0 10.1


























Columns 4–6 of Table 5.3 show the AVE that SSA faces in the EU market,
the AVE that the EU imposes against its imports other than SSA and the EU,
and the EU’s average AVE respectively. SSA enjoys preferential access to the EU
market. Its preferential rate for agriculture of 0.8 per cent on average is sub-
stantially lower than the rate the EU imposes against suppliers other than SSA
and the EU itself (7.3 per cent). SSA appears to benefit from the lower prefer-
ential rates for its processed agricultural goods (1.3 per cent on average) relative
to the AVE the EU imposes against other suppliers (11.1 per cent on average).
The preference margins appear to be especially large for such products as meat
(1.9 per cent vs. 54.0 per cent), dairy products (2 per cent vs. 23.9 per cent),
and sugar (1.2 per cent vs. 43.8 per cent). The last column of Table 3 reports the
AVE for intra-SSA trade. Despite the presence ofmany trade blocs within Africa,
AVE protection for agricultural goods within SSA remains relatively high at
10.1 per cent (higher than the world average AVE of 8.2 per cent), with an
especially high AVE for processed agriculture, at 12.6 per cent.
In its export markets, SSA faces tariff escalation within many value chains:
paddy rice (1.2 per cent) vs. processed rice (5.7 per cent); oil seeds (7.0 per cent)
vs. vegetable oils and fats (8.0 per cent); sugar cane and sugar beet (0.4 per
cent) vs. sugar (9.1 per cent); raw milk (0.0 per cent) vs. dairy products (10.9
per cent); and cattle, sheep, goats, horses (1.3 per cent) vs. animal products
(2.6 per cent), cattle, sheep, goat and horse meat (33.7 per cent) and other
meat products (5.0 per cent) (column 1 of Table 5.3). SSA’s own AVE against its
imports (column 2), intra-SSA AVE (last column) and world AVE (third col-
umn) also demonstrate similar tariff escalation.
5. Simulation Scenarios and Results: Trade Effects
In this section, we use the standard GTAP model (Hertel 1997) to analyse the
comparative-static impacts of different potential policy reforms. In doing this,
we build on the insight from Jensen et al. (2010), that the impact of a trade
regime on production incentives requires a general equilibrium treatment.
By simulating the removal of protection, these experiments are intended to
assess the effects of the existing distortions on SSA’s agricultural trade rather
than to evaluate specific impacts of any actual trade reforms. As this chapter
focuses on agro-processing and horticultural exports, the purpose of the simu-
lations is to measure trade effects.
Column 1 of Table 5.4 shows the simulation result from eliminating tariff
escalation by SSA’s partner countries, reducing their AVE protection for pro-
cessed goods to the levels of unprocessed goods in the same value chain
identified above (for example, lowering the AVE rate of processed rice to the
level of paddy rice) (Simulation 1).
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Table 5.4. Simulation results: trade effects (%)
Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 Sim 4 Sim 5
To Wld To EU To Wld To SSA To Wld To Wld To Wld
1 pdr Paddy rice 9.87 22.14 2.96 9.01 5.76 5.76 9.05
2 wht Wheat 7.46 61.76 3.08 3.87 3.24 3.24 16.05
3 gro Cereal grains nec 1.54 5.70 0.44 2.95 0.59 0.59 1.76
4 v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts 3.46 8.58 3.30 17.42 1.89 1.89 4.32
5 osd Oil seeds 5.63 1.31 1.09 6.36 3.21 3.21 5.16
6 c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet 7.21 1.30 1.96 1.42 4.40 4.40 8.80
7 pfb Plant-based fibres 3.83 0.48 0.67 4.42 1.92 1.92 6.21
8 ocr Crops nec 5.69 4.92 1.73 14.10 3.03 3.03 7.06
9 ctl Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 3.00 7.04 0.20 2.36 1.10 1.10 2.60
10 oap Animal products nec 2.78 5.92 1.08 10.74 0.93 0.93 3.24
11 rmk Raw milk 10.48 1.94 1.61 0.00 0.81 0.81 13.71
12 wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons 9.48 1.92 1.96 2.02 0.33 0.33 26.47
13 fsh Fishing 2.80 1.45 0.65 16.24 1.08 1.08 4.09
14 cmt Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse 5056.80 95.74 28.99 48.44 77.81 77.81 8.88
15 omt Meat products nec 34.23 72.99 12.08 67.06 80.20 80.20 3.02
16 vol Vegetable oils and fats 35.31 13.27 1.90 52.56 50.95 50.95 10.16
17 mil Dairy products 194.54 75.59 6.03 90.31 45.98 45.98 36.78
18 pcr Processed rice 22.76 50.50 4.88 38.38 34.96 34.96 3.25
19 sgr Sugar 60.62 83.72 52.15 54.57 37.01 37.01 29.03
20 ofd Food products nec 1.82 21.19 9.77 29.66 28.63 28.63 7.71
21 b_t Beverages and tobacco products 0.49 4.93 1.48 20.33 7.87 7.87 7.94
22 Others Non-agriculture 2.96 0.41 0.38 0.18 1.36 1.36 9.45
Total 1.10 2.05 0.19 4.91 0.30 0.30 9.27
Summary of agricultural exports changes (%)
To Wld To EU To Wld To SSA To Wld To Wld To Wld
Bulk 4.58 4.60 1.04 8.24 0.28 2.48 6.36
Horticulture 3.46 8.58 3.30 17.42 1.48 1.89 4.32
Processed agriculture 114.27 29.86 12.20 37.57 13.08 30.31 10.50
Total agricultural exports 38.96 14.91 5.48 28.81 5.14 9.58 7.54


























SSA’s exports of processed goods would increase by 114.3 per cent while
its bulk and horticulture exports would decrease slightly by 4.6 per cent and
3.5 per cent, respectively. Overall, SSA’s agricultural exports would increase by
39.0 per cent.6 These results show that tariff escalation in external markets
poses substantial barriers for SSA’s exports of processed agricultural products.
While SSA receives duty-free access from some partners such as the EU (and it
is likely that the preferential access creates incentives for processing in SSA),
there appears to remain scope to increase agro-processing exports further with
removal of tariff escalation by other trading partners. The dramatic increase in
exports of processed agriculture from SSA under Simulation 1 suggests that
the provisions in the Doha Agenda proposals on reducing tariff escalation
(WTO 2008: 18) may have very favourable effects on exports of processed
agricultural products from Africa. They make a case for policy makers focusing
on this issue in future trade negotiations.
Simulation 2 explores what happens if the SSA loses its preferential access to
the EU market for its agricultural goods, with the EU increasing AVE protec-
tion against SSA from the preferential rates to those imposed against other
suppliers (columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.4). SSA’s agricultural exports to the EU
would decrease by 14.9 per cent, which would lead to a reduction of its overall
agricultural exports by 5.5 per cent. As the EU’s AVE protection for processed
agriculture against non-preferential suppliers is especially high, the loss of
preferences would result in a sharp reduction in SSA’s exports of processed
agricultural products—by 29.9 per cent to the EU, and by 12.2 per cent to
the world.
Since agricultural trade in SSA tends to occur in the same regions (Fukase
and Martin 2016: Figure 6), Simulation 3 investigates the impacts of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Mar-
ket for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) countries reducing their AVE agricultural
protection against each other to zero within their regional arrangements
(columns 4 and 5). The result shows that the agricultural liberalization within
these trade blocs combined would lead to the expansion of intra-SSA agricul-
tural trade by 28.8 per cent, while SSA’s total agricultural exports to the world
would increase by 5.1 per cent. The results of this simulation reflect the effects
of removing agricultural barriers in general, and the tariff escalation within
such barriers, and hence result in more rapid growth in exports of processed
6 The 5,056.8 per cent increase in the exports of cattle, sheep, goat, and horsemeat (cmt) appears
to reflect initially very high AVE protection imposed by some partner countries (for example,
Norway) against SSA’s exports of this category. One caveat on this exercise is that the AVE
protection used in this chapter does not include sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) requirements
and that SPS issues frequently need to be addressed for new exports to take place.
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agricultural products than in total agricultural exports (37.6 per cent and
13.1 per cent increase in processed agricultural exports to SSA and to the
world, respectively).
Simulation 4 explores what would happen if SSA countries were to increase
total factor productivity in processing of agricultural goods by 10 per cent
(sixth column of Table 5.4). This simulation ignores the costs of bringing
about such productivity gains and is intended to help identify the areas in
which the gains are likely largest. The results reveal that SSA’s exports of
processed agriculture would expand by 30.3 per cent; its exports of bulk and
horticulture goods would decrease slightly by 2.5 per cent and by 1.9 per cent
respectively as some goods are processed before being exported; and its overall
agricultural exports would expand by 9.6 per cent. This simulation result is
consistent with the literature on high productivity associated with exports in
Africa (e.g., Mengistae and Pattillo 2004; Newman et al. 2016a) and highlights
the importance of improving the productivity of agricultural processing activ-
ities for expansion of these exports. This simulation understates the long-run
impacts of raising productivity in these sectors because the modelling frame-
work looks only at static gains and does not allow for the emergence of new
activities. Thus, it misses the extensive-margin impact of increases in prod-
uctivity, where higher productivity may cause new export activities to
take place.
Simulation 5 involves complete removal of AVE protection against SSA’s
imports including non-agricultural goods. Not surprisingly, it leads to a much
larger increase in total exports than any of the other simulations (last column
in Table 5.4). Three effects on processing exports from removing all import
protection can be anticipated: (1) the removal of each country’s own tariff
escalation is likely to reduce production of processed goods for domestic
markets; (2) the removal of tariff escalation by African partners increases
opportunities for processing; and (3) reductions in the costs of inputs used
in processing would be expected to expand processing for both domestic and
export markets.7 The model’s results point to an increase in processed agricul-
tural exports relative to bulk and horticultural exports, suggesting that the
reduction in production costs and the increase in market access opportunities
would outweigh the reduction in incentives to process for domestic markets.
However, the increase in agricultural exports is not much larger than the
increase in overall exports.
7 Bigsten et al. (2016) find that input tariff reductions are associated with higher firm-level
productivity in Ethiopia.
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6. Policy Questions
The decision whether to export a raw or processed agricultural product should
still be based solely on the economics of the value-adding process. If, for
instance, coffee may be exported in fresh or roasted form, the decision on
whether to undertake the roasting stage should depend on the costs and
returns associated with undertaking that stage. The ‘great unbundling’
(Baldwin 2006) means, however, that other countries may well have become
competitors for the bean-producing country in roasting the coffee. Naïve
calculations that consider only the value of the roasted beans relative to the
value of the raw beans—without considering the costs of the processing
phase—are insufficient as a basis for deciding whether to undertake the pro-
cessing phase in the producing country.
In general, it seems sensible for policy makers to delegate to producing and
processing firms the decisions about whether to undertake particular stages
of production, and to focus on providing an enabling environment in which
producers may be able to take advantage of those opportunities that generate
positive value-added. However, in the unbundled trade system, it is nowmuch
more important for governments to keep channels of communication open to
identify specific constraints that are preventing the emergence of processing
stages in the country. If there are, for example, high tariffs on inputs needed in
the production process, this may turn out to make it uneconomic to process
the good domestically even though doing so would add value at world
prices. Another important source of elevated costs is weaknesses in infrastruc-
ture, such as transport, electricity and water, or excessive costs of customs
clearance, that may make otherwise high-return activities privately unprofit-
able. A key step for governments is to identify where they can reduce some of
these costs to enable firms to undertake processing operations that would be
economically worthwhile.
If we find that high tariffs and other charges on intermediate inputs result in
negative value-added (at market prices) in at least some processing activities,
the disincentive to undertaking these activities may result in economically
desirable processing not being undertaken. If the government wishes, it may
deal with these problems either by reforming its tariffs and customs regimes or
by specific export-focused policy responses such as providing duty exemp-
tions on intermediates used in the production of exports. Responses of this
type would not require negotiations with trading partners.
Another potential cause of failure to undertake desirable processing actions
arises from distortions imposed by trading partners. A key challenge for pro-
cessing in developing countries comes from tariff escalation in importing
markets. In this situation, the tariff in the importing market is low on raw
materials, higher on intermediates, and highest on final consumer goods.
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This policy option creates—and typically is intended to create—incentives to
undertake processing in the importing country and to discourage processing
in the exporting country. Such incentives could be countered by the exporting
country, but this action would surely be difficult to undertake successfully.
However, information on the extent of such tariff escalation is likely to be
useful background for tariff negotiations.
The impact of tariff escalation is likely to be turned on its head when
considering exporters that have access to effective preferences for raw and
processed products. If we assume that processing a good adds 20 per cent to its
initial value, then a tariff margin of 20 per cent between the raw and the
processed form of a product creates a 100 per cent effective rate of protection
on the processing activity. Under a non-discriminatory tariff regime, this
assistance is provided to processors in the importing country. If this tariff
applies against imports of most producers but some small producers receive
a tariff preference, the 20 per cent effective rate of protection may be available
to processors in the exporting market. Comparison of the mix of processing in
preference- and non-preference-receiving exporters may provide some indica-
tion of the effectiveness of the preference regime in creating incentives for
additional processing in exporting countries.
Developing new exports from Africa is both vitally important and very
challenging. Some of the barriers that have been identified—such as geog-
raphy and landlocked status (Freund and Rocha 2011)—are inherent, but their
effects may be addressed by adequate policy reforms and associated invest-
ments. For instance, in examining the effect of trade times on Africa’s exports
of new products, Freund and Rocha (2011) report that reducing inland transit
times significantly boosts exports (especially for time-sensitive agricultural
exports) and suggest the importance of investments on inland transportation
and infrastructure. Bouët et al. (2017: Figure 2.4) show that the costs associ-
ated with time for border and documentary compliance are high especially for
agricultural products for many African countries.
The stylized fact emerging from the recent literature on exportingfirms that a
small number of highly productive firms generally dominate exports (Bernard
et al. 2007) would seem to allay the concerns expressed by Hausmann and
Rodrik (2003) that firms investing in costly discovery of successful exports lose
the returns from export success through entry of copycat firms. Approaches to
creating incentives for innovative exports by providing protection to sales on
the domestic market appear to have little applicability in Africa. Large domes-
tic markets for these products only rarely exist, and they are likely to become
saturated relatively rapidly, leaving innovators with low returns on their
investment. While export subsidies for developing countries are only loosely
constrained by World Trade Organization (WTO) rules (Creskoff and
Walkenhorst 2009)—and are almost unconstrained for least developed
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countries and countries whose per capita GDP is under US$1,000 in 1990
dollars—the fiscal costs of such export subsidies are likely to be very high.
The approach of grants and subsidies to chosen firms suggested by Hausmann
and Rodrik (2003: 630) seems likely to be very costly if the subsidies are large
enough to make a difference, and Farole (2011: 173) finds that such incentives
are associated with poorer performance in African economic zones.
In contrast, providing a relatively level playing field on which exporters can
experiment to identify successful exports seems promising. One approach to
providing an environment for experimentation is to allow exporters to access
intermediate inputs for use in production of exports at world prices. In China,
duty exemptions were a central feature of reforms, allowing exporters to use
imported materials and to increase processed exports in a wide range of labour-
intensive activities (Ianchovichina 2004). Other successful exporters of indus-
trial goods—for instance, Cambodia, Mauritius, Tunisia, and Vietnam—also
established a ‘free trade regime for exporters’ through a variety of mechanisms
such as tariff exemptions, duty drawbacks, and rebates of indirect taxes
(Newman et al. 2016a).
Duty exemptions and Value Added Tax (VAT) refund mechanisms are
frequently part of more comprehensive export promotion mechanisms such
as Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (Farole 2011). SEZs typically involve other
features, such as improved infrastructure, and a different regulatory environ-
ment from the rest of the economy. Frequently, this environment is designed
to attract foreign direct investment. Collier and Page (2009) point to strong
advantages if they are in geographically favoured regions near good infrastruc-
ture. Farole (2011: Ch. 8) finds that African SEZs have encountered difficulties
in many areas, including unreliability of power supply relative to Asian zones,
slow customs procedures, and wage rates that are high relative to labour
productivity. Following Farole (2011: Table 8.2), Fukase and Martin (2016:
Table 6) show that wage rates in African SEZs are almost 90 per cent of wage
rates in four comparator countries, even though GDP per capita, and, hence,
likely the opportunity cost of labour to the zone, is only 42 per cent of the
level in the comparator countries.
Drawing on the lessons of recent decades, it seems more likely to us that
deep, sustained growth in exports from SSA will result from policies that
provide as much scope as possible for entrepreneurs to search and discover,
in the sense suggested by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), the products that will
be the highly successful exports of the future. Current, generally closed, SEZs
do not seem to have worked very well in doing this, despite the provision of
duty exemptions on intermediates, improved infrastructure, and fiscal incen-
tives. Perhaps one way to overcome these challenges is to draw from China’s
experience and to extend the duty exemptions for intermediates used in
the production of exports to export processors of all kinds throughout
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each country. Once processors of agricultural products, along with producers
of other potential exports, have access to intermediates at world prices and to
labour and other inputs at domestic prices, their experimentation may lead to
identification of exports that will become the future big hits and mainstays
of higher levels of future exports. As argued by Newman et al. (2016b), it is not
enough just to improve the investment climate—which nevertheless remains
a high priority—but what is needed is a broader push for export development
of the type seen in successful Asian exporters.
7. Conclusions
The recent focus on the potential for agricultural processing and horticultural
exports as growth engines for Africa appears to be driven in part by pessimism
about the prospects for growth of manufacturing exports of the type that have
been so stunningly successful in driving export growth from many Asian
countries. Key questions include whether this pessimism is warranted, and
whether the agricultural processing and horticultural exports can become the
engine of growth so much needed to promote African development.
When we look at the pattern of exports from African countries, we find that
the share of agricultural exports has declined to around 10 per cent of the
total, somewhat less than the 12 per cent of exports accounted for by non-
factor services. This is a small share on which to build if the goal is to stimulate
dramatic growth in exports through exports of horticultural or processed
agricultural products. Within agricultural exports, the share of traditional,
bulk agricultural exports has fallen sharply, from 60 to 42 per cent, although
this is now twice the share of such exports in global trade. Where Africa does
stand out is in the share of horticultural products in total exports—more than
22 per cent of agricultural exports in 2014 as against 12 per cent for the world.
The relatively low, but rising, share of processed agricultural exports from
Africa may reflect the relatively low incomes in African countries. When we
look at the relationship between the share of processed agricultural exports
relative to total agricultural exports and per capita income, it seems to follow
the same broad relationship as other countries, a quadratic response of the
ratio to income growth.
Simulation analysis is used to examine the response of processed agricul-
tural exports from Africa to changes in protection rates and productivity
growth in processing. The results suggest that tariff escalation in export mar-
kets within the same value chains has powerful impacts. Cutting protection
on processed agricultural products to the levels of bulk products in export
markets would substantially increase exports of processed products from
Africa. Cutting agricultural protection within main African trade blocs and
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extending liberalization to all the trading partners and to all the goods would
similarly increase exports of processed agricultural products.
Our overall assessment is that increased exports of processed agricultural
products could be a worthwhile contributor to an overall upturn in African
agricultural exports. Horticultural products could also contribute to such a
turnaround. However, our view is that policymakers should thinkmuchmore
broadly and develop an export promotion strategy that works both for these
products and other export-oriented goods and services. Most definitely, policy
should not target ‘value-addition’ for these products, a strategy that often
results in value subtraction at the expense of low-income producers. As trad-
ing costs in Africa remain relatively high, including import duties, transpor-
tation costs, documentary and border compliance costs, and other nontariff
measures (Bouët et al. 2017), policy reforms and associated investments
appear to be necessary. For instance, one of the promising ways to encourage
a surge in agro-processing and other exports would be to reduce the cost of
intermediate inputs generally. Reducing this disadvantage for exports—
ideally by reducing protection, but perhaps initially by ensuring that all
exporters have access to intermediates at world prices—is likely to stimulate
growth in a wide range of exports as entrepreneurs discover what exports best
use the country’s skills and resources.
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Air Transport in Africa
A Portrait of Capacity and Competition
in Various Market Segments
Heinrich C. Bofinger
1. Contextual Setting of Air Transport in Africa
Air transport in Africa is a vigorously growing sector. However, the growth,
though an important element of the sector, does not provide a complete
perspective on its health. Several important facts play a role in truly under-
standing where Africa’s air transport has been, is now, and where it might
develop.
Air transport volumes in Africa are still very low when compared to the rest
of the world: with 104 million seats, on all types of routes, sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) is far behind the country of Brazil, with 120million seats, of which nearly
100 million are domestic traffic only. Other comparisons are as staggering.
In the area of Washington DC in the US, three airports (Reagan National
Airport, Dulles Airport, and Baltimore Washington International Airport) had
68.5 million passengers in 2015, which would translate to 90 million seats at a
load factor of 76 per cent. This is nearly all of the capacity offered in all of
SSA. The distribution of these capacities is also important: the main air trans-
port corridors are along the East, stretching from South Africa to Kenya and
north to Ethiopia, all three being important hubs. No such hubs exist in West
Africa, and Central Africa has minimum service. Another factor is the fact that
Africa still leads in hull losses due to accidents,1 and still retains a safety record
1 Hull losses are only one measure of accident rates, and can be skewed: the newer the airplane,
the less likely the airplane is to be written off after an accident rather than repaired. This means,
however, that higher hull loss rates may also indicate older aircraft being in service.
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that is in most need of improvement when compared to the rest of the world.
Though there has been significant improvement from 2010 until 2013, the
sharp increase since then (in 2015 at 3.49) is well ahead of the Common-
wealth of Independent States (1.88), and much above of the world average
(0.32); see Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
The notion of the national flag carrier is still deeply ingrained in the politics
of the air transport sector, and though various privatization attempts have
been made (e.g. PPP arrangements for Air Senegal after the disbandment of
Senegal Airways), many governments are reluctant to (a) completely hand
over airlines to the private sector, or (b) completely depend on airlines from
the outside if a national airline is not economically sustainable.
Both anecdotally and empirically the new challenges for African air trans-
port market development are not so much around liberalization, but rather
affordability and the rise of airport charges. Liberalization amongst African
countries is taking place, as evidenced, for example, by the expansion of fifth
freedom routes of Ethiopian Airlines.2 However, new and sometimes overam-
bitious investments in airports and terminal buildings are increasingly being
financed by higher per passenger airport charges.
2. Airlines and Routes
2.1. Overview of Traffic and Intercontinental Capacities
The overall air transport capacity in SSA has seen significant growth starting
in 2002, from 47.6 million seats to 104.7 million seats in 2015. Overall, traffic
grew at an annual rate of 5.8 per cent between 2001 and 2015, and between
2003 and 2010 the rate jumped to 7.6 per cent. The years of global economic
downturn, between 2009 and 2012, showed a growth rate of 4.9 per cent,
followed by a rate of 5.3 per cent during the subsequent recovery.
Route types in the African market can be divided into different segments:
intercontinental traffic, international traffic within SSA, international traffic
between North Africa and SSA, and domestic traffic within SSA (Table 6.1).3
The highest amount of capacity can be found in the intercontinental capaci-
ties, followed very closely by domestic seat capacity. Though a small player in
overall capacity, the routes connecting North Africa with SSA show the high-
est growth rates, at 12 per cent. The growth in routes with North Africa may
2 Fifth freedom flights are defined as flights leaving, for example country A, landing in country
B and dropping off passengers and picking up passengers, some of whom would then go on to
Country C. The right to pick up passengers in a country other than the airline’s, and then dropping
them off in another country than the airline’s, is what distinguishes this freedom of the air.
3 See Bofinger (2017: Figures 5 and 6).
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have to do with hubs in North Africa providing connections for travellers from
the underserved SSA, especially in West Africa.
Recent developments include first the rise of Ethiopian Airlines’ role on the
continent, displacing South African Airways as the leader. Both Ethiopian and
Emirates seemed to have appeared rather rapidly, without much of a share in
2001 (Table 6.2).
In general, small state-owned carriers are not economically sustainable, and
create market distortions that can cause more harm than good to the industry:
often routes operated by small, state-owned airlines are (at times unofficially)
protected, lowering service standards and preventing competition. Many of
Figure 6.2. Global aircraft positions over continental Africa, 9 July 2016
Source: flightradar24.com (2016), captured 9 July 2016 at 11:28 a.m. EST, reproduced with
permission.
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All markets 47.6 53.2 70.2 89.7 104.7 3.7% 9.7% 5.1% 5.8%
All within Sub-Saharan Africa 29.2 31.4 42.8 54.2 64.2 2.4% 10.9% 5.2% 5.8%
Sub-Saharan domestic 17.1 18.4 26.5 31.9 37.6 2.4% 12.9% 4.5% 5.8%
Sub-Saharan international within
Sub-Saharan
11.3 11.8 14.0 18.9 22.7 1.5% 5.9% 6.3% 5.1%
Sub-Saharan intercontinental
(no North Africa)
18.4 21.8 27.3 35.5 40.5 5.8% 7.8% 5.0% 5.8%
Between North Africa and sub-
Saharan Africa
0.8 1.2 2.4 3.4 3.8 15.8% 24.9% 6.2% 12.0%
Note: Numbers differ slightly from the 2007 version of the study because of improvements in adjusting seats for multi-destination flights.


























the small state-owned carriers, such as Air Malawi and Air Tanzania, had an
extremely small number of seat kilometres served compared to the established
carriers, and proved not to be sustainable.4
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA INTERCONTINENTAL CAPACITIES
Intercontinental traffic (external traffic not including North Africa) has been
growing by an average of 5.8 per cent between 2001 and 2015, from
18.4 million seats to 40.5 million. During this period there was not one year
of negative growth, even during the economic slowdown. Direct routes grew
from 260 to 363.5

























1 Ethiopian Airlines 4.02 11.82 35.68 11.5% 14.8% 16.9%
2 Emirates 1.72 11.03 32.68 10.5% 14.5% 23.4%
3 South African Airways 33.80 32.53 28.61 9.2% 1.6% 1.2%
4 Air France 13.55 18.24 23.57 7.6% 3.3% 4.0%
5 British Airways 19.67 15.89 15.01 4.8% 0.7% 1.9%
6 Kenya Airways 5.05 10.71 14.37 4.6% 3.7% 7.8%
7 KLM 5.99 9.40 10.64 3.4% 1.6% 4.2%
8 Turkish Airlines 0.42 0.59 8.99 2.9% 40.5% 24.5%
9 Delta Air Lines 0.00 2.95 7.96 2.6% 13.2%
10 Air Mauritius 7.26 8.55 7.93 2.6% 0.9% 0.6%
11 Lufthansa 3.17 5.84 7.24 2.3% 2.7% 6.1%
12 Qatar Airways 0.11 2.35 6.72 2.2% 14.0% 34.0%
13 Comair Ltd. 0.00 3.90 6.42 2.1% 6.4%
14 CORSAIR 1.84 2.78 5.84 1.9% 9.7% 8.6%
15 TAAG—Linhas Aereas
de Angola
1.32 2.39 5.41 1.7% 10.8% 10.6%
16 Air Austral 0.40 3.92 5.26 1.7% 3.7% 20.3%
17 Royal Air Maroc 0.45 2.61 4.99 1.6% 8.4% 18.8%
18 Arik Air 0.00 0.46 4.55 1.5% 33.3%
19 Brussels Airlines N.V. 2.94 2.31 4.43 1.4% 8.5% 3.0%
20 TAP—Air Portugal 1.43 3.14 3.98 1.3% 3.0% 7.6%
21 Virgin Atlantic Airways 3.02 5.14 3.59 1.2% 4.4% 1.2%
22 Egyptair 0.99 2.42 3.44 1.1% 4.5% 9.3%
23 Mango Airlines 0.00 0.55 3.42 1.1% 25.7%
24 Etihad Airways 0.03 1.02 2.82 0.9% 13.5% 39.8%
25 Qantas Airways 2.04 2.25 2.73 0.9% 2.5% 2.1%
Note: The airlines represent 82.4% of total market share in estimated seats.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data by Diio (2016).
4 See Bofinger (2017: Tables A2.1 and A2.2) for a listing of airlines.
5 See Bofinger (2017: Figures 7 and 8).
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For a long time, Johannesburg has been by far the most important inter-
continental gateway to SSA. And as traffic has grown overall, so has that of
Johannesburg, albeit at a slower pace. Significant is the emergence of Addis
Ababa as a prime gateway and hub, now, with 5.10 million estimated seats,
nearly as busy as Johannesburg (6.69 million estimated seats).6
The emergence of Emirates and Ethiopian as the prime providers of inter-
continental services is a recent phenomenon, since this role has traditionally
been held by South African Airlines. The decline of South African Airways
from its prominent position is the result of unanticipated challenges and, in
hindsight, ill-advised management decisions.7
British Airways has traditionally been one of the leading airlines from
Europe into East Africa, which is mostly English-speaking. However, this role
has declined, as the airline has gone from serving thirteen SSA in 2001 to only
seven in 2015. By contrast, Air France has held her ground, serving twenty-
one to twenty-five countries each year between 2001 and 2015, most of them
French-speaking, with no presence in East Africa. The top three airlines offer-
ing intercontinental services now consist of Emirates, Ethiopian Airlines, and
Air France.8
2.2. International Traffic within Africa
After a short decline in capacity between 2001 and 2002, international traffic
within Africa showed strong growth, especially within SSA, though inter-
national traffic between SSA and North Africa also increased.9
INTERNATIONAL CAPACITIES WITHIN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
There has been some increase in direct international connectivity measured in
airport pairs served between SSA. This dwarfs the significant increase in overall
capacity, from 10.3 million seats in 2001 to 22.7 million in 2015. Average
growth has been 5.1 per cent for the period.
For a long time, Johannesburg has been by far the most important intercon-
tinental gateway for SSA and as traffic has grown overall, so has that of Johan-
nesburg, albeit at a slower pace. Significant is the emergence of Addis Ababa
as a prime gateway and hub, now edging up to South Africa. Some of the top
connections involve South Africa and its neighbours (Zimbabwe, Namibia), but
also interestingly the islands of Mauritius and Réunion. The significance of the
connection between Kenya and Tanzania is easily explained—their border
shares some of the most important tourist destinations in East Africa.
6 See Bofinger (2017: Figure 7).
7 For a discussion of the rise and fall of carriers in Africa, see Bofinger (2017: Box 1).
8 See Bofinger (2017: Table 5). 9 See Bofinger (2017: Figure 9).
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It is in the international markets within SSA where Ethiopian Airlines’
strategy of expansion, often using fifth freedom flights (hopping from country
to country on a single flight), has paid off. Between 2007 and 2015, the airline
has nudged the long-leading South African Airways into second place, with
10.87 billion seat kilometres as compared to South Africa’s 6.76 billion.
INTERNATIONAL CAPACITIES BETWEEN THE NORTH
AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Between 2003 and 2008 some of the highest annual growth rates in seat
capacity in Africa can be found between North and SSA, topping 30 per cent
in 2004. Overall, the market averaged 12.3 per cent annual growth between
2001 and 2015. The number of routes more than doubled between 2001 and
2015, from thirty airport pairs to over sixty in 2015. Much of this has to do
with the new role of Royal Air Maroc: with scarce connections within West
Africa, the airline developed its connections into the region. The top fifteen
routes include routeswithMorocco and Senegal,Mauritania, CoteD’Ivoire,Mali,
Guinea, Congo, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Sierra Leone. Royal Air Maroc ranks
first in the intra-North and Sub-Saharan market, with a 45.9 per cent market
share, followed by Egypt Air with 31.4 per cent. Not surprisingly, the airport in
Casablanca ranks first in this market, albeit by a small margin over Cairo.10
THE RISE OF FIFTH FREEDOM FLIGHTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The Yamoussoukro Decision of November 1999 aimed at liberalizing inter-
national travel between African countries by promoting free pricing, lifting
capacity and frequency restraints, and by allowing fifth freedom flights. Given
the overall small size of the African air transport market, allowing fifth free-
dom flights is a significant step, since it allows the capacity of an aircraft to be
spread amongst multiple international destinations on one marketed flight.
This allows, for example, a flight to originate out of Addis Ababa, land in
Nairobi, Kenya to drop off and pick up passengers, continue on to Kilimanjaro
in Tanzania to drop off passengers destined there, move on to Dar es Salaam,
drop off passengers there from both Addis Ababa and Nairobi, and pick up
passengers for the last leg back to Addis Ababa.11
The success in the implementation can be measured in the number of
international airport connections served by multi-stop flights in Africa. Sub-
Saharan services have thrived, and multi-legged connections have increased
significantly. The share of seats on those flights as compared to the overall
10 See Bofinger (2017: Tables 9–11).
11 Note that there are no passengers being picked up in Kilimanjaro for Dar-es-Salaam, since this
is a domestic route, and a foreign airline serving domestic routes in another country would consist
of cabotage, which in air transport generally does not occur.
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total has remained within a 20 per cent to 25 per cent band, showing the
importance of these flights as being about one-quarter of the overall capacity.
The total percentage share of the flights themselves over total international
flights in SAA has declined, indicating that the multi-legged international
flights are using larger aircraft with higher seat capacities (Figure 6.3).
The fifth freedom routemodel has become the keystone of the development
of services by key African airlines, with both Ethiopian and Kenyan Airlines
having drastically increased the number of these segments. It also appears to
be the cornerstone strategy of some newcomers, such as RwandaAir, which
has grown 55.1 per cent annually since 2007 and now holds an 8.8 per cent
market share.
2.3. Domestic Traffic
Domestic traffic in SSA has been climbing steadily, from 17 million seats in
2001 to nearly 38 million seats in 2015, with the only decline being between
2011 and 2012. However, as passenger volume has skyrocketed, the number of
direct domestic routes has declined between 2001 and 2009 from above 450 to
below 300. One may, incorrectly, assume that the decline in direct connect-
ivity may have to do with the emergence of hubs such as Bole International





































































International Pairs within SSA Flights Share of Total Flights
Seats Share of Total Seats
Figure 6.3. Number of international airport pairs served on multi-stop flights in
sub-Saharan Africa, and the share of total international routes and seats
Source: Author’s calculations based on data by diio (2016).
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phenomenon, with the number of routes involving hubs such as Bole also
declining between 2001 and 2009 as domestic traffic actually grew. Another
theory could be the increasing urbanization centred on larger African cities,
with less populated destinations falling off the domestic air transport grid.
Also there could be modal shifts between destinations as the road networks
improve.
By far the largest domestic air transport market is South Africa with an
estimated 18.56 million seats in 2015, with Nigeria being a distant second
with 6.62 million seats. Both Kenya and Tanzania have the rift valley as an
important tourist destination, which is also a driver for domestic services.
South Africa also dominates in the number of seats for domestic airports,
and nine out of the top fifteen domestic routes are in South Africa. The three
top domestic airlines, Comair, South African Airways, and Mango Airline are
all based in South Africa, and command over 50 per cent of all domestic seat
capacity in SSA.12
2.4. Competition
A common measure of competitiveness in a given market is the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index (HH Index), which is a measure of market concentration
used both by the US Department of Commerce and the Department of Justice
in allowing corporate mergers. Conceptually, the HH Index is a simple meas-
ure: it is simply the sum of the squares of each market participant’s market
share. The result of the sum allows an interpretation of market concentration.
One way to compute this index would be to total all the seats in a given
market segment, such as intercontinental travel with SSA, and then create the
same summation by airline in the market, with the percentage share. This,
however, would miss the fact that true competitiveness should be measured
on a per route basis. A better measure of competitiveness would be to analyse
the competitiveness of each route in amarket segment, and thenfind anoverall
percentage of routes that fall within a given state of market concentration.





Where n ¼ the number of airlines serving the route, and s ði ¼ 1to nÞ ¼ the
individual market shares per airline.
The following sections present the results of the calculations for each market
segment.
12 See Bofinger (2017: Figures 15, 16, and Tables 13–16).




Routes in general show an almost symmetric pattern of swinging between
being highly concentrated and a complete monopoly with only one airline
serving (Figure 6.4). The percentage of routes that are moderately concen-
trated is very low—their share hovers between 0.1 and 0.6 per cent of all
routes, with 2006 having had the highest share. Overall competitiveness
rose between 2005 and 2007, with the number of highly concentrated routes
gaining at the loss of monopolized routes. This trend reversed itself in 2008,
and as the number of total routes rose, there are indications that the new
routes may have been single-airline routes.
The symmetry of these patterns is common in all market segments, with
some differences in severity. Intercontinental routes with SSA will, for
example, show that over 80 per cent of routes are in a monopoly state,
whereas in northern Africa the percentage has dropped from over 70 to
slightly above 60.
COMPETITION IN SUB-SAHARAN INTERCONTINENTAL ROUTES
Even as the total number of intercontinental routes has risen form a low of
300 in 2003–4 to a high of 440 in 2012, the share of routes in a monop-
olized state has risen from 69.5 per cent in 2001 to 81.5 per cent in 2015
(Figure 6.5). This implies relatively thinly travelled routes, where airlines may





































































% Moderately Concentrated % Highly Concentrated
% Monopoly Number of Routes
Figure 6.4. Percentage of routes by market concentration, all travel with Africa, and
total number of routes
Source: Author’s calculations based on data by diio (2016).
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not much divergence in the pattern—the percentage of sub-Saharan intercon-
tinental routes that are a monopoly has steadfastly been above 70 per cent.
COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL ROUTES
WITHIN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Competitiveness in international routes within SSA was in a dead heat
between routes with only one carrier and highly concentrated, but not mon-
opolized routes in 2001. Since then, single-carrier routes have gained, rising
from 51 per cent of routes to 70 per cent of routes in 2015 (Figure 6.6). A very
similar pattern evolved with international routes within North Africa.
COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL ROUTES BETWEEN
NORTH AFRICAN AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The international routes between the north and SSA feature the least compe-
tition, and the highest percentage shares of monopolies. Royal Air Maroc and
Egypt Air combined hold 77.3 per cent of this market in seat kilometres, with
other competitors being minor. Over 90 per cent of routes are a monopoly
(Figure 6.7).
COMPETITION IN DOMESTIC ROUTES WITHIN SSA
Between 2001 and 2009, as the number of routes served declined from 577 to












































































Figure 6.5. Percentage of routes by market concentration, intercontinental with
sub-Saharan Africa, and the total number of routes
Source: Author’s calculations based on data by Diio (2016).










































































% Moderately Concentrated % Highly Concentrated
% Monopoly Number of Routes
Figure 6.6. Sub-Saharan Africa, and total number of routes








































































% Moderately Concentrated % Highly Concentrated
% Monopoly Number of Routes
Figure 6.7. Percentage of routes bymarket concentration, international travel between
North and sub-Saharan Africa, and the total number of routes
Source: Author’s calculations based on data by Diio (2016).
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monopolies falling to 72 per cent in 2008, and 11 per cent of being highly
concentrated rising to 28 per cent in 2008 (Figure 6.8). A reversal took place at
the oncoming of the global slowdown, and between 2008 and 2009 competi-
tiveness trended downwards, followed by a mild recovery that lasted until
2013. The trend is now towards further consolidation.
POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE OVERALL CONCENTRATION
IN AFRICAN AIR TRANSPORT MARKETS
Overall, African markets suffer from very low volumes. There are only three
truly competing sub-Saharan carriers providing viable international services
within Africa: Kenya Airways, South African Airways, and Ethiopian Airlines.
Many of the routes flown are not sustainable by themselves: only by introdu-
cing fifth freedom ‘round robin’ flights can load factors reach sustainable
levels. An indicator of the density of traffic can be seen in the number of
runways at key airports: only OR Tambo International Airport in Johannes-
burg has two parallel runways, while Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International
Airport does not even have a parallel taxiway for the entire length of the
runway. In another perspective, of the 328 international and intercontinental
airport pairs served in 2015, only 57 had over 100,000 seats, approximately
the viable breakpoint at which competition enters the market. The number of
monopolized routes decreases with the number of estimated seats, the seats








































































Moderately Concentrated Highly Concentrated
Monopoly Number of Routes
Figure 6.8. Percentage of routes by market concentration, domestic travel within
sub-Saharan Africa, and total number of routes
Source: Author’s calculations based on data by Diio (2016).
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The question of why air transport demand is so low on these routes could be
a factor of costs, or perhaps protectionism does play a role. However, most
likely the low demand represents the overall weakness of the economies
involved: Senegal’s Senegal Airlines attempted to build a cross-regional net-
work in West Africa by throwing high-quality capacity at the market (several
Airbus A-320s on leases), but the overall effort failed significantly, with only
operators flying small turboprops being able to sustain service.
Though liberalization is not equally implemented in SSA, the overall
framework Ethiopian Airlines invokes when negotiating with potential part-
ner countries is centred around the Yamoussoukro Decision. The seventeen
SSA countries not served by Ethiopian Airlines are mostly islands, smaller
states, or not densely populated. This would further support the notion that
the lack of service or competition for service in SSA is no longer a function of
restrictions of access (protectionism), but rather lack of demand based on
other economic factors.
THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN AIRLINE OWNERSHIP
A common refrain amongst economists and consultants is that airlines should
not be owned by governments, but be owned and operated by the private
sector. The US and the EU are held up as models for how the industry should
function. Many smaller countries, though, pride themselves in having a
national flag carrier that represents the country in air transport. Often the
marketing towards tourism is cited as a reason.
Travel & Leisure annually ranks the best airlines according to their quality
of service. The magazine also ranks the worst airlines in terms of service. The
2016 lists are interesting, because the top four ‘worst’ airlines (Spirit, Allegiant,
Frontier, and EasyJet) are privately owned in highly competitive domestic
markets, while the top four best airlines are all government-owned flag carriers
(Singapore, Emirates, Qatar, and Etihad). When advised not to reinvest in a
failing flag carrier, and tomove towards private sector participation, a counter-
argument by policy makers is ‘but why, look at the success of Ethiopian,
Singapore, or Emirates’, which are all state-owned flag carriers.
Table 6.3. Number of international routes with monopolies by estimated seats per route






<100,000 200 271 73.8%
>=100,000 and < 200,000 11 36 30.6%
>=200,000 and < 400,000 2 13 15.4%
>=400,000 and < 1,000,000 0 8 0.0%
Source: Author’s calculations based on data by Diio (2016).
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There are, however, many reasons why airlines succeed or fail, and both
private sector and publicly owned airlines do both. In an open system with
publicly owned airlines there is price competition, and though you may see
airlines fail, the consumer benefits through lower prices. In closed, monopol-
ized systems there is no competition, prices may be higher, and an airline may
still fail if there are (a) no economies of scale and (b) no management of the
airline in a truly commercial framework, as is often the case.
2.5. Air Freight
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The air freight market, as measured in ton kilometres, has grown from roughly
1,800 million to nearly 2,900 million between 2008 and 2015. As expected,
the global slowdown is reflected between 2006 and 2008 (air cargo tends to be
a leading indicator). The most recent data shows a slowdown of growth to
about 0.5 per cent, significantly down from the post-recession recovery, where
annual growth was as high as 17.8 per cent between 2009 and 2010.
Ethiopian Airlines has followed an aggressive strategy in expansion, and
the freight ton kilometres for Ethiopia show the results. Both Kenya and
Ethiopia have horticultural (cut flowers) exports, which mean long-haul
flights to Europe.13
DESCRIPTION OF THE AIR FREIGHT MARKET
IN THE NORTH AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Unlike the passenger market in air transport, the air freight market is diffi-
cult to quantify and analyse, in part because there are different variations of
service within the air freight market, and also because of the lack of publicly
available data.
A large portion of air freight (between 30 per cent and 50 per cent by weight
globally) travels within the bellies of passenger jets, along with checked
luggage. The capacity to transport this freight is deeply dependent on passen-
ger flights. Air freight in general is considered to bemore liberalized in terms of
movements between countries and allowing routes, including fifth freedom
routes. However, though the limitations on air freight theoretically are less,
belly capacity realistically places a larger portion of air freight into the same
realm as passenger services, which generally tend to be less liberalized. This
affects the belly capacity for air freight travelling within Africa.
Scheduled cargo services are hard to measure statistically, since markets are
highly competitive, and keeping route data and current and potential clients
13 See Bofinger (2017: Figure 22 and Table 22).
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confidential is a necessary modus operandi in the air cargo industry. A true
understanding of the industry, therefore, needs incorporation of anecdotal
evidence, and also an understanding of the underlying sources of demand.
The sector can be described as having three variations in implementation:
• Belly cargo for within and intercontinental freight transport: perishable
exports such as cut flowers may be loaded into the bellies of wide-bodied
passenger planes leaving Nairobi or Addis Ababa for, say, Europe, where
they are brought to purchasers.
• Dedicated scheduled cargo flights, either from carriers having both pas-
senger services or being strictly cargo, may on a regular basis jump from
country to country (fifth freedom flights), using dedicated cargo aircraft.
• Random charters or industry-specific flights might be undertaken, on a
less formal basis, to export cargo such as mineral products or perishable
food products, with chartered dedicated cargo aircraft. These flights can
be with normally operated airports, or can be bush flights, as is the case in
remote mining operations such as in Congo, DRC.
Africa’s air freight in the past has mostly been of the third variation above:
with minimal industrial exports, the largest bulk of air freight exports were
perishables with Europe (Boeing 2015: 33). The markets vary in their state of
development: Kenya’s flower exports are well studied, and the industry can
now be considered well established. Similar attempts are now being made in
Mwanza, Tanzania. Ethiopia is building its flower exports. Critical factors for
success are the underlying infrastructure in getting cut flowers to the airport:
Kenya’s flower-growing region (Lake Naivasha, 90 km north-west of Nairobi)
is well connected by road to Kenya’s international airport, whereas Ethiopia’s
flower-growing region in the past has had poor road connectivity to Bole
International Airport in Addis Ababa, with a 40 per cent spoilage rate.
3. Safety Oversight
Air safety in Africa has been one of the aviation industry’s biggest concerns.
For years, Africa ranked the worst in jet hull losses and other types of safety
measures. A rash of eight serious accidents between 2002 and 2009 put
aviation safety in Africa into the spotlight: of those eight accidents, four
were in Nigeria, and a concerted effort began to bring safety issues under
control, including a World Bank programme for increasing effective oversight
in several countries in West Africa.
The causes of the high rate of accidents and fatalities are numerous.
For several years, African countries became a favourite destination for older
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soviet-made aircraft, and aircraft age (including western manufacturers) and
overall quality became an issue. The old aircraft ‘dumping’ onto Africa also
reflected a basic lack of capacity by, and independence of, regulatory agen-
cies that often fell under political influence. A potential operator would use
political influence, for example, to have an older cargo aircraft certified for
commercial use even though the aircraft would never pass properly enforced
safety inspections.
ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) provides a
yardstick with which countries can bemeasured comparatively with respect to
their implementation of aviation safety standards and recommended prac-
tices. The audit also issues alerts when a country’s regulatory oversight is
so poor that safety concerns are significant. Four out of the globally eight
countries flagged as such are in SSA, namely Angola, Djibouti, Eritrea, and
Malawi. Overall fifteen SSA countries have deficits in meeting global averages
in implementation of all eight categories being measured.14 What is import-
ant in understanding USOAP averages is that these global averages are (a) just
averages of implementation and below the optimal level of implementation
and (b) as averages, are mathematically pulled lower by poor performers.
Three other global safety assessment programmes exist that have a significant
impact. Beyond ICAO’s USOAP, there is the US FAA’s International Aviation
Safety Assessment (IASA) programme, which also audits safety oversight in
countries, the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) registry, which audits
individual airlines’ safety mechanisms, and the EU blacklist, which bans
either countries or individual airlines from countries from entering the EU.
The FAA’s IASA programme is comprehensive in that it does not audit
specific airlines, but rather the regulatory oversight system of countries.
A country that wishes to fly into the US is required to complete this audit,
and pass the coveted ‘Category 1’ rating, while failing results in a ‘Category 2’.
To date there are only four SSA that carry the Category 1 rating: Ethiopia,
South Africa, Cape Verde, and recently (as of 2010) Nigeria.
IATA requires all member airlines to pass the ISOA, after which the passing
airline appears on the IATA registry. Currently there are thirty-one sub-
Saharan airlines on the registry, including the major carriers (Ethiopian
Airlines, Kenya Airways, and South African Airways).
The EU blacklist is unique in two aspects. The list works by country, airline,
and even specific aircraft, where for example all aircraft from a mentioned
airline may be banned from the EU except for one or two with specific registry
numbers. The list also mentions airlines that do not fly into the EU, and have
no intention of flying into the EU: the list warns European nationals about
14 See Bofinger (2017: Table 24).
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what airlines to avoid when travelling abroad. In 2012, the list contained 284
airlines, of which 130were African, and 24 countries, of which 17were African
(Ohaeri 2012). The list of 12 August 2016 still includes 24 countries, of which
15 are Sub-Saharan (European Union 2016).
The silver lining in the cloud is that the shock of the series of accidents
between 2005 and 2006 in Nigeria resulted in significant changes in the
leadership of Nigeria’s civil aviation authority. On 23 April 2010 Nigeria
received the coveted Category 1 rating by the US FAA. In 2012, the African
Union signed the Abuja Declaration on Aviation Safety in Africa, which is now
being implemented in cooperation with IATA.
4. Policy Recommendations
Three significant challenges face the aviation sector in SSA: aviation safety
(a reflection of institutional oversight); non-sustainable national flag carriers;
and expensive infrastructure investments that overestimate demand and fail
to recognize the key functions of airports. Policy makers should be fully aware
of where the separation of private sector service provision and public infra-
structure should occur. Three general policy recommendations are:
1) Aviation safety cannot be compromised for any short-term economic
gain or interim policy objective.
Preventing accidents requires a rigorous institutional approach in implementing
international standards and recommended practices. Regulators, airport
authorities, and airlines should be institutionally separated and have clear
firewalls between them
2) Small, state-owned flag carriers tend to drain state funds, are not
sustainable, hinder the sector from developing, and often even pose a
safety hazard.
There is a list of about-to-be defunct and actually defunct small flag carriers
that have accumulated extensive losses for their treasuries. Airlines appear,
some survive, and some fail, and the private sector should assume this risk
3) Airport investment should be done carefully, keeping in mind that
most airports serve as gateways, not as hubs, and that creating a hub
requires players who desire a hub.
Three notions need to be kept inmind when looking at airport investments:
a) Airports are, by their very nature, monopolistic. But airports are also
complex systems: there is, for example, no shortage of runways in Africa
given the current traffic levels. However, terminal space can run out as traffic
grows, and terminals can be developed with private sector participation. It is
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Air Transport in Africa
131
becoming more and more common for governments without the capital
reserves to invest in new terminals to use PPP concessions to finance new
investments
b) Many countries dream of developing passenger or logistics hubs at the
airports, often spurred on by hearing news that a neighbouring country has
the same plans. The fact is that there can only be somany hubs globally, and
most likely the airport in question really serves as an all-important gateway
c) In Africa, new airport development is often financed through very high
ticket surcharges. These have the effect of reducing traffic and demand. If a
US$400 ticket has a US$80 to US$100 airport development surcharge, the
extra 25 per cent added to the ticket price will have a dampening effect.
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How Trucking Services Have Improved and
May Contribute to Economic Development
The Case of East Africa
Charles Kunaka, Gaël Raballand, and Mike Fitzmaurice
1. Introduction
An efficient and properly functioning transportation and logistics system
drives competitiveness, particularly in this era of tightly integrated global
supply chains and cross-border trade.1 There has long been consensus in the
literature and among policy makers on the importance of good logistics in
order to make manufacturing and exports grow (Huria and Brenton 2015;
Oqubay 2015; Haralambides and Londoño-Kent 2004). The regional dimen-
sion of infrastructure and trade facilitation policies is considered as an import-
ant determinant of countries’ ability to connect to global value chains
(Shepherd 2016).
Good logistics means efficient services, such as trucking services, freight
forwarding and handling, and terminal operation, as well as those provided
by a whole chain of service providers. In this regard, there is a common
paradox:
1 The authors are grateful for the guidance and suggestions of several colleagues and reviewers,
among them Richard Newfarmer, John Page, and Phil English, as well as participants at a workshop
organized by UNU-WIDER in July 2016. The authors are also indebted to Olivier Hartmann, who
provided data and shared his tremendous knowledge of the trucking industry of East Africa. They
also appreciate the generosity of many of the trucking firms and drivers, who provided data during
surveys on the industry. Mike Fitzmaurice has been involved in many such surveys and is
particularly grateful for their willingness to share their views on the improvement of the
trucking industry of the region. Last and by no means least, the authors acknowledge the
support and resources provided by UNU-WIDER and the World Bank, without which this work
would not have been possible.
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• On the one hand, it is clear from experiences on the ground and the
perceptions of traders and exporters/importers that efficiency in logistics
services is crucial for trade growth
• On the other hand, as mentioned by Porter (2014), research on transport
services efficiency has mainly been a ‘forgotten factor’ in the literature on
infrastructure efficiency.
Trucking services are crucial to the development of African economies. Access
to regional markets is very sensitive to the efficiency of trucking services, as
these are the dominant mode of transport. More efficient transport services
and increasing trucking industry productivity are crucial to the development
of various industries, such as horticultural products, including fresh fruit,
vegetables and flowers.
Efficiency in logistics services is also crucial to regional trade integration: if
trucking services are not efficient, the economic impact of infrastructure
investments is limited (Teravaninthorn et al. 2009). When access is granted
regionally to foreign-owned logistics firms, the export of services can grow in
line with increased efficiency.
In East Africa, there have been numerous concerns over logistics efficiency
(for example, Kamarudeen and Söderbom 2013 for the case of Rwanda; World
Bank 2013 for Kenya; Hartmann and Asebe 2013 for East Africa as a whole).
Balistreri et al. (2016) find that trade costs have become a greater barrier to
trade integration than tariffs. So, even as tariffs have been abolished within
the East African Community (EAC), high trade costs, of which transport is a
major component, still hamper the free flow of commerce.
However, East Africa is making progress in logistics performance—at least
according to the Logistics Performance Index (LPI).2 East African countries
were among the most improved countries between 2014 and 2016. Kenya,
Rwanda, and Uganda out-perform their income group peers (see Figure 7.A1 in
the Annex). This is mainly due to: (a) port and border post improvements;
(b) transit management reforms; and (c) reduction in en-route physical checks
and controls.
With a focus on East Africa, this chapter will not only assess the efficiency/
inefficiency of the trucking industry in comparison with other regions of the
world, but also present the various industry trends (in terms of productivity/
competition/innovation) in order to supply information usually overlooked
by policy makers and trade researchers. Through this lens of fleet character-
istics and management, the chapter will explain why there have been
major price reductions along the Northern Corridor but not along the
Central Corridor.
2 For details on the methodology of the LPI, see http://lpi.worldbank.org/.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Industries without Smokestacks
134
In terms of methodology, we utilize a combination of unpublished data
surveys and published data (mainly port data). We present unpublished
material obtained through trucking and border surveys to assess the extent
of trucking services integration.
Based on these various types of data on the trucking industry, several
important messages can be drawn:
• There has been a noticeable price reduction of long-distance trucking
services along the Northern Corridor (the corridor from Mombasa,
Kenya, to Uganda/Rwanda/Burundi/eastern DRC).
• The integration of trucking services is moving fast in East Africa (along the
Northern Corridor), with three-quarters of trucks serving Rwanda foreign-
owned.
• Trucking fleet characteristics and management have improved tremen-
dously and are now comparable to those of South Africa, which has the
most developed market in sub-Saharan Africa.
• The facilitation of border clearance processes has played a major role in
improving fleet productivity.
• Regional harmonization of infrastructure, improvements in vehicle
standards, and the facilitation of market access seem to be bearing some
fruit along the Northern Corridor, as evidenced by the rapid development
of larger and more efficient truck fleets (with several companies operating
more than 500 trucks in this sub-region).
• However, some forms of protection remain in place, taking effect through
the prohibition of cabotage, the imposition of permits, or restrictions on
vehicle configurations.
Overall, transport price decreases along the Northern Corridor derive from
increased competition and a reduction in border-crossing delays that led to
increased mileage and lowered traffic. There has been an incentive to invest-
ment in new fleets and an increase in professionalism.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section
presents the stylized facts on trade volumes and transport prices trends.
Section 3 presents the characteristics of the truck fleets and the main trade
facilitation reforms that have taken place in East Africa in recent years.
Section 4 provides estimates of the extent of competition in the trucking
industry regionally and an assessment of the remaining obstacles. The final
section presents conclusions and suggests what should be done to further
improve trucking efficiency in the sub-region.
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2. Trade Volumes and Transport Prices
International trade volumes of EAC countries have increased significantly in
recent years. For instance, over the period between 2010 and 2014, total trade
increased from US$3.7 billion to US$5.6 billion. However, the increase in trade
volumes was even more visible in the growth in international trade flows
through the main trade gateways of the ports Mombasa and Dar es Salaam.
At Mombasa, the volume of traffic increased by half between 2004 and 2011,
while at Dar es Salaam it doubled between 2002 and 2010. In the last decade,
traffic flows have increased from over 400,000 TEUs3 to over 1 million TEUs.
Even if port traffic in East Africa remainsmarginal compared with other regions
of the world, traffic has increased dramatically in the last decade.
While the coastal states of Kenya and Tanzania account for much of the
growth in traffic through their ports, the growth in the volume of transit
traffic to and from the landlocked countries has been just as significant.
A combination of infrastructure and border management improvements has
led to greater volumes being shipped faster and more efficiently to economic
centres in Burundi, eastern DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. In fact, the region is
beginning to develop a regionally integrated and increasingly sophisticated
logistics system with infrastructure and services connecting the seaports
and container freight stations with the inland container depots (ICDs)4
and other customs clearance facilities. This is despite the fact that some of the
infrastructure, especially off-dock facilities, was initially designed as a quick-fix
solution to overcome port congestion.5 Off-dock facilities were initially estab-
lished in 2007 in the vicinity of the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam to
alleviate terminal congestion but have since become established as extensions
of the ports, as well as being designated to handle specific types of cargo.
In contrast to the situation in the colonial period when rail transport
dominated, road transport is by far the most important mode of transport
in East Africa (see Figure 7.1), with a market share of over 90 per cent for the
EAC region as a whole and for Tanzanian traffic (out of the port) and over
80 per cent for Zambia and DRC, despite the long distances involved. This
explains why trucking services efficiency is critical to logistics efficiency and,
consequently, manufacturing growth in the sub-region.
Limited capacity and unreliability due to operational constraints limits the
market share of the railways, the only other feasible mode, to about 6 per cent
of total volumes in both the Northern and Central Corridors. The railways
3 Twenty-foot equivalent units.
4 In East Africa, ICDs are secured facilities far from the port that help importers and exporters to
process goods clearance. They are mainly along railway lines in East Africa.
5 For a more detailed presentation of the implemented reforms, especially for Dar es Salaam, see
Raballand et al. (2012).
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suffer from many years of low investment and poor reliability; even after
concessioning, they are yet to attract traffic from the roads. However, it is
expected that the new standard-gauge railway network that is under construc-
tion across the region will offer faster and more reliable services and be more
competitive with road transport.
With the rapid growth of traffic, many companies have invested in new
trucks in recent years (especially in Kenya). However, in the last two or three
years, traffic has not increased as before; in a competitive environment, supply
being in excess of demand, prices should therefore have decreased. This has
been partially true in East Africa (and is a proxy for remaining obstacles to
competition in the sub-region, as will be illustrated later).
In recent years, there have been conflicting trends in East Africa:
• Transport prices along the Northern Corridor have gone down signifi-
cantly (by 30 per cent from Mombasa to Kigali between 2011–15 and by
26 per cent to Kampala during the same period).
• Transport prices along the Central Corridor have increased significantly
in this same period, with an increase of 79 per cent from Dar to Kampala
and 36 per cent to Kigali.6
It is all the more puzzling that Tanzania has had such a price increase when
traffic has increased even more than in Kenya, which should have led to the
same investments and trucking professionalism improvements. As we will




































Figure 7.1. Road transport share of different destinations out of Dar es Salaam, 2015
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from Tanzania Ports Authority.
6 Shippers Council of Eastern Africa (2015).
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this probably explains at least partly why transport prices are still high despite
growing traffic.
The possible impacts of improving logistics performance can be seen from
the results of the East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP)
financed by the World Bank in East Africa (see Box 7.1 below). Financing
through the project totalled US$219 million, distributed across four project
countries: Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.7 The project financed
improvements to infrastructure (border posts, weighbridges); modern IT
systems in the port and for trade portals and national single window systems;
and the rehabilitation of vessels on Lake Victoria. It also financed policy
reforms for border management in all the project countries.
One of themost effective ways to assess the impact of improvements along a
trade corridor is to look at the changes in the costs incurred by the supply
chains along the corridor. A supply chain approach helps to disaggregate the
costs associated with each activity along the supply chain and allows for the
Box 7.1 THE EATTFP
The EATTFP was developed as a response to a request by the EAC and its member
countries. Following is promulgation, the EAC sought World Bank and African Develop-
ment Bank support to enhance the regional integration agenda in East Africa. The
project was conceived with three main aims:
i. to support the improvement of the general trade environment through effective
implementation of the customs union and related free market;
ii. to support actions for improving the efficiency of supply chains in and out of the
region as well as along the trade routes linking the main gateways to the main
economic centres;
iii. to support the governments of Kenya and Uganda in the joint concessioning of
the Kenya and Uganda Railways.
The project was designed to reduce delays and uncertainty caused by poor transport
systems and logistics. The weaknesses in logistics performance showed themselves through:
• port clearance delays
• poor infrastructure and services conditions along the main corridors
• long clearance times at border crossings
• poor general transport and transit organization
• inefficient intermodal interfaces and inland clearance processes.
Project interventions were a mix of seemingly discrete actions, as shown below, but
which all contributed to the development objective.
7 The amount included a partial risk guarantee of US$60 million for the concessioning of the
railway between Kenya and Uganda.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Industries without Smokestacks
138
assessment of the impact of facilitation and regulatory or investment meas-
ures (Arvis et al. 2010). Direct and indirect costs can be estimated for each
activity, including the costs and time associated with the clearance of goods
through a port or a border post, the cost of storage of goods in warehouses
(and related opportunity costs of stock-outs and tied up capital), and the costs
of mitigating the risk of unreliability in system operations. Uncertainty in
delivery time can impose a significant cost on shippers of goods and is often
one of the most important cost items to estimate. Using a supply chain
approach in East Africa, it was established that the main cargo delays at the
ports, especially Mombasa, were reduced by simplified processes, as were
clearance times at border crossing points, and there were improvements to
intermodal interfaces and inland clearance processes.
As argued above, most of the growth in traffic in East Africa has been
accommodated by road transport. The economic analysis of the EATTFP
suggested savings to the four economies where the project was implemented
totalling US$800 million by 2012 from an initial investment of US$200
million. The savings were distributed as shown in Table 7.1.
Even though a majority of the benefits concerned the transit countries
(Kenya/Tanzania), Uganda and Rwanda benefited from annual transport
savings of over US$200 million and over US$35 million, respectively, or
3–4 per cent of total import costs.
Reforms during EATTFP implementation have had an even greater impact
on reducing uncertainty than on delays and transport costs (see Figure 7.2).
A graphical illustration of the impacts makes it clear that whereas the benefits
of the reductions in delays and uncertainty were expected initially to be felt
largely in the coastal countries, Kenya and Tanzania, such benefits are also
significant in the landlocked countries, Rwanda and Uganda. Still, contrary to
the conventional wisdom that the benefits of regional projects should be
largest in landlocked countries, the analysis clearly shows that Kenya and
Tanzania, the coastal countries, have benefited much more from trade facili-
tation interventions.
The analysis also shows that the return on investment from soft interven-
tions is much larger than from any infrastructure project. The internal rate
of return (IRR) for the project, if all the effects are attributed to it, is over
100 per cent. Even if only a third of the impacts are attributed to the EATTFP,
the project has still brought significant benefits to the private sector in East
Africa. The impact of the types of intervention supported by the project,
especially on shippers and transport companies, was most visible at the
border posts. At the Malaba border post, between Kenya and Uganda, a
dramatic reduction in clearance times was observed. These reduced from
an average of twenty four hours to an average of four hours between Decem-
ber 2012 and January 2013. The reduction was due to a cocktail of measures,
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chief among them (i) better coordination and data-sharing between the
border agencies of the two countries; (ii) mandatory pre-arrival lodgement
of declarations; and (iii) the imposition of traffic and truck parking rules to
decongest the Customs Controlled Zone.
Improvements in the performance of the Northern Corridor, combined
with other reforms (especially the introduction of a single customs territory),
have led to a reorganization of some logistics services. Especially in Kenya,
Rwanda, and Uganda, the traditional trucking firms and clearing and forward-
ing enterprises are increasingly offering combined services, covering clearing
and forwarding, storage, and transportation. Over time, in line with empirical
evidence from other countries, it can be expected that some of the operators













2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012
Transport Delays Uncertainty
Tanzania Rwanda Uganda Kenya
Figure 7.2. Composition of logistics cost savings as a result of EATTFP
Source: Authors’ estimates based on World Bank project monitoring data.
Table 7.1. Savings resulting from EATTFP interventions in
2012 (in million US$)
Transport Delays Uncertainty
Kenya 0 126.4 176.1
Uganda 92 49.2 50.8
Rwanda 21.2 8.1 7.2
Tanzania 0 52 223.3
Total 113.2 235.7 457.4
Source: Data from Waithaka et al. (2014).
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3. Fleet Characteristics and Developments
Even though there remain numerous problems, trucking services efficiency
has improved significantly in recent years (especially along the Northern
Corridor) among Kenyan fleets, some of which are now on a par with those
in South Africa.
We present in this section the results of (unpublished) trucking surveys in
East Africa carried out in 2012–13 (see Table 7.2 for the number of enterprises
surveyed).8 These have generated new data, which shed new light on the road
transport industry in East Africa, as presented in the rest of this chapter.
The main findings are the following:
• East African fleets are catching up South African companies in terms of
productivity, fleet age, use of GPS devices, and tracking.
• However, in the sub-region, Tanzanianfleets still lag behind Kenyan fleets.
• The market continues to be concentrated, with a small number of
companies owning a large share of the total fleet and a multitude of
family-owned companies.9
• In terms of employment generation, direct employment of trucking
services remains rather limited (since it is a capital-intensive activity).
As in the more sophisticated trucking markets of the USA and Europe,
the ownership of the road transport industry in East Africa is concentrated:
5 per cent of the enterprises operate 45 per cent of the truck fleet in Kenya,
while that proportion is 40 per cent in Tanzania. There is a dual market, with
large enterprises co-existing and competing with much smaller enterprises.
In 2014 the Tanzania Transport Operators Association (TATOA) had 838
members, of which 692 (83 per cent) owned between 1 and 15 trucks
and 146 (17 per cent) had 16 trucks or more. In fact, in Tanzania more than
Table 7.2. Enterprises surveyed versus total per country
Kenya Tanzania Rwanda South Africa
Total enterprises 1,574 732 220 1,296
Total fleet 17,066 12,356 444 73,787
Note: Figures include domestic transportation.
Source: Data from Hartmann and Asebe (2013); and NP & Associates for South Africa.
8 The surveys were the result of a collaboration between corridor authorities and national road
transport associations (NRTAs) and increased the visibility of the NRTAs for the industry.
9 This is not specific to Africa, but is also a characteristic of this industry in the USA and Europe
(Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2009).
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50 per cent of the enterprises operate 7 trucks or fewer, while in Kenya a
similar proportion operate 4 trucks or fewer. In Rwanda, almost 80 per cent
of the enterprises operate only one truck. At the other end of the spectrum,
several companies operate over 500 trucks, especially in Kenya.10
Although some enterprises are large, most road transport enterprises in
East Africa are family/individual owned (see Table 7.3). In general, share-
holding companies are rare, particularly in Tanzania, and they are mostly
controlled by national enterprises. Foreign shareholding and investment is
practically non-existent, largely due to the relatively low attractiveness of
transportation services compared with other services that are open to foreign
direct investment.
This should not imply that individual ownership prevents a firm from being
managed professionally. The survey depicts an industry in which the top
management is highly qualified,11 the fleet is carefully managed and main-
tained, employees are paid comparatively well, and modern operational tech-
niques are used.
As an illustration of the openness to modern techniques, the level of utiliza-
tion of ICT for fleet management is high, particularly in Kenya and Rwanda,
and there is a high use of GPS management for large fleets (see Figure 7.3). It is
particularly striking that half of the enterprises with fewer than ten trucks
in Kenya and in Rwanda (where they actually tend to have fewer than seven
trucks) are equipped with GPS-based fleet management systems.
The introduction of GPS devices has enabled firms to better monitor vehicle
utilization and drivers’ practices and has led to transport time reduction as
well as better tracking of vehicles and cargo. GPS has also helped to improve
the performance of other logistics services users and service providers. Ship-
pers are able to better track and trace their shipments, while customs and other
Table 7.3. Ownership structure of road transport enterprises in East Africa
Kenya (%) Tanzania (%) Rwanda (%)
Individual/family-owned 71 89 74
Local shareholding 16 2 16
Foreign shareholding 3 2 0
Publicly-owned 1 0 0
Others 6 1 0
Not specified 3 7 11
Total n 101 117 19
Source : Data from Hartmann and Asebe (2013).
10 In South Africa, 36 companies operate more than 500 trucks.
11 In both Kenya and Tanzania, most top managers are graduates or post-graduates and have
professional experience—typically 5–15 years, but frequently more.
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border agencies can monitor shipments of high-risk commodities, especially
for transit operations.
To some extent, the characteristics of the fleet are in line with prevailing ICT
techniques, as the acquisition practices of the road transport enterprises differ,
as shown in Table 7.4—in Kenya the majority of trucks were purchased new,
in Rwanda second-hand trucks are slightly in themajority, and in Tanzania an
overwhelming majority are second-hand purchases. The average age of the
fleet reflects those practices: 7.5 years in Kenya, 12.6 years in Rwanda, and
over 16 years in Tanzania.
As a result, the total Kenyanfleetmay even perform better than the total South
African fleet. In terms of fleet productivity, according to logistics performance
surveys, almost one-third of the interviewed fleets operate trucks covering more
than 15,000 kmpermonth (which ismore than the South African fleet record).12
4. Trade Facilitation and Public Policies
Numerous public reforms have been undertaken in the last decade in East Africa
to facilitate trade, with a mix of ‘hard’ measures (mainly infrastructure invest-
ments such as road rehabilitation and new border facilities) and ‘soft’ measures
(simplification of processes, harmonization of rules, etc.). An example of
reforms based on soft rather than hard interventions is the East Africa Trade







Large Medium Small Unspecified Total
Kenya Tanzania Rwanda
Figure 7.3. Percentage of use of GPS fleet management according to fleet size
Note: Large = 100+ trucks, Medium = 11–99 trucks, Small = 1–10 trucks.
Source: Hartmann and Asebe (2013).
12 Around 10,000 km per month, according to Shippers Council of Eastern Africa (2015).
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Why is trade facilitation so important for trucking efficiency? According to
Hartmann and Asebe (2013), even though investing in infrastructure is essen-
tial, it is often not sufficient to enhance the efficiency of border management
but must be accompanied by close cooperation between border agencies in
one country as well as with those of the neighbouring country. In many
instances this increases revenues for countries but also reduces costs for the
private sector. The impacts of the interventions through the EATTFP and
complementary initiatives were significant, leading to greater fleet utilization
and savings in other costs running to several millions of dollars.
Government authorities have striven to reduce procedural obstacles in order
to speed up clearance processes. A study by the SSATP (2013) at the Malaba
border post (at the Kenya–Uganda border) found that reforms to clearance
processes had resulted in a drop in average crossing times for all trucks from
twenty-four hours to four hours (forty-eight hours to six hours for loaded
trucks) (see Figure 7.4), while the value of the time saved by trucking compan-
ies and traders was equivalent to US$70 million per year.
Table 7.4. Age of truck at purchase and fleet age
New, % Second-hand, % Unknown, % Total operated Average age (years)
Kenya 56 23 21 4,531 7.5
Tanzania 18 80 2 4,322 16.2
Rwanda 38 60 2 133 12.6
South Africa
(cross-border fleet)
80 20 33,942 7






















3h to 6h 6h to 24h 24h to 48h Over 48h
Before reform After reform
Figure 7.4. Time spent at Malaba border post before and after reform
Data source: SSATP (2013).
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Alongwith the simplification of processes, one-stop border posts (OSBPs) have
been set up in East Africa at major crossing points in order to reduce the number
of controls and therefore border processing time. It seems that, in East Africa,
border crossing times are on a downward trend (despite increased traffic).
In parallel with national reforms, the EAC (the major regional integration
body) has developed regional rules in areas relevant to trucking efficiency.
These are aimed at harmonizing road and vehicle standards, vehicle insurance
policies, and even market access. The main legal instrument governing
trucking operations is the East African Community Tripartite Agreement on
Road Transport. This agreement was originally signed by Kenya, Tanzania,
and Uganda in 2001; Rwanda and Burundi became parties to it on joining the
EAC. The agreement is complemented by specific instruments such as axle
load controls and other protocols for the two main trade routes, the Northern
and Central Corridors. Taken together, the various regional or corridor instru-
ments seem to have led to the rapid development of new and efficient truck
fleets, especially on the Northern Corridor.
5. Employment
Trucking surveys have enabled us to estimate the extent of employment
in trucking services in East Africa (Kenya/Tanzania/Rwanda). On average,
each truck has approximately 2.5 staff (one driver and one or two additional
staff—usually a mechanic/second driver and, in the case of large companies,
an administrative/support staff person) (see Table 7.5). For those three
countries, there are approximately 30,000 trucks, amounting to approxi-
mately 75,000 total staff, compared with total employment in manufactur-
ing of just over 400,000.
Trucking is becoming increasingly integrated in East Africa, and Kenyan
transport services are being exported along the Northern Corridor. However,
trade in transport services remains low compared with trade in goods.
Table 7.5. Estimate of total employment generated by trucking industry
Trucks Drivers per truck Employment per truck Total employment
Kenya 17,066 1.11 2.73 46,590
Tanzania 12,356 1.18 2.23 27,554
Rwanda 444 1.11 2.77 1,230
Total 29,866 75,374
Source : Data from Hartmann and Asebe (2013).
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6. Competition
Competition in the trucking industry,while it has been generally ignored, seems
to play a major role in price determination and therefore in trade and develop-
ment. Lall et al. (2009) considered the function of scale economies, market
structure, and competition between transport providers as determinants of
transport prices inMalawi andconcluded thatmarket structure and competition
play a major role in determining prices. Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009)
demonstrated that, along the major corridors in Africa, transport prices (the
prices paid by users) were high, whereas transport costs (the cost of ‘producing’
the transport) were no higher than in Europe on some corridors—the most
problematic region being West Africa, where bilateral trade agreements divide
the trucking market between transit countries and landlocked countries, the
latter operating a ‘tour de role’ system13 that creates rents by non-transparently
allocating access to freight. Finally, USAID (2012) demonstrated in the case of
West Africa that trucking liberalization could save over US$400 million in
transport costs and increase the value of transit trade by around 8 per cent.
In East Africa, with rapid growth in traffic have come large fleet investments
in recent years (especially in Kenya), with the result that access to freight has
become even more critical to the viability of trucking operations. Kenya’s
trucking industry has developed very much along the lines of the South African
trucking industry and canbe compared to it. Trucking inKenya, unlike Tanzania,
is not centred around cross-border trade and has a large local and regional
component. Imported goods are moved by local trucking fleets from the port of
Mombasa to the hinterland and the area around Nairobi.
A major concentration of demand is to be found in the ports. Access to
freight volumes in ports is therefore a significant factor in trucking efficiency
in East Africa. That there is competition, at least in Rwanda, is clear.
Although there are no publicly available data on market share breakdown
among fleets, we have been able to compute them based on surveys on the
ownership of trucks conducted at border posts compared with port data on
cargo destinations. At the Gatuna border post (Rwanda–Uganda border),
Rwandan companies operate only 20 per cent of the flows (see Table 7.6).
However, the figure of 280 trucks a day is not the total market share
market of Rwanda, since this country is a transit country for flows to Burundi
and DRC. Taken from the Uganda trade diagnostic (World Bank 2013),
approximately thirty trucks a day from each country transit through the
Gatuna border post to Burundi and DRC. The total market for Rwanda is
therefore approximately 220 trucks a day, meaning that Rwandan
13 Trucking companies load cargo based on approvals from the shippers’ council and/or trucking
associations.
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companies operate more than a quarter of Rwandan trade. But it also means
that the bulk of Rwanda trade is transported by foreign-owned trucks
(mainly Kenyan and Ugandan).14
From these data we can estimate the value of trucking services from Kenya
to Rwanda. Based on the price of a truckload from Mombasa to Kigali
(US$4,500 in 2015 (Shippers Council of Eastern Africa 2015)) and assuming
a minimal figure of fifty trucks a day,15 we estimate the value of transport
services from Kenya to Rwanda to be US$50 million per annum. This com-
pares with the total value of trade between the two countries in 2013 of
US$169 million. While not often included in official statistics, transport ser-
vices are therefore a large share of the trade exchange between the countries.
Competition is less intensive along the Central Corridor. The road transport
industry in Tanzania is regulated by the Transit Goods Permit System, which
restricts the movement of foreign-registered vehicles through the country and
therefore favours Tanzania-registered transporters. Local transporters pay only
US$10 per trailer unit for an annual Transit Permit, which is required by the
Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) to transport cargo through Tanzania to
neighbouring countries or other landlocked countries. It is also an EAC
requirement that all transit trailers have the words ‘TRANSIT GOODS’ painted
or stuck on the side of the chassis in large, clearly visible letters. On the other
hand, foreign-registered vehicles are required to pay US$300 per trailer unit
per annum for the same Transit Permit from TRA. Moreover, most southern
African countries have adopted the South African-designed Interlink trailer
configuration, which means that they have to pay US$600 per annum for a
two-trailer combination. On top of this, the Tanzania National Road Agency
Table 7.6. Average daily number of trucks crossing









Note: The nationality of trucks is determined by the vehicle registration.
Source : Authors’ own trucking surveys.
14 It is impossible to compute the market share of the various fleets, since some of them also
transit to Burundi and DRC. The largest market share is held by Kenyan trucks, especially
for imported goods from overseas, since they are mostly based in Mombasa port area.
15 Based on observation of 87 trucks per day and assuming that the remaining transit fleet for
Burundi and DRC is Kenyan-owned.
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(TANROADS)—which is opposed to these trailers coming into the country,
claiming that they damage the road infrastructure—has made it a requirement
that Interlink trailers must obtain an Abnormal Load Permit on entry at
the border post, at a cost of US$20 per crossing. This makes it difficult for
foreign-registered vehicles to participate or compete in the Tanzania trucking
industry. Moreover, foreign-registered transport companies are opposed to
having the words ‘TRANSIT GOODS’ permanently on their trailers. All these
measures discriminate against foreign-registered trucks and restrict competi-
tion with Tanzanian fleets along the Central Corridor.
The Tanzanian case illustrates the fact that some forms of protection remain
in place in the sub-region. The most common regulations are: discriminatory
prices on transit permits; different axle-load regulations,16 prohibiting some
trailer combinations; discriminatory road use charges for foreign-registered
vehicles; taxes at borders,17 prohibition of cabotage.18 However, thanks to
increasing integration and competition in East Africa, transport prices charged
to manufacturers/importers and exporters have been on a decreasing trend,
which makes production and trade to/from East Africa more competitive.
7. Conclusions and Recommendations
There are some positive signs regarding the trucking industry in East Africa:
• transport quality and fleet management have rapidly improved in
recent years
• regional integration, though not perfect, is taking place in the Northern
Corridor
• competition has increased
• consequently, transport prices decreased by 30per cent along theNorthern
Corridor between 2011–15.
It should be emphasized that not all hard infrastructure has the same impact
and that hard and soft investments may be complementary. Road rehabilita-
tion along busy corridors is economically justified. However, creating
One-Stop Border Posts (OSBPs) without changing procedures and processes
will not have a major economic impact.
16 For more information on the various types of protection in the trucking industry, see
Raballand et al. (2008).
17 This mainly concerns the DRC.
18 Using foreign-registered vehicles for the domestic movement of merchandise. Even in the EU,
cabotage was prohibited until 1992.
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Since increasing trucking industry productivity is crucial to the develop-
ment of various logistics-intensive industries (e.g. fresh fruit, vegetables,
flowers),19 these recent trends are encouraging. However, prospects for indus-
tries without smokestacks depend on even greater regional harmonization
and integration. It is important for policy makers in the region to give even
greater priority to the implementation of regional regulations over national
and bilateral approaches in order to make trucking services even more pro-
ductive, thereby facilitating the trade expansion of African countries.
Improving logistics performance in East Africa can have a transformative
impact on the economic development of the region. Reductions in transport
and logistics costs are expected to serve as a stimulus for the reorganization of
economic activity. As a result of such reductions, amanufacturer could change
the source of inputs or the destination of exports or relocate production,
thereby reconfiguring the topology of their supply chains. They could also
enter into the production of new products. Ultimately, therefore, improve-
ments in transport and logistics can affect the real economy and also the
















































Figure A7.1. LPI scores in 2016
Source : Authors’ compilation based on data from World Bank (2016).
19 Constraints along the value chain are not always related to transport issues.
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Opening Markets to Create Opportunities
Bernard Hoekman
1. Introduction
African trade is heavily concentrated in agricultural and natural resource-based
commodities and the agricultural sector continues to be a major source of
employment and economic activity—especially when indirect ancillary linkages
are taken into account.1 Although trade volumes have risen since the 1990s,
and exports of some industrial and processed products have been increasing,
intra-regional trade remains well below potential, and the challenge of diversi-
fication continues to prevail. There are encouraging prospects for accelerat-
ing trade growth as a result of policy reforms, ranging from trade facilitation
efforts to the high-level political ambition to achieve regional integration
objectives—e.g. through a continental free trade agreement. Much depends
on the willingness and ability of African leaders to deliver on their stated
objectives. A premise of this chapter is that a precondition for leveraging
trade opportunities is a substantial reduction in trading and transaction
costs for African firms, and that this must go beyond the current focus on
actions to facilitate trade and focus more on improving the performance of a
variety of services, including transport, logistics, and related services.
Reducing trade costs in Africa is in (large) part a challenge of increasing
productivity in a variety of service activities—most obviously in the areas of
transport and logistics, less obviously in areas such as communications and
1 I am grateful to Richard Newfarmer and other participants in the June 2016 Helsinki
conference for helpful comments. This chapter draws in part on joint work with Matteo Fiorini
and Dominique Njinkeu.
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finance, services that enable cross-border movement, and more generally
the quality and costs of a variety of intermediate services that are inputs into
the production of trade goods and services. The lower the productivity of
firms providing intermediate services, the more disadvantaged the sectors
that source from them.
Trade in services—broadly defined to include cross-border exchange through
telecommunications channels, the temporarymovement of service suppliers or
consumers, and foreigndirect investment (FDI) (establishment in ahost country
by foreign affiliates that produce/sell services)—is one potential channel for
productivity growth. As in the case of goods, trade in services allows specializa-
tion according to comparative advantage. What is different is that trade in
services requires a movement of providers, whether legal entities (firms) or
natural persons (service suppliers). This implies that a (much) broader range of
policy instruments and underlying public policy concerns arise than in the case
of trade in goods. Another difference, at least in degree, is thatmany services are
critical inputs for a large number of industries, and thus that imports of services
may be a particularly important channel for productivity growth.
This chapter reviews some of the literature on trade in services, with an
emphasis on recent analyses of services trade policies and their effects. The
plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the role of services
in development and growth, the potential role of trade in services, and recent
evidence of the magnitude of services trade costs. Section 3 discusses the
indirect effect of services trade and investment policies on the productivity
of downstream firms and presents some research indicating that market open-
ing can bring significant gains in productivity. Section 4 turns to the direct
effects of trade barriers on services trade and the potential for services trade
liberalization to expand trade in Africa, drawing on recent case study evi-
dence. Section 5 argues that the extent to which countries will benefit from
open services regimes depends on the quality of economic governance. This
appears to be particularly significant for services trade, in part reflecting the
role that FDI plays as a channel for foreign suppliers to provide services, which
suggests that policy needs to go beyond a focus on services trade barriers to
span regulatory regimes and institutions. Section 6 discusses what could be
done through regional integration to reduce services trade barriers, the state of
play in this regard in Africa, and what research on services trade policy
suggests should be on the agenda looking forward. Section 7 concludes.
2. Services, Trade, and Structural Transformation
The share of services in total output and employment for the world as a whole
has been increasing over time as countries become richer. This is nothing new,
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but for any level of economic development the role of services in the economy
is todaymore important than in the past as a result of advances in information
and communication technologies and transport. Efficient services are critical
for economic development because they are determinants of the productivity
of capital and labour (think of the role that financial services intermediaries
play in providing funds to firms that have been generated by households
seeking to invest their savings and the role that health and education services
play in enhancing the skills and quality of life of workers). Services are also the
backbone of connectivity—‘facilitating’ the physical movement of goods and
people (transport services) and the exchange of knowledge and information
(communications services). Many business and professional services such as
accounting, legal services, and management consulting are important inputs
into the production process of firms. Thus, the performance of the services
sector matters for economic growth and the overall productivity of the econ-
omy as a whole.
An increasing share of services in GDP and employment is part and parcel of
economic development and thus a key feature of structural transformation.
From a growth perspective there is nothing inherently negative about shifting
resources into services, or in countries pursuing a development strategy
(growth path) that involves rapid expansion in service activities and less in
the way of manufacturing production than was the case in the past for
countries that were successful in becoming high-income economies. Success-
ful (desirable) structural transformation is not conditional on achieving sig-
nificant growth in the share of manufacturing assembly operations; it is
conditional on expanding the share of economic activities that generate
higher average real wages (higher productivity). Such activities need not
involve a preponderance of the types of industries and production that
drove development in the past, because technologies today (e.g. regional or
global value chains) allow firms to specialize and outsource services that used
to be provided within the firm. Most of the value added embodied in
products—whether goods or services—reflects services inputs, whether pro-
vided through the market or within the firm.
Services lend themselves just as much to productivity growth as does manu-
factured goods production. Structural transformation is in part an inter-
sectoral dynamic—from low-productivity agriculture and informal services to
higher-productivity work in the formal sectors (both goods and services)—but
just as important are shifts within sectors, including increasing demand for
intermediate services (Berlingieri 2014). Within services, resource allocation
shifts are a driver of productivity growth in the same way as in goods-
producing sectors. Young (2014) finds that average productivity growth in
services is similar to that in other sectors. The presumption that most services
are unproductive, best illustrated in Baumol’s (2012) celebrated view of the
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inherent ‘cost disease’ that accompanies a rising share of services in GDP, is
incorrect. Growth in the production (and consumption) of services as coun-
tries grow richer is not just a function of final demand patterns and income
elasticities (Herrendorf et al. 2013).
Historically many services could be characterized as non-tradable as a result
of their non-storable and intangible nature. An implication was that inter-
national trade in many services required the cross-border movement of
providers—in turn involving the movement of capital and labour. The need
for such factor movement has been declining as the result of technical change
that allows services to be digitized and provided cross-border through ICT
networks, as well as of improvements in transportation, connectivity, and
information networks that allow firms to both identify market opportunities
and exploit them. However, trade costs for services remain much higher than
trade costs for goods, and the rate of decline in such costs has been less than is
often realized (Miroudot and Shepherd 2016).
One consequence of high trade costs is that many services tend to be
traded indirectly, embodied in goods or in people (service providers). At
least 50 per cent of global trade on a value added basis comprises services:
the sum of the value of services output that is traded directly and is captured
in BOP statistics (some 20–25 per cent of total exports), plus the value of
services that is embedded in trade goods (another 25–35 per cent).
An increasing number of studies and reports have analysed the role of
services trade and related policies from an economic development perspective
(see, for instance, Mattoo and Payton 2007; Saez et al. 2015; Dihel and
Goswami 2016; Balchin et al. 2016), complementing studies of developed
economies (e.g. Breinlich and Criscuolo 2011; Wagner 2012). This literature
has generated findings that apply to both developing and developed country
contexts, e.g. that firm heterogeneity plays an important role in shaping
patterns of services trade, much as is the case for trade in goods, as do barriers
to trade and regulatory regimes for product markets. What follows is a discus-
sion of one important determinant of services performance and thus
economy-wide productivity—policies towards trade and investment in
services—focusing on the role that services play as inputs into production of
both goods (manufactured) and other services.
3. Services Trade Policies and Economic Performance
Services trade policies matter for many dimensions of economic performance.
For example, services trade policy has been shown to matter for product
differentiation and diversification. Building a gravity framework for more
than 100 countries, Nordås (2011) finds that price-reducing liberalization in
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business services is associated with greater product differentiation, particularly
in the motor vehicle industry. On the basis of these findings, she argues that
opening services markets should be considered as an element in strategies for
industrial upgrading in developing countries. Miroudot and Shepherd (2016)
find that a 10 per cent increase in the level of services trade restrictiveness is
associated with an increase in trade costs of 2.7–3.1 per cent, using trade costs
data compiled by Arvis et al. (2016), the biggest effects being in postal services
and telecommunications. Borchert et al. (2017) note that many landlocked
African countries restrict trade in services that could have a significant effect
on overall trade performance; for example, air transport policies tend to be
significantly more restrictive than in other countries, reducing connectivity
with the rest of the world. The consequence is more concentrated market
structures and less access to transport services. Even moderate liberalization
of air transportation services by landlocked sub-Saharan countries could gen-
erate a 20 per cent increase in the number of flights.
This type of research has become possible as a result of new datasets.
Research on the effects of services trade policies has traditionally been
impeded by data limitations. Policy information is often patchy at best, time
series data on key policy variables generally not being available on a cross-
country, comparable basis, and such information frequently not existing at
country level either. This situation has changed recently with the publication
of a new dataset by the World Bank that characterizes the restrictiveness
of policies towards services trade and investment (Borchert et al. 2014). The
World Bank database covers five services sectors and three modes of supply:
cross-border trade, commercial presence (FDI), and temporary movement
of service suppliers. Not all of these are relevant for all sectors, and in some
cases policies affecting a mode of supply apply to many or all sectors. The
Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) is a numerical summary of applied
services policies believed to affect trade flows. The more restrictive a country is
towards trade and investment in services, the higher its STRI.
Figure 8.1 summarizes the data, which are available for only one year at
present. The reported STRIs present an overall indicator, in the sense of a
summary number that covers all sectors and modes. The average STRI for
the sub-Saharan countries included in the database is 32. The general picture
that emerges is that African countries are relatively liberal when it comes to
Mode 1 (cross-border supply of services), but have higher levels of trade
restrictiveness in place for Mode 3 (sales through establishment by foreign
affiliates, i.e. FDI) (not plotted). However, policy measures vary considerably
by sector and country. Although Africa is relatively liberal (open) on the basis
of the STRI measures, it should be kept in mind that the STRI covers only one
dimension of services policies—the extent to which policy discriminates
against foreign providers. It does not capture the types of trade costs associated
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with corruption and inefficient border clearance for services suppliers or the
performance of services sectors such as transport and logistics. As discussed
below, the available evidence suggests that the quality of economic govern-
ance broadly defined plays an important role in determining the extent
to which African firms and households benefit from reductions in services
trade restrictions.
Of particular interest from the perspective of this chapter is the effect of
policies that limit the ability of (raise the costs for) foreign firms in providing
services in a market. A positive association between policy reforms in services
and inward FDI in services, and between total factor productivity (TFP) growth
in the performance of downstream firms and FDI is perhaps the most robust
finding to emerge from the limited empirical research on the impacts of
services reforms (Francois and Hoekman 2010). FDI is a particularly important
channel for the transfer of services-related know-how and technology, as
foreign firms introduce new types of services that may be better suited to the
needs of clients, or provide existing services at lower cost than was available
before they entered themarket. International trade and investment in services
provides local firms and households withmore choice. Greater competition in
services markets and access to a broader range of differentiated services should
increase the total factor productivity of firms in proportion to the intensity
with which services are used. Thus, firms that are relatively intensive users
(buyers) of services should benefit the most from measures that increase the
availability of services in an economy.
This applies as much to lower-income countries as it does to high-income
economies. Arnold et al. (2008) use data from over 1,000 firms in ten sub-
Saharan African (SSA) economies to analyse this question, and conclude that
there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the observed
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Figure 8.1. Services Trade Restrictiveness Index, 2009
Source: Author’s illustration based on World Bank Services Trade Restrictions Database.
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telecommunications services industries. More recent research on individual
economies that focuses on the effects of (changes in) services policies over
time finds that more open services markets are associated with the better
productivity performance of downstream industries. This has been shown by
Arnold et al. (2011) for the Czech Republic, by Bas (2014) for India, as well as
for OECD nations (Barone and Cingano 2011; Bourlès et al. 2013).
Greater competition on services markets also matters for the productivity of
(other) services sectors, as different services industries all source inputs from
each other. Miroudot et al. (2012) use a gravitymodel setting to estimate cross-
border (Mode 1 andMode 2) trade costs in twelve services sectors for sixty-one
countries and find that lowering services trade costs by 10 per cent is associ-
ated with a 0.5 per cent gain in services TFP. Similarly, Van der Marel (2012)
shows that services trade and investment policies (notably FDI regulations) are
a determinant of TFP growth in services sectors. All of this research therefore
demonstrates the importance from a policy perspective of recognizing the
‘input role’ of services when it comes to efforts to improve the productivity
performance of the economy.
Hoekman and Shepherd (2017) build on these types of analysis using more
recent data for a large sample of firms and developing countries. Using World
Bank enterprise survey data for 58,000 firms in over 100 developing countries,
they find that services sector productivity matters for the productivity of
downstream firms producing goods, with services productivity mattering
more for those firms that use services relatively intensively in their overall
input mix, as is to be expected. The strength of the productivity linkages vary
substantially across the African countries in their sample, reflecting differing
intensities of use of services inputs in the production process. They also find
that the relationship depends on services trade: lower barriers to services
trade and investment increase the productivity performance of domestic
manufacturing industries. They find that, at the average rate of services input
intensity, a 10 per cent improvement in services productivity is associated
with an increase in manufacturing productivity of 0.3 per cent, as well as
higher exports of manufactures. While the effects are statistically significant,
they are relatively small in magnitude compared with the findings in the
above-mentioned country case studies, suggesting that country-specific and
institutional variables may play an important intermediating role. As in the
country-specific analyses briefly mentioned above, less open FDI regimes
appear as the core causal channel for this link.
Hoekman and Shepherd (2017) also use a gravity regression framework to
analyse the relationship between levels of services trade policies andmerchan-
dise export performance, using the services trade restrictiveness index (STRI)
compiled by Borchert et al. (2014). They find that exports of manufactured
products depend in part on policies towards trade in services, and this finding
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holds up if one controls for the effect of other variables such as trade policy
towards goods sectors. For any given country pair, on average a 2 per cent rise
in the level of services trade restrictiveness is accompanied by a 1 per cent
decline in the value of bilateral merchandise trade. While this type of analysis
does not consider general equilibrium effects, the magnitude of the effect is
substantially greater than what is obtained from estimates using firm-level
data. Hoekman and Shepherd (2017) find that policies that restrict trade in
transport and retail distribution services have the largest negative impact on
merchandise exports. This is intuitive, as global value chains and international
trademore generally depend on access to reliable and low-cost logistics services,
the quality of transport and logistics services being particularly important for
higher-value products (World Bank 2014).
Results for specific countries help to provide a sense of how variation in
STRIs impacts on trade performance. Focusing on the East African Commu-
nity member states, which tend to be somewhat less restrictive towards trade
in services than the average nation in SSA (although three of the five EAC
member countries have an average services trade restriction score of 30 or
higher), Hoekman and Shepherd (2017) argue that if the EAC countries as a
group were to reduce their average level of services trade restrictions to that of
Ghana (the African country with the lowest services trade barriers, with an
STRI of 18), theirmerchandise exports could increase substantially: by 13 per cent
for Rwanda, and some 20 per cent for Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
The upshot of the foregoing is that opening services markets can have
substantial positive effects on economic activity and welfare. Computable
general equilibrium models for specific African countries that incorporate
estimates of the ad valorem equivalent of services trade and regulatory pol-
icies, including barriers to FDI, suggest that the opportunity cost of not
focusing on the reform of services policies can be very high. Jensen et al.
(2010), for example, estimate that removing restrictive services policies
would increase welfare (real consumption) in Tanzania by 16 per cent in
the long run. In the case of Kenya, Balistreri et al. (2009) conclude that
welfare gains would be even greater, with real consumption increasing by
some 50 per cent.
4. The Potential for Services Trade Expansion in Africa
The foregoing discussion has focused on the role of services as inputs into
production and thus as a determinant of sectoral productivity and overall
performance. Services are of course also important in themselves as sectors
of activity and as potential drivers of direct exports (as opposed to their
indirect role embodied in traded goods). Recent technological changes are
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making it increasingly feasible to trade services directly, both digitally through
ICT networks and the internet/cloud, and through the temporary cross-border
movement of suppliers (facilitated by better information on demand, price
differentials, and in some cases reductions in the cost of transportation as a
result of improvements in transport infrastructure and connectivity).
The weakness of services data makes it difficult to analyse the effects of such
developments on services trade. This is true even for OECDmember countries,
as much of what is exchanged digitally is not measured—in part because
it often occurs within the boundaries of a multinational firm, and in part
because it is very difficult to measure sales of services provided by suppliers
that cross borders on a temporary basis. The data challenges are even greater
for low-income countries. Data for many African countries are very weak;
many countries do not report detailed statistics and some do not report at
all. This implies that analysis of available statistics is likely to give amisleading
picture of the reality ‘on the ground’ in Africa. On average, services account
for some 50 per cent of GDP in SSA, while services trade is equal to about
10 per cent of GDP. This compares with 62 per cent and 13 per cent, respect-
ively, for the world as a whole, suggesting that African services trade intensity
is quite similar to that of the world as a whole (WDI database). Travel (includ-
ing tourism) is the major export category and has been growing faster than
other categories of services. That said, a number of African countries have
experienced significant growth in trade in commercial services.
Case studies provide a sense of both recent developments in services trade
and illustrate the potential for services trade growth for African countries. This
goes much beyond the well-known potential to exploit natural endowments
such as good weather, beaches, and unique wildlife/nature preserves. Tourism
is an important activity for many African countries in terms of contributing to
employment and GDP. Tourism is dependent onmany other services, ranging
from telecommunications and transport to hotels and restaurants. There is
substantial scope for countries to diversify beyond sun, sea, and sand tourism
(beachholidays) and safaris into other types of tourism services, e.g. themedical
and business tourism subsectors, and a number of countries are seeking to
do so, e.g. Rwanda. A necessary condition for fully leveraging tourism potential
is to have an adequate tourist-related infrastructure and aworkforce that has the
skills needed to interact with tourists and to provide the many ‘back office’
services that are inputs into the production of high-quality tourism services.
Skills development, an open skies policy with liberalized bilateral air service
agreements, and improved linkages between foreign travel companies and local
firms are actions that are required in many African countries.
While tourism is an important sector that deserves priority attention in
many countries, the potential for services trade goes far beyond tourism.
Innovative firms and entrepreneurs operating in a variety of services sectors
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have demonstrated that Africa can compete on world markets. Equally
importantly, recent research has documented that there is scope for greatly
increased intra-regional trade in services. Indeed, it is noteworthy how much
trade in services already occurs. Based on surveys of firms and complementary
innovative data collection methods in a set of Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA) countries, Dihel and Goswami (2016) conclude
that more than 16 per cent of the interviewed accounting, architectural, engin-
eering, and legal firms engage in exports, mainly to neighbouring countries.
They also document substantial trade in education, health, banking, insurance,
and accounting services. Importantly, too, they document that barriers affecting
trade in services—for allmodes of supply—leadmanyAfrican service suppliers to
engage in informal trade and/or significantly reduce their productivity. The case
studies included in Dihel and Goswami (2016) demonstrate that entrepreneurs
are able to circumvent formal barriers to cross-border trade in services and that
there is substantial demand for services imports, suggesting that liberalization
and services trade facilitation—to remove the need for bribes andmore generally
to lower transaction costs and reduce the ability of incumbent services industries
(e.g. professional associations) to restrict foreign entry—have great potential to
both further expand trade and increase welfare (the gains from trade).
Dihel et al. (2012) provide a case study of Kenya and discuss how new ICT
technologies and improvements in ICT infrastructure and mobile internet
connectivity have expanded mobile phone and internet access and supported
the emergence of globally competitive services suppliers such as KenCall
(business process outsourcing—BPO), Ushahidi (open source software plat-
forms to visualize information in real time on mobile devices), and Safaricom
(mobile telecoms; mobile payment services—M-Pesa). Kenyan services exports
include insurance, accounting, non-bank financial, and BPO services. The
regional market—the EAC—is often the largest one for smaller firms providing
professional/business services. More than half of Kenyan services exporters
have clients in Tanzania and/or Uganda and one-third have clients in
Rwanda. Regional markets are important for exports of accounting, architec-
ture, engineering, insurance, and legal services. In BPO, Kenyan firms export
an array of services, ranging from inbound/outbound customer voice, email,
and SMS support to phone-basedmarketing services and surveys of the custom-
ers of client firms, as well as a variety of back-office support services, including
database management, storage, and back-up facilities. Kenyan firms have also
become exporters of software design services, apps such as games for mobile
devices, and user interface systems, as well as high-value technology services
such as data recovery. While Kenya has developed a comparative advantage
in such modern ICT-based and enabled services, similar trends can be observed
in other African countries, including Nigeria, Mauritius, Ghana, and Senegal.
Space constraints prohibit an extensive discussion of specific cases; the main
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point of this subsection is to illustrate that there are already substantial levels of
trade in services in Africa, that there is great dynamism in services trade, and
that much of this is regionally focused.2
5. Regional Cooperation to Integrate Services Markets
Regional integration has long been a stated priority of many African countries,
as is reflected in numerous integration efforts among subsets of African econ-
omies. An increasing recognition by African leaders that the patchwork of
partially overlapping regional economic communities was sub-optimal led to
a decision to gradually move towards the creation of a continent-wide free
trade area (the CFTA). A feature of regional integration efforts in Africa as well
as the PTAs that African countries have been negotiating or have signed with
non-African nations—most notably the Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs) with the EU—is that the focus has been on policies affecting trade in
goods. This is unfortunate from the perspective of the economic relationship
between access to services and measures of economic performance, including
the role that services play as determinants of productivity in agriculture,
mining, andmanufacturing. For example, overall, across Africa, the temporary
cross-border movement of service suppliers is often quite restricted and much
remains to be done to address opposition by incumbent operators and sector
associations to the regional liberalization of services trade. Karingi and
Davis (2016) note that the average African citizen needs to obtain a visa in
advance of travel for 55 per cent of the countries he or she may want to travel
to. Dihel and Goswami (2016) and Dihel et al. (2012) document that there are
still many regulatory barriers as well as outright discrimination against foreign
professional service providers in the East and Southern African context.
Insofar as barriers to trade in services and differences in regulatory regimes
pertaining to services impede services trade, regional integration efforts will
have less impact on performance. Moreover, insofar as incumbent (national)
services suppliers and industries oppose the opening of markets to competition
from foreign firms, the exclusion of services from PTAs implies an opportunity
cost, as the role that PTAs can play in changing political economy equilibria to
allow the pursuit of efficiency-enhancing reforms is removed from the table.
While services have been left to the future in the context of the EPAs with the
EU, intra-Africa regional economic communities increasingly include a focus on
services. Although in many cases the extent to which PTAs liberalize trade in
2 Dihel and Goswami (2016) provide a number of excellent case studies and informed
discussion of trade in services in Africa. See also Cattaneo et al. (2010), Saez et al. (2015), and
Balchin et al. (2016).
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services and result in domestic reforms is still limited, significant progress in
some dimensions has been made in some contexts. An example is the EAC
Common Market Protocol, which spans trade in services and has as its object-
ive the progressive liberalization of all four modes of supply. The Protocol
imposes a standstill on newmeasures restricting intra-regional trade in services,
and liberalization follows a so-called positive list approach (as in the WTO),
where governments make commitments to liberalize specific sectors and
modes of supply. The sectors chosen for initial liberalization were business
and professional services, communications, distribution, education, finan-
cial services, tourism and travel-related activities, and transportation.
Commitments in these sectors vary across EAC members and were to be
implemented by the end of 2015.3 They are complemented by efforts to
mutually recognize professional qualifications obtained by services suppliers
in EAC states. As noted below, assessments of the extent to which commit-
ments have been implemented suggest that progress has been slow.
There are several reasons to focus more on services in the context of regional
integration efforts. One important reason is that the potential for trade
between neighbouring or regional countries is significant and in many cases
is greater than is realized, especially if informal trade is taken into account. The
case study evidence noted above illustrates that intra-regional trade in many
services is already occurring and has been dynamic. Creating conditions to
move transactions out of the informal sphere and to facilitate cross-border
exchange will not only support existing regional trade by lowering transaction
costs but also allow trade to grow by encouraging firms to invest in higher
value-added services offerings and move along the extensive margin of trade.
In principle it should be easier to pursue services trade liberalization in
a regionally cooperative setting. One reason for this is that the type of political
economy dynamics that prevails for trade in goods may in fact be easier to
overcome in the case of services because of their role as inputs into the
production of firms in many different sectors as well as many, if not all,
households. Thus, the inclusion of services on the agenda of regional integra-
tion initiatives may help to overcome resistance by domestic services interest
groups by mobilizing a much larger number of stakeholders who stand to
benefit from liberalization. More generally, international cooperation will
often be a necessary condition for liberalization, as there needs to be mutual
acceptance or recognition that regulatory norms and requirements in differ-
ent countries are equivalent and/or satisfyminimum levels of quality.While the
unilateral opening of services markets will often be feasible and beneficial—
subject to compliance with prevailing domestic regulation and norms—this
3 Of the EAC members, Tanzania made the fewest commitments (59) and Rwanda the most
(101) (World Bank and EAC 2016).
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does not ensure access to partner country markets. Pursuing reforms in the
context of a trade agreement can help to address political economy constraints
on reforms by generating additional market access opportunities.
Various factors may explain the limited attention given to services in the
context of regional integration efforts and the neglect of using trade agree-
ments to pursue mutually beneficial reforms that would support greater trade
in services. One is a lack of understanding of the importance of services for
growth and productivity. While this has little to do with trade per se, it may be
a factor that has led the services trade to be neglected in trade agreements.
Another likely reason for the relative neglect of services is that even when
policymakers recognize the need to deal with the services policy agenda, there
is uncertainty about how to do so in the context of trade agreements in a way
that ensures that the domestic economy benefits (households and firms
obtain greater access to better services; firms and workers will be able to
utilize improved access to partner country markets; local service providers
will not be swamped by foreign suppliers, etc.). This raises issues concerning
the design of trade agreement commitments (e.g. sequencing; safeguarding
provisions; adjustment mechanisms) and points to the need to ensure that
regulatory institutions are adequate. A third possible factor centres on
the political economy of trade agreements. As noted above, in principle the
political economy of services reform should be less difficult to manage than
the liberalization of trade in goods, as there are many more industries and
groups in society who would benefit from better access to services. However, if
this is not evident to these groups or, as is often the case (especially if the focus
is mostly on goods), these groups are not consulted and have no voice in trade
negotiations, these pro-reform dynamics may remain weak. One implication
is that analysis is required to enhance understanding of the costs of status quo
restrictive policies and the magnitude of the benefits (rents) that accrue to
incumbent vested interests.
There are mechanisms that can be used in the context of regional integration
efforts to identify both the need to address regulatory weaknesses and the
priorities for joint reform by the parties to a trade agreement (i.e. liberalization).
One template is to create knowledge platforms that bring together all groups
with a stake in a given set of activities that jointly impact on the performance of
a sector or value chain. Take the case of trade facilitation, a priority for many
countries. This goes beyond matters of customs clearance and the operation of
border crossings. Enhancing regional connectivity through trade facilitation
and cooperation between customs and tax agencies to establish joint border
posts and single windows needs to be complemented by cooperation to
create efficient road corridors and effective transit regimes that allow trucks
and people to move across borders and along transport routes, and cooperation
in the setting and enforcement of health and safety standards and the
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certification/licensing of service providers. Knowledge platforms that bring
together groups with a stake in a given sector, including industries that use a
given service as an input, can help governments better understand where and
why specific services reforms matter and areas where joint action by govern-
ments are needed (Hoekman and Mattoo 2013).
An example of what such an approach might generate is provided by
Rwanda. The National Logistics and Distribution Services Strategy was devel-
oped to helpmitigate Rwanda’s logistical challenges. The strategy: (i) provided
an enhanced role for Rwanda’s logistics system; (ii) incorporated logistics
services with value-added activities; (iii) strategically aligned logistics and
distribution facilities to production centres; and (iv) led Rwanda to export
logistics services. The strategy supported the development of projects and the
mobilization of investment in logistics facilities to capitalize on longer value
chains in the horticultural sector; regional logistics centres and land bridge
improvements for the extended market’s transit traffic; and air cargo market
development to respond to overlapping market opportunities. This provides
an illustration of how African countries can move up global value chains by
leveraging regional opportunities (see Njinkeu and Hartmann 2015).
These considerations point to the need to think through (re-think) the
design of and approach towards negotiation and implementation of inter-
national trade agreements to support welfare-enhancing opening of services
markets. The empirical literature on the design (content) and effects of services
trade agreements suggests that most have not been very effective at opening
servicesmarkets (Miroudot et al. 2010). Instead, unilateral reform appears to be
the prime channel through which steps towards liberalization have been
made. Djiofack-Zebaze and Keck (2009), for example, show that the effect of
GATS commitments on the economic performance of the African telecommu-
nications sector is rather weak in comparison with the positive effect of uni-
lateral reforms. This points to the need to focus on national services trade
policies. But that will not be enough, especially given the many countries in
Africa and the many economies that are landlocked. As discussed in greater
depth in Hoekman and Mattoo (2013), it is important that liberalization
strategies/reform programmes go beyond questions of market access and
include efforts to improve and strengthen regulatory regimes. Beverelli et al.
(2017) find that economic governance quality plays an important role in
determining the magnitude of the net gains from services liberalization.
Regional reform programmes need to go beyond a focus on specific technical
issues and pay attention to the political implications of the status quo—
understanding who benefits and who loses, or who perceives that they will
benefit or lose, from a policy or a proposed reform. This requires identifying
the interests of the different stakeholders, how they are represented, how pro-
reform coalitions can be built and strengthened, and how anti-reform interests
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can be accommodated. The organized (formal) private sector will play an
effective and proactive role if and when it sees clear business opportunities.
In East Africa, as Kenyan firms have increased their investment in other EAC
partner states, they have increasingly lobbied their government to implement
the EAC protocols of direct relevance to their sectors.4 This is particularly true of
trucking companies interested in servicing the regional market, which have
aggressively lobbied for more competition and improved efficiency, and have
generally supported efforts to eliminate restrictions on foreign competition in
the transport sector.
Other businesses that are more focused on the domestic market have acted
in a different way. For example, the Kenya International Freight Forwarders
and Warehousing Association and the Tanzania Freight Forwarders Associ-
ation have seen regional integration in the transport sector as a threat to their
business and as a result have been lobbying for less competition. Some mem-
bers of these associations oppose allowing foreign clearing and forwarding
agents to handle domestic cargo, while others see this as an opportunity for
partnerships and mergers between the Tanzanian and/or Kenyan forwarders
and their counterparts in landlocked partner countries. Business associations
with memberships that span multiple countries may promote harmonization
of business processes and better engagement with governments. In the case of
the EAC, the East Africa Business Council, the Kenya Manufacturing Associ-
ation, and the Kenya Private Sector Alliance, among others, play such a role.
The transport sector associations, such as the Kenya Shippers Council and the
Uganda Shippers Council, have made the Shippers Council of East Africa a
powerful advocate for regional integration. Partly as a result, EAC member
states are making some progress on regulatory harmonization in the transport
sector, particularly with regard to axle load harmonization, through which all
EAC member states use the same policy for axle loads.
An implication of such successful examples is that pragmatic acceptance of
variable geometry-based approaches should be encouraged in pursuing
regional cooperation to lower trade costs and integrate markets (Hoekman
and Njinkeu, 2017). Tanzania, and to some extent Burundi, has for a long time
preferred slower integration of EAC members than Kenya, Rwanda, and
Uganda. The heads of state of the latter three countries have supported a
variable geometry-based timetable in such areas as infrastructure development,
the single tourist visa, and enhanced labour mobility. This has facilitated the
implementation of a Single Customs Territory along the Northern Corridor and
has led to reduced border crossing times, the elimination of many weighbridges
and police checkpoints on the roads, and growing compliance with weight
4 What follows draws on Njinkeu and Hartmann (2017).
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restrictions. For example, a Regional Customs Transit Guarantee scheme covers
transit goods from or to the ports and has eliminated multiple national transit
guarantees. The regional scheme is accepted throughout the customs territory
and this has supported greater intra-EAC trade and lowered costs for firms
using the Northern Corridor. This in turn has had positive spillover effects on
Tanzania and Burundi, as well as South Soudan and Eastern DRC.5
Flexibility in the design of cooperation and use of deliberation mechanisms
such as knowledge platforms needs to be complemented by information
on prevailing policies and objective analysis of their economic effects. Given
agreement to commit to specific reforms, it is also important to monitor
implementation so as to inform stakeholders and policymakers on progress
and to identify areas where progress is not being made and assess why.
The EAC has developed a mechanism (supported by the donor community
through TradeMark East Africa and the World Bank) to generate information
through a ‘scorecard’ that tracks compliance in implementing EAC services
liberalization commitments. The latest scorecard (World Bank and EAC 2016)
indicates that the two large EAC counties are lagging behind other EACmembers
on road transport liberalization and that most instances of noncompliance—
across all EAC members—are for professional services (some three-quarters of
all nonconforming measures). The scorecard process makes transparent where
progress has been achieved and where attention needs to be focused. Between
2014 and 2016, only six out of 63 nonconforming services restricting measures
were removed and two new ones were put in place. The fact that most noncon-
forming measures in the EAC pertain to professional services and that there are
fewer nonconforming measures for transport may be explained in part by the
types of regional mechanism mentioned previously, which focus on transport
and logistics.
6. Concluding Remarks
Services play a critical role in economic growth and development. Trade in
services is a key channel through which countries can exploit their compara-
tive advantage. Sectors such as tourism and business process outsourcing
can generate substantial employment and foreign exchange earnings. More
generally, however, it is important to recognize that services activities affect
economic development through a variety of indirect channels. Opening
trade and investment in services to foreign competition is a source of new
knowledge and new products that can have amajor impact on the productivity,
5 See Kunaka et al. (2016) for a detailed discussion.
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and thus competitiveness, of many firms in the economy. Services account for a
substantial share of the total costs of production ofmany firms inmany sectors.
Reducing these costs and increasing the quality of available services is therefore
a mechanism through which to increase economy-wide performance.
That said, the economic research literature also makes clear that services
liberalization is not a panacea. The quality of prevailing economic govern-
ance, implementing institutions, and regulatory regimes will determine how
much a country stands to benefit from opening services markets to foreign
competition. This strengthens the case for a concerted and consistent focus on
improving economic governance as a necessary condition for sustained
growth. The more trade agreements are designed to promote that goal, the
more valuable they will be from a development perspective. The question is
how to do so, a subject that has not attracted the attention it deserves.
Mechanisms of the type that have been put in place in the EAC context are
steps in the right direction, but a precondition is that governments are willing
to use regional integration processes to liberalize services trade and to identify
where this needs to be complemented by regulatory reform and regional
regulatory cooperation.
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Implications for Ethiopia’s Industrialization
Mulu Gebreeyesus
1. Introduction
Exports can promote economic growth through multiple channels and also
provide opportunities to initiate structural transformation. In recognition of
this, many countries have made attempts to diversify export product bases.
Likewise, the Ethiopian government adopted an (export promotion strategy)
EPS in 1998 that was later (in 2002) developed into a full-fledged industrial
development strategy (IDS). The government has made notable efforts to
promote exports in selected priority industries, and particularly light manu-
facturing (textile, leather, and other agro-industries) through setting targets
and providing multifaceted support to meet these targets.
Despite these efforts, Ethiopia’s export sector has remained a very small con-
tribution to the envisaged structural transformation. According to Gebreeyesus
and Kebede (2017), Ethiopia’s merchandise export receipts can finance only
about one-fifth of the import bill. The trade deficit is increasingly high and
unsustainable, reaching about US$15.2 billion in 2015. The export basket has
remained less diversified despite efforts to diversify in the last two decades. More
than three-quarters of the merchandise export revenue in Ethiopia still comes
from agriculture. The surge in imports and sluggish export growth has led to a
shortage and, thus, rationing of foreign currency that is crucial for importing
capital goods and other intermediate inputs that are required to sustain growth in
manufacturing and other sectors.
Although the manufacturing sector is known to have a unique role in
structural transformation, the potential of other sectors, such as natural
resource-based activities and tradable services, to provide exports and drive
growth must not be underestimated. The industries without smokestacks that
include tradable services (for example, IT, tourism, transport), horticulture,
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and agro-industry can provide new opportunities for export development in
low-income countries, including Ethiopia, which in turn can drive economic
growth. The development of these sectors can also provide significant oppor-
tunities to build new areas of comparative advantage, including in the manu-
facturing sector through resolving the shortage of foreign exchange, lack of
inputs, and poor logistic and infrastructure services. The growth in the prod-
uctivity of services and agricultural inputs is found to be closely linked to the
productivity growth of the manufacturing sector and exports of manufactur-
ing (for example, Lee and McKibbin 2013).
With vast natural and man-made tourist attractions and diversified agro-
ecological opportunities, Ethiopia is particularly well positioned to exploit the
opportunities in sectors without smokestacks, especially horticulture, tourism,
and transport. The extent of knowledge regarding these sectors is, however, very
limited. Moreover, to date the importance of the development of these sectors to
the transformation of the economy has received little attention—at least in prac-
tice. The main objective of this case study is, thus, to show the current state and
contribution of these sectors to the economy and exports, as well as to improve
our understanding of the major bottlenecks and required solutions to unlock the
potential of these sectors. A special focus is given to the horticulture and tourism
industries, given the huge unexploited potential of these sectors in Ethiopia. It is
our belief that this study can also serve as an input for policy makers when
reviewing the existing strategies on these industries and their implementation.
The methodology we have applied here is mainly descriptive. Towards this,
and in addition to the standard review of the literature and policy documents,
we use data from several sources, including the database from Ethiopian
Central Statistics (CSA), the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), the Ethiopia
Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA), Ethiopian tourism organizations,
the World Bank, United Nations tourism organizations, and other sources.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some
conceptual issues regarding exports diversification and structural transform-
ation. Section 3 briefly reviews the evolution of Ethiopian export promotion
policies. Section 4 presents the recent performance and structure of the
Ethiopian economy, especially exports. Sections 5 and 6 examine the opportun-
ities, performance, and bottlenecks in the two selected sector cases: the travel
and tourismandhorticulture industries. Section7 concludeswith some remarks.
2. Export Diversification and Structural Transformation:
Conceptual Issues
Manufacturing has long been hailed as the main engine of structural trans-
formation. Diversification into manufacturing has, thus, been advocated as
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the primary goal of national development strategies of low-income countries.
A substantial part of the empirical literature provides evidence in support of
the manufacturing sector as an engine of growth. For recent reviews on this,
see Szirmai (2012) and Szirmai and Verspagen (2015).
The flipside of this argument is that diversification into primary commod-
ities and natural resources can have detrimental effects on countries’ growth
prospects—commonly referred to as the ‘resource curse’.1 However, the
‘resource curse’ view is not consistent with the historical evidence demon-
strated in several natural resource-richOECD countries (e.g. Australia, Canada,
Scandinavia, the United States) and non-OECD countries (e.g. Brazil, Chile,
Uruguay). The experience in these countries shows that resource-based activ-
ities can lead growth over long periods and can be a source of knowledge and
technological advancement (Lederman and Maloney 2002).
The economic structural transformation in Asia in the last half-century has
been mainly driven by the growth of the manufacturing sector. Replication of
this growth path in other developing countries, including those in sub-Saharan
Africa, however, has remained challenging. This is because, first, even with the
low-wage advantage, many African countries’ transition to manufacturing
might be limited due to internal factors such as initial conditions (poor infra-
structure, human capital, and institutions), geography (many small and/or
landlocked countries), and richness in natural resources. Second, the windows
of opportunity used by Asian countries are no longer available to newcomers.
The global setting and industrial environment have significantly changed and
this has altered the way enterprises and countries compete (Lall 2005).
According to Perez et al. (2014), the information and communication tech-
nology (ICT) revolution and its paradigm in the organization of global cor-
porations, the process of globalization of production and hyper-segmentation
of markets, the rise of Asia (notably China and India), as well as the threat
of global warming and other environmental concerns have profoundly
modified the conditions (innovation and trade) in all sectors. These trans-
formations have radically changed the capacity to innovate in natural
resource-based activities and driven them towards ‘decommoditization’. In
contrast, matured manufactures, which depend on highly codified technolo-
gies and low-cost labour, are suffering from a process of ‘commoditization’ and
have been shown to be as vulnerable to downturns as the lower echelons of
primary producers, and as being just as likely to suffer decreasing margins
(Kaplinsky 1993).
1 There are various arguments supporting this view. Among others, these include: low world
income elasticity of primary products and declining terms of trade; lower skill and technological
content of primary commodity production and as a result lower growth spillover; Dutch disease,
limiting the effectiveness of government capacity building efforts; and rent-seeking.
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Another pessimistic view of the smokestack industries is that they generally
have banks of chimney stacks emitting smoke into the atmosphere, which
has a negative impact on natural and environmental resources, as well as
on the local people. Decades of manufacturing-oriented industrial growth in
the West and Eastern side of the globe have had an adverse impact on the
environment. Hence, sustainable development has been the overarching goal
of the international community since the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in 1992.
Our intention here is not to give a gloomy picture of the potential of
the manufacturing sector in Africa, but provide a rationale to look beyond
conventional smokestack manufacturing as a means to achieve industrial trans-
formation. If managed properly, industries without smokestacks can provide
new opportunities for export development in Africa and help to build new
areas of comparative advantage, including the manufacturing sector. It is in
this context that some scholars (for example, Pack and Saggi 2006; Rodrik
2007) have provided a broader definition of industrial policy as government
selective intervention or policies that stimulate specific economic activities and
promote structural change. This thus includes not only industry per se, but also
non-traditional agriculture or services.
3. Overview of Ethiopia’s Export Promotion Policies
In the mid-1990s, the Ethiopian government formulated its development
vision, known as the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI).
Agricultural development was envisaged as playing a leading role in the
industrialization process by preparing various conditions for full-fledged
industrialization through supplying inputs to the industrial sector, generating
foreign exchange for importing industrial inputs, and creating markets for
industrial output. ADLI also embraced an export-led development strategy as
an engine of growth.
Despite the revival of private sector participation, the 1990s did not see a
significant increase in the volume or diversification of exports. In 1998, the
government adopted the Export Promotion Strategy (EPS) to alleviate the
problems of trade balance. The EPS was based on resource endowment and
comparative advantage, with a focus on the following four major elements
(International Trade Centre (ITC) 2001):
1. The gain from surplus venting through productivity improvements and
cultivation of unused land would be maximized
2. The advantage of natural resources for exports of high-value agricultural
products would be utilized
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3. A new basis for exports ofmanufactured goods, grounded on the country’s
comparative advantage of labour
4. The discovery and exploitation of exportable minerals.
Accordingly, coffee, oilseed, horticulture, meat, cotton, clothing, leather, and
minerals were chosen as primary products for export promotion and associ-
ated incentives. Incentives include: a duty drawback scheme on items
imported to produce exports; a voucher scheme or bonded manufacturing
warehouse; pre- and post-shipment credit guarantee schemes; and permission
for retention of a certain percentage of foreign exchange. Different types of
export trade support services were also created.
A comprehensive IDS was formulated in 2002–3 under which export
orientation was made one of the key principles (FDRE 2002). Accordingly,
export-oriented sectors were designated to lead industrial development
and be given preferential treatment. The strategy declares certain industries
mostly export-oriented ones, such as textiles and garments, leather and
leather products, meat, sugar, and other food products as priority. The
selection of these industries is also justified on the ground that they are labour
intensive and provide strong linkages with the agricultural sector in addition to
their comparative advantage in competing in export markets. The government
provided extensive support programmes that include economic incentives,
capacity building, cluster development, and direct public investment in order
to meet these targets. The specific policies and instruments with regard to
manufacturing exports can be found in Gebreeyesus (2013).
In terms of sectors, the focus of the IDS strategy has obviously been on
manufacturing, thus, non-manufacturing exports are not covered under this
strategy. Although not with equal emphasis, the government has also tried to
promote the tourism industry (see Section 5.2) and high-value agricultural
exports, particularly horticulture (see Section 6.2).
4. Ethiopia’s Recent Economic Performance in the Context
of Structural Transformation
Ethiopia has achieved a remarkable and sustained economic growth over
the past decade. Figure 9.1 shows the pattern of gross domestic product
(GDP) growth and the contribution of the major sectors towards this
growth. Between 2005–6 and 2014–15, Ethiopian GDP grew by an annual
average of 10.5 per cent. The major sectors, including agriculture, industry,
and services have also shown unprecedented growth over the same
period. The main drivers of this impressive economic growth have been
the service sector and agriculture, in that order. The annual average of
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the service and agriculture sectors’ contribution to GDP growth over the
period 2005–6 to 2014–15 was respectively about 51.5 and 32.5 per cent. In
contrast, the industrial sector contribution to GDP growth remained small at
only 16.3 per cent.
Despite such rapid economic growth, the pace of structural transformation
has been slow. Ethiopia’s structure of output has shown a shift from agricul-
ture to services. As per the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) 2015 annual
report, the respective shares of the services and agriculture sectors to GDP in
2014–15 was 46.6 per cent and 38.8 per cent. However, Ethiopia’s industrial
sector—which includes construction, manufacturing, mining, and utilities
subsectors—remained underdeveloped and contributed only about 15 per cent
of GDP. The contribution of the manufacturing subsector to GDP was
only 5 per cent, which is very low even in comparison to the sub-Saharan
Africa average.
Table 9.1 shows the pattern of Ethiopia’s export of goods and services over
the period 2005–13. Ethiopia’s exports grew threefold, from about US$2
billion to nearly US$6 billion. However, the recent growth pattern is not
encouraging and started to flatten in 2011. Table 9.1 also classifies exports
into major subsectors. The broad classification between the merchandise and
service exports shows that, despite some fluctuations, each accounts
for about half of the goods and services exports. With over 37 per cent of
total goods and services exports, agricultural products continue to dominate
Ethiopia’s exports. This amounts to 80 per cent of merchandise exports. Trans-
port services is the second important sector, accounting for about one-third of









2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Agriculture contribution to GDP growth Industry contribution to GDP growth
Services contribution to GDP growth Growth in Real GDP
Figure 9.1. Contribution of the different sectors to Ethiopia’s real GDP growth
Source: Author’s illustration based on NBE annual reports.
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export earnings, which are mainly generated by the national carrier, Ethiopian
Airlines. In contrast, themining andmanufacturing sector share of total exports
is among the lowest, below 5 per cent and 9 per cent of total export earnings
respectively.
5. The Travel and Tourism Industry
The World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) defines tourism as the activities
of persons travelling to and staying in places outside their usual environ-
ment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business, and other
purposes. The travel and tourism sector includes subsectors such as tour
operators, accommodation, travel agents, attractions, transport, and ancillary
services. Recent UNWTO (2016a, 2016b) reports show that, especially after
entering the new millennium, tourism has become prominent, with a signifi-
cant rise in the number of international arrivals and receipts. For example, in
2015 international tourist arrivals reached about 1.2 billion, generating
receipts of about US$1.232 trillion.
Europe has been the leading continent for international tourist arrivals,
while Asia and the Pacific showed the most rapid growth in international
arrivals as well as receipts. Despite great potential for tourism, with its diverse
cultural and natural resources, Africa’s share of worldwide tourism remains
below 5 per cent in arrivals and 3 per cent in worldwide tourism receipts.
Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia are the preferred destinations of international
tourism in East Africa (WTTC 2015).

















2005 1,931.0 36.9 2.7 8.0 47.6 24.2 8.7 19.5 52.4
2006 2,200.0 37.4 2.7 7.9 48.0 26.6 7.4 18.0 52.0
2007 2,649.9 40.1 2.5 8.4 51.0 27.7 6.7 14.7 49.0
2008 3,500.0 40.0 2.7 6.5 49.2 30.0 10.8 10.0 50.8
2009 3,429.8 41.6 3.3 4.5 49.4 28.9 9.6 12.1 50.6
2010 4,640.0 43.6 4.9 4.9 53.3 25.4 11.3 10.0 46.7
2011 5,809.7 42.3 3.2 6.6 52.1 27.2 13.0 7.7 47.9
2012 5,990.0 44.9 3.9 5.5 54.3 28.9 10.1 6.7 45.7
2013 5,900.0 37.6 3.0 6.2 46.9 35.2 10.6 7.4 53.1
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the ERCA (2016) for merchandise exports and World Development
Indicators (WDIs) for service exports.
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5.1. The Contribution of the Travel and Tourism Industry in Ethiopia
This subsection presents the state and contribution of Ethiopia’s tourism
industry and compares it with neighbouring Kenya, a country known to be
the most important destination for tourists in East Africa. Table 9.2 compares
Kenya and Ethiopia in terms of tourist arrivals and the contribution of tourism
and travel to export receipts for employment and GDP. Ethiopia’s number of
international tourist arrivals has been growing rapidly. For example, between
2005 and 2013, the number of tourist arrivals tripled, increasing from 227,000
to 681,000. International tourist and travel receipts have similarly tripled in
the same period.
In contrast, Kenya’s number of arrivals and receipts have not shown
any progress in this period. And yet Ethiopia’s tourist arrivals are only
about half of Kenya’s. Surprisingly, despite the difference in arrivals, the
two countries are almost equal in terms of revenue generated from tourist
arrivals (i.e. receipts). If these figures are correct, the receipts generated per
traveller in Ethiopia are much higher than those in Kenya. This might be
caused by the large share of Ethiopian Airlines in the tourist and travel
receipts of Ethiopia. In this regard, more information is needed to account
for the size of its contribution.
In 2005, the contribution of the travel and tourism sector to GDP and employ-
ment in Ethiopia was almost half that of Kenya. But Ethiopia has reduced this
gap following the expansionof this sector in the last decade. For example, in2015
the travel and tourism sector contributed about 11.3 per cent and 12 per cent
of GDP, respectively, in Ethiopia and Kenya. For employment, these figures were
9.8 per cent and 10.4 per cent, respectively.
Air travel is the major means of transportation for international tourists
to Ethiopia. According to the MOCT (2016), out of the 770,428 tourists who
Table 9.2. Contribution of tourism and travel to exports, GDP, and employment: Ethiopia
vs Kenya
Year Arrivals (‘000) Receipts
(US$ billion)
Contribution of travel
and tourism to GDP, %
Contribution of travel and
tourism to employment, %
Ethiopia Kenya Ethiopia Kenya Ethiopia Kenya Ethiopia Kenya
2005 227 1,399 0.53 0.97 8.1 14.7 7 12.7
2008 383 1,141 1.12 1.39 10.3 12.8 9 11.1
2009 427 1,392 1.12 1.12 9.2 11.5 7.9 10
2010 468 1,470 1.4 1.6 11.1 12.7 9.6 11.1
2011 523 1,750 1.99 1.8 12.5 13.2 10.8 11.5
2012 597 1,619 1.98 2 12.2 12.5 10.6 10.8
2013 681 1,434 N/A 1.83 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2015 11.3 12 9.8 10.4
Source: Author’s calculations based on WDI data.
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visited Ethiopia in 2014, about 97 per cent arrived by air. This suggests that
Ethiopian Airlines is playing a critical role in stimulating the Ethiopian tour-
ism industry. With regard to the purpose of their visit, recreation and holi-
days, and business and professional visits are the two main reasons for the
tourist flow to Ethiopia (see Figure 9.2).
5.2. Tourism Industry Policies and Implementation
In Ethiopia, modern tourism promotion started in 1961 following the estab-
lishment of the Ethiopian Tourism Organization. In the beginning, the
income generated from tourist flows was not as great as anticipated, but later
it started to increase steadily. However, the drought in 1974 and restrictions
on entry and free movement instituted by the military junta negatively
affected the sector. After the fall of the military government in 1991, a con-
ducive environment for infrastructure development coupled with the removal
of travel restrictions led to a substantial revival of the tourism sector. The
inflow of tourists has since been on the rise, except in 1998 and 1999, which
was the period of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Walle 2010).
In 2005, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MOCT), as per proclamation
No. 471/98, was re-established with the aim of making Ethiopia one of the top
tourist destinations in Africa. The sector is perceived to increase the foreign
exchange capacity, create employment opportunities, and play a role in sus-









2011 2012 2013 2014
Leisure, Recreation & Holidays
Business & Professional Others (transit & not stated)
Visiting Friends & Relatives
Figure 9.2. The purpose of tourists’ travel to Ethiopia, 2011–14
Source: Author’s illustration based on MOCT (2016).
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In 2009, the government of Ethiopia launched a tourism development
policy to increase tourist arrivals and optimize returns from the sector
(MOCT 2009). The tourism sector was given better attention in the second
phase of the Growth and Transformation Plan (2015–20). The number of
arrivals by 2020 is expected to be above 2.5 million. A sustainable master
plan with the help of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA) is also in the process of formulation.
One of the most crucial issues underlined in the policy document is build-
ing a positive image with a brand that will represent the country and maxi-
mize the benefits gained. With the aim of leading the tourism sector in a new
direction, in March 2016 the MOCT launched a new brand name, ‘Ethiopia,
Land of Origins’, with its own logo, slogan, and icon. In addition to the new
brand name, the Ministry has in parallel been trying to develop different
websites, build a new communication campaign, and develop new mobile
apps to promote the country as a popular tourist destination.
To strengthen the collaborative relations among actors participating in the
tourism sector, in August 2013, the government established the Ethiopian
Tourism Transformation and the Ethiopian Tourism Organization Council.
This council is chaired by the prime minster and is composed of council
members including all the minsters, regional leaders, and tourism bureaux
of each region state, Ethiopian Airlines, the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce
and Sectoral Associations, hotels and restaurants, and other sector represen-
tatives. The Tourism Council is expected to enhance benefits from tourism
based on the potential of the country and to provide leadership to tourism
sector actors and stakeholders (MoFA n.d.).
The country’s image has continued to improve over time. A vivid example
of this is that recently a representative of the twenty-eight countries on the
General Assembly of the European Council on Tourism and Trade named
Ethiopia as the ‘Best Tourism Destination’ of 2015.
To summarize, most of the issues that were listed under the policy can be
said to be mostly in the first phase and still require full commitment from the
government and other stakeholders.
5.3. Opportunities and Challenges: The Tourism Industry in Ethiopia
OPPORTUNITIES
Ethiopia is endowed with rich cultural and abundant natural resources. It is a
land of remarkable features, such as the Ras Dashen and Danakil Depression,
two of the highest and lowest places on earth, respectively (MOCT 2016).
In terms of history, Ethiopia is a very old country, with over 3,000 years
of history. The Axumite Kingdom was a powerful realm during the early
Christian era, and a great civilization. Great religious civilizations in Lalibela
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that possessed great faith and architectural skills also flourished during the
ancient period. Moreover, the Walled city of Harar made the country one of
the four ancient Islamic cities in the world. Ethiopia is home of nine United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World
Heritage Sites and twelve world literary and manuscript heritages (MOCT
2016). Moreover, Ethiopia has numerous national parks with a range of
wildlife and biodiversity preserved in their natural habitats. It is also a coun-
try of different ethnic groups with their own unique languages, cultures, and
traditions (MOCT 2016).
For tourism to be successful, some crucial enablers like political stability, air
transport facilities for easy access, and high-standard accommodation are
needed. Ethiopian Airlines, a Star Alliance member, can be seen as one oppor-
tunity to advertise Ethiopian culture and to attract tourism. The airline’s new
strategy to build the major new airport hub for African transport in Addis
Ababa is expected to enhance the development of the tourism sector. More-
over, the country is improving existing and establishing new accommodation
for tourism.
The other valuable resource of the country is its people. The country has
a large pool of labour that can be trained and employed in the sector. The
country also has the potential for conference tourism. The presence of
UNECA, the African Union, and other regional and international organiza-
tions has made Addis Ababa a diplomatic hub (Azage 2013), and could create a
strong market for conference and domestic tourism. Thus tourism could offer
a substantial contribution to the overall economy by creating opportunities
for local communities to sell goods and services directly or indirectly. More-
over, Ethiopia’s tourism sector benefits immensely from the expansion of
infrastructure being undertaken in the country, including the construction
of roads, airports, hotels, and communication networks. The tourism sector is
not the only beneficiary, but is also driving allied activities. Consequently,
tourism-related subsectors have started to expand. Incentives in the sector
have also been introduced by the government, such as tax holidays and
100 per cent duty exemptions, which are available for all investment capital
goods imports (Assefa et al. 2013).
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
As shown above, tourism has a considerable and unexploited potential in the
development of the Ethiopian economy. But the sector has major bottlenecks
that prevent it from growing as expected; some of these are listed below:
• Weak coordination among tourism stakeholders. One cause for the poor
implementation of the policy is lack of coordination and attention
among the various stakeholders in playing their roles (Kasahun 2010).
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Strong coordination and commitment from the government, public, and
private sectors, as well as the local community, is thus necessary for full
implementation of the strategy
• Weak attention to domestic tourism. Efforts made to promote domestic
tourism by the government and private sector are quite insignificant.
There is no clear strategy promoting domestic tourism. The weak
tourist-travel culture of the society and the low income of the majority
of the population are hindering factors. Too little promotion and
unaffordable prices for domestic travellers are an obstacle to the growth
of domestic tourism. As domestic tourism is less sensitive to crises, a clear
strategy to promote it should be created (World Bank 2015)
• Lack of awareness and incentives among the local people. The lack of awareness
among the local people about preserving the potential for tourism devel-
opment has made it difficult to generate good incomes (Asmelash 2015).
Most of the local community consider tourism as a luxurious industry and
believe that tourism wrongly leads to inappropriate service delivery, like
overcharging. Moreover, since the community has little or no awareness of
tourism’s contribution, they are not committed to protecting the tourism
resources or making businesses out of them. The solution to this is, thus,
not only to improve awareness but also to support the local community’s
ability to benefit from tourist activities—for example, creating enterprises
producing goods and services for tourists
• Shortage of trained labour. There is a critical shortage of skilled labour in
hospitability and logistics in Ethiopia. Hence, the government need to
promote tourism-related education and expertise
• Lack of infrastructure. Though the country is making significant progress,
there is still poor road infrastructure, banking services, water, power
supply, and communications, especially in rural areas (Shitemaw 2015).
Improving ICT and banking services is particularly crucial in attracting
more tourists and benefiting from their stay
• Lack of quality service provision. In Ethiopia there is a limited supply of
multiple-star and tourist-quality hotel rooms, especially outside Addis
Ababa. In addition, many of the existing hotels in the tourist sites lack
some basic services like sanitation and clean, good-quality water, and lack
variety in food (Gebru 2011)
• Inadequate promotion work. Different promotion strategies play a critical
role in the expansion of the tourism sector. Unlike many other tourist
destination countries, Ethiopia does not advertise its tourist potential
using international media with a global reach. Thus, most of the country’s
tourism resources are almost unknown internationally (Gebru 2011). Using
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the new brand name, and as outlined in the Growth and Transformation
Plan (GTP), the MOCT should actively promote the country using differ-
ent media and other outlets. More resources are, of course, needed to
implement this.
6. Ethiopian Horticulture Sector
6.1. The Features of the Horticulture Sector
Endowed with a wide range of agroclimatic conditions, adequate water, and
soil types, Ethiopia is suitable for producing diverse varieties of horticulture
products, including temperate, tropical, and subtropical crops. In terms of
exports, the country is also geographically well positioned for major inter-
national horticulture markets in the Middle East and Europe. The fruit and
vegetable subsector has significant importance for improving food security
(and nutrition) as well as the development of agro-processing industries.
However, the production of fruits and vegetables in Ethiopia is not devel-
oped to its full potential, nor is production of other grain crops. As per the CSA
(2015) survey report, the total area under fruit and vegetable cultivation
(by both smallholders and commercial farms) in 2014–15 was respectively
146,776 and 98,275 hectares.2 The respective yield for these crops during this
year’s Meher season3 was estimated at about 6.84 million quintals and 8.10
million quintals. The fruit and vegetables account for only 1.87 per cent of the
total land area under cultivation and 3.4 per cent of the total grain crops
production in the same year. The production distribution of fruits and veget-
ables is highly skewed towards a few crops such as red peppers, cabbage, and
banana. Smallholder farmers account above 90 per cent of total cultivated
land and 87 per cent of the production of fruit and vegetables. See the working
paper version for more on this discussion.
6.2. Horticulture export promotion and performance
In recognition of Ethiopia’s significant comparative advantage in horticultural
production and marketing the government in 1998 identified the sector as an
option for export diversification through high-value crops. Investors in horti-
culture exports have been granted various incentives, including exemption
from customs duties and import tariffs on all capital equipment and up to
2 Table 4 in the working paper version (Gebreeyesus 2017) provides a summary of cultivated
land and production of major crops.
3 Meher season is the main Ethiopian crop season (June–August), accounting for about 95 per cent
of total annual crop production in Ethiopia.
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15 per cent on spare parts, and an income tax holiday of 1–5 years. Further-
more, investments in exports are exempt from income taxes if at least 50 per
cent of the output is directly exported or if at least 75 per cent of the output is
indirectly exported for a period of no less than five years (Ethiopian
Investment Agency 2012).
Commercialization of the agriculture sector both through private sector
large-scale farms and smallholder out-grower schemes were anticipated to
accelerate production of exportable vegetables, fruits, flowers, spices, and
herbs. The objective of the government to promote horticulture exports
was carried forward through the subsequent five-year development plans.
For example, targets were set to generate US$356 million from exports of
flowers and US$371.6 million from exports of fruit and vegetables by the end
of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) I (2014–15) (FDRE NPC 2016).
To provide institutional support for the development of the horticulture
sector, in 2008 the government established a separate agency, the Ethiopian
Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA), which is responsible for promot-
ing, facilitating, coordinating, and supporting investment in flowers and fruits
and vegetables. The EHDA has separate technical support case teams for
flowers and fruit and vegetables. Investment promotion and marketing
departments also have teams that work for both sectors.
Table 9.3 gives the value of Ethiopia’s horticulture exports from 2007–8
to 2015–16. Ethiopia exports fruit and vegetables mainly to Europe, the
Middle East, and East Africa. Exports of fruits and vegetables have shown
some increases over the last decade—for example, from US$13.4 million in
2007–8 to US$43.5 million by 2014–15. But this is still small in contrast
not only to the country’s potential, but also to neighbouring Kenya’s exports.
For example, in 2014 Kenya earned about US$266 million from exports of
Table 9.3. Pattern of Ethiopia’s exports of flowers, fruits, and
vegetables (in US$ million)
Year Flowers Fruits and vegetables
Fruits Vegetables Total fruits and
vegetables
2007–08 111.26 3.26 10.39 13.66
2008–09 130.64 3.01 16.84 19.85
2009–10 158.15 4.23 27.63 31.86
2010–11 175.28 4.02 29.04 33.06
2011–12 196.97 4.40 40.54 44.94
2012–13 188.00 4.09 61.89 65.98
2013–14 195.03 5.72 41.24 46.96
2014–15 201.24 5.41 38.14 43.55
2015–16 225.32 5.79 43.50 49.30
Source : Author’s calculations based on EHDA data.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Industries without Smokestacks: Ethiopia
183
fruit and vegetables, which is about six-fold the amount of Ethiopia’s foreign
exchange earnings from fruit and vegetables for the same year. Ethiopia’s
actual fruit and vegetables exports are also much lower in comparison to
the targets set under the five-year development plans. For example, only
US$43.55 million was collected by the end of the GTP I plan period, which
is only 11.7 per cent of the target set.
The picture is very different when it comes to flower exports. Unlike with
fruit and vegetables, Ethiopia has achieved extraordinary success in flower
exports, making the country a global player in the sector. The flower sector
has started to show a significant contribution to the Ethiopian export
sector, beginning in the mid-2000s. Between 2002 and 2008, the number
of flower farms grew about sixteen-fold and reached eighty-one, covering
about 1,200 hectares. The value of flower exports has also soared in this
period, growing about twenty-fold. Ethiopia’s current (2015–16) exports
have reached about US$225 million, making the country the second largest
cut-flower exporter in Africa.
To give more context to the different performance between the flower
subsector and the fruits and vegetables subsector, we can compare the export
earnings per hectare cultivated. The flower sector generates about US$225
million foreign exchange from a cultivated land area of no more than
1,200 hectares, whereas the fruits and vegetables subsector generates no
more than US$50 million from cultivation of as much as 250,000 hectares.
The flower industry has attracted a large amount of foreign investment;
about two-thirds of the existing eighty-plus flower farms are foreign-owned. In
contrast, the fruit and vegetables subsector is not only dominated by smallholder
farmers, but also most investors (85 per cent) in the large commercial farms are
domestic ones, mainly targeting domestic markets instead of exporting. Foreign
investors are not very interested in the fruit and vegetable industries yet.
For example, in 2012 there were about twenty-three commercial vegetable
farms (among which thirteen received foreign direct investment) and six
fruit companies (among which two received foreign direct investment).
6.3. Understanding the Factors behind the Differential Success between
the Flower and the Fruit and Vegetables Subsectors
WHY HAS THE SUCCESS OF THE FLOWER INDUSTRY NOT BEEN
REPLICATED IN THE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE SECTOR YET?
Before directly answering this question, we would like to start by highlighting
how the flower industry came to emerge with a focus on public–private
interaction. Flowers are a new export venture for Ethiopia. An export-oriented
and private sector-based floriculture industry began to appear in the mid-
1990s after two domestic private entrepreneurs experimented in the
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aftermath of the extensive reform programmes intended to transform the
command economy to a market oriented one.4 These early entrants faced a
number of difficulties, particularly related to logistics, land, and finance.
In 2002, they formed an association and started to seek government support.
The government was made aware of the export potential of this sector
through the experiments of the private entrepreneurs and their efforts to
acquire government support. The government responded quickly and posi-
tively following lobbying from the private sector through their association.
In 2002, the government worked out a five-year plan of action for the sector,
outlining the sector’s constraints and possible solutions. With the government
decision to engage, several domestic and foreign investors have been attracted
and, as shown above, with about US$225 million, the sector has become one
of the major foreign exchange generating export products for the country.
Gebreeyesus (2014) contrasted the performance of the flower industry and
the basic metal and engineering industry (BMEI) sector in Ethiopia in an effort
to understand the factors behind the success of the former and failure
(less success) of the latter, despite similar policy environments. He argues
that the first reason for the differential success between the two sectors is related
to the presence or absence of comparative advantage respectively the flower
sector and BMEI. The second reason is that floriculture is a specific activity,
while the BMEI consists of highly diversified industries, making it difficult to
come up with an effective industry action plan. The third explanation is related
to the choice of policy instruments and specifically the presence or lack of
distinct instruments addressing sector-specific binding constraints.
The present case, i.e. why the flower but not the fruit and vegetable sectors
succeeded, is even more paradoxical given the close similarities between the
two sectors. The country is believed to have a comparative advantage in both
subsectors, at least in terms of agro-climatic endowments. The government
has promoted the two subsectors equally and provided the same package of
investment incentives related to land acquisition, duty-free import of machin-
ery, tax exemption, credit, etc. Lastly, the industry association that was formed
in 2002 represents not only the flower sector but also the fruit and vegetables
producers and exporters.
So the question is why has the success in the flower subsector thus far not
been replicated in the fruit and vegetables subsector despite such similarities?
To provide plausible explanations for this we look further into the analysis of
comparative advantage among the two sectors. Below are some of the issues
that came to our consideration through discussion with the relevant actors in
the sector, such as the EHDA.
4 See Gebreeyesus and Iizuka (2012) for extensive discussion of this.
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• Agronomic differences and required size of land. The two sectors have some
differences in agronomic and required land size. Flower production
requires shorter time periods compared to most types of fruit. Hence,
investment in the flower subsector has a shorter payback period (cost
recovery) than most fruits with long gestation periods, although the
former require higher initial investment. Moreover, the production of
fruit and vegetables requires a relatively larger land area. Land rotation
is required after some years of fruit and vegetable production, but flowers
can be produced in smaller land areas and for a longer period of time
without undertaking land rotation
• Market conditions. The flower industry has secured an international mar-
ket. Investors can enter international auction markets for flowers if they
satisfy the minimum requirements (which are relatively easy) and sell
their products. However, the story is different for fruit and vegetables. The
market for fruit and vegetables requires direct sales (no auction market),
which in turn requires searching for and dealing with buyers
• International stringent standards requirement for food items. The standards to
enter developed country markets is more stringent in the food (fruit and
vegetables) than in the flower sector. Unlike flowers, which are required
for aesthetic purposes, fruits and vegetables are food items. Hence, any
export of fruits and vegetables has to fulfil international standards, which
are mandatory as compared to the voluntary standards for the non-food
items, including flowers. Fulfilling these standards requires establishing
‘closed systems’ for the production of fruits and vegetables, which in
turn requires costly technology and know-how. But most production
in Ethiopia uses open field systems, which makes quality control difficult
• Cost of transportation. Flower exports are not heavy (small volume) and
hence using air transportation is viable. But in the case of fruit and
vegetables, the fresh weight is high because water is themajor component
of the products. It makes them bulky and they have a low value per unit
despite being expensive to transport in their fresh form. Therefore,
using air transportation is costly (not feasible economically). Moreover,
as Ethiopia is landlocked, the cost of using marine transportation to
export fruit and vegetables is high (given the perishability and the long
time required to transport the exports via Djibouti ports).
The above suggests that Ethiopia has a greater comparative advantage in
flowers than fruit and vegetables exports. This is due to the long gestation
period for most fruits, more stringent standards for food in the destination
markets, and, more importantly, the high logistics cost because of the bulky
nature of fruits and vegetables. Ethiopian Airlines was instrumental in
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reducing the transport-related uncertainties in the flower industry. Unfortu-
nately, this is not the case for fruit and vegetables exports due to the bulkiness
of the product. The ideal transport means for Ethiopia to export fruits and
vegetables is a combination of road and sea transport. As a landlocked coun-
try, Ethiopia has a comparative disadvantage in this regard. As a result, foreign
investors are not very interested in the fruit and vegetable industries. The
majority of investors (more than 85 per cent) are domestic, and they mainly
target domestic markets instead of exporting their products.
This should not, however, be taken to imply that Ethiopia should abandon
promotion of fruit and vegetable exports. Rather, it suggests the design of
appropriate policy instruments and support programmes that are different
from those applied in the flower sector and specifically address the major
bottlenecks in fruit and vegetables, particularly related to market access,
improving logistics, and farm productivity. Another implication is that the
promotion should identify champion products within fruit and vegetables
instead of using a sector-wide approach.
7. Concluding Remarks
Ethiopia has long recognized the role of exports in economic development. In
the 1990s the country adopted an EPS that was in 2002 transformed into a
comprehensive IDS. These visions have been put into action through con-
secutive development plans over the last decade and a half, which always
include export targets and associated support programmes.
The Ethiopian economy has registered impressive growth over this period.
However, the exports are not able to catch-up with surging import demand,
which in turn is fuelled by unprecedented economic growth. As a result, the
economy is facing a critical foreign exchange shortage, which it is feared will
slow momentum.
The focus on export promotion has largely been on the light manufacturing
sector. As shown above, manufacturing exports and the sector at large have
not taken-off yet and it may require more effort and time. The current driving
forces behind the growth of Ethiopian exports and the economy at large are
the agriculture and service sectors. These sectors are not only major sources of
exports, but also the growth drivers of the economy generally. The implica-
tion is that the government needs to give more attention to these sectors as
part of not only export promotion but also industrialization. They can ease
the foreign exchange strains that manufacturing firms face when importing
machinery and industrial inputs. Advancement of the service sector can also
improve the efficiency of manufacturing activities. Moreover, promotion of
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the horticulture sector can also directly enhance the manufacturing sector by
improving the supply of industrial inputs.
Within the span of less than a decade, Ethiopia has emerged as a global
player in the cut-flowers business. It has become the second largest flower
exporter in Africa, after Kenya. However, the success of flower exports has not
thus far been replicated in the fruit and vegetables sector, despite huge poten-
tial. This study identified some critical bottlenecks—among others market
access, logistics problems, and low farm-level productivity—that inhibit the
expansion of fruits and vegetables exports as well as policy suggestions to
address these bottlenecks.
This chapter has also specifically examined the opportunities and chal-
lenges of the Ethiopian travel and tourism sector. Ethiopia has vast natural
and man-made tourist attractions but these are largely unexploited, although
a tourism development policy was launched in 2009 and the Tourism Trans-
formation Council chaired by the prime minister was established in 2013.
However, implementation of the policies and strategies remained poor and
coordination among the different relevant institutions is weak. Lack of trained
labour in the sector and poor infrastructure facilities are also among the
major bottlenecks for the growth of the sector. Equipped with the existing
policies, policy makers need to redirect their efforts into practical implemen-
tation and institution building that will facilitate the growth of the travel
and tourism sector.
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The Agro-Processing Industry and its
Potential for Structural Transformation
of the Ghanaian Economy
Nkechi S. Owoo and Monica P. Lambon-Quayefio
1. Introduction
The agricultural sector plays a critical role in the overall economic growth of
the Ghanaian economy. Indeed, agriculture is expected to lead to a significant
transformation of the economy through improvements in the sector’s product-
ivity. The sector is divided into a number of subsectors: crops, cocoa, livestock,
forestry, and fisheries. The crop subsector contributes about 66.2 per cent to
the sector, with a large percentage of its products undergoing some form of
processing (MoFA 2010). Themajor products include cocoa, cashew, sunflower,
oil palm, groundnut, fruits, and vegetables, among others. The most common
item that is processed ismaize, followed by other commodities such as nuts and
oils, fish, and grains such as millet, sorghum, and guinea corn.
Food processing is an important activity related to the agricultural sector and
is dominated by predominantly small- and medium-scale firms which operate
in the informal sector of Ghana. Indeed, the agro-processing sector may be
classified into two groups: domestic processing and factory processing (Quartey
and Darkwah 2015). Domestic processing activities are dominated by female
workers who are predominantly illiterate and have no formal training. Skills
in food processing are acquired mostly through apprenticeship and a large
amount of family labour is employed. This domestic processing often leads to
processed outputs of variable quality. Nonetheless, these small-scale units are
able to create employment opportunities and make use of local resources.
Factory processing activities, on the other hand, are mostly foreign-owned
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(e.g. Nestle and Cadbury) or state-owned (e.g. Fan Milk). These factories can
process large quantities of rawmaterials and can contribute significantly to the
economy through export activities.
Agro-processing is important for a number of reasons, chief of which is
a reduction in post-harvest losses. Post-harvest losses in maize, cassava, rice,
and yam amounted to about 35 per cent, 3406 per cent, 6.9 per cent and
24.4 per cent per cent in 2007 (MoFA, 2007) as a result of, among others,
ineffective food-processing technologies. According to the Ministry of Food
and Agriculture (2012), only 5 per cent of food products harvested in Ghana
are processed. Therefore, from a health and nutrition perspective, agro-
processing has the potential to increase nutritional value and also increase
food security, through a reduction in food spoilage and wastage. Processed
foods also enjoy greater price stability on the world market and may therefore
increase market opportunities for exports, contributing to income securities
particularly in rural communities, which are mostly engaged in farming. The
development of the agro-processing industry may also promote employment
generation, contribute to enterprise development, diversification of rural
economies, import substitution, among others. According to Quartey and
Darkwah (2015), agro-processing is the most important sub-sector of the
manufacturing sector, with food and beverages representing the largest com-
ponent of processed commodities.
There are a lot of opportunities to add value to agricultural commodities—
export of processed horticultural products (i.e. fruit and beverages), for
instance, has become increasingly significant in the Ghanaian economy,
particularly given the presence of a knowledgeable private sector. Indeed,
export of produce from the agro-processing sector in Ghana is dominated
by horticultural products (fruit and beverages), in addition to vegetables,
roots and tubers, and palm oil. Pineapples, bananas, mangoes, and flowers
were among the top non-traditional export commodities in Ghana in 2012.
Notable horticultural processing firms include Blue Skies (processes pine-
apples and other fruits into juice for local and international markets); Pinora
(processes pineapples and oranges into frozen concentrates for export);
see, among others Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio (2017: Figure 1).
Presently, the agro-processing industry in Ghana is not well-advanced and
there is a relatively low degree of value-addition to agricultural commodities,
and few linkages withmarketing and financial services, partly due to the small
firm sizes and under-developed processes which lead to many of these firms
operating below-capacity using inefficient technologies. According to Afful-
Koomson et al. (2014), 85 per cent of all agro-processing firms in Ghana
are micro-enterprises, 7 per cent are very small firms, 5 per cent are small
firms and only 3 per cent are medium agro-processing firms. An implication of
the limited scale of production of agro-processing firms in the country is that
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they are faced with greater bureaucratic, legal, and administrative challenges,
compared to larger firms. Typically, policy directives and initiatives are less
tailored to the needs of SMEs within the country and therefore these firms are
more often faced with overbearing regulations, delays, etc.
2. Agriculture’s Role in the Ghanaian Economy
2.1. Sectoral Performances
The agricultural sector has traditionally been the largest contributor to Ghana’s
GDP and has been the cornerstone of the economy since the country’s
independence in 1957. Between 2000–8 for example, the average sectoral
share in GDP for this sector was 38.7 per cent, compared to 26.1 per cent and
31.3 per cent for the Industry and Services sectors, respectively (GSS 2008).
Additionally, the sector employed about 55 per cent of Ghana’s population
between 2000–7 (ISSER, SGER 2008).
By 2010 however, there had been a change in the landscape with regards to
the economic contributions of the various sectors—the services sector became
the largest contributor to the country’s GDP and growth in the agricultural
sector began to stagnate. The services sector continued to drive the economy
and accounted for approximately 50 per cent of total production during
2012–14, while the agricultural and industry sectors contributed about
23 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively (Ghana Budget Statement 2015);
see Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio (2017: Figure 2).
There are a number of factors that may explain the deteriorating perform-
ance of the agricultural sector over time. First, the economic reforms of 1983,
which led to the removal of agricultural subsidies, led to a slow-down in the
performance of the food crop, fishing, and livestock sub-sectors. Additionally,
inadequate access to markets and storage facilities and the resultant post-
harvest losses may also explain the reduced performance of the agricultural
sector. Other factors include the rapid loss of forest cover as a result of bush-
fires and logging activities, in addition to inadequate irrigation facilities and
poor extension services. More recently, the discovery of oil deposits in the
country has also been attributed to the declined performance of the agricul-
tural sector, through the Dutch Disease phenomenon. This phenomenon
refers to the adverse effects of a significant increase in a country’s wealth.
Here, a boom in a natural resource sector of an economy, such as the oil sector
in Ghana, leads to the shrinkage of other non-resource sectors. This may lead
to the country specializing in the resource sectors, which makes the economy
more vulnerable to resource-specific shocks.
Despite the increased significance of the services sector to the country’s
total production, this sector may not easily be properly positioned to bring
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about the necessary structural transformation of the Ghanaian economy.
This is because, in the strictest sense, transformation involves not only the
reallocation of economic activity across the three sectors (i.e. agriculture,
manufacturing, and services), but the increase of new and more productive
activities and a shift away from older, less productive, traditional activities.
This increase of new and productive activities is what is expected to drive
the economy forward while the shift from older, less productive activities
is what is expected to diffuse the gains of productivity throughout the
economy (McMillan and Rodrik 2011). In Ghana, however, the domin-
ance of the informal activities in the services sector and the prevalence of
low-productivity activities, in addition to the reduced significance and
performance of the manufacturing sector make recent changes in sectoral
contributions more indicative of a structural shift, as opposed to a struc-
tural transformation.
Interestingly, although the services sector records the largest contribu-
tion to GDP, the agricultural sector is the only sector that maintained
its rising growth trend over 2013–14. While the industry and services sectors
recorded declines in growth during 2012–14, the agricultural sector has
been able to maintain its contribution to the economy, with the food and
crops sub-sector accounting for about 75 per cent per cent of the total agri-
cultural production within the period; see Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio
(2017: Figure 3).
Generally, Ghana may have a very strong competitive advantage within its
agricultural sector for a number of reasons. First, over two-thirds of the total
land is fertile and requires little fertilizer to produce farm commodities. Sec-
ond, the government has demonstrated significant interest in agribusiness
and a commitment to support increased investment in this area. Third, there
is a large unemployed youth population that may provide the much-needed
labour supply for the agricultural sector.
2.2. Agricultural Policies and the Agro-Processing Industry
Generally, the role of government in the formulation and enactment of
economy-wide policies that provide an enabling environment for the growth
of economic activities is expected to be crucial. These policies are meant to
engender conducive environments for private sector development through
the provision of stable macroeconomic conditions such as low inflation,
stable exchange rates and limited budget deficits. The economic reform of
the 1980s, which mandated the promotion of free markets and trade liberal-
ization have played an important role in encouraging exports of goods, in
addition to the growth of the agro-processing industry. Efficient financial
systems, good legal and regulatory environments, a reliable judicial system
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are other factors that contribute to a favourable general economic climate to
foster the activities of the agricultural sector. A fuller discussion of agricultural
policies can be found in Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio (2017).
Historically, agricultural policies in Ghana have generally favoured the
production of raw materials and primary products. After independence, con-
tinued emphasis was placed on primary agricultural production in an attempt
to provide the requisite raw materials for the manufacturing sector, under the
dominant import-substitution strategy. It is important to note that this period
marks one of the earliest known attempts to promote agro-processing within
the country. The main difference between the colonial and post-colonial era
was the focus on the modernization of agriculture in the latter era, through
emphasis on large-scale state-led production.
Between 1966 and the early 1980s, there were changes in government,
which led to alternating socialist and capitalist policies on agricultural
promotion and by the early 1980s, the agricultural sector began to decline.
Between 1991 and 2000, the Medium-Term Agricultural Development Pro-
gramme (MTADP) was themain policy that aimed to provide a comprehensive
framework for the recovery and accelerated growth of the agricultural sector.
The Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP I) of 2002 was
relevant chiefly because it adopted a sector-wide approach to guide agricul-
tural development and interventions. TheWorld Bank-IMF sponsored Interim
PRSP (2000–2) and the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies, GPRS I
(2003–5) and GPRS II (2006–9) were also significant to agricultural production
in the country. The first Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I), 2003–5
focused on agricultural development to drive rural development, while the
second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II), 2006–9, and its
follow-up, the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I (GSGDA),
2010–13, proposed that agriculture would lead the growth and structural
transformation of the economy (METASIP 2010).
The second phase of the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy
(FASDEP II) aimed, among many other things, to promote agro-based indus-
trial development in the country. The main difference between FASDEP I and
FASDEP II is that the latter adopted a value-chain approach to agricultural
development.
Although various agricultural policies over time have included sections
that focus on the development of the agro-processing industry in Ghana,
Ghana may still from an integrated and strategic national plan that takes
into account specific characteristics and challenges faced by small- and
medium-scale firms in the informal sector of the country, who are largely
engaged in agro-processing activities. Such a national policy plan may also
facilitate important linkages between the agro-processing industry and other
relevant sectors.
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3. The Development of Agro-Processing and its Significance
to the Economy
3.1. Definition of Agro-Processing and Linkages within the Economy
The FAO (1997) describes agro-processing as the transformation of products
originating from agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. While agro-processing
may involve global-to-local patterns (processing of imported agricultural
commodities to be sold on the local market) and local-to-global patterns
(processing of locally-produced commodities for export), the industry in
Ghana appears to bemostly concentrated on local-to-local patterns (production
of locally-produced commodities for domestic consumption), and dominated
by informal sector activities.
Agro-processing may vary from simple preservation operations such as
drying products in the sun to more complex, capital-intensive processes.
Agro-processing industries are typically comprised of upstream and down-
stream industries. Upstream industries refer to the initial processing of agri-
cultural commodities such as rice and flour milling, leather tanning, cotton
ginning, fish canning, among others. Downstream industries are involved in
more complex processing of intermediate products made from agricultural
materials and include the making of bread, biscuits, textiles, paper, clothing,
footwear, etc. (FAO 1997). Agro-processing firms are characterized by crucial
backward and forward linkages.
Backward linkages arise when local producers are able to satisfy their
demand for raw materials and services from local suppliers. This may refer to
the supply of credit, inputs, and other production-generating services. Back-
ward linkages may be established by the procurement of capital goods and
equipment from other industries; or the purchase of agricultural inputs from
farmers. Forward linkages on the other hand refer to the creation of additional
opportunities in other parts of the economy, from the activity of agro-
processors, through the sale of processed products. This refers to the market-
ing of these products and the generation of employment opportunities
through the value-addition processes. Forward linkages have positive impli-
cations for increased export earnings, employment generation, and greater
food security (Babu 2000) and may be established through sale of processed
goods to final consumers; and sale of processed gods as inputs to other firms
who use these as inputs to their own production processes.
The role of agro-processing in Ghana’s development could be vital, given its
ability to generate increased demand for the products of other industries
through backward or forward linkages. Despite the promising state of Ghana’s
agricultural sector, the linkage between agriculture and industry appears weak,
and value additions by themanufacturing sector remain low. Agro-processing,
an integrated form of agricultural development may be expected to have the
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strongest effect on agricultural production, given the increased demand for
primary products from this sector. Additionally, the infrastructure (e.g. roads
and transport facilities, power, etc.), which is essential for promoting the
growth in agro-processing, could also be vital to increased growth in the
agriculture sector.
3.2. Evolution and Structure of Agro-Processing Firms
According to Okorley and Kwaten (2000), agro-processing in Ghana can be
traced back to the colonial period, where these activities were performed on a
small scale and consumed locally. After independence in 1957, the industri-
alization drive embarked on by the new government resulted in a number of
state-owned processing factories which were directly linked to the country’s
agricultural products. These agro-processing factories were strategically
located to use the primary agricultural products produced by the various
regions. For example, the sugar factories located in Komenda and Asutuare
in the Western and Eastern regions,, respectively, were meant to use the raw
sugar canes produced in these regions as raw materials. Also, the Pwalugu
tomato factory was located in the region to make use of the abundant
supply of good quality tomatoes in Pwalugu and its surrounding areas. Others
included the Bolgatanga meat processing factory and the Nsawam Fruit
Cannery. About two decades after their establishment, after the overthrow
of Kwame Nkrumah, most of these state-owned processing plants experienced
declines in their production performance due to administrative and manager-
ial challenges. As a result, some of these processing plants were either sold/
privatized or left to run down.
In recent times, apart from cocoa which is processed on a large scale, the
agro-processing industry in Ghana has been described as in its nascent stages
according to Sutton and Kpentey (2012). The industry in Ghana is character-
ized by a large number of micro, small-, and medium-scale processing enter-
prises that are involved in activities such as gari processing, fish smoking, flour
making, nut and palm oil processing, as well as fruit and juice processing.
These artisanal processing activities have relied mainly on very simple and
locally-manufactured technology in their processing activities. Over the years,
processing of these products has moved from completely traditional methods
of processing to semi- mechanized and then to fully mechanized methods.
3.3. Performance of Agro-Processing Firms and Contribution
to the Economy
Although the agro-processing industry in Ghana is dominated by small- and
medium-scale players, it continues to play a significant role in the Ghanaian
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economy. According to the Ghana Export Promotion Authority, the industry
grew at an average rate of 14.93 per cent in 2008–13 (GEPA 2014). A report
from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO 2011)
shows that within the manufacturing sector in Ghana, the agro-industry
represents more than half (54.6 per cent) of total manufacturing value
added. Specifically, the food and beverages subsector of the agro-processing
industry accounted for about 32.5 per cent of total manufacturing value added
in 2003 (World Bank 2009).
Da Silva et al. (2009) argue that the agro-processing industry in an import-
ant source of employment and income generation globally. In addition, FAO
(1997) reports that the highest shares of employment in the agro-processing
industries are found in Africa. In spite of the lack of national level data on
employment in the industry, Amapadu-Ameyaw and Omari (2015) demon-
strate that in Ghana the agro-processing industry is an important source of
employment for the rural people, and especially for women given that the
sector is dominated by women. In a survey of 272 small- and medium-scale
agro-processing enterprises in Ghana, Afful-Koomson et al. (2014) found that
Brong Ahafo, Western, and Northern regions employ the majority of the
labour force in the industry. By firm size, the study also showed that micro
agro-processing firms employ about 48 per cent of the total agro-processing
labour force. This is therefore reflective of the importance of the industry for
employment, income, and inclusive growth for the country.
The contribution of the agro-processing industry to total export earnings in
Ghana cannot be overestimated. Export earnings from the agro-processing
industry have increased from US$181.1 million in 2004 to about US$902.5
million in 2011, representing a growth of 398 per cent for that period
(Oduro and Offei 2014). In 2004, the industry accounted for about 7.4 per cent
of total export earnings even though this dropped significantly to about
4.9 per cent in 2011. In addition, processed and semi-processed agricultural
products accounted for about 86.31 per cent of the country’s non-traditional
exports, contributing US$2.16 billion in export earnings in 2014 compared to
the US$2.11 billion in 2013 (GEPA 2014); see Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio
(2017: Table 1) showing the trend in Ghana’s agro-processed exports between
2004–11.
With respect to sector productivity, findings from Amapdu-Ameyaw and
Omari (2015) and Afful-Koomson et al. (2014) have found that the indigen-
ous technology adopted among the firms in the industry has resulted in
reduced efficiency and productivity, compared to the multinational agro-
processing firms who are able to rely on modern and more efficient technol-
ogy in their operations. The labour intensive and time-consuming features of
the indigenous technology oftenhinder the opportunity to scale upoperations,
creating a scope for policy in this area.
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3.4. General Constraints on the Growth and Development
of the Agro-Processing Industry
Despite general and specific policies put in place by the Government of Ghana
and aimed at promoting the agro-processing industry in the country, Ghana
produces a little over 30 per cent of the raw materials needed by agro-based
industries (RoG 2007). Almost all the food products sold to local markets have
very limited value addition. Cereals and grain legumes are often just threshed,
while roots and tubers and plantains are sold predominantly in their raw form.
Recent attempts to produce cassava, plantain, and yam flour are yielding
results but, at present, markets for these are not yet fully established. Low
income levels are also a source of restrained demand for well-packaged cas-
sava, plantain, and yam flour. It is important to note that there are hardly any
statistics on the output of the agro-processing industry in the country.
A critical element of the modernization of the agriculture sector is value
addition to primary produce. However, the lack of reliable statistics on the
supply of and demand for processed agricultural products, constrains the
effectiveness of this sector (MoFA 2010).
A number of reasons may be proposed to explain the low uptake in agro-
processing in the country. These include the lack of agro-processing facilities
and modern equipment, which often results in significant agricultural yields
going to waste; the high cost of equipment is another factor. Agro-processors
also often receive limited information from extension officers, in addition to
low access to adequate packaging materials. There is also a lack of marketing
skills on the part of agro-processors.
Attention to hygiene and basic food safety procedures is found, at times, to
be limited among informal enterprises, including agro-processors (FAO 2014).
Knowledge of specific regulations and legislation governing food safety and
hygiene issues is only evident among those processors who market their
product through formal outlets. Other reasons are the irregular supply of
energy, low youth interest in farming, agro-processing, and agribusiness, in
general, due to low profitability. Additionally, the greater perceived gains in
the mining sector also attracts youth away from the agricultural sector.
3.5. Policy Environment of Agro-Processing Firms
As outlined in Section 2, Ghana’s agricultural policies have aimed at the
promotion of the agro-processing industry, through the creation of strong
linkages between the agricultural and industrial sectors. Indeed, one of the
key goals of the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA)
is the strengthening of the agro-processing sector. The focus on agro pro-
cessing is important, given the rapidly expanding urban sector, and also due
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to the sector’s potential to bring about a critical structural transformation
of the economy.
Although Ghana’s agricultural sector continues to contribute positively
to the country’s GDP, there remains a weak linkage between agriculture
and industry. According to Nti (2015), the manufacturing sector grew by
only about 2 per cent annually between 2006–13, with the share of manu-
facturing declining over the same period from about 10 per cent of GDP to
5.8 per cent. Although agro-processing of food and beverages represents about
30 per cent of manufacturing, poor linkages to agricultural raw materials
results in little value addition, a situation which limits growth and transform-
ation of the economy.
There have been policies formulated and implemented by Ghana’s govern-
ment (through theMinistry of Food and Agriculture and the Ministry of Trade
and Industry) that have had positive impacts on the agro-processing sector.
The fruit and juice processing subsector, for instance, has benefitted from a
number of incentives, including zero input duties on inputs, zero value-added
tax (VAT) and national health insurance levy (NHIL) on inputs, low level
corporate income tax, zero VAT and NHIL on imported packaging material,
zero import duties on farm machinery, among others. The creation of the
Export Development Agriculture and Investment Fund (EDAIF) in 2000 to
promote non-traditional exports also plays a positive role in the agro-
processing industry, through the provision of financial resources for export
activities. The fertilizer subsidy program, initiated in 2008, involves the
absorption of approximately a third of the cost of certain categories of fertil-
izers. This policy leads to a reduction in the costs of production of raw
materials for agro-processing firms.
Despite the fact that agro-processing has been encouraged since the
time of independence, with a policy of industrialization through import
substitution, Ghana’s current agro-processing industry may be described as
having low-value addition, with low technology at the cottage industry
level, and few large-scale industries (Aryeetey and Mensah 2008; Quartey
and Darkwah 2015). There has not been an entire absence of technological
innovations. For example, development projects such as the Village Infra-
structure Project support the introduction of technologies such as shea
processing equipment in the northern region of Ghana. Development pro-
jects have also supported capacity-building through knowledge transfer and
training of small andmedium firms (Owusu-Kwarteng 2014). Nonetheless, it is
doubtful that these technologies can support large-scale production, particu-
larly by medium-scale firms. In Ghana, over 70 per cent of agro-processing
occurs informally, posing challenges for technical innovations and knowledge
transfer, in addition to quality control.
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With respect to local technology development and adaptation, there
appears to be an apparent disconnect between local product development
and uptake by local agro-processing firms, which further reduces technology
adoptions in the agro-processing sector. Agricultural research could play a
critical role in enhancing agro-industry competitiveness. However, policy
makers may need to focus on better ways of facilitating the flow of agricultural
technology from public discovery to private use, taking into account key
barriers (cost- and non-cost-related) to technology transfer between public
research institutions and private seed companies, and the role of the policy
in impeding or accelerating technology development and transfer.
It is argued that the growth and development of small-scale food processing
industries in West African countries has been limited as a result of inefficient
and inappropriate technologies, poor management, inadequate working cap-
ital, limited access to financial institutions, high interest rates, and low profit
margins Aworh 2008). Indeed, in Ghana, the presence of recent utility tariff
increases and a high interest rate pose a major challenge to the survival and
growth of small agro-processing firms in the country. Additionally, the recent
income tax regime appears to be unfavourable. In past periods, agro-processing
firms enjoyed a five-year tax holidays; under the new regime, businesses will be
charged a 1 per cent rate during the five-year period, and subsequently, the
standard corporate tax of 25 per cent.
4. Key Agro-Processing Subsectors
Four major subsectors of the agro-processing industry are discussed in this
section. These include nuts and oils, grains, roots and tubers, and fruits and
fruit juices. Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio (2017: Figure 4) models the value
chain process of these products from the farm through to handling, process-
ing, and distribution to the final consumer.
As mentioned above, a large amount of the agricultural products harvested
at farms do not undergo any processing, but are distributed and consumed
directly, either locally or internationally. Some of the agricultural output how-
ever does go through some degree of processing before final sale and consump-
tion. A number of factors, however, play an important role in the agricultural
production stage, and also during the agro-processing stage. As discussed above,
themicroeconomic climate is an important determinantwithin the value chain,
and this can be influenced by public policies, as discussed above, aimed at
improving the competitiveness of agro-processing industries. Additionally, the
presence of institutions, such as adequate access to credit, food safety, and
standards boards, access to technical knowledge, etc., are also important. In
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Ghana, agro-processing firms face constraints with respect to the availability
of these enabling institutions. Facilitating services such as good transportation
systems, adequate storage facilities, efficient packaging systems, among others,
also contribute to the production of agricultural commodities and agro-
processing activities; see Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio (2017: Figure 4). It is
important to note however that value chains vary for different products.
4.1. Nuts and Oils
The major nuts produced and processed in Ghana include palm nut, shea nut,
ground nut, cashew and coconut. Palm oil and shea butter/oil are the pre-
dominantly processed nuts; these activities are typically carried out on small-
and medium-scales in the country. Addaquaye (2004) classifies the processing
technologies into three namely: the traditional manual method; semi-
mechanized; and fully-mechanized methods.
Palm oil and shea oil/butter processing, which is predominantly under-
taken by women, involves very laborious tasks, such as pounding/milling,
kneading, washing, and cream boiling, all carried out with very simple
household equipment such as the pestle and mortar. This process, according
to Addaquaye (2004), is the main method of processing oils in most West
African countries, including Ghana. Hall et.al (1996) claim that this process
takes about 20–30 hours in order to produce substantial amounts of oil.
Mensah (2001) also documents that about 80 per cent of Ghana’s shea butter
is produced through the traditional processing techniques.
There have been attempts to reduce the long processing times and the
excessive use of water and firewood in the processing of these oils. Addition-
ally, women engaged in the process are exposed to long hours of heat and
smoke. Collaborative work with the United Nations Fund for Women’s Devel-
opment, non-governmental organizations such as Technoserve, and develop-
ment partners such as the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) has
led to the emergence of improvements in the form of semi-mechanized
technologies which are locally designed and manufactured. Examples of
such equipment include the hydraulic and mechanical presses which are
meant to make oil processing more efficient. These have reduced processing
times and facilitated more moderate use of inputs such as water.
Nonetheless, household units that produce oil at the micro- and small-scale
levels continue to rely on traditional manual methods of extracting oil due to
financial constraints in purchasing the locally-manufactured equipment. As a
solution to the problem of financial constraint, in some instances, these rural
women who are engaged in oil processing have organized themselves into
groups in order to access the semi- mechanized processing technologies which
allow them to increase their production.
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Over the years, these semi-mechanized technologies have developed further
from equipment designed to perform particular operations such as oil diges-
tion and oil pressing to machines that combine several operations in the
process (FAO 2002). Apart from gaining access to the improved technologies,
these women’s groups have also been able to undertake effective marketing of
their products (Mensah, 2001). Some of the finished products include oils for
household cooking, oil for the cosmetic industry as well as oil for the soap-
making industry. In some cases, the palm nut is also processed into palm nut
paste (used in preparing soups) and packaged for export.
Shea nuts are picked and processed into kernel by young women and girls.
The pulp of the shea nut may be sold to domestic consumers. Men are
typically responsible for bagging large amounts of shea kernels and transport-
ing these to processing centres. These kernels may also be transported to
exporters. At the processing sites, the kernels are crushed, roasted, milled
into paste and boiled to an emulsion. The oil is then collected and cooled in
order to obtain the butter. This processing of kernels into butter is typically
handled by women. The butter is transported to the shea butter traders, who
go on to export it for sales, or sell it in the domestic market. The value-addition
process in the shea butter subsector is summarized in Owoo and Lambon-
Quayefio (2017: Figure 4a).
4.2. Grains
The main grains cultivated in Ghana are maize, millet, sorghum and rice.
Maize is the most important cereal crop produced in Ghana and it is also the
most widely consumed staple food in Ghana (FAO 2008; Morris et al. 1999).
In Ghana, processing of these grains is primarily undertaken by women
using simple household equipment. Processing usually involves de-husking,
roasting and milling into flour. The flour is further processed into different
kinds of porridges, beverages, and other foods. Milling of the grains is usually
done with mechanized locally fabricated grinders, which is an improvement
from the use of stone grinders and pestle and mortar that were employed in
the past.
In fairly recent times, grains have been processed on amedium to large scale
using relatively more sophisticated technology. At the medium-scale level,
grains are roasted and milled into flour and mixed with other legumes such as
soya beans and groundnut and packaged for both domestic consumption and
for export. On a large scale, grains are processed into grits and serve as raw
materials for poultry farms and for giant brewery companies such as Guinness
Ghana Brewery Limited and Accra Brewery Limited in the production of new
beer varieties and other beverages. Also, grains in Ghana are processed into
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
The Agro-Processing Industry
203
high-end infant cereals such as Cerelac, using state of the art food processing
technology by renowned food processing companies such as Nestle.
Smallholder farmers produce substantial amounts of maize in Ghana. These
are sold in sacks to aggregators, who repackage these into 50 and 100 kilogram
bags for sale to local consumers, and also to maize processors. This weighing
function may serve as a form of value addition as the standard weight con-
forms to the sale requirements set out by the Ghana Standards Authority
(GSA). In some circumstances, these market aggregators pre-finance the activ-
ities of smallholder farmers, who pay back at the time of harvest, with maize
yields. Smallholder farmers may also sell to market ‘queens’ (women who
often act as aggregators and contribute significantly to the quantity of specific
crops and the prices that they are sold for on the market) for sale in local
markets, or to processors such as beverage breweries. Maize processing typic-
ally involves the shelling and grading/sorting of maize products. The value
chain for the production ofmaize is described byOwoo and Lambon-Quayefio
(2017: Figure 4b).
4.3. Roots and Tubers
According to MoFA (2010), roots and tubers, which include cassava, yam,
cocoyam, and sweet potato, contributes about 50 per cent of Ghana’s agricul-
tural GDP. Of these four, cassava is the most often processed due to the fact
that it is the most perishable of the roots and tubers, deteriorating within a
period of two to three days after harvest (FAO 1998). The processing of cassava
in the past has predominantly been carried out by individual micro and small
processors. These processors have relied on very rudimentary technology
made from local materials. Some of the finished products include gari, kokonte
(sun-dried cassava chips/flour), cassava dough (agbelima), tapioca, and starch,
usually for local and domestic consumption.
The introduction of starchy high-quality cassava flour (HQCF), glucose
syrups, and industrial alcohol (which served as potential cassava-based indus-
trial raw material for the bakery, plywood, paperboard, pharmaceutical, con-
fectionery and beverages industry in the mid-1990s) has seen the emergence
of several medium and large-scale processing enterprises in the country
(Dziedzoave 2008). The technology used in the processing of cassava has
also evolved from the traditional manual technique which involves the use
of heavy knives for peeling and heavy reliance on the sun for drying the
cassava chips. The traditional processingmethod also includes sifting, fermen-
tation, and roasting.
Medium- and large-scale processing of cassava benefitted from the
introduction of motorized cassava graters in the 1ate 1960s. Since this
period, stakeholders in the industry, such as research institutes, university
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departments, small-scale artisanal shops, and blacksmiths, have designed
and developed different kinds of cassava processing equipment, with the
support of various non- governmental organizations. Some of the locally
manufactured equipment used in processing cassava in recent times has
included graters, cassava chippers, screw presses, hydraulic presses, cassava
dough disintegrators, sieving machines, grading machines, plate mills, ham-
mer mills, and mechanical dryers. In recent times, these new technologies
have been adopted, especially at the micro and small-scale levels by groups
of women who have formed cooperatives in order to be able to purchase the
equipment. Currently, the export of cassava chips for industrial use has been
made possible through the efforts of private initiatives, supported by the
government. The renewed demand for wet cassava chips especially in the
brewery industry, which makes use of more sophisticated technology, has
made cassava processing an even more profitable venture in Ghana.
Production of cassava is carried out predominantly by small-scale farmers.
There are also a few medium and large-scale producers of cassava in the
country. After harvest, small-scale farmers typically sell their fresh cassava
root produce to assembly traders and other middlemen for sale in local mar-
kets. In some instances, assembly traders supply fresh cassava roots as raw
material to some processing plants. Medium- and large-scale producers of
cassava however sell their produce predominantly to processors, who make
cassava products such as gari, agbelima, and kokonte, which is sold in local
markets or exported. Processors also make starch which may be exported or
consumed in the local market. The value chain for the production of cassava
in Ghana is described in Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio (2017 Figure 4b).
4.4. Fruits and Fruit Juice Processing
Between the mid-1990s and 2002, Ghana depended on about four large fruit-
processing companies that employed very expensive, capital-intensive and
imported technology for fruit-juice processing in the country.1 The huge
capital outlay required for fruit-juice processing therefore served as an entry
barrier. During the same period, there was a proliferation of flavoured drinks
through the use of syrups and these types of drinks required substantially less
start-up capital. Due to the large number of producers of flavoured drinks, the
Soft DrinksManufacturers Association of Ghanawas formed. The viability and
the perceived shortage of players in the fruit juice industry propelled the
leadership of this association to engage local engineers in the manufacture
1 Information from this session was obtained from a one-on-one interview with the President of
the Fruit Processing and Marketing Association of Ghana (FPMAG).
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of simple machines and equipment to overcome the huge capital outlay of
fruit processing. This initiative was largely successful and the subsequent
locally manufactured technology adequately handled processing steps that
ranged from extraction of juices to bottling on a small scale. Washing and
cutting up of fruits however remained a manual process. A main factor that
increased the adoption of these technologies was its affordability. Also, the
local equipment facilitates the production of juice on a relatively small scale.
Over time, these local technologies have been further advanced with the
introduction of hydraulic presses for juice extraction, a semi-automated pro-
cess that further increases efficiency.
A major challenge in the juice-processing industry in Ghana is the issue of a
limited supply of fruit, which serves as the main rawmaterial for the industry.
Farmers are often unable to provide a constant supply of fruits to the proces-
sors’ factories due to relatively high input prices and unexpected weather
conditions. Also, fruit farmers in the peri-urban areas are gradually losing
their farmlands to very large estate developers. With regards to packaging,
the industry is challenged by a lack of access to clean and sanitary bottles.
The heavy reliance on recycled bottles for its packaging is unsustainable as
processors are not guaranteed continuous supply of these bottles. To get
around this challenge, the association has begun to explore the option of
using plastic bottles. These however entail additional costs.
Although not currently widespread, some players in the fruit-processing
industry have begun to export cut fruits for export to European markets.
Fruit export to European markets was precipitated by the high demand for
the Ghana’s sweet pineapple variety, accompanied by the proximity of the
country to its target market, which ensures constant supply to Europe via
cargo planes. This mode of transportation is however costly, and therefore
an association formed by pineapple exporters has explored cheaper options
to transport fresh produce to Europe. Sea freight appears to be a cheaper
option, and combined with the availability of cold storage facilities at the
ports, has facilitated more efficient transportation of processed goods to
European markets.
The process of learning in the fruit-juice processing subsector of the indus-
try can be described as a top-to-bottom transfer of knowledge. Leadership of
the association is periodically engaged in different capacity building and
training activities at the national or international level. Knowledge and skills
gained about new technologies as well as best practices in the industry, which
are likely to improve the production process, are then cascaded down to
members through locally organized training workshops for its members. Add-
itionally, the availability of juice processing manuals, through funding from
the agriculture ministry and development partners like GTZ, opens up the
industry to more entrepreneurs.
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The supply of pineapples is dominated by small-scale farmers who operate
on approximately 1–5 acres of land. Market women often play the role of
middlemen, who take on the risks of storage, transport, and associated
finance between farm and final consumer. Middlemen may supply har-
vested pineapples to small grocery stores or large-scale MNC shops. Alterna-
tively, they may also supply pineapples to various processing plants. Once
processed into juice or pulp, products may be sold in the local markets
through retailers, or in the international market through the services of
exporters, which may include large commercial farms. It is important
to note that in addition to processed pineapples, large international super-
markets also buy the whole pineapple as well. The value chain for the
production of pineapples is described in Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio
(2017: Figure 4d).
5. Case Studies
This section provides case studies of two major firms involved in agro-
processing in the country. This includes Sekaf Ghana Ltd, which processes
shea butter for local and international markets (see Box 1) and Blue Skies
Ghana Ltd, which produces and processes pineapples and other fruits for
domestic and foreign consumption (see Box 2).
Blue Skies Ghana Ltd is a foreign-owned company that has been in oper-
ation since 1998; while Sekaf Ghana Ltd is a locally-owned company estab-
lished in 2003.
6. Conclusion
Although agricultural production in the country is generally rainfall-
dependent, there are a number of factors that make this sector a viable area
to focus more attention and investment. These factors include the presence of
a well-endowed drainage basin with networks of water bodies that can be
tapped for irrigation; a well-established agricultural research system which
has been successful in the improvement of crop production such as cassava,
maize and cowpea; a large youth population which can provide a ready supply
of labour for increased crop production; relative proximity to the European
market for exports facilitation, compared to other countries in southern
Africa, (GIPC 2013). A major strength of the agricultural sector is the diversity
of commodities being produced in each of the three major agriculture zones
within the country. The northern savannah zone, the largest agricultural
zone, is well-known for its production of rice, millet, sorghum, yam, tomatoes,
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cattle, sheep, goat, and cotton. More recently, mango plantations and
ostrich farms are also gaining agricultural prominence in the zone. The
coastal savannah zone is another important agricultural zone in the country.
The lower portion of this zone drains into the Volta River and therefore
provides a conducive environment for fish farming and aquaculture. Other
commodities produced in this zone include sweet potato and soybean crops
under irrigation, in addition to rice, maize, cassava, vegetables, sugar cane,
mangoes, coconut and various livestock. The forest zone, with its more
abundant supply of rainfall, is more noted for the production of cocoa.
Box 1 SEKAF GHANA LIMITED- SHEA BUTTER
Sekaf Ghana Ltd is a Ghanaian-registered company that is based in the town of Tamale,
in the middle of the savannah zone, in northern Ghana. The company was founded in
2003 and was engaged in the distribution of a varied array of nut products. In 2004, it
began to specialize in shea, given the opportunities for growth and expansion in this
area. The company relies primarily on groups of women for the production and pro-
cessing of raw shea butter.
An important activity of the company was the establishment of the SeKaf Shea Butter
Village in 2008, which serves as a convergence point for the processing of shea butter by
women from neighbouring villages. Here, shea fields are developed and managed in
collaboration with the women cooperatives. Approximately 2,500 women are currently
employed as shea nut pickers and processors for SeKaf Ghana limited.
In addition to the purchase of raw/unrefined shea butter, the company also purchases
shea nuts from local village women. It ensures the high quality of these products and
provides storage/warehousing facilities as well. The unrefined shea butter is used to
produce high quality cosmetic products for sale in local and international markets, and
the company assumes responsibility for the labelling and packaging of final products.
These products are then distributed to buyers in both local and international markets.
Products from Sekaf Ghana Ltd include shea nuts, shea oil, shea stearin, cold press shea
butter, traditionally hand-crafted shea butter, and cashew nuts.
Noted challenges with the production and processing of shea butter include poor and
inconsistent shea butter quality leading to low market competitiveness, low bargaining
power and absence of guaranteed buyers. SeKaf Ghana Ltd addressed these in a number
of ways. First, the quality of shea butter was upgraded through the establishment of the
SeKaf Shea Butter Village, where shea butter could be processed in a controlled envir-
onment and under better supervision, as opposed to the former method of home-based
processing. Second, to deal with the problem of low bargaining power, the company
encouraged the formation of cooperatives and also provided training in simple cost
calculations in order to ensure that women did not trade at a loss. Third, to overcome
the problem of steady demand, SeKaf pledges to be a guaranteed buyer for women,
with a guaranteed price that is 15% higher than the calculated market price. While this
ensures a steady supply for SeKaf ’s processing plants, it also guarantees income for
women engaged in the shea butter processing and trade. SeKaf Ghana Ltd. Also
provides interest-free loans to women and receives shea nuts in exchange for these
loans, in some instances, indicating the presence of some pre-financing schemes.
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Other crops cultivated in this area include coffee, oil palm, cashew, rubber,
plantain, banana, and citrus crops.
Although the services sector currently contributes the majority share to
total GDP within the Ghanaian economy, it is unlikely to sustain growth
Box 2 BLUE SKIES GHANA LTD, PINEAPPLES
Blue Skies Limited is one of the largest agro-processors in Ghana, and employs over
1,500 workers. The company was founded by a UK-based entrepreneur and has its head
office in the UK. Blue Skies Ghana Ltd began producing fresh cut fruit in 1998 and in
2004, expanded its operations to include fresh fruit juice for both local and international
markets. In addition to various pineapple varieties such as the Smooth Cayanne, MD2
and Organic Sugarloaf, Blue Skies also processes other fruits such as mangoes, papaya,
coconut, passion fruit, and banana. The company sources pineapples, mangoes, passion
fruit, papaya and coconuts from eastern and central regions in Ghana; melons and
pomegranates from Egypt; melons from South Africa; and mangoes from Brazil.
Although initially established in Ghana, the company has since expanded to include
branches in Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, and the UK.
Fresh-cut fruit were the first product of Blue Skies Ltd, Ghana and initial quantities were
prepared for supermarkets in Europe. Smallholder farms provided the majority of the
supply of pineapples, although some pineapples are also sourced from a few commercial
farms in Ghana. The company deals with individual farmers and not with co-operatives,
and purchases over 1,750 tonnes of raw fruit products from these fruit growers on a
monthly basis. This linkage between the small fruit cultivators and the processing com-
pany is beneficial as the farmers benefit from greater local and international market access
to their products. Additionally, the company is known to pay farmers promptly and at a
higher rate per kilo of produce, compared to other competing buyers in the area, which
ensures a continued supply of raw materials to its factories. Blue Skies Ltd also provides
technical advice and regular training on agricultural methods to its currently over 150
small-scale fruit growers and has been known to pre-finance the production activities of
these farmers. The company also provides inputs and equipment to pineapple growers for
purchase, and takes on the technical and financial responsibility for certifying its suppliers.
This, however, further obliges suppliers to remain loyal in their supply of produce to the
company. The close proximity of the Blue Skies factory to these farmers allows it to obtain a
regular supply of rawmaterials for its processing plant, which facilitates delivery of freshly-
harvested fruit to local consumers within 24 hours, and to UK consumers within 48 hours.
The products of Blue Skies Ltd Ghana undergo a significant amount of value addition
at its local processing plants. The fresh fruit are bought and transported from local
farmers to factories, cleaned, cut, and packaged for sale. Fresh-cut fruit and juices are
produced under strict local and international food safety and quality management
systems. Additionally, the products are labelled and branded by the company, an
important step in the value chain process. They are then transported by air-freight
using commercial airlines, to international market locations. The company’s access to
primarily UK-based supermarkets is often attributed to the founder’s origin and networks
within the EU supermarket industry (Webber and Labaste 2009).
From a policy perspective, the continued expansion of Ghana’s pineapple industry
may be attributed to regulatory reform, tax incentives, market linkages, investments into
new pineapple varieties, and public-private partnerships.
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and long-term development due to a recognized lack of competitiveness in
this sector. First, although education levels within Ghana are relatively high,
the quality of education that is needed to foster innovation and increased
productivity is lacking. Rather, these average levels of education may be
sufficient to spur production in light manufacturing sectors such as agro-
processing, which typically relies on relatively lower skilled labour. Add-
itionally, while service sectors thrive on well-developed infrastructure and
technology such as good transportation systems, storage facilities, financial
systems, among others, the current access to only basic infrastructure (e.g.
electricity, road networks from farming communities to urban and peri-
urban markets, irrigation facilities) in Ghana may be more conducive to
activities of the agricultural and agro-processing sector. The experience gath-
ered by the labour force in these blue-collar jobs in the agro-processing
industries may also likely propel the establishment and growth of heavy
manufacturing industries which will ultimately spur overall economic growth
and development.
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Prospects for Information and
Communications Technology-Enabled
Services in Kenya
The Case of the Mobile Money Transfer Industry
Dianah Ngui and Peter Kimuyu
1. Background
Kenya is the largest economy in East Africa, with a gross domestic product
(GDP) of US$55 billion and gross national income (GNI) per capita of
US$1,190 (World Bank 2014). It is also the most diversified when we compare
the ratio of agriculture to other sectors. Services form a small but fast-growing
sector of the economy. For instance, financial services account for 4.8 per cent,
education 3.5 per cent, and health 1.9 per cent. However, national income
and export revenue are dominated by agriculture. Agriculture accounts for
roughly 25 per cent of GDP, and over 51.4 per cent of export revenues (ROK
2014a). Over the last decade, Kenya has experienced tremendous growth in
information and communication technologies (ICT), which have become a
major driver of economic growth (ROK 2015). Since 2011, Kenya’s economy
has grown at an annual average of 5.46 per cent, with the ICT sector contrib-
uting approximately 11.8 per cent of GDP growth (ROK 2016). The value of
ICT output has increased over the years, amounting to KSh280 million in
2015 (ROK 2016). This growth can be ascribed to the embrace of technology
by sectors such as finance, health, education, agriculture, and government,
which use ICT for the distribution of information and the improvement of
service delivery (Ogutu 2015).
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Kenya has shown that it has the potential to become a global leader in ICT
services. While Africa’s internet contribution to GDP is low at 1.1 per cent,
Kenya leads the continent at 2.9 per cent—ahead of South Africa, Tanzania,
Nigeria, and Ethiopia, and just behind Senegal at 3.3 per cent (McKinsey
Global Institute 2013). In addition to contributing to GDP, ICT enables
innovation, production, and efficiency gains across several sectors that are
core to Kenya’s economic growth. For instance, ICT services-led innovations
such as M-PESA, the pioneering mobile money platform, have led to financial
inclusion (Akamanzi et al. 2016).
Kenya’s overall ranking within the African region as measured by the Inter-
national Telecommunications Union ICT Development Index is higher than
Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Ethiopia (see Muchai and Kimuyu 2017:
Table 1). Globally, it was ranked 129th in 2016—down slightly from 126th
in 2010—and ninth in sub-Saharan Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya
has the highest competence in using ICT efficiently, a result of appropriate
skills, the highest accessibility of ICT infrastructure, and the highest level
of IT use (ITU 2015b, 2016). The average growth of ICT use in Kenya was 3.4
points between 2010 and 2016. The change in ICT use is more dynamic due to
the rapid growth in fixed andmobile broadband connectivity (seeMuchai and
Kimuyu 2017: Table 1).
The government of Kenya has emphasized universal access to ICT as a main
objective of Vision 2030 (ROK 2014b). Developments in ICT and their busi-
ness applications, together with the globalization of the world economy, have
led to a rapid internationalization of ICT-enabled services (ITES) and business
process outsourcing (BPO) (ROK 2014b). ITES is a form of subcontracted
service that arose due to the involvement of ICT in numerous fields, includ-
ing, among others, banking and finance, telecommunications, and insurance
(Vaidyanathan 2008). BPO is the subletting of a particular business undertak-
ing to a third-party service provider (Vaidyanathan 2008). The terms BPO and
ITES will be used interchangeably in this chapter.
The ICT sector is largely made up of the postal and telecommunications
sector, which mainly comprises mobile, fixed-line, and Internet/data services
(ROK 2015). The BPO/ITES sector in Kenya is under the jurisdiction of the ICT
Board and the Ministry of Information and Communications. Consequently,
BPO/ITES is classified under the ICT sector. The government singled out BPO
as part of Vision 2030, signifying the potential of the BPO/ITES sector in the
country. In addition, the government has put strategies in place to enhance
the BPO/ITES sector, including a favourable legal framework and funding
efforts, a sign of their confidence in increased growth.
The purpose of this chapter therefore is to provide an analysis of the ITES
industry, specifically the mobile money transfer (MMT) industry’s potential
in terms of market opportunities and its development impact in terms of
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jobs, income generation, and productivity growth. The study is organized as
follows. Section 1 provides background information. Section 2 analyses the
development of the ITES industry in Kenya, discussing policies and their
outcomes. The status of the BPO/ITES industry is also discussed. Section 3
presents the MMT industry and discusses its operations and policy perspec-
tives. Section 4 discusses the potential and development impact of MMT,
including a synopsis of the literature on the industry’s country-level devel-
opment impact. Section 5 presents the obstacles and opportunities for MMT
arising from changes in technology. Section 6 presents the conclusion of
the study.
2. Development of the Industry: Policies and Outcomes
in the ICT-Enabled Services Industry
The first national ICT policy, published in 2006, visualized Kenya as a suc-
cessful ICT-driven society, with a mission to improve Kenyans’ livelihoods by
guaranteeing that ICT services would be accessible, efficient, trustworthy, and
affordable (Waema and Ndung’u 2012). The government embarked on the
reinforcement of ICT as a driver for important sectors and a way of growing
technology entrepreneurs and businesses as strategic pillars (Wausi et al. 2013).
However, the enlargement of subsectors such as BPO/ITES was challenged by
unbalanced ICT access among remote and underserved communities in Kenya
(Wausi et al. 2013).
The ITES/BPO sector was identified as one of the six key economic sectors in
Vision 2030 (ROK 2007). This aimed to diversify, and to move away from a
dependence on tourism and tea and coffee production. Vision 2030 outlined
strategies to penetrate the global outsourcing market in order to position the
country as the top African BPO destination. The strategic pursuits included an
international information technology supplier base, multinational corpor-
ations and foreign BPO, local champions, and integrated value propositions
(Thugge et al. 2009). As a result, the BPO and Contact Centre Society was
formed in March 2007. This was the BPO cluster’s first ‘institution for collab-
oration’. The Kenya ICT Board (KICTB), formed by presidential directive in
2007, was the second such institution for collaboration. According to Waema
and Ndung’u (2012), its aim was to encourage the growth of ICT in the
country, specifically BPO and ITES, guiding the government on ICT concerns
alongside the Directorate of e-Government in regard to the enactment of
e-governance systems. In 2008 the Kenyan BPO Value Proposition was estab-
lished and marketed at BPO conferences and trade shows all over the world
(Mann and Graham 2016). Following this, the government introduced pro-
grammes to mainstream ICT in government operations (see Ochieng’ et al.
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2011; ROK 2004). For instance, the government launched local-government
service delivery centres known as Huduma Centres to broaden internet access
(ROK 2014b). The government also proposed to adopt ICT-enabled services to
improve effective delivery from a customer support perspective. To this end
the government adopted the use of customer relationship management tech-
nology under a public-private partnership, and sought to transform 10,000
public servants into customer contact agents (ROK 2014b).
During 2007–10, the government offered subsidies to firms in the BPO
sector in an attempt to encourage the development of the sector. The govern-
ment was also in the process of establishing Konza Technology Centre, a BPO
park at a location in Athi River, which was projected to generate 20,000 direct
jobs and contribute KSh10 billion to GDP (Mann and Graham 2016). Accord-
ing to Graham and Waema (2014), the concentration on international BPO
work was not as effective as initially intended. The few ITES exporters were
predominantly small local firms with negligible exports.
To enable the advancement of an ICT-enabled economy, a strong ICT
infrastructure is necessary (ROK 2014b). Kenya has successfully provided a
competent and well-regulated ICT infrastructure, and constantly updates
knowledge that will also improve the penetration of ICT in Kenya (ROK
2014b). The lowering of interconnection and communication costs has
been one of the important enablers of the ICT-enabled sector (KICTB
2013). UNESCO (2015: 5) notes that ‘affordable and reliable power, easy
and affordable access to requisite technology and capital goods, a support-
ive regulatory environment, programmes for skills development, and an
ability to make trusted and verifiable payments’ are important enablers for
a thriving ITES industry.
2.1. The State of the BPO/ITES Industry
The BPO industry has been growing steadily since the first international call
centre opened in 2005. A growing number of firms offer high-end services
such as software development, programming, research and development, and
finance and accounting services. The domestic call centre space has been
expanding, with large telecoms and banks setting up captive call centres to
handle customer service enquiries. Kenya lies in 39th position, being a new
entrant and the only East African country in the 2016 Global Services Loca-
tion Index (see Muchai and Kimuyu 2017: Table 2). It has the same financial
attractiveness (availability of infrastructure) as Senegal, which is not far
behind the industry leaders India and the Philippines, and well ahead of
China and Malaysia (see Muchai and Kimuyu 2017: Table 2).
Kenya’s ranking is higher than that of Senegal in relation to telecommuni-
cations infrastructure and human resources as measured by the 2016
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International Telecommunications Union ICT Development Index. Kenya
was ranked 129th in 2016, higher than Senegal (141st) but lower than
Ghana (112th), China (81st), the Philippines (107th), and Malaysia (61st)
(ITU 2016). With regard to business environment, Kenya is behind the African
countries with the exception of Ghana. Research by McKinsey and Company
(2009) found that Kenya has lost out to its competitors in the outsourcing
industry since it has not identified a market niche, created investment oppor-
tunities, or addressed associated risks. Many local firms have grown by serving
customers in Kenya and the neighbouring countries of Uganda and Tanzania
(A.T. Kearney 2016).
Many companies have left the industry, despite persistent expectations
around BPO (see e.g. The Economist 2010; Fildes 2010; Wambugu 2010).
The companies that have remained operational engage in less attractive con-
tracts, and have altered their work from that whichwas initially intended (Free
2015). For example, KenCall, Horizon, Techno Brain, Direct Channel, Spanco
Raps, and Gorilla BPO now carry out work acquired from the local and East
African regional market, rather than the international clients that were their
original focus (Free 2015). Nonetheless, to varying degrees, BPO and call
centres remain promising sources of future entry-level youth employment in
Kenya, South Africa, and Ghana (IYF 2013). In Nairobi, BPO is largely regarded
as low-skilled work that can fundamentally be done by anybody (Free 2015).
Unlike many BPO operations, which are presumed to employ many people at
one time, Nairobi’s BPO call centres have been entirely small-scale, with the
number of agents working during any given period ranging from 10 to a few
hundred (Free 2015).
The overall goal for the BPO sector up to 2012 was the generation of 7,500
direct jobs and a GDP contribution of KSh10 billion (ROK 2007). The growth
experienced in Kenya’s BPO industry included contributions to total GDP, up
from less than 0.01 per cent in 2008 to 6 per cent in 2012 (Wausi et al. 2013).
In total, 7,000 jobs were generated by mid-2012 (ROK 2012). The government
attributed this to ‘increased marketing of the country, reduction in telecom-
munication costs, and subsidised broadband for local BPO operators’ (Waema
and Ndung’u 2012: 12).
The government envisions call centres as a major source of employment
in data-oriented BPO for jobless graduates and school leavers (Free 2015).
Waema (2009) notes that in the BPO industry, the lowest employment age is 18,
with a minimum qualification of a certificate, subject to the agent’s operations.
Free (2015) observes that those with lower levels of education—predominantly
those with a secondary-school education—are more dedicated, and are not dis-
posed to leave for better jobs. With regard to skills analysis, the Ministry
of Information and Communications (MOIC 2010) notes the skills required for
BPO-ITES employment as computer skills, knowledge of specializations in
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particular industries such as medicine and law, communication skills, cultural
sensitivity, customer interaction, data skills, and business ethics and organiza-
tional culture. An assessment of IT skills byWausi et al. (2013) revealed that there
was a gap in software development and project management skills.
Basic monthly salaries as of November 2011 were US$300–500 including
incentives for voice profile agents, and US$500–1,000 including performance-
related pay for group leaders (Wausi et al. 2013). Free (2015) found that in
Kenya, an agent’s starting salary ranged between KSh15,000 and KSh25,000
per month (US$150 and US$250). The bonuses earned by agents from sales
transactions are the primary attraction of BPO work. Nevertheless, the meagre
earnings have led to graduates leaving their companies in pursuit of better
opportunities and pay in rival companies. This has made companies within
the BPO sector struggle to maintain their staff (Free 2015).
The entry of optic fibre cables has made international and in-country con-
nections cheaper and more common (Mann and Graham 2016). This in turn
enlarged the demand for ICT access and services, and encouraged the creation
of additional products and services (KICTB 2013). One such product was
mobile phone-facilitated services. The Communications Authority of Kenya
indicated a growth of 26.4 million mobile phone subscribers, crossing the
30 million mark of active mobile phone numbers by December 2012 (CAK
2012-Q1). The McKinsey Global Institute (2013) indicated that 95 per cent of
Kenyans had internet-enabled phones, with 31 per cent owning smartphones.
The government reoriented its funding and policy making attention to
software development and other high-value products, due to the incredible
infiltration of mobile connectivity (Mann and Graham 2016). Most notable
were Safaricom’s mobile money platform M-PESA, and the disaster response
crowdsourcing tool Ushahidi (Mann and Graham 2016). From an oper-
ational point of view, the government started to understand the potential
of ICT automation for the centralization of control over government budgets
and reducing corruption and waste. For example, the Kenya Revenue Author-
ity declared that all medium- and large-scale taxpayers would file and pay
their taxes electronically in 2013 (Mann and Graham 2016). In July 2011, the
Kenyan government launched the Open Data Initiative to offer transparency
and open a development dialogue between citizens and the public sector
(KICTB 2013). Similarly, tax evaders in the informal economy were to be
identified through the digital tracking of M-PESA and bank transfers (Omondi
and Juma 2013).
Themost successful ITES/BPO service in Kenya isMMT, the flagship product
being the M-PESA service from Safaricom Kenya Ltd. As will be observed in
this chapter, MMT services have contributed both directly and indirectly to
boosting economic growth, specifically by facilitating payments and trade,
and by creating significant incomes for service providers.
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3. The Development of the MMT Industry
Mobile phones are the most widespread technology, with half of the world’s
population having at least onemobile subscription in 2014 (GSMA 2015), and
total mobile subscriptions reaching more than seven billion by the end of
2015 (ITU 2015a). In Kenya, mobile phone subscriptions were 33.6 million
with a capacity of 65 million in 2014 (ROK 2015). However, mobile phone
capacity declined by 3.5 per cent to 62.8 million in 2015, due to the exit
of Essar (YU) Ltd (ROK 2016). Mobile phone subscriptions currently stand at
37.7 million with a penetration rate of 87.7 per cent, proving that the mobile
phone is becoming a significant tool in changing lives (CAK 2016-Q2; ROK
2016). The growth in subscribers led to an expansion in used mobile capacity
from 51.7 per cent in 2014 to 60.1 per cent in 2015 (ROK 2016).
Kenya has the highest number of mobile phone subscriptions per 100
inhabitants (see Muchai and Kimuyu 2017: Table 3). This can be attributed
to the country having the most affordable mobile phone price and the cheap-
est mobile broadband services, which have increased the uptake of ICT ser-
vices, particularly mobile money services. This is in spite of Kenya having a
low GNI per capita (less than US$7,000) compared with South Africa, which
has a GNI per capita of above US$7,000. This indicates that the affordability of
mobile phone services does not depend exclusively on a country’s economic
development, but also on competition, efficient regulation, policy making,
and private initiatives (ITU 2015a). The favourable regulatory regime has
been of benefit to the ICT sector in general and mobile money in particular
(Peake 2013). The Ministry of Information and Communications has taken
the view that regulation should be introduced after the markets have been
allowed to grow and novelty has been encouraged (Peake 2013). A good
example was the introduction of a comprehensive reform of communica-
tions legislation in 2008, by which time the mobile sector had already grown
rapidly (Peake 2013).
The availability of mobile devices offers a distribution technology for
mobile financial services for the unbanked (Macmillan 2016). The initial
impetus for mobile money services was to enable unbanked persons to
transfer funds electronically that they had previously been transferring
physically, bringing people from the cash-based ‘unbanked economy’ into
modern systems (Macmillan 2016). The convergence of telecommunications
and banking services generated opportunities for the development of mobile
commerce, specifically mobile banking and MMT, which have made vast
contributions to economic development (Vaughan 2007). According to the
Central Bank of Kenya (2009), most large banks have made considerable
investments in mobile phone banking. Among the numerous non-banks com-
peting for positions in this fast-growing space were mobile network carriers,
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credit card processors, and online personal finance services that allowed
customers to have their accounts on a single website (Deloitte 2010).
The development of MMT is generating more incentives for banks to serve
customers in an improved, well-organized way, thus altering the economics of
banking (Deloitte 2010). MMT is an innovation to transmit money using the
ICT infrastructure of mobile network operators (Mbiti and Weil 2011). MMT
service subscribers reached 26.8 million in 2015, representing a penetration
rate of 60.6 per cent of the total population (ROK 2016). MMT is appropriate
for the rural poor, who are frequently unreached by the banking system. It has
also obviated most rural-urban movement, especially during month ends,
thereby reducing remittance-related costs. It facilitates trade, making it sim-
pler for people to purchase goods and services, and at the same time reducing
transaction costs and the risks of loss inherent in handling cash. Kenya has
been able to keep up with the fast-growing technology and is in the lead with
regard to MMT (ROK 2015).
MMT is offered by several service providers. The main mobile network
operators offering these services, namely M-PESA, Airtel Money, and Orange
Money, are Safaricom, Airtel, and Telkom Kenya (operating under the Orange
brand) respectively. Finserve (Equitel Money), Mobile Pay (which launched a
service under the name Tangaza), and Zioncell/Mobile Decisioning (MoDe)
were also granted mobile virtual network operator licences in May 2014
(Muthiora 2015). By December 2015 the mobile money market had roughly
37.7 million users; Safaricom’s M-PESA was ranked the biggest, with 24.4
million registered customers (CAK 2016-Q2). Safaricom Ltd, Airtel, Orange
Kenya, and Finserve Africa Ltd recorded market shares of 64.7 per cent, 19.2
per cent, 12.4 per cent, and 3.7 per cent respectively in December 2015
(CAK 2016-Q2).
3.1. The Structure of MMT
Mobile money providers can be regarded as payment service suppliers or
e-money issuers, according to the National Payment Systems (NPS) Act. Cus-
tomer resources are separated from the service provider’s resources, are not
allowed to be advanced as a loan or invested, and must be held in confidence
with a ‘highly’ ranked controlled bank (Muthiora 2015). Agents, directly
supervised by service providers, are appointed to registered customers, and
offer cash-in and cash-out services (Muthiora 2015). These agents not only
maintain e-float balances on their mobile phones and cash on their premises,
but also accept deposits/withdrawals of cash from customers who have
registered as facility users. To enable agents to prefund their ‘float’ accounts,
mobile money is changed into electronic values, with a corresponding cur-
rency amount kept in a trust account (Muthiora 2015). For bulk customers
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(e.g., public agencies making social transfers), the trust account is prefunded
to cover the transfers. The mobile money system and trust account balances
are reconciled every day (Muthiora 2015).
3.2. Policy Perspectives on MMT Services
The NPS Act was operationalized to enable secure online disbursements by
assisting multiple financial institutions to transmit electronically and simplify
the handling of payments. The NPS regulations were published in August
2014 (Muthiora 2015). This provided a strong foundation for new innovations
in mobile phone financial services and the extension of national and regional
payment structures. Mobile money services can be offered by banks, non-
banks, and mobile operators. While the NPS guidelines do not require mobile
money businesses to operate under a distinct authorized body, mobile oper-
ators should work under different business entities. With the guidelines not
being very rigid, and with investment incentives being offered to service pro-
viders by the Central Bank, originality and development have been encouraged
in the sector, while the solidity and reliability of the financial sector has been
maintained (Muthiora 2015).
To ensure the reliability of mobile money services, service providers
must establish acceptable operative and transparent governance measures
(Muthiora 2015). Furthermore, it is mandatory for providers to reveal to clients
and the Central Bank any alterations in rates, terms, conditions, or charges
for the service no less than seven days before they come into operation
(Muthiora 2015).
4. The Prospects and Development Impact of MMT
MMT in Kenya has grown remarkably, becoming a major spur for economic
growth and social development (Financial Sector Regulators Forum 2015).
Although some of MMT’s initial achievements could be credited to an excep-
tionally favourable environment for mobile payments—including resilient
customer need, a friendly regulatory environment, backing from banks, and
strong brand awareness for Safaricom—the structure of the distribution net-
work has also played a significant role in the remarkable growth of MMT,
notably M-PESA, and the safety of the scheme (Muthiora 2015). In East Africa,
Kenya has the highest share of adults with a mobile money account at
58 per cent, followed by Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda with roughly 35 per
cent (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2015). Table 11.1 shows how mobile phone finan-
cial services have grown since 2010.
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The use of MMT has been increasing since 2010. Cash deposits made
through mobile money agents increased to KSh1,347 billion in 2015, up
from KSh1,269 billion in 2014 (ROK 2015). The volume and value transacted
increased from 911 million transactions valued at KSh2,371.8 billion in 2014
to 1,223.4 million transactions worth KSh2,816 billion in 2015, representing
a 24.3 per cent and 34.3 per cent increase in volume and value respectively
(ROK 2015). Overall, in 2015 the value transacted increased by 18.7 per cent,
representing 45.2 per cent of Kenya’s GDP. The growth can be attributed to
the introduction of cashless payments on public transport, aggressive market-
ing by service providers, and increased acceptance of the service by customers
owing to its accessibility, cost-effectiveness, and safety. The number of MMT
accounts increased by 0.03 per cent and 2.8 per cent in 2014 and 2015
respectively, and the number of agents increased by 16.4 per cent in 2015
compared to 9.4 per cent in 2014. The total number of active MMT agents
stood at 143,946 in December 2015, up from 129,357 in June 2015 (CAK
2015-Q1; ROK 2016).
The percentage change in employment from 2014 to 2015 was high in
MMT at 16.4 per cent; agriculture, forestry and fishing, manufacturing, and
the wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles respectively
showed 1.2 per cent, 2.9 per cent, and 5.4 per cent (see Muchai and
Kimuyu 2017: Table 5). This demonstrates the potential of the MMT sector
as far as boosting employment is concerned. Nevertheless, McCaffrey et al.
(2014) show that Kenyan mobile cash agents earn the lowest commission at
roughly KSh11,700 (US$117) per month, followed by Tanzania at KSh12,600
(US$126), with the best-paid agents being in Uganda (KSh13,600/US$136). It
should be noted, however, that the agents are not wholly employed bymobile
providers, but also engage in other activities such as retail trade, and perform
their function as agents part-time. In addition, outlets serve as double service
points for other mobile network operators within the country, which increases
agents’ average monthly income.
Table 11.1. Mobile phone financial services growth
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total number of agents 39,449 50,471 76,912 113,130 123,703 143,946
Mobile money transfer accounts (‘000) 10,615 17,396 19,319 26,016 26,023 26,753
Total number of transactions (millions) 311.0 433.0 575.0 733.0 911.0 1,223.4
Total value transacted (KSh billion) 732.2 1,169 1,544 1,902 2,372 2,816
Average value per transaction (KSh) 2,354.0 2,700.0 2,672.0 2,594.0 2,604.0 2,301.8
Total deposits through agents
(KSh billion)
391 566 811 1,033 1,269 1,347
Sources: Authors’ compilation based on data from ROK (2015, 2016) and CAK (2016-Q2).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 3/10/2018, SPi
Industries without Smokestacks
222
MMT serves as a partial substitute for the formal banking system. Before the
introduction of mobile money, many Kenyans were excluded from modern
financial services. According to the Central Bank of Kenya et al. (2016),
71.4 per cent of Kenyans use mobile money; only 17.4 per cent of the popu-
lation is now financially excluded, and financial exclusion has more than
halved since 2006. The introduction of agent banking, and the increased
association between mobile network operators and banks, has considerably
expanded the banking business since 2010 (Muthiora 2015). One of the
factors that keep the poor stuck in poverty is insufficient and inaccessible
financial services, which leave people unable to finance their education or
health, start a business, or acquire tools to increase their productivity (Digital
Undivide 2012). A study by Burgess and Pande (2005) found that rural poverty
rates in India declined considerably due to rural banking expansion, which
according to Pickens et al. (2009) was largely determined by increased access
to credit.
Researchers have also noted the potential of mobile money to affect savings.
National savings are expected to increase from 14 per cent of GDP in 2007 to
over 25per cent in 2030 (ROK2007).Mbiti andWeil (2011) observe thatmobile
money affects the economy directly through intensifying access to funds,
and indirectly through increasing savings and banking charges. Although the
mobile money system does not offer interest, customers use their mobile
money accounts as simple bank accounts to save money (Morawczynski and
Pickens 2009). This could be attributed to some individuals’ desire for safety,
particularly when travelling or sending money upcountry (Vaughan 2007).
Apart from making money transactions flexible, fast, and cost-effective,
mobile money has empowered the creation of businesses. For instance, Safar-
icom established a customer contact centre with 1,200 seats, integrating a
do-it-yourself (DIY) platform (Wausi et al. 2013). These technologically sup-
ported services lead to customer call centres that function like BPO call
centres, at the same time concentrating on local business from the technology
side (Wausi et al. 2013).
Since the introduction of mobile money in 2007, Kenya has become a
leading entrepreneurial power in Africa (USAID 2015). Kenya scored high in
high-tech transfer and networking in the 2016 Entrepreneurship Index, ahead
of any other East African country (Acs et al. 2016). Companies are generally
quite willing to adopt new technologies into their practices, and ‘opportunity-
driven entrepreneurship’ has gained traction ‘as more people embrace it for
self-development’ (Oigara 2015). A good example is Jana, a mobile microbusi-
ness, where mobile devices are used to assign tasks to workers, and payment is
made through airtime or mobile money (ITU 2013). There has also been
a proliferation of mobile start-ups, and even mobile incubators such as
mLab and iHub that use the services of mobile network operators, including
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mobile money. Entrepreneurship has been encouraged by strong and visible
government support for infrastructure, incubators, and policy reform
(Akamanzi et al. 2016). The strong government backing has established the
internationally recognized term ‘Silicon Savannah’ (Bloomberg 2012).
Through mobile money, integration with existing products and innov-
ations of new products have been developed. Kenya scored high in the 2016
Global Innovation Index, ahead of any other East African country (Dutta et al.
2016). Kenyan customers have rapidly adopted new internet-based services
specifically tailored to address some of the local competitive deficiencies and
problems. For example, M-PESA’s success was due to its ability to provide fast
and secure cash transfers even to remote villages (Runde 2015). Building on
that success, more start-ups have been spawned to address payment-related
issues, such as school fees transactions or public transport payments (The
Economist 2012). The World Bank (2012) observed that insurance, credit,
and savings services were developing within established mobile money sys-
tems. For example, in 2009 Syngenta Foundation and UAP Insurance, in
partnership with Safaricom, started Kilimo Salama, an insurance product
that uses M-PESA to make payments to smallholder farmers whose crops fail
due to excess rain or drought. Mobile money providers have collaborated with
commercial banks such as Equity Bank, Commercial Bank of Africa, I&M
Bank, Kenya Commercial Bank, Barclays, and Co-operative Bank to offer
mobile-based products. For instance, in 2012 Safaricom teamed up with the
Commercial Bank of Africa to launch M-Shwari, a mobile service that offers
micro savings accounts and credit. The total value of deposits organized
through M-Shwari as of February 2014 was more than KSh24 billion
(US$26 million) (Muthiora 2015), with more than 890,000 loans being
given (Ngigi 2014). These are examples of how ICT services are seizing
opportunities and customer readiness to make a real economic impact,
accelerating the growth of Kenya’s service sector through the adoption of
ICT services (Akamanzi et al. 2016).
Many small companies depend on mobile money for almost all their trans-
actions, or provide a service that is derived from the platform itself. Many have
adopted M-PESA to streamline transactions with suppliers and customers.
Digital transfers in the sale of agricultural produce have particularly gained
ground in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. For instance, in Kenya, 37 per cent of
recipients receive payments into a mobile money account, compared with
24 per cent and 15 per cent in Tanzania and Uganda respectively (Demirguc-
Kunt et al. 2015). Market traders can now transfer their money to the supplier,
who can then deliver the goods to their premises (Ng’weno and Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation 2010).
Mobile money eases trade by empowering users to purchase goods and
services directly from businesses and service providers (Runde 2015). This in
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turn has reduced corruption by decreasing the necessity of operating a cash-
only economy (Runde 2015). The influence of mobile money is expected to
spread to the public sector through improved efficiency and reach. The adop-
tion of mobile money by the government—for instance, in salary payments—
would not only demonstrate its importance as a driver of the service all over
the economy, but would also ‘improve the government’s ability to monitor
financial flows, collect tax revenues, and reduce illicit activity’ (World Bank
2012: 65).
5. Obstacles and Opportunities for MMT
Despite an increasing number of achievements, the mobile money industry
faces numerous obstacles. The mobile money industry spans two distinct
industries, finance and telecommunications, which have distinct business
models. This implies that it faces by-laws emanating from two distinct sectors.
Developing the required cross-sectoral partnerships in addition to connecting
cultures and regulations may be challenging (World Bank 2012). By-laws are
required not only to be exhaustive, but also to increase proportionately as
mobile money grows.
Mobile money can enhance the national payments system by making
available innovative ways to meet customers’ transaction requirements
(Ndiwalana et al. 2010). While there seems to be an opportunity for market
players to invest, they must fully comprehend not only the needs, behaviour,
and skills of the users, but also their level of adoption and their motivations
and opinions regarding the use of money (see Donner and Tellez 2008). This
would go far in contributing to the success of mobile money.
Many service providers have been or are being hindered by legacy systems
that destabilize the efficient growth of services. For instance, there may be
substantial suspicion of formal financial services, which have tended to make
people uncomfortable about parting with their money (seeWorld Bank 2012).
In such cases, a flawless and dependable value proposition that fits within
societal and traditional practices should be created by the mobile money
operators (World Bank 2012). This would help people to embrace the service
being offered to them.
There are numerous opportunities for theMMT services industry to connect
with health, agricultural, and financial inclusion goals. Kenya’s challenges in
areas such as security and property rights provide room for more business
opportunities. However, this has been slowed by the lack of internet access
in the country, specifically in remote areas. Given similar challenges in
surrounding countries, increasing internet access in the region is likely to
increase demand for such services.
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MMT requires a certain standard of literacy, which could lead to the exclu-
sion of the small but important segment of Kenyan society that is illiterate. For
technology-oriented Kenyan firms, accessing highly skilled talent is a major
cause for concern: the skills gap encompasses both the supply of adequately
trained personnel for ICT firms and the demand for ICT services from a
citizenry with a basic education (ROK 2013). As a result of the discrepancy
between the capabilities of the jobless and the skills requirements of prospect-
ive employers, a large percentage of qualified young people are likely to
remain jobless for a long time (Wausi et al. 2013). To bridge the gap, there is
a need for collaboration between mobile network operators and educational
institutions to make sure that graduates’ skills match the skills required to
operate MMT services. Training should be provided in customer services such
as how to win and retain the trust of customers, and how to manage liquidity
with money and e-cash.
MMT could lead to a significant increase in themoney supply, undermining
monetary policy. Adam andWalker (2015) note that while the mobile money
sector is enormously positive from the perspective of financial development,
the same process risks undermining the efficacy of conventional systems of
monetary control. Mobile money has the potential to impact negatively on
demand for money and the money multiplier. The impact on the multiplier is
unpredictable, because as people and banks switch away from cash they can
move to things that affect either the top or the bottom of this ratio. If the
money multiplier fluctuates unpredictably due to innovations—of which
mobile money is just one—the strategy of setting reserve money to control
inflation becomes difficult (Adam and Walker 2015). However, Adam and
Walker (2015) argue that the influence of mobile money is highly likely to
be positive and to improve rather than destabilize the effective application of
monetary policy if countries adopt modern monetary frameworks.
6. Conclusion
As this chapter has established, and as other researchers (such as Wausi et al.
2013) have noted, a precondition for online and digital work in Kenya is the
improvement of ICT services in rural and remote areas. The government has
made this possible through the improvement of ICT infrastructure connect-
ivity across the country. Nevertheless, market-based strategies—for instance,
the development of skill sets that meet the requirements of the market—that
would stimulate investment in the sector, in addition to increased govern-
ment access to ICT revenues from MMT, are essential to enhance growth.
The Kenyan MMT industry has recorded exponential growth relative to its
neighbours, regardless of the obstacles faced. This could be attributed to
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Kenya’s having the highest capability to use ICT effectively thanks to relevant
skills, the highest availability of ICT infrastructure and access, and the highest
level of IT use compared with Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Ethiopia.
Kenya also has the most affordable mobile phone prices and most affordable
mobile broadband services within the East Africa region, and this has also
increased the uptake of ICT services, particularly mobile money services. This
is in addition to Kenya’s distribution network structure, friendly regulatory
environment, and the brand awareness of Safaricom, which have also played a
significant part in MMT’s extraordinary growth.
Given Kenya’s status as a leading commercial and logistics hub in East
Africa, coupled with the competitive strengths of smaller regional peers such
as Rwanda (i.e. regulatory environment and research facilities), there is a
unique opportunity for Kenya to lead the creation of a regional ICT cluster
boasting a domestic market of 160 million consumers that can compete with
not only other regional clusters on the continent such as South Africa, but also
other emerging global ICT service clusters such as the Philippines (Akamanzi
et al. 2016). Kenya could expand its services in the region and maximize the
economies of scale required for not just the industry’s success, but also its
expansion. This can be achieved if Kenya identifies its market niche, generates
investment prospects, and addresses the accompanying risks.
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Mozambique Country Case Study
António S. Cruz and Fausto J. Mafambissa
1. Introduction
Considering the strong competition from Asian countries and other emergent
economies in the export of manufacturing goods, Mozambique could attempt
to break into the international market through exports from industries with-
out smokestacks (IWSS).1,2 These exports could be complemented by natural
resources extraction and processing, as well as by investments in smokestack
industries whenever possible.
Mozambique is a low-income sub-Saharan African country that has been
growing rapidly since 1993, at an annual average rate of 7.8 per cent, as a result
of a series of transformations following its independence from Portugal in
1975, notably from a centrally planned economy to a market economy in the
mid-1980s, from civil war to peace in 1992, and from a one-party system to a
multi-party democracy in 1994. However, since 2012, there have been signs
that the last two transformations have been overturned: Mozambique is back
to armed conflict3 between the state security and defence forces and Renamo
1 We are grateful to Finn Tarp, John Page, Richard Newfarmer, Claudio Frischtak, Ottavia Pesce,
Joseph Laredo, and Fotini Antonopoulou for their comments and revision of this chapter.
2 Industries without smokestacks are activities producing horticultural products, fruits, and
agro-industry goods, and providing tourism services, information-based services, and other
tradable services (including transportation and communications).
3 An International Peace Institute project on ‘Understanding Compliance with Security Council
Resolutions in Civil Wars’ defined civil war as a conflict in which at least 500 battle deaths are
reported during a given year, besides being a dispute concerning government and/or territory in a
state, and involving two or more armed parties, one being the government of the state and the
other a non-state opposition (Cockayne et al. 2010: 43).
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armed forces, and democracy seems to be more fragile in the 2010s than in
previous years (DW 2013; AIM 2016a, 2016b; Kaiser and Rantala 2016).
The economy’s rapid growth in the past two decades has been influenced by
substantial inflows of foreign aid and foreign direct investment, a high rate of
population growth and a young population, generally good weather condi-
tions, significant investment in education, health, and basic public infrastruc-
tures, and legislative and institutional reform.
Nevertheless, Mozambique has not undergone a structural transformation
like the industrialized countries and the emergent Asian and Latin-American
economies. Around 80 per cent of Mozambique’s labour force is still in agri-
culture, livestock, forestry, and fisheries, applying traditional manual and
low-productivity technology (Tarp et al. 2002: 6–7; Chilonda et al. 2011: xv;
Jones and Tarp 2012). It has a small and fragmented manufacturing sector
producing for the internal market, and a large non-competitive and non-
tradable services sector. The aluminium smelter is integrated into the inter-
national market but has a minor multiplier impact in the national economy,
as it operates like an enclave. Extractive industries have been expanding,
gradually from 2004 and more rapidly since 2011—an expansion driven
mainly by mineral coal exports and investments for an expansion in natural
gas extraction.
With this type of structure, the economy is not improving its competitive-
ness in the international market; nor is it allowing small family producers in
agriculture and fisheries and lower income producers in urban areas to
increase their income significantly and sustainably. The poverty headcount
ratio of the total population reduced slowly from 54.1 per cent in 2002–3 to
49.2 per cent in 2014–15, according to the official household budget survey
analysis (MPD 2010; MEF 2016).
From 2010, economic policies increasingly targeted investment in natural
resources exploitation, mainlymineral coal and natural gas. This policy choice
resulted in a surge in foreign investment in both products. However, the
decline in international oil prices and the reduction in external demand for
coal and natural gas in 2015, accompanied by a slowing of foreign investment,
weak export performance, and a cut in foreign aid, led to a 135 per cent
depreciation of the metical (MZN) against the US dollar between January
2015 and October 2016 and a rise in inflation from 1.9 per cent in December
2014 to 10.5 per cent in December 2015 and 25.5 per cent in October 2016
(INE 2015b, 2016a, 2016b; OANDA 2016). This unstable macroeconomic
trend is likely to continue in the near future.
Also from 2010 onwards, the government tended to increase public invest-
ment by obtaining non-concessional credit in the international market and
consequently increasing external debt ratios (IMF 2010: 18, 2014a: 15; GdM
2016: 28). In the period 2012–14, the Mozambican government allowed
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newly created companies led by high-ranking officials to obtain secret and
non-secret loans with public guarantees from international banks amounting
to US$2.3 billion, most of them without parliamentary approval (Hanlon
2016; IMF 2016a; WSJ 2016). The resulting increase in external debt has
aggravated the already unbalanced macroeconomic situation. Consequently,
economic growth is slowing down and general living conditions are deterior-
ating, particularly for poor families.
This debt crisis may be partly due to the frailness of a strategy based on the
extraction of natural resources mainly for export, and it prompts a search for
alternative strategies that would enable theMozambican economy to compete
in the international market. The country will have to manage its limited
resources much more carefully, and should look for other export opportun-
ities based on the production of manufactured goods and services.
This chapter uses hard data from statistics and other complementary
sources to analyse the structural transformation of the economy as well as
the size and the role of industries without smokestacks in the domestic
economy (Section 2). It then presents the main public policies on macroeco-
nomy, trade, labour, agriculture, and industry, and their impact on IWSS
(Section 3) and outlines policy issues and challenges for the development of
tourism as an IWSS case (Section 4). Section 5 presents conclusions.
2. Development of Industries without Smokestacks, 1993–2015
2.1. Wide Spectrum Economy Evolution vs. Lack of Structural
Transformation
The transition to a market economy in the 1980s, the peace agreement with
Renamo in 1992, themulti-party elections in 1994, and the transition from an
apartheid regime to a multi-racial and multi-party system in South Africa in
1990–4 formed the basic conditions for the recovery and growth of the
Mozambican economy at an unprecedented pace and with a noticeable level
of diversification (Table 12.1).
In the 1980s and 1990s, macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjust-
ment policies, including the World Bank’s ‘Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’
initiative, created an enabling environment for price stability and economic
equilibrium that was to a significant extent stimulated by external aid inflows
(Tarp et al. 2002; IMF 2004: 4–5; USAID 2004: 1.1, 1.5). ‘End of period’ annual
inflation reduced from 54.1 per cent in 1995 to 16.6 per cent in 1996, reaching
an average of 2.9 per cent in 2011–14 (IMF 2001: 4, 2014a: 18, 2015: 19). The
difference between the official exchange rate of 2,742 MT/USD and the rate in
the free market of 2,951 MT/USD in 1992 declined to 10,776 MT/USD and
10,890 MT/USD, respectively, in 1995 (IMF 2001: 100).
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Although this rapid economic growth pattern between 1993 and 2014 was
diversified to some extent, it proved not to be sustainable, according to evi-
dence in 2015–16. The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP in nominal
prices averaged 26.9 per cent in the period 1993–2015, but it showed an
aggravation to 41.8 per cent in 2011–15 (INE 2016d). Net international
reserves declined fromUS$2,995 billion at the end of 2013 to US$2,889 billion
at the end of 2015, representing a decline from 3.3months of imports of goods
and non-factor services to 2.7 months (IMF 2016b). Around 80 per cent of the
labour force is in the agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fisheries sectors ( Jones
andTarp 2012). These primary sectors produced 34.1 per cent of the aggregated
valued added in 1993–5, but only 25.0 per cent in 2013–15 (INE 2016c). The
decline in the share of primary sectors in GDPwas duemainly to an increase in
the relative share of mining and services. Production in mining and services
increased from 0.2 per cent and 51.2 per cent, respectively, to 4.6 per cent and
55.2 per cent in the same periods. Meanwhile, manufacturing, electricity,
water, and construction experienced a slight change, from 14.5 per cent to
15.3 per cent. Mining occupies only 0.2 per cent of the labour force, and
services are mainly non-competitive in the international market or non-
tradable. The share of services in total exports declined from an annual average
of 35.5 per cent in 2000–2 to 17.2 per cent in 2012–14 (INE 1996–2015).
Table 12.1. Industries without smokestacks contributed with 1.9% to annual average GDP
growth in 1993–2015
Sector of activity1 1993–4 1995–2004 2005–10 2011–15 1993–2015
Agriculture and fisheries 3.59 2.36 2.00 0.76 2.02
Mining 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.66 0.24
Manufacturing 0.49 1.75 0.19 0.32 0.83
Electricity, gas, water 0.00 0.32 0.36 0.15 0.27
Construction 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.17
Commerce and auto repair 0.30 0.52 0.99 1.03 0.74
Transportation and storage 0.61 0.72 0.77 0.50 0.68
Hotels and restaurants 0.47 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.22
Information and communications 0.19 0.29 0.35 0.34 0.31
Financial activities 0.09 0.15 0.51 0.79 0.38
Real state and services to
enterprises
0.58 0.40 0.33 0.48 0.42
Public administration and defence 2.42 0.39 0.42 0.61 0.28
Education 0.15 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.52
Health 0.04 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.11
Other services 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.07
Taxes on products and FISIM 0.04 1.09 0.07 0.43 0.59
Gross domestic product
growth rate
8.26 8.43 7.36 7.10 7.83
Note: 1Percentage contribution to the annual average GDP growth in 1993–2015, by sector of activity.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from INE (2016c).
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Evidently, the growth in the economy has been mainly directed at the
internal market, but a large share of its labour force uses almost exclusively
manual technology with low productivity rates (Tarp et al. 2002; Cruz et al.
2014). There is no evidence of a labour force transition from primary sectors to
secondary and tertiary, accompanied by an increase in agricultural productiv-
ity, and no statistical evidence of a significant change in the economic struc-
ture in rural areas. The share of the urban population in the total population
has been kept constant at around 30 per cent between the two most recent
censuses of 1997 and 2007 (INE 1999b, 2010b).
The annual average share of manufacturing in GDP increased from 13
per cent in 1993–9 to 16 per cent in 2000–7 (INE 2016c). The country’s
aluminium smelter started producing ingots in 2000, and contributed to an
increase in the weight of manufacturing in GDP (Andersson 2002: 531, 540).
But this share declined to 11 per cent in 2008–15, as aluminium production
stabilized while GDP continued to rise. Besides aluminium ingots, Mozam-
bique exports manufactured goods. Annual average manufactured4 exports as
a percentage of total exports of goods and services increased from 10.9 per cent
in 2000–7 to 20.6 per cent in 2008–14 (INE 1996–2015; BM 2016). Including
aluminium ingots, this share increased to 52 per cent in the whole period
2000–14.
Although the share of manufacturing in total GDP is relatively small, its
annual average value added per worker, at constant prices, of MZN151,000,
places it fourth (below ‘other services’, including financial, information and
communications, and real estate activities at MZN214,000, mining at
MZN235,000, and transportation and storage at MZN317,000) in the period
1993–2015 (Jones and Tarp 2012; INE 2016c). The 7.7 per cent annual average
real growth rate of value added per worker in the manufacturing sector is the
third highest in 1993–2015 after construction (10.3 per cent) and mining
(21.4 per cent). Although this indicator dropped from an annual average of
13.9 per cent in 1993–2004 to 1.3 per cent in 2005–15, the productivity per
worker in manufacturing evidences the potential for value added creation and
economic growth stimulation.
The role of services in the structural transformation of Mozambique has
been mixed in 1993–2015. It is heavily weighted in the economy, with a
53 per cent annual average share of GDP, but it has a weak role in international
transactions. While there is an increasing number of people in small commerce
and other services at a subsistence level, there is also an increasing number
4 Manufactured exports include: food, beverages and tobacco; chemicals; plastics and rubber;
leather; paper and cardboard; textiles; shoes; common metals; machinery and electrical
equipment; transportation equipment; optical equipment, photographic equipment, and
watches; medical equipment; and toys. Aluminium ingots are excluded from manufactured
exports in this ratio.
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of skilful young people working in transportation, information and communi-
cations, financial activities, and real estate. These skills require some degree of
investment in education and the ability to operate with modern technology.
In terms of growth, the annual average contribution of services, excluding
government, education, and health, increased from 2.4 per cent in 1993–2004
to 3.3 per cent in 2005–15, whereas GDP growth was 8.4 per cent and 7.2 per
cent, respectively. Services had an annual average of MZN114,000 of value
added per worker, at constant prices. This places it in sixth position, below
public administration and defence, with a value added per worker of
MZN140,000. It is worth noting that the contribution of commerce activities
is driving down the value added per worker in the overall services sector due to
the large number of people dedicated to sales and to other services of subsist-
ence remuneration. Even so, the annual average real growth rate of value
added per worker in the services increased from 3.3 per cent in 1993–2004
to 6.4 per cent in 2005–15, where the aggregated annual average real growth
rate of value added per worker in 2005–15 was 4.8 per cent.
When it comes to the international market, the annual average share of
services in the total value of exports of goods and services was 21.5 per cent in
2000–14. This share was just 18.5 per cent in 2008–14. The large share of
services in GDP does not match the much smaller share of services exports in
total exports, or even the weak performance over time of services exports as a
share of total exports.
Although the economy has grown at a fast pace since 1993, with a certain
degree of diversification, 80 per cent of its labour force live on income from
agriculture and related activities using traditional manual and low-productivity
technology. The low share of manufacturing in total GDP, the structure and
dynamics of exports based on primary commodities or selected commodities/
services from large projects with weak linkages to the internal economy, and
the large services sector as a proportion of GDP with little competitiveness in
the international market are signs of a lack of structural transformation.
2.2. Industries without Smokestacks
This section accounts for the performance of IWSS—with a caveat on the level
of precision, as the data available vary in terms of disaggregation5 degree.
Besides IWSS, other Mozambican non-traditional products with potential
5 It should be noted that ‘industries without smokestacks’ does not have a specific classification
in national accounts; nor it is treated as a specific GDP component in the official statistics of
Mozambique. Therefore, any attempt to aggregate IWSS activities runs the risk of either over-
estimation or under-estimation of this set of goods and services in total GDP.
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for export growth are maize, sesame, and soybeans, but these will not be dealt
with in detail in this chapter. Based on INE’s data, Industries without Smoke-
stacks6 contributed with 1.9 per cent to the GDP annual average growth
rate in 1993–2015 (INE 2016c). The rest of the economy contributed with
5.9 per cent.
In the agriculture sector, production of citrus fruits increased at an annual
average of 6.7 per cent in 1993–2014, and the volume of tomatoes and horti-
cultural products increased at an annual average of 8.0 per cent and 12.6 per
cent, respectively, in 1993–2002. No production statistics for tomatoes
and horticultural products are available from 2003 onwards in the official
Statistical Yearbook series. Nevertheless, the annual average exports of horticul-
tural products increased from US$282,000 in 1996–8 to US$15.4 million
in 2006–9 (MPF-DNE 1994–5; INE 1996–2015). This indicator also increased
slightly for fruit exports, from US$34.4 million in 1995–8 to US$36.3 million
in 2006–9. In particular, banana exports increased significantly in 2011 due
to a foreign direct investment project in Nampula Province.7
Manufacturing output increased its share of GDP to 18 per cent in 2001, but
this subsequently declined to an annual average of 10 per cent in 2012–15.
Gross value added (GVA), in current prices, of food processing, textiles and
garments, and wood processing represented 32 per cent, 5 per cent, and
9 per cent, respectively, of aggregate GVA in manufacturing in 2010–15 (INE
2016e). The GVA of these three manufacturing sub-sectors represented 4.5 per
cent of aggregated GVA in the economy. The annual average GVA variation in
current prices of food processing, textiles and garments, and wood processing
was 9.9 per cent, 6.2 per cent, and 7.7 per cent, respectively, in 2010–15. The
variation in the same indicator for the manufacturing sector was 8.5 per cent,
and for the entire economy 11.2 per cent.
Agro-processing—of sugar, cashew nuts, and cotton fibre—for export has
been a traditional activity in Mozambique since before independence, and
continues today (Dias 2012; Sutton 2014). Maize flour, refined edible oil, and
processed tea are also exported at a more modest revenue. Processed wood
is also currently exported. Processed rice is traditionally consumed in the
domestic market, and soybean production is expanding for poultry feed
(Calima et al. 2014). There are plans to attract foreign direct investment on
two paper pulp projects, in Zambézia and Nampula provinces, amounting to
US$4.5 billion (MPD and MF 2012: 12).
6 The composition of IWSS in the GDP comprises the following sectors: 16.98% of the total
agricultural and fisheries, 45% of the total manufacturing, transportation and storage, hotels and
restaurants, and information and communications.
7 Banana exports reached an annual average of US$70.9 million in 2011–14 (BM 2016).
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Transportation and storage accounted for 10.1 per cent of GVA in the
aggregated economy in 1993–2015, and has been growing at an annual aver-
age of 7.8 per cent, which is the same rate as GDP. With an annual average of
47 billion passenger-kilometres, road transportation accounted for 98 per cent
of the total passenger traffic transported by rail, sea, air, and road in 2009–15
(MTC 2016). Railway (40 per cent) and road (51.5 per cent) transportation
account for an annual average of 2.8 and 3.6 billion ton-kilometres transported
in 2009–15, respectively. Railway transportation grew by 387 per cent between
2009 and 2015 due to the extraction of mineral coal, mainly after 2011. Total
cargohandling in the country’smainports increased from12.7million tonnes in
2009 to 32.1 million tonnes in 2015 (MTC 2016).
GVA in tourism (hotels and restaurants) accounted for 2.2 per cent of
aggregated value added in 1993–2015. This sector has been growing at an
annual average rate of 9.1 per cent, which is higher than GDP growth. This is a
sector with potential for growth, for clients from both the domestic and
the international market. One factor that could increase the flow of tourists
from abroad is a more cost-efficient air transportation service. International
demand and safety inside Mozambique are other relevant factors influencing
tourism (Batey 2014).
Regarding the GDP production approach, national accounts statistics do
not provide disaggregated data on ‘information-based services’, but on the
aggregated information and communications sector. The share of these
services in total GDP was 3.3 per cent in 1993–2015. This sector contributes
with 0.31 per cent to GDP growth, well above the sectors’ hotels and res-
taurants (0.22 per cent), electricity, gas, and water (0.27 per cent), and public
administration and defence (0.28 per cent) (Table 12.1). The share of gross
value added for consultancy, scientific, and technical services in total GVA is
2.1 per cent, based on nominal values for 2010–2015 (INE 2016e). The total
number of mobile phone subscriptions increased from 5.9 million in 2009 to
20.1 million in 2015 (MTC 2016). In terms of exports as a share of total
exports of services, technical assistance and services related to commerce
(14 per cent) and telecommunications, computers, and information services
(5 per cent) were ranked third and fourth, respectively, after transportation
(43 per cent) and travel (31 per cent) in 2006–15 (BM 2016). The low share of
information and communication technology in total exports allows us to
hypothesize that Mozambique is mainly importing information-based tech-
nology in order to increase productivity across sectors producing for the
domestic market.
From the limited information available, there is evidence that IWSS have
been contributing to economic growth in Mozambique since 1993, but there
is no evidence of a significant contribution to the expansion of its goods and
services in the international market.
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3. Selected Public Policies
This section reviews macroeconomic, trade, labour, agricultural, and indus-
trial policies that have influenced economic performance since 1993, in par-
ticular in relation to IWSS. A recent and detailed policy review is presented in
UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2014/059 (Cruz et al. 2014).
3.1. Macroeconomic Policies
The Mozambican government implemented the Economic Rehabilitation
Program (PRE) from 1987 onwards, although initial price reforms started
earlier in the same decade (USAID 2004). This macroeconomic stabilization
and structural adjustment programme represented a transition from a cen-
trally planned economy to a market economy system, and it was designed to
reverse the declining trend of the economy in a civil war context.
In the period from 1980 to 1984, the economy declined by 26 per cent
(Sulemane 2002). Exports and imports fell, while the trade deficit worsened,
from US$320 million in 1979 to US$444 million in 1984, reaching US$607
million in 1982. Foreign debt-servicing obligations amounted to more than
twice the value of exports of goods and services in 1985 (IMF 2004: 5). Thus,
foreign currency was in short supply, which drove the parallel (black) market
exchange rate downwards and increased the gap with the official exchange
rate (Hanlon 1991; Tarp et al. 2002: 25–6). The government was able to cover
its deficit by printing money, adding pressure for an increase in prices in the
parallel market, i.e. driving up inflation (Tarp 1990).
In order to reverse this trend, the government progressively devalued the
official exchange rate and gradually liberalized prices, interest rates, and trade
(IMF 1996, 2004). It also restricted public expenditure and the money supply,
and reformed the system of revenue collection. Although basic policies were
implemented in the first years of the PRE, it was only after the peace agree-
ment in 1992 that economic growth accelerated from an annual average of
6.6 per cent in 1990–2 to 6.9 per cent in 1993–5, and end-of-the-period
inflation declined from 54.1 per cent in 1995 to 16.6 per cent in 1996 and
5.8 per cent in 1997 (IMF 2001; Sulemane 2002).
Fiscal reforms, privatization programmes, and financial sector reforms con-
tinued after 1992, with the aim of reducing macroeconomic imbalances and
improving efficiency and competition in the economy. As a result of success-
ful policies and reforms, Mozambique benefited from debt relief from donors
under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative from 1998 to 2002
amounting to US$2.7 billion in 1999 values (IMF 1998: 3, 1999).
The country continued to implement market-oriented macroeconomic
policies and structural reforms until 2015 (IMF 2014b: 1, 2016b). Taxation
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reforms—in particular, institutional reforms such as the creation of the
Tax Authority—led to an increase in the state revenues to GDP ratio from
12.4 per cent in 2004 to 25.5 per cent in 2015 (Barnes et al. 2016; IMF 2016b).
This improved macroeconomic performance allowed economic agents to take
resource allocation decisions partly on the basis of price signals.
However, many distortions and weaknesses remain, such that the Mozam-
bican economy has not yet reached the point of Pareto efficiency. To a large
extent, the public deficit has been financed by external aid and public bor-
rowing, with transparency and accountability shortfalls, in particular between
2012 and 2015 (GdM 2016; IMF 2016a; WSJ 2016). Furthermore, the
exchange rate dynamic has not always been favourable to the tradable sectors,
in particular agriculture.
3.2. Trade Policies
The exchange rate was devalued in 1987 and in the following years of the
PRE. Subsequently, the exchange rate tended to be determined by the market.
The tariff book was simplified in 1996 (USAID 2004). In 2004, the Most
Favoured Nation duty structure included ad valorem percentage rates of
0, 2.5, 5, 7.5, and 25 (Alfieri et al. 2006: 6–7). In 2006, the highest rate dropped
to 20 per cent. Following the SADC Trade Protocol, Mozambique had grad-
ually liberalized trade with most member countries by the end of 2012, and
with South Africa by the end of 2015 (PdM 2009). Mozambique is amember of
the World Trade Organization and has preferential market access with the
European Union under the Everything but Arms and the Economic Partner-
ship Agreements, and with the Unites States under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (USAID 2004: 5–1, 5–2).
In the 1990s, an interbank foreign exchange market was developed and
customs exemptions were reduced (IMF 2004: 6, 7). Customs procedures were
reformed (IMF 2004: 12). In 2006 the creation of the Tax Authority was an
institutional reformmilestone. These reforms were aimed at reducing the costs
of international trade and increasing control over tax revenues. Complemen-
tary reforms were introduced to promote an enabling business environment
and trade, such as the creation of the one-stop shop and the abolition of
visas for many SADC countries (Imani Development International 2007: 3).
Mozambique has also developed legislation and started implementing Export
Promotion Zones at a moderate pace, mainly in Beluluane and Nacala.
As a result of trade liberalization and reforms, as well as foreign direct
investment in mineral resources such as heavy sands, natural gas, and coal,
and other investments (in the hydroelectric power system, sugar, and
tobacco), exports grew at an annual average rate of 14.9 per cent between
1993 and 2015 (INE 2016d). Imports grew at 11.5 per cent in the same period.
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The current account deficit as a percentage of nominal GDP reduced from
43.7 per cent in 1995 to9.1 per cent in 2007, reflecting an upward trend in
exports. This ratio worsened to 53.6 per cent in 2013, however, due to large
foreign direct investment in the exploitation of coal in Tete province and
natural gas in the Rovuma basin. The current account deficit declined in the
period up to 2015 as imports reduced at a faster rate than exports due to the
reduction in international prices of coal and natural gas, and the postponing
of investment in the latter commodity.
Some analysts have been arguing in favour of Mozambique advancing
further with trade liberalization, by continuing to reduce tariffs, applying a
flat rate, complying with WTO rules, facilitating visas and international work
permits, and reducing transportation and port costs (Flatters 2002; USAID
2004; Menon 2014). Such measures would reduce transaction costs and
increase the competitiveness of Mozambican exports. Other analysts consider
that trade liberalization has limitations as a promoter of exports insofar as
(i) such a policy fails to protect producers for the external market from a
deterioration in international terms of trade, (ii) the market power of private
companies prevents local producers from competing on the international
market, and (iii) foreign aid contributes to an overvalued local currency,
reducing competitiveness in the external market (Castel-Branco 1997; Mosca
et al. 2014).
3.3. Labour Policies
Labour policies in Mozambique are managed by the Ministry of Labour,
Employment, and Social Security (MITESS). This institution is responsible
for devising and monitoring government policies, for coordinating the
National Social Security System, and for participating in national minimum-
wage negotiations. Two major trade union confederations, the Mozambique
Workers’ Organization (OTM) and the Mozambique Independent and Free
Union Confederation (CONSILMO), participate in the annual minimum-
wage definition together with the Confederation of Business Associations of
Mozambique (CTA) and the Mozambican government. MITESS is also respon-
sible for the management of the foreign-worker quota system and oversees
vocational education and training through the National Institute of Employ-
ment and Vocational Training (INEFP).
Over time, several instruments have been used in order to implement labour
policies. As part of public sector reform, a significant improvement in the
business environment was achieved through the simplification of administra-
tive procedures, and the last revision of the labour law came into force in 2007,
when Law 23/2007 replaced Law 8/1998 (PdM 2007).
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Law 23/2007 included new provisions for the promotion of entrepreneur-
ship and the protection of workers, most notably strengthening job security,
preventing unfair dismissal, protecting the dignity of workers, and extending
their rights to trade union activity, to strike, to social security, to fair remu-
neration, to resting periods, to holidays, to maternity and paternity leave, to
retirement schemes, and to pre-professional training. The new labour law also
created an extra-judicial system for the resolution of labour disputes. The
recently approved Employment Policy aims at harmonizing and aligning
various strategic actions to induce improvements to the business environment
and to the labour market (MITESS 2016).
The latest report on the manufacturing enterprises survey in Mozambique
in 2012 shows that there is a slight improvement in labour legislation, which
is thus becoming less of a constraint in the labour regulations environment
than it appeared in the 2006 survey (Rand and Tarp 2013).
3.4. Agricultural and Industrial Policies
Agricultural policies in Mozambique have elicited a positive response from
smallholder agricultural producers to price incentives, improvements to
road and ports infrastructure, and improvements in basic trading services.
The same incentives have elicited a positive response from commodity
producers for the external market (e.g. sugar and tobacco). According to
official agricultural production figures, aggregate agricultural production
increased by an annual average rate of 6.7 per cent between 1993 and
2015 (INE 2016c), although these figures are considered to be overestimated
(Pauw et al. 2012: 2). Nevertheless, agricultural production is still based on a
large number of family smallholder units using traditional and manual
technology, and low levels of technical input. Hence, agricultural product-
ivity remains low (Cunguara et al. 2012: 121; Pauw et al. 2012: 8–9; Benfica
et al. 2014: 17).
Industrial policies from 1992 onwards were ‘hands-off ’, with the govern-
ment undertaking limited initiatives. Markets were meant to determine
where investors should allocate their resources. A broad privatization pro-
gramme was implemented that eliminated bankrupt companies, reduced
public expenditure on inefficient companies, and permitted private reinvest-
ment in a small proportion of running enterprises. The impact of the privat-
ization programme on industrialization in Mozambique is considered to be
far from successful in terms of manufacturing diversification and expansion,
or in terms of employment generation (Castel-Branco et al. 2001: 11–12;
Dibben and Wood 2016). Privatization also requires careful preparation and
analysis in order to address the country-specific conditions (Torp and Rekve
1998). Such a privatization process would permit supportive measures like
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access to credit and encourage national entrepreneurs, which has not always
happened in Mozambique.
On the other hand, the Export Promotion Zones policy led to one major
capital-intensive foreign direct investment project, the aluminium smelter.
However, this mega-project is considered an enclave, with weak connections
to the rest of the domestic economy. Other, smaller-scale, successful industries
produce a variety of goods, though mostly food and beverages, for the domes-
tic market, and tobacco and sugar, mainly for the international market. In
general, though, industrial policies have failed to promote manufacturing
diversification and expansion of output as a proportion of GDP, in particular
since 2004 (Cruz et al. 2014). The state imposes conditions on the creation
and development of enterprises through the licensing process, labour inspec-
tions, and tax inspections.
The Industrial Policy and Strategy approved by the government in 2016
defined its main objective as transforming manufacturing into the main
vehicle for the country to achieve prosperity and improve living conditions,
through generating employment, increasing production, and processing nat-
ural resources. A local content law is currently being drafted in order to address
the need to develop further connections between local companies and extract-
ive industries.
Given the young population structure of the country and the high
unemployment rate, especially in urban areas, labour-intensive manufactur-
ing production could play a role in the growth of jobs, income expansion, and
industrial intensification. Yet this kind of production, in particular for exports,
has not been developed in Mozambique due to poorly designed, coordinated,
and implemented industrial and competitiveness policies (Krause andKaufmann
2011: 54; Rand et al. 2014: 15). The newly approved Industrial Policy and
Strategy could change this pattern if the government avoids falling into the
high-value natural resources sector trap and being driven by foreign invest-
ment decisions.
3.5. IWSS Policies
Production of horticultural products and fruits for export has benefitted
from the general investment promotion legislation. This was the case with
citrus production in Boane; baby corn, fresh chilies, green beans, mange tout
peas, sugar snap peas, and okra production in Vanduzi; and banana produc-
tion in Nampula. However, there has not been a significant increase in
horticultural and fruit production for export. Encouraging large foreign
investment projects has not been and will not be the only way of increasing
exports of these commodities. Due to the very large number of smallholder
agricultural producers (4.2 million), it will be necessary to encourage them to
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participate in export projects as producer units and not only as a source of
cheap labour (MASA n.d.).
Regarding agro-processing for export, previous and current industrial pol-
icies have been and still are ineffective. It requires political will and stronger
local business interests to remove the business barriers that are well known
and highlighted in theWorld Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ annual reports. It would
also require a persistent and continuous effort in terms of public policies
directed at promoting agro-processing projects to allow the expansion of
this sub-sector (MPD 2014). Poverty reduction strategy papers since 2001
have weakened the industrial policy component in the set of public policies.
At least 70 per cent of the state budget has been allocated to ‘social sectors and
other priority sectors related to poverty alleviation’, at the expense of the
industrial sector (GdM 2001). At the same time, natural resources extraction
for export has gradually become the economic policy focus due to the percep-
tion that it could provide the required revenue to finance the expanding state
budget and the opportunity for national interest groups to profit from allow-
ing international extraction of mineral coal, natural gas, and other minerals
(e.g. heavy sands and precious stones).
Transportation, communications, and information policies have promoted
the rehabilitation and construction of roads and railways connecting land-
locked countries/regions with the Indian Ocean and opened the market for
passenger and cargo road transportation companies and for mobile telephone
and internet provider services. Nevertheless, further competition in these
areas could contribute to an improvement in the quality of services and a
reduction in costs for the consumer. Since the late 2000s, Mozambique has
been open to various international air transport companies. Currently, seven
international airlines fly to Maputo or other cities in the country. The chal-
lenges for theMozambican government are the increase in competition in the
domestic flight market, and the reduction in the fares charged by the Mozam-
bican national airline, LAM, which needs to improve the quality and reliabil-
ity of its services in order to achieve international standards. Tourism policy
issues are discussed in the next section.
4. Tourism: An IWSS Case
While economic growth is being fuelled by investment in the exploitation of
mineral resources (coal and hydrocarbons) and related infrastructure in the
2010s, the tourism sector is seen as an opportunity to diversify the economy
through its potential for export expansion, job creation, skills learning, and
income generation. Tourism development requires investment in basic infra-
structure (road networks, water and sanitation, energy, and health centres), as
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well as in the provision of excellent services in terms of technology and
transportation, which are sought by increasingly demanding customers
(Jones 2007; Jones et al. 2007; Portuguez et al. 2012).
Mozambique can be considered an attractive destination for tourism
because of its natural conditions, biodiversity, and cultural diversity. Its coast-
line of over 2,700 km offers excellent beaches, bays, and lagoons. About 15 per
cent of the country is classified as a protected area (IFC 2012). The Ministry of
Tourism has produced a brief profile of each of the country’s three regions:
North, Centre and South (MITUR 2004: 62). In order to take advantage of the
country’s tourism potential, the government has also approved a tourism law
(PdM 2004).
4.1. Opportunities and Challenges
Tourism services are growing faster than the rest of the economy. However,
these services are still far from achieving their potential, and the sector has
opportunities that could be further explored, such as combining sun and
beach resorts with eco-tourism, cruises, events, business, or gambling.
According to the Second Strategic Plan for the Development of Tourism
2015–24 (PEDT II), tourism development is facing four main category
barriers, which need to be addressed: (i) high cost of air and road transporta-
tion, (ii) corruption, road control by police officers, and an unstable military
and political situation, (iii) high competition with other Southern African
countries, and (iv) need to have higher trained professionals working in the
tourism industry (Fernando 2013; MITUR 2015a).
Recently, however, the Government of Mozambique has adopted a new
approach to the development of tourism, which focuses on an integrated plan
identifying Touristic Interest Areas and Investment Priority Areas in the prov-
inces of Inhambane, Zambézia, Nampula, Cabo Delgado, and Niassa (MITUR
2013, 2015b).
5. Conclusion
Under the current international economic conditions, where Asian countries
are strong competitors over manufacturing commodities, low-income coun-
tries like Mozambique could attempt to compete in industries without
smokestacks. Examples of commodities and activities in which Mozambique
could compete on the international market are baby corn, green beans, citrus
fruits, bananas, mangos, cut flowers, maize and related products, sesame,
tourism, electricity from hydropower plants and natural gas plants, and
transportation services.
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An analysis of the last two decades, during whichMozambique has followed
an upward path of economic growth, reveal that the country has not under-
gone a structural transformation like those of the industrialized countries and
the emergent Asian and Latin-American economies—i.e. an expansion of the
manufacturing sector, as a share of GDP and a share of the total labour force,
and an increase in agricultural productivity accompanied by a reduction in its
share of the labour force due to amigration to othermore productive sectors in
the economy. In Mozambique, about 80 per cent of the labour force is in
agriculture and other rural activities, producing about 25 per cent of GDP.
Manufacturing output as a share of GDP has been declining since 2001, to
10 per cent in 2015. The economy is mainly growing inwards with a limited
expansion of exports, in particular of labour-intensive goods and services.
The government’s growth strategy since 2010 has been focused on inter-
national investment in mineral coal and natural gas, as well as on an expan-
sion in public infrastructure investment, with a growing share of external
commercial lending. The country’s economic performance in 2015 and
2016 reveals that this strategy is risky and unsustainable. Lower international
demand for commodities in general, and coal and natural gas in particular, a
sharp rise in external public debt, a decline in foreign aid, and public policy
mismanagement are causing a serious economic crisis.
Mozambique is in dire need of reversing its macroeconomic and other
policies in order to stabilize the economy. Meanwhile, a diversified and
balanced growth strategy could promote synergies to expand output from
agriculture and related activities, and other industries without smokestacks,
so that these sectors can compete on the international market. An open and
transparent public policy on the exploitation of coal, natural gas, and other
high-value natural resources could integrate these products into a processing
value chain, such that the country’s economy could gradually industrialize.
A complementary role for investments in smokestacks industries should also
be considered, whenever possible. For any economic policy to obtain mean-
ingful results, the restoration of peace in the country is a pre-condition.
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A Service Economy in Need of an Export Boost
E. Philip English
1. Overview
Senegal is one of the most stable and democratic countries in Africa. It is the
only country in continental West Africa that has never experienced a coup
d’état.1 It has enjoyed multi-party democracy since 1976 and has twice seen
the defeat of the incumbent president at the ballot box, in 2000 and 2012.
There is substantial freedom of the press, and the capital, Dakar, is one of the
safest large cities in Africa. The country is proud of its reputation for tolerance
and the good relations between its Muslim majority and Christians. It is an
open society with strong ties to the West.
The economy has done less well. Senegal is a border-line low-income coun-
try, with GDP per capita estimated at US$950 in 2016.2 The oil shock of 1975
and the subsequent debt crisis led to a slow but steady decline. With a fixed
exchange rate tied to the French franc, the country was obliged to attempt an
internal adjustment, which proved impossible, and finally the currency was
devalued—for the first and only time—by 50 per cent in 1994.
The economy grew strongly for the next ten years, with an average GDP
growth of 4.5 per cent per annum. However, there was little structural change,
and the rural economy remained dependent on rain-fed crops, which were
vulnerable to the unreliable rainfall typical of a Sahelian country. While many
African countries experienced a commodity-driven boom after 2005, the
1 The island country of Cabo Verde also enjoys this record.
2 Senegal was classified as a lower-middle-income country in 2014 until the appreciation of the
US$ caused a decline in its GDP per capita in US$.
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Senegalese economy slowed down. It suffered from spikes in food and oil
prices, the global financial crisis, climatic shocks, a slackening in the reform
effort, and worsening governance.
The new government of Macky Sall inherited a sluggish economy in 2012,
with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 45 per cent and a fiscal deficit of 6.7 per cent of
GDP. It immediately committed to the restoration of sound macroeconomic
management with an IMF Policy Support Instrument. The fiscal deficit was
reduced to 4.2 per cent in 2016. The CFA franc is managed by a relatively
independent, regional central bank, which has maintained low inflation and
generally avoided an overvalued exchange rate.3 The advantages of a sound
monetary policy, ease of transactions betweenmember states, and the absence
of exchange rate risks, are generally considered to outweigh the constraints of
a fixed exchange rate regime.
When the Doing Business ranking for Senegal fell to 176, the government
committed to an ambitious three-year programme of reforms. Its ranking in
2016 improved to 147, albeit still very low. Senegal’s ranking in the corruption
perception index has improved from 112 to 64. GDP growth gradually
strengthened to 6.6 per cent in 2016, thanks in part to good weather condi-
tions, making it the fourth fastest growing economy in sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) in 2016, with continued growth at 6.6 per cent.4 By early 2016, Senegal
was one of only two sub-Saharan African countries to enjoy a positive outlook
from the rating agencies.5
Today, Senegal has a diversified economy driven by services. The tertiary
sector has accounted for 60 per cent of GDP and 65 per cent of GDP growth
since 2005, led by telecommunications and finance. In the secondary sector,
construction has been the most dynamic, but the mining sector has gradually
expanded with new mines in gold and mineral sands. Manufacturing repre-
sents 12 per cent of GDP. The primary sector is small by African standards, at
15 per cent of GDP, but it is diversified between crops (8 per cent), livestock
(4 per cent), and fishing (3 per cent).
2. Trade Performance
Senegal’s exports of goods and services as a share of GDP fell to 25 per cent by
2014, below the average of 30 per cent for SSA. Exports of goods have typically
covered only half of merchandise imports. Services trade also records a small
3 This is the general conclusion of the IMF, though it might change if the US$ weakens.
4 This seems a little optimistic since it is unlikely that agriculture will grow much and may even
fall somewhat.
5 The other one was Côte d’Ivoire.
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deficit. However, the diversity of the economy is reflected in its exports. No
single good accounts for more than 10 per cent of total exports of goods and
services; see Table 13.1. The largest commodity export is a wide variety of fish
products, both industrial and artisanal. Manufactured goods, including pet-
roleum products, cement, phosphoric acid, and fertilizer amount to almost
half of all goods exported. Tourism appears to be the largest single foreign
exchange earner, though the data is not reliable. Other business services,
which include business process outsourcing, are the next largest service export
and the sixth largest export overall.
The four traditional exports have been fish products, groundnut oil, tourism,
and phosphoric acid and fertilizer. Fish products suffer from serious over-fishing
and are unlikely to sustain significant growth until stocks are replenished.
Groundnut oil has been hampered by fluctuating supplies of raw material
due to irregular rainfall, declining soil fertility, mismanagement throughout
the value chain, and declining world demand for groundnut oil.6 Tourism did
well until 2000, after which it has suffered from neglect. Phosphoric acid and
fertilizer have enjoyed some growth, and may be able to support further
expansion under new ownership of the existing mine and the opening of
one new mine.
New exports have emerged, notably petroleum products, gold, and cement.
Petroleum products involve little value-added, however, as they depend on
imported crude oil, which is processed at a small and inefficient refinery.
There is no potential for growth here, at least until newly discovered off-
shore oil and gas reserves are developed. The recent slump in prices suggests








Other business services 4.9






Note: *Average of 2014 and 2015 for goods; 2014 for services. **Over half consists of
telecommunications services which are essentially taxes on incoming long-distance calls.
Source: BCEAO (2014); République du Sénégal (2015).
6 However, exports of raw groundnuts have recently expanded significantly, notably to China.
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that this may not happen soon. Gold production began in 2006, and a new
boost in output in 2016 made it one of the two largest exports, along with
phosphates. Cement has registered rapid growth, drawing on local limestone
deposits. In general, however, Senegal is not considered to have major mining
potential. The last notable merchandise export is fresh fruits and vegetables.
These remain modest in size, but enjoyed the fastest growth from 2005
to 2015.
Exports of business services have grown steadily over the last ten years, and
do not face any fundamental supply or demand-side constraints. Transport
services have also grown, albeit more slowly. The port has been relatively well-
managed and transit trade to Mali benefited from the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire,
the major competing transit country. On the other hand, the national airline
has suffered from continued mismanagement and was effectively bankrupt
by late 2015. The rail link to Mali has steadily deteriorated, to the point where
the operating concession was rescinded in 2015. With the stabilization of Côte
d’Ivoire and the location of Senegal on the extreme western end of West Africa,
the prospects for expanding transit trade appear limited.
The government has high hopes for a special economic zone that it is
developing near the new airport just outside of Dakar. The Chinese have
begun to build one industrial zone nearby and are committed to experiment-
ing with some labour-intensive manufactured exports. Senegal would seem
well-suited given its proximity to Europe and America and its good port facil-
ities. However, it remains a high-cost business environment, with burdensome
labour regulations. One hopes that this will materialize and expand in scope,
but many observers are sceptical.
Clearly there are more than two or three export sectors that have the
potential to drive this economy. Senegal is fortunate to have a variety of assets
on which to draw. But three sectors that have a proven track record and plenty
of up-side potential are tourism, information and communication technology
(ICT), and horticulture. All three are highlighted in the government’s new
development strategy, the Plan for an Emerging Senegal (PES). These sectors
are the focus of this chapter.
3. Tourism
In the 1980s, Senegal was second only to Kenya in SSA in terms of tourist
arrivals. This was based on its beautiful weather during the European winter,
extensive beaches, proximity to Europe, peaceful environment, cultural
attractions, and reputation for hospitality. Club Med was operating two
resorts and a new tourism station had been developed at Saly-Portudal, attract-
ing investors who steadily expanded the hotel capacity. However, by 2010,
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Senegal was no longer in the top ten destinations in SSA. While tourism has
boomed in many countries, it has faded in Senegal. This is due primarily
to neglect rather than to any fundamental problems and the future should
be bright.
The analysis of the tourism sector is hampered by a lack of data. This is
rather surprising given its role as one of the top sources of foreign exchange,
but symptomatic of the degree of interest shown by the authorities. Official
statistics on tourism arrivals, drawn from the main hotels, end in 2010. They
indicate that non-resident arrivals gradually increased to a peak at 492,000 in
that year. However, non-resident nights peaked in 2002 at 1,569,000 and
declined thereafter to only 1,234,000. The only data available after 2010 is
for visitors arriving by plane, and this indicates no improvement up to 2013
and a dramatic fall in 2014 to 374,000, reflecting the Ebola scare. 2015 was
not any better since the threat of Ebola affected the 2014–15 tourism season,
but the sector started to recover in 2016.
The only detailed study of the economic impact of tourism in Senegal dates
from 2003, with technical support from the World Tourism Organization.7 It
estimated the direct contribution of tourism at 4.6 per cent of GDP, or 6.8 per
cent once indirect benefits are included. However, this includes domestic
tourism, transport, and public spending related to the tourism industry. The
overall contribution of foreign tourists’ spending in Senegal would be closer to
4.3 per cent of GDP. The number of tourist nights was adjusted in the study to
include small hotels and campements not covered by the survey ofmain hotels,
along with stays with friends and relatives, and long-term visitors who typic-
ally come for several months during the European winter. The latter has
become an important, and somewhat overlooked, phenomenon in Senegal,
and may now account for tourist nights equivalent to 20 per cent of those in
hotels.8 However, the clients of small hotels are more likely to be nationals or
other African visitors on business. The study also highlights the likelihood of
under-reporting by hotels, but the correction made seems excessive.9 The
impact of international tourism was probably no greater than 4 per cent of
GDP in 2000 and has probably declined closer to 3 per cent in 2015.
That said, it is worth underlining that tourism brings significant benefits to
the local economy, to respond to a debate that unfortunately continues to
linger in some circles, including with the previous president of Senegal. The
2003 study estimated the import content of tourism spending at 30 per cent.
This is roughly consistent with a more detailed study conducted for the
year 1979, which estimated this figure at 36 per cent, when the economy
7 République du Sénégal (2003).
8 There are 33 ‘residences’ in Saly-Portudal alone, each with roughly 40 villas.
9 The total number of hotel nights is estimated at 2.6 million.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Industries without Smokestacks
258
was somewhat less developed.10 The impact on employment is also signifi-
cant, though again data is lacking. Global evidence suggests that on average in
developing countries, each hotel room creates one hotel job, one more job in
the rest of the tourist industry, and one job through indirect linkages.11 With
10,000 hotel rooms, this implies roughly 30,000 jobs, of which 90 per cent can
probably be attributed to foreign visitors.12 This contribution is noteworthy
given that much of this employment is located outside of Dakar, where
alternatives are limited.
The fall in the total number of nights spent in hotels reflects a decline in the
average length of stay to only 3.2 nights. Given the increase in arrivals, this
suggests that business tourism has been expanding while longer-stay holiday
tourism has declined. Unfortunately, this level of detail is not available in the
statistics but it is confirmed by actors in the industry. New hotels have opened
in Dakar and the top ones have recently expanded their capacity. In addition
to normal business tourism, Dakar is a popular site for conferences. The last
available survey conducted in 2000 indicated that 39 per cent of tourist nights
took place in Dakar, where it was assumed that the purpose was essentially
business and conferences. This share has undoubtedly increased since then.
Since business tourism is doing well and is more a by-product of other activ-
ities in the economy, our focus is on leisure tourism. However, the potential to
expand conference tourism must not be overlooked.
Saly-Portudal is clearly suffering, as is the othermain beach destination, Cap
Skirring, in the Casamance. Several hotels have recently closed, and others
have deteriorated in quality, as low profitability has impeded their capacity to
conduct regular maintenance, let alone upgrade their products. Hotel oper-
ators have relied increasingly on seminar business, since Saly-Portudal is
only 1.5 hours from Dakar, along with small but growing local tourism during
the school holidays in the off-season. In the more distant Casamance, unoffi-
cial estimates point to a decrease in arrivals from 60,000 in 2000 to only
20,000 today.
The reasons for this are many. The 2008–9 global financial crisis hurt
demand in Europe, and the insecurity in Casamance affected its attractive-
ness. Yet, the crisis in North Africa and the Middle East should have worked to
Senegal’s advantage; the only security incident in the Cap Skirring region
occurred in the early 2000s. Something more fundamental is clearly at work.
In essence, the product has become tired and the government has done little
or nothing to support it—on the contrary, it has taken some measures that
have hurt the industry.
10 English (1983). 11 English (1986: 38).
12 The 2003 study by the Government estimates total employment at 100,000 but this seems too
high. République du Sénégal (2003).
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Senegal offers a variety of attractions, from sport fishing and bird watching
to village stays and art festivals. However, most of the holiday business is
anchored on fairly low-cost beach tourism, in the context of an exotic but low-
risk African setting. This worked well for a while. But global demand has
gradually evolved to higher quality products, along with more emphasis on
adventure, culture and other forms of tourism. And though the demand for
low-cost beach tourism remains important, notably post-2008, Senegal has
had trouble competing with other destinations on the basis of price. Its strong
currency, tied to the Euro, has put it at a disadvantage relative to neighbouring
Gambia. Cabo Verde, which also has a strong currency, has relied on all-
inclusive packages in large-scale hotels owned by tour operators who ensure
competitive air transport costs. Senegal has relied more on scheduled flights
and, with limited airline competition, notably in itsmain Frenchmarket, costs
have been high. This problem has been aggravated by surcharges intended to
finance a new airport that has taken eight years to build and was still not
complete in 2016. The extra cost of reaching the Casamance by air is also cited
as a major factor in the decline of this segment of the industry.
Pre-2000, Senegal drew from a wide variety of markets, but with a lack of
destination promotion or investment in hotel assets, the non-French
markets started to decline. Increasing competition in the French market led
to price competition, reduced margins, and a further contraction of invest-
ment. Senegal lost its image as an ‘exotic’ destination and became a mass-
market product.13 Meanwhile, the Saly-Portudal product suffered from beach
erosion and a general lack of planning or regulation. The resort became
crowded and poorly maintained, and tourists regularly complained of harass-
ment by itinerant hawkers. Prime beach locations were sold for private resi-
dences, hotels were allowed to build infrastructures that aggravated the
erosion, and nothing was done to protect the beach.
The previous President, Abdoulaye Wade, who held power 2000–12, made it
clear that he did not believe that tourism benefited the country and therefore
had no intention of providing significant support. This attitude prevailed in
spite of the fact that the 2006 Accelerated Growth Strategy identified tourism as
a priority sector. Senegal has paid a heavy price for this neglect.
The new government of Macky Sall has reversed this position. However, its
actions have sent a mixed message. The ineffective tourism promotion agency
was closed, but responsibility was transferred to the private sector, which was
too weak to provide effective leadership. A complicated online biometric
visa system was introduced for all visitors, and this had to be completed in
advance of departure. Funding for control of beach erosion disappeared, and
13 World Bank (2015a).
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a new strategy was developedwith little input from private sector leaders. These
problems were then compounded by the Ebola scare, which discouraged many
tourists from going to any West African destination for the 2014–15 season.
Nonetheless, the Sall government appears to be slowly improving its
approach. The tourism industry in the Casamance was given a ten-year
exemption from all taxes. The reduced VAT rate of 10 per cent applying to
hotels in the rest of the country was extended to tour operators. Minor
reductions in some airport taxes have been made. Small sums have been
allocated to begin the rehabilitation of Saly and a project has been launched
to counteract beach erosion, with World Bank funding. New airlines have
been encouraged to provide services to Senegal, notably in the key French
market. Government resources are also being devoted to the infrastructure
needs of a new beach resort. Most significantly, the President admitted that
the new visa system was a mistake and it was rescinded.
In early 2016, there were several promising signs of recovery in the tourism
industry. The Ebola scare had ended and bookings were increasing for the
upcoming season. The few higher-end hotels were doing well, demonstrating
that Senegal remained attractive if the product was well-managed. This was
further confirmed by the decision of Club Med to buy and upgrade a beach
hotel that had been closed for many years. The new airport was nearing
completion, as was a new highway to link it to Saly.14 Together, this infra-
structure should make the arrival and departure experience much easier when
completed. Unfortunately, a new external shock appeared. Terrorist attacks in
hotels in Burkina Faso and Mali, followed by an attack at a beach outside
Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire, have the industry worried once again.
3.1. Where to from Here?
There should be no doubt that demand will expand for the products that
Senegal can offer. Rising incomes will enable more and more people to travel
internationally, and traditional destinations such as the Canary Islands are
becoming saturated.15 The instability in North Africa and the Middle East is,
regrettably, likely to continue for some time. Cabo Verde has managed to
surpass Senegal in tourist nights on the basis of two small islands with little
more than sun and sand. Senegal offers a special opportunity to discover
Africa with minimal risk, combining sun and sea with adventure, nature,
and culture. It is sometimes described as ‘Africa for beginners’. But past trends
and attitudes must change in order to make this a reality.
14 The final date for completion of the airport remains uncertain but, in the interim,
improvements have been made to the old airport.
15 Currently nine million tourists annually.
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The renewed commitment to tourism by the current government is prob-
ably the single most important step required to move forward. However, the
industry is a complicated one, which calls for a sophisticated understanding
on the part of the authorities across variousministries and levels of government, a
close and constructive partnership with the private sector, and well-thought-out
priorities. Unfortunately, the tourism ministry is weak, its leadership changes
frequently, the dialogue with the private sector is inadequate, and the current
strategy lacks strategic vision and prioritization.
The top priority would seem to be saving Saly. This is the foundation of the
leisure tourism industry and the one known by global tourism actors. At
present it does not portray a positive image of Senegal. The beach needs to
be rebuilt and protected, the hotels renovated and properly classified, the
town cleaned up, and the harassment ended. The situation is so dire that
some senior officials appear to turn their back on Saly and focus instead on the
development of new resorts farther down the coast. This is also the impression
given by the PES. Fortunately, a newWorld Bank-funded project is focusing on
Saly, particularly the beach problem.16 It is also financing several integrated
destination development plans, including one for the Saly-Portudal region. This
is probably more useful than revisiting the national tourism strategy.
At the national level, a new tourism promotion strategy is needed to repos-
ition Senegal internationally, emphasizing not just its weather and beaches,
but also its stability, culture, and the variety of adventures that it can offer in
an African setting. This should include a concerted campaign to reassure
tourists of the safety of Cap Skirring in the Casamance.17 It should also reduce
dependence on the Frenchmarket. A new tourism promotion agency has been
created, but its capacity needs to be built up and it should bemanaged in a true
partnership with the private sector. It will need to be combined with an air
transport strategy that increases competition and accesses newmarkets. Much
better data must be collected to guide the development of the sector.18
New tourism resorts, as called for in the PES, are needed for the industry to
expand. These should learn from the experience of Saly—emphasizing higher-
quality hotels, protecting the beaches, working closely with the local commu-
nity, and managing the growth in peripheral activities. The plan to make
Pointe-Sarène an eco-friendly resort of high-end hotels is a good one, in
keeping with evolving trends in the industry.
The new airport needs to be completed as soon as possible. This would
enhance the experience of the tourists and improve the country’s image
16 The World Bank Exports and Competitiveness project was due for approval in 2016.
17 Part of the problem is the classification of Casamance as high-risk by the French Foreign
Ministry. This not only discourages tourists but raises the cost of insurance for the airlines.
18 The new World Bank project also has components to support tourism promotion, public-
private dialogue and data collection.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Industries without Smokestacks
262
generally. It would also help the new conference centre, which needs business
to justify its large investment costs. Completing the nearby airport will
improve the attractiveness of the conference centre, especially if it encourages
the establishment of new hotels in the vicinity.19
Finally, but most difficult of all, the authorities need to do whatever they
can to avoid a terrorist attack. Hotels have strengthened their security meas-
ures, as has the main shopping centre. In any event, this threat should not
distract the authorities from a long-term commitment to expanding this
sector. Tourists will eventually come back even if there is an incident, and
tourism offers one of the best options for job creation and poverty reduction
in many regions of the country.
4. Horticulture
Some of the attributes that underpin Senegal’s tourism industry are also
conducive to the development of horticulture exports. The warm, sunny
weather during the European winter makes Senegal well-placed to provide
off-season fruit and vegetables. Its proximity to Europe and its direct access to
the ocean make it the closest potential tropical supplier (after Mauritania)
with the option of lower cost maritime transport.20 Its openness to foreign
investors is a third critical advantage. The lack of rain could pose a problem;
however, groundwater is adequate in areas close to Dakar and the Senegal
River provides ample irrigation potential in the northern part of the country.
Exports remained modest up to 2003, with volumes in the range of 10,000
tonnes, and products dominated by green beans. Starting in 2004, exports to
Europe grew rapidly, averaging increases of 20 per cent per year to reach
81,000 tonnes in 2014. Another 4,700 tonnes were exported within Africa,
primarily to Côte d’Ivoire and Morocco. However, this impressive growth
stopped in 2015 when exports declined, before making a partial recovery in
2016. The product range has diversified significantly. Melons, watermelons,
and cherry tomatoes now surpass green beans by volume, while mangoes and
sweet corn are now comparable to green beans. Exporters are experimenting
with a wide range of other crops (e.g., sweet potatoes, green onions, radishes).
The sector is dominated by integrated multinational companies that handle
production, processing and exporting, with distribution channels in Europe,
selling either to wholesalers or directly to supermarkets. Production typically
takes place on commercial farms to ensure the complete control over the
19 Currently conference participants have to travel from hotels in downtown Dakar some
30km away.
20 So far, attempts to develop horticulture exports from Mauritania have not succeeded.
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production process necessary to meet phytosanitary standards. Smallholders
only remain significant in the case of mangoes and green beans.
Horticulture exports remain very small as a percentage of GDP, in the order
of 0.5 per cent. But they are now comparable to groundnuts in terms of export
value, exceeding the latter in years of poor rainfall. More importantly, their
rapid growth stands in sharp contrast to the decline in groundnuts. Ground-
nuts still occupy far more people, but many of these will have to exit, given
the low productivity and poor market prospects. Horticulture export farms
offer an attractive alternative, as summarized in Box 1.
One of the keys to the early expansion of this sector was the arrival of
Grands Domaines du Sénégal (GDS), an affiliate of Compagnie Fruitière, in
2003. The parent company was best known for exporting bananas and pine-
apples from Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, and had developed special high-
speed ships to bring these goods to northern European markets. With excess
capacity, they decided to develop a side-business in Senegal, which was on the
route. The country was not suitable for their traditional products so they
launched a completely different cherry tomato operation in the Senegal
River valley. While they coped with many problems, they invited other
exporters to use their ships, and at least one was given access to their
Box 1 THE IMPACT OF HORTICULTURE EXPORTS ON POVERTY
AND WOMEN IN SENEGAL
In 2005 and 2006, independent researchers from Belgium analysed the impact on
poverty of horticulture exports from Senegal. Their initial working assumptions were
not positive, as reflected in the title of their subsequent paper, ‘Globalization and Poverty
in Senegal: A Worst Case Scenario?’ First, they looked at employees working for the
industry leader in northern Senegal. To their surprise, households with an employee at
this company had lower poverty rates (35 per cent) compared to other households in
the same village (46 per cent), even though the former households were larger and had
less land on average, and should therefore have been poorer. The difference in extreme
poverty was even more marked, 6 per cent vs 18 per cent. Their total income was twice
as high, and even their income from farming was higher.
Similar results were found in their second study of employees in nine green bean
exporting farms in Les Niayes, just north of Dakar. This result is due to the fact that most
of the work on these export farms takes place during the dry off-season of October to
May, when demand in the European market is strong. Since there is little to do in rural
Senegal during this time, the opportunity cost of labour is very low. Employees are then
free to return to their farms when the rains come back in July. The researchers also point
out that much of the benefit is captured by women, who tend to dominate the
workforce on export farms. They speculate that it is better for women to work as
employees rather than on their own farms under contract with commercial farms,
since such contracts are typically signed by themale head of the household, even though
the women will do much of the work. By working as employees they are likely to have
more control over the income earned. However, they were unable to test this hypothesis.
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refrigerated containers at Farmgate. The sector was able to shift from air
transport to maritime, significantly improving its competitiveness. Thus, the
transport dilemma was resolved for more than half of all horticulture exports,
along with the availability of other ships, andmore recently the option of road
transport.21 In contrast, transport problems have led to the demise of many
exporters in the neighbouring Gambia. Maritime transport accounted for
77 per cent of total exports to Europe in the 2014–15 season, road transport
18 per cent, while air transport is marginal (5 per cent).
The second typical problem for such activities is access to land. Indeed, it
was for this reason that GDS moved its initial operation from the Mauritanian
side of the Senegal River. This had not proven to be a major constraint up to
2014, given the small land requirements and low population density, espe-
cially along the Senegal River valley. However, the arrangements were often
unstable and occasionally precarious. Few exporters had land titles, and some
simply made informal agreements with a village to use land in return for
certain promises. The most common solution was to convince a village to
transfer land to the government, which was then in a position to sign a long-
term lease with the exporter. But this meant that the community lost control
of the land and did not necessarily receive any direct benefits, other than the
prospect of jobs. Exporters have generally maintained good relations with
their communities, though a large biofuel project in the Senegal River valley
did not do so well and this may have set off alarm bells. Also new foreign
investors are looking for more secure arrangements. Access to land appears to
be the main factor explaining the lack of growth observed since 2014.22
The government has been working with the World Bank to find a solution
to this problem without waiting for full-fledged land reform, and they think
they have an answer. Rural land is generally classified as Domaine Nationale
and controlled by rural communities through their rural council. This land
can be converted to Domaine Privé de l’Etat (private land of the State) and then
leased to private operators. The new proposal involves returning such land to
the community, and then allowing the community to sign a sub-lease with
an investor. Part of the annual lease payment will go to the community and
part to the government. A World Bank project will provide technical assist-
ance to the communities to assist them in negotiations with investors. This
arrangement has the advantage of not requiring a change in the law, although
it did necessitate some new implementation decrees. It has taken longer than
21 Recently, some exporters have found that the higher cost of trucking throughMauritania and
Morocco can be offset by the greater flexibility, since trucks can depart at any time, while goods
may have to wait up to five days for the next ship. This improves the product’s shelf-life for clients.
22 In addition, the biggest fruit exporter cut back on production for fear that the Ebola scare
would hurt demand.
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hoped, as the government moved cautiously to avoid a backlash, but it was
ready for a test in 2016.24
A third problem was related to taxes, specifically value added tax. This came
to a head in 2012 in the context of a general tax reform and was only resolved
by intervention from the President. The problem re-emerged in 2016 andmay
yet discourage some new investors, who are not being offered the same
advantages as existing exporters (see Box 2).
4.1. Where to from Here?
Exporters describe Senegal as virgin territory for horticulture exports. Even
though there are more than twenty exporters, most are small and Senegal’s
share of the Europeanmarket is tiny. Horticulture has been the fastest growing
category of global agricultural trade, along with fish products, and expect-
ations are that it will continue to expand. Senegal enjoys ideal conditions
Box 2 VAT REIMBURSEMENT: THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF THE VAT SYSTEM23
In 1997 the Senegal government created a special status for enterprises exporting at
least 80 per cent of their output, called the Entreprise Franche d’Exportation or
EFE. Among other things, this allowed companies to import inputs without paying the
18 per cent value added tax. This was judged to be appropriate since these companies
would not be receiving VAT payments on their exports and would therefore be eligible
for reimbursement by the government, but the reimbursement process typically led to
long delays, which could seriously impact cash flow and profitability.
Over the years, many enterprises obtained this status without meeting the minimum
export criteria or even exporting at all. In 2012, the government proposed to end the
special regime as part of an overall exercise to reduce tax exemptions. However,
legitimate exporters in the horticulture and fishing sectors were concerned that this
would threaten their viability and pointed out that some of them had invested on the
basis of the twenty-year commitment made by the government in 1997. After appealing
directly to the President, their status was preserved. The exporters then offered to work
with the authorities to weed out ineligible beneficiaries, explaining to the authorities
exactly what documentation should be requested from all EFE status holders and why. In
the end, the number of EFE companies was reduced from 439 to 77.
However, continued concern over tax exemptions in 2015 led to a tightening of the
rules for existing EFE companies and a decision to stop offering EFE status to new
investors. Given that the process of VAT reimbursement is still not working well, it
would seem advisable to concentrate on removing cheaters while continuing to facilitate
legitimate exporters.
23 This expression comes from IMF (2005).
24 The World Bank supported three rounds of consultations with all villages in the project area,
in collaboration with local NGOs. While the communities were all supportive, some NGOs
continued to express concerns over potential land-grabbing. The project, called Senegal:
Sustainable and Inclusive Agribusiness, was approved in 2013.
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for fruit and vegetables, and could also re-enter the floriculture market.25
Horticulture is one of the top sectors of interest to new foreign investors.
The current government clearly understands the importance of this sector,
and it figures prominently in the PES.26 Now it needs to strengthen its role as
facilitator without frustrating the dynamism of the private sector. First and
foremost is the land issue. As inmost other countries, access to land is a highly
sensitive topic, and it has become especially controversial in recent years due
to unfortunate examples of ‘land-grabbing’ in other African countries. The
authorities must find a way to provide investors with secure access to land
while protecting the legitimate interests of the local population. This process
appears to be well underway.
Water is the next critical input. It should not be a major constraint in the
Senegal River valley, except around the Lac de Guiers. This lake, fed by the
Senegal River, is the only lake of any size in Senegal. It provides two-thirds of
the drinking water to Dakar, and also supports the only sugar plantation in the
country. Horticulture exporters are now locating around the lake. At some
point, the authorities may have to choose between the expansion plans of the
sugar company and the development of horticulture.27
The authorities would also be well-advised to resolve the VAT reimburse-
ment issue as rapidly as possible, either by continuing to offer EFE status to
new investors, or by finally implementing an efficient reimbursement mech-
anism. Port facilities could be further improved, perhaps with the establish-
ment of a special terminal for fruit and vegetables. The proposed bridge over
the Senegal River at Rosso would facilitate the alternative of road transport.
Finally, the dialogue with key private sector operators, foreign and domestic,
needs strengthening in order to identify and resolve critical problems before
they become serious.
5. Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
The communications sector has been the fastest growing part of the economy,
averaging over 10 per cent per year, thus its share of GDP has increased from
3.5 per cent in 1995 to 6.7 per cent in 2013. This is close to the total contri-
bution of crop agriculture (8 per cent on average, less in years of drought). And
this probably does not include some activities typically associated with ICT,
such as software development. Most of this growth has been driven by services
25 Kenyan exporters have recently visited Senegal to explore the options.
26 The Minister of Agriculture has made it clear that he would prefer to focus on horticulture
rather than groundnuts, but the latter’s problems cannot be ignored.
27 The sugar company is the largest single employer in the region, but it depends on high
protection.
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for the domestic market, notably through the rapid expansion of mobile
phones. But exports have also been important.
Senegal was one of the earliest entrants into outsourcing in SSA. This
reflected its reputation for economic and political stability, a well-educated
workforce, investments in telecommunications infrastructure, as well as the
usual cost advantages. Call centres were the main focus, and companies were
able to attract better qualified employees than in France, at one-tenth of
the cost.28 By 2000, thirty-five companies exporting IT-enabled services were
operational. While call centres have constituted the dominant source of ICT
exports, Senegalese companies are involved in a full range of other exports,
including data processing, the design and maintenance of applications and
websites, systems integration, and software development. Much of this trade
is focused on West Africa, especially the higher value-added services.
There are numerous success stories that underline the potential for further
growth. The largest call centre company, Premium Contact Center Inter-
national (PCCI), now has branches in seven other African countries, two offices
in Europe, and headquarters in Dubai (see Box 3). On a smaller scale, Samres AB
has trained Senegalese to speak enough Swedish to arrange transport services for
the disabled in Sweden. Pictoon developed the first African animated TV series,
which was sold to several African TV companies.29 A private-public partnership
between the customs agency and ICT companies led to the development of
ORBUS, a single window for trade facilitation, which has now been adopted in
Burkina Faso, Togo, and Kenya. Chaka Computers has developed a money
transfer system that is competingwithWesternUnion. And in 2016, the French
company, Atos, established a large operation in Senegal, initially to develop a
new financial information management system for the finance ministry, but
with the intention of exporting this expertise to other African countries.
Senegal is among the top fifty potential suppliers of outsourcing services
according to the AT Kearney Global Services Location Index; see Table 13.2.
However, it lies near the bottom in 45th place, and its ranking has fallen
significantly in the last five years from 29th. Its financial attractiveness is
not far behind the industry leaders, India and the Philippines, comparable
to other African competitors, and it is well ahead of China and Malaysia, but
Senegal has lost ground. The greatest weakness appears to be in the quality
and quantity of human resources, and here too its attractiveness has declined.
On the third criterion, the business environment, Senegal is not much behind
India, and is making slow progress. Overall, Senegal has slipped behind
Morocco and Mauritius, two of its main francophone rivals.
28 ILEAP (2014).
29 This company has since closed, but several of its artists have gone on to set up their own
companies and a program has been created to train animation specialists from across Africa.
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Box 3 PCCI: FIRST CALL CENTRE OF AFRICA AND MORE
PCCI was founded in 2001 by three Senegalese entrepreneurs. Its first call centre was
created in Dakar in 2002. Since then it has grown steadily, both in geographic scope and
range of services. It now has operations in Cameroun, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo (Brazzaville),
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Nigeria, as well as Senegal, and a sales office in
France. In 2015, its head office was moved from London to Dubai. PCCI employs 3,000
people, including 1,400 in Senegal.
Call centres are still the core activity, including customer services for the thirty million
clients of theMTN cell phone company in five African countries. However, PCCI provides
a large number of other back-office services, including electronic document manage-
ment portals, web portals, content management systems, email processing, and tele-
surveys. Turnover is split between Europe (40 per cent) and Africa (60 per cent).
In its earlier days, the company faced many challenges associated with meeting
international market requirements, especially pricing and service quality. Costs were
high and there was also a severe skills shortage and no local institutions specialized in
training tele-marketers. Labour turnover was high due to stiff competition for skilled
workers. Today, the entry of the large French company, Atos, into Senegal is increasing
the competition for IT engineers, which may make it more difficult for PCCI to expand its
higher value-added services. Also the expansion of its domestic sales and the tightening
of procedures may jeopardize its status as an Entreprise Franche d’Exportation, which
allows it to import inputs duty- and VAT-free. For the moment, the authorities have
made an exception for PCCI, even though their share of exports in total sales has fallen
below the 80 per cent threshold normally required.
Source: ITC (2013); www.pcci-group.com; Groupe PCCI annonce l’ouverture de cinq nouveaux centres de
contact, www.ict4africa.net.








India 3.22 2.55 1.19 6.96 1
China 2.28 2.71 1.51 6.49 2
Malaysia 2.75 1.42 1.89 6.05 3
Philippines 3.17 1.43 1.29 5.88 7
Ghana 3.27 0.85 1.07 5.19 29
Mauritius 2.55 0.94 1.65 5.17 30
Morocco 2.80 0.93 1.34 5.07 34
Tunisia 3.04 0.82 1.18 5.05 38
Kenya 3.06 0.86 1.11 5.03 39
Senegal
2016 3.06 0.70 1.13 4.89 45
2011 3.23 0.78 1.11 5.12 29
Source: AT Kearney, Global Services Location Index (2011, 2016 editions).
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Senegal’s ranking is even lower when the focus is on telecommunications
infrastructure and human resources, as measured by the International Tele-
communications Union ICT Development Index. Senegal was ranked 132nd
in 2015, up slightly from 137th in 2010, and only 12th in SSA. Clearly it has
lost its leading role within the region.
By 2007, only ten call centres and a handful of other IT-enabled service
exporters remained. There has been little progress since then. A Technopole
was established in Dakar to attract more companies but it failed to take off. In
2016, there were only nine call centres and they were finding it increasingly
difficult to compete outside Senegal. Pressure on French companies to restrict
foreign outsourcing appears to be part of the problem. Just three call centres
accounted for 70 per cent of the market. Software development appears to
be doing better, as solutions developed for Senegal are well-suited to other
African contexts. The arrival of Atos is promising, although the competition
for local IT engineers worries existing companies.30
The situation with regard to human resources is amixed picture.Whereas the
shortage of IT engineers is becoming a serious problem, call centres are able to
hire university graduates from other disciplines, in contrast with France where
they typically rely on high-school graduates. Call centres complain of high
turnover and the need to train employees in-house, given the absence of such
training in independent schools, but this is a common problem for call centres
anywhere. The lack of English speakers is another constraint, although learning
English is mandatory in high school and an increasing number of post-
secondary programmes emphasize English, while some business schools teach
exclusively in English. At the same time, Senegalese are moving to Morocco
to work in call centres where they are better paid. This suggests that other
constraints that increase costs are the bigger problem.
The quality and cost of telecommunications infrastructure is also a mixed
picture. Senegal had its first submarine fibre optic cable connection in 2000
and now has three. The internet bandwidth increased to 18.7 Gbit/second in
2013, making Senegal the largest internet portal in West Africa. However, the
price is high compared to competitors in other regions. The monthly cost of
fixed high-speed internet access was €38 in 2012, compared to €12 inMorocco
and €7 in Tunisia.
The contrast between quality and cost reflects a wider characteristic of the
telecommunications sector in Senegal. The principal investor in these fibre
optic cables has been Sonatel, the former parastatal privatized in 1997. With
the threat of increased competition, Sonatel reduced prices significantly in
30 Atos is a French leader in digital services with 93,000 employees in 72 countries. It was
reported to be hiring the entire graduating class of IT engineers at the University of Dakar, as
well as staff from other companies.
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the early 2000s. But subsequently, it has been able to maintain a monopoly
on external connectivity, and the number of internet service providers has
fallen from nine in 2009 to two in 2012.31 The quality of basic telephone and
internet services is reasonably good. But the speed of internet access, at 4.52
Mbps is below the average for SSA (5.11) and much slower than Rwanda (9.5)
or Kenya (7.3).32 The cost has failed to keep up with global trends, and other
services, such as number portability and access to short numbers, are poor.
Start-ups have been discouraged and Sonatel has been accused of taking over
the most promising new ideas.33
Sonatel has grown to become the largest Senegalese company quoted on the
regional stock exchange, expanding into Mali, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau. It
is the largest taxpayer in Senegal, and since the state still owns 27 per cent of
its shares, Sonatel is also a major source of dividends. Some of its staff go on to
work for the regulatory agency, ARTP (Autorité de Régulation des Télécommuni-
cations et la Poste) which observers accuse of failing to promote greater
competition.34 A new Telecommunications law was approved in 2011 but it
did little to promote new internet service providers and the necessary imple-
mentation decrees to render it effective had still not been approved in early
2016. However, the political will for reform appears to have strengthened
since then. The law has been amended to simplify the process of establishing
an ISP, including the right of a provider to develop its own infrastructure.
5.1. Where to from Here?
In 2014, a meeting of all the stakeholders in the telecommunications sector
was organized by the responsible Minister as part of the process of defining a
new strategy. One of the participants spelled out the key question clearly:
Do you want to maintain the current situation where a few companies dominate
the sector, the state receives large tax revenues, and employment increases slowly,
or do you want to create a more competitive market where tax revenues fall in the
short term, but 50 small start-ups are created in the next few years?
The Minister immediately spoke up in favour of the second option and a
general consensus seemed to emerge. Unfortunately, the Minister soon
resigned and the strategy process stalled.
31 Sonatel had 99 per cent of the market for fixed high-speed internet access in 2012. A third
company subsequently obtained access to a new submarine fibre optic cable but this is in
partnership with Sonatel, who remain in control. Google (2013).
32 Ookla net index for 2014 as reported in World Bank (2015b).
33 Several of the internet service providers who closed attributed their failure to unfair
competition by Sonatel. Google (2013: 21).
34 Google (2013: 30).
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In 2016, the strategy was adopted and the government stated that three new
internet service providers would be allowed to enter the market. But at the
same time, Sonatel’s licence was up for renewal and the government was eager
to raise additional revenues to finance its PES strategy. If the government
wants to develop ICT exports, it will need to change its pro-Sonatel policy of
the last ten years and move quickly to keep up with competitors like Ghana
and Kenya, who have adopted concerted strategies to promote ICT.
The PES acknowledges the need to improve the regulatory framework to
guarantee fair competition andmarket entry for new players. This would be an
essential first step. It also proposes the establishment of an ICT Board to
strengthen the dialogue between the private and the public sectors. Both of
these reforms are being supported through a series of World Bank budget
support operations over the period 2017–2019. Finally, the PES suggests the
creation of a specialized business park to attract firms engaged in business
process outsourcing. A project is being developed with the AfDB to be located
in the new city of Diamniadio on the outskirts of Dakar.35 It would be a good
idea to hire a private company tomanage the park, and to focus on the quality
of services and infrastructure, notably a reliable energy supply, rather than on
fiscal advantages.
6. Conclusions
Senegal is first and foremost a services economy, and is likely to remain so.
Second, it is an agricultural society, though the economic role of agriculture is
small given the low productivity levels and limited alternatives. Manufactur-
ing is struggling and its most successful components derive from natural
resources (phosphates, and limestone for cement). Labour-intensive manufac-
tured exports are virtually non-existent. A new experiment with Chinese
participation may start to turn this around, but such trade is likely to remain
small. Senegal appears destined to become a major hydrocarbons exporter,
though this may take many years and will never employ more than a small
share of the growing labour force. It will likely undermine the country’s
competitiveness in labour-intensive exports.
Consequently, Senegal would be well-advised to build on its established
experience in services such as tourism and IT-enabled exports, and to re-orient
its agriculture to high value-added products like horticulture exports. These
sectors could make an important contribution to the pressing challenge of
job creation. Tourism and horticulture have significant potential to absorb
35 The proposed project is called the Parc de Technologies Numériques.
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low-skilled labour, notably outside of Dakar where the opportunities are
otherwise very limited. At the same time, they generate demand for some
skilled labour and provide openings for local entrepreneurs. IT-enabled
exports are more demanding and urban-based but offer an outlet for the
growing number of graduates from higher education.
The PES clearly recognizes the need for a diversified export strategy with a
strong focus on services. However, there remains a lack of solid sector-specific
strategies. The new tourism strategy is weak; attention should probably be
devoted to regional plans, starting with Saly-Portudal and Casamance. The IT
strategy has only just been finalized, and horticulture could benefit from a
strategy; however Senegal has a long history of strategies with weak imple-
mentation. This will need to change.
When strategies are implemented, the Senegalese government tends to put
itself in the driver’s seat, expecting the private sector to follow. The relation-
ship with the private sector is often unbalanced, with a tendency to privilege
certain insiders while treating others with suspicion and occasionally harass-
ment. The government needs to find a way to listen to and support serious
players while sanctioning those who opt for rent-seeking. This need not
require significant investments or fiscal incentives. Much can be done by
reducing delays in VAT refunds, streamlining tax payments, reducing fiscal
controls on low-risk taxpayers, avoiding mistakes like the new visa system,
allowing greater flexibility in the use of short-term employment contracts,
facilitating access to land, promoting Senegal as a tourist destination, and
liberalizing the telecommunications sector.
Senegal will need to go beyond general improvements in the business cli-
mate, although this is important. Its high-level economic staff will need to
develop a better understanding of the specific characteristics and constraints
of the key sectors, and develop partnerships with private stakeholders to ensure
that problems are addressed quickly and effectively. Regular sectoral meetings
with the main exporters are needed to share concerns, agree on appropriate
measures, and to promote accountability. And this will also require a new
approach to collecting data, so that authorities know, for example, how much
foreign leisure tourists actually spend in Senegal, what the value of horticulture
exports really is, and how many people are employed in IT-enabled services.
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the Services Sector in South Africa
An Overview
Haroon Bhorat, Christopher Rooney, and François Steenkamp
1. Introduction
The rapid transformation of many of the East Asian economies, including
China, has been driven by a process of secondary industry growth, within
which the core lever has been the expansion in globally competitive manu-
facturing exports.1 Consequently, manufacturing is often seen as the key
route to increasing national per capita income levels. However, recent evi-
dence suggests that global demand for manufactured goods is declining, and
economic conditions are less conducive to building a development path based
on fast-growing manufacturing exports (Rodrik 2014). Thus, there is a distinct
possibility—if these global demand trends in manufacturing continue—that
manufacturing and manufacturing exports in particular, may play a less cen-
tral role in shaping the economic growth trajectories of developing countries
in the future. In this vein then, as the scope for manufacturing-led growth
possibly wanes, closer examination should be given to the services sector as an
engine of growth.
The South Asian experience is instructive here, and provides evidence that
services can drive development. Indeed, the services sector has been a signifi-
cant contributor to economic growth in South Asian economies such as India,
Pakistan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Approximately 60 per cent of
1 The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Nomsa Kachingwe and Adrienne Lees,
contributing authors on an earlier working paper on which this chapter is based.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
overall growth for the period 2000 to 2010 can be attributed to services in
these countries (Noland, Park and Estrada 2012). There is evidence showing
that this South Asian services-driven growth can be linked to rising labour
productivity (Bosworth and Maertens 2009), job and wage growth (Ghani
2009), and poverty reduction (Ghani 2009) across the region. Ghani (2009)
argues that, in addition to global technological advancements, the emergence
of South Asia, and India in particular, as a leading services exporter, has been
ascribed to a combination of effective market integration, the availability of
skilled labour, and supportive institutions and infrastructure. A key question is
whether a similar services-driven growth path can emerge in the South African
context, particularly in the face of a declining manufacturing sector.
This chapter examines the potential of the services sector in South Africa to
act as an engine of growth. We examine the growth potential of the services
sector by considering, firstly, its export potential, and secondly, its employ-
ment potential. The former is concerned with the ability to generate growth-
inducing economies of scale, thereby increasing foreign exchange earnings.
The latter is concerned with the ability of the sector to generate jobs for a
young and growing labour force in South Africa. It is important to note that
the services economy is heterogeneous, and thus we place emphasis on the
sub-sectors or industries that comprise the overall services economy.
The chapter is divided into four sections, including an introduction and
conclusion. Section 2 examines the scale and composition of the services
economy in South Africa. This section considers the GDP and employment
contribution of the services economy and its respective sub-sectors. It reflects
on the extent to which the services economy has driven structural transform-
ation over the post-2000 period. Finally, this section provides a segmentation
of the services economy according to the growth potential of the various sub-
sectors. The third section considers the export potential of the services econ-
omy in more detail. This section starts by considering cross-border trade in
services, specifically on the export side. This is followed by a discussion on
foreign direct investment (FDI), and thus the commercial presence of South
African firms in regional and international markets. Finally, focus is placed on
the tourism industry in South Africa as a source of service-driven export
growth with strong employment potential.
2. The Services Economy in South Africa
The South African economy is a de facto services-based economy. The sector
accounted for 62 per cent of GDP in 2000, and its share of the economy has
expanded to 69 per cent in 2014. In contrast, the key industrial sectors of
mining and manufacturing have both experienced steady declines in their
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share of GDP over the period. The former’s share of the economy declined
from 13 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 8 per cent in 2014, while the latter
declined from 16 to 14 per cent over the same period. Agriculture’s contribu-
tion to GDP has remained low and stable, hovering at around 3 per cent.
The services sector is comprised of a variety of heterogeneous sub-sectors or
industries, which manifest in varying contributions to the broader economy.
Ghani and Kharas (2009) delineate between modern and traditional services
industries, arguing that the former is more dynamic, tradable, and thus able to
act as an engine for growth. In the South African context, two traditional
service industries, namely government services, and wholesale and retail
trade, are the largest services sub-sectors, accounting for 17 and 15 per cent
of GDP in 2014, respectively. The relative contribution of these traditional
services industries has remained stagnant over the period 2000 to 2014.
However, modern service industries have become increasingly important
in the South African economy. The business, finance, and communica-
tions services industries have increased their combined share of GDP from
19 per cent of GDP in 2000, to 24 per cent in 2014—with this growth being
most rapid in the financial services industry.
Ultimately then, the steady decline in the share of GDP accounted for by
manufacturing, mining, and agriculture, together with the steady rise in the
share of the services sector, re-asserts the notion that the South African
economy is not only services-based, but that this structural feature of the
economy has intensified over the last 15 years.
The services sector’s substantial contribution to GDP is matched by its
contribution to employment. The tertiary sector accounted for 65 per cent
of total employment in 2000. This rose to 74 per cent in 2014. The sector as a
whole was in turn responsible for 119 per cent of employment growth over
the period, thus counteracting employment losses in manufacturing and
agriculture. The services sector has accounted for almost all of South Africa’s
employment growth since 2000. Hence, while the primary sector experienced
a decline in total employment, and secondary sector employment grew by
126,734 jobs, employment in the tertiary sector rose by over 3 million jobs.
The performance of the services sub-sectors provides further insight into the
sector’s contribution to employment growth. Traditional services industries,
namely, wholesale and retail trade, government services, and other CSP ser-
vices (as well as modern business services), are the largest sources of employ-
ment in 2014. Business services displayed the strongest growth relative to
other service sub-sectors in the economy, followed by transport and storage,
and government services.
However, recognition of the strong employment growth in the business
services sector needs to be tempered by the fact that a large share of employ-
ment in this sector is through the use by employers of temporary employment
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services (TES) firms.2 TES employment refers to the practice of third-party
companies providing workers to perform occupations such as cleaning,
accounting or security services, to formal sector firms (Bhorat, Cassim and
Yu 2016). Bhorat et al. (2016) find that TES employment as a percentage of
business services employment has risen dramatically in the post-apartheid
period. They estimate that approximately 61 per cent of business services
employees were in TES employment in 2014.
The sizeable expansion of the wholesale and retail trade industry needs to be
considered in relation to the high levels of informality associated with the
industry (Cassim et al. 2016). The forced segregation policies of apartheid
resulted in the development of large informal settlements, where vibrant retail
markets developed. Estimates suggest that in 2003, informal retail outlets in
townships accounted for 10 per cent of total retail trade in South Africa
(Ligthelm 2008). Estimates derived from the Labour Market Dynamics Survey
from Statistics South Africa (2014), show that approximately 41 per cent of
employment in wholesale and retail trade services is informal sector
employment.
In contrast to the services sector as a whole, manufacturing and agriculture
account for a relatively small and declining share of employment. Over the
14-year period, close to a quarter of a million manufacturing jobs were shed.
Agriculture experienced the largest decline in employment, with losses of over
700,000 jobs. Small gains in employment were experienced in mining,
utilities, and construction.
The above, then, ultimately suggests that the historical importance of the
primary sectors (namely agriculture and mining) has significantly waned in
the post-apartheid South African economy. In addition, the poor output and
employment performance of the manufacturing sector is manifest in the
steady decline, bordering on de-industrialization, of the domestic economy.
The upshot of the latter two trends has been a rapid growth in the job
generating capacity of the services economy. This services employment
growth in turn can be understood within the context of several underlying
trends. Firstly, in the pursuit of regulatory avoidance, formal firms have
increased the use of temporary employment services—thus increasing the
share of workers categorized as ‘business service’ employees. Secondly, South
Africa’s consumption-driven economic growth model has resulted in a rapid
rise in the growth of retail employment. Thirdly, the poor employment gen-
erating capacity of the formal sector as a whole has witnessed a rapid rise in the
2 TES is classified as ‘Business Activities Not Elsewhere Classified’ in the survey data. We also
observe that most of the workers tend to also be employed in services-type occupations (see Bhorat
et al. 2016). Hence, these are not predominantly TES workers in the manufacturing sector, for
example. We are thus confident that the services employment category for TES captures workers
who are largely in services-based occupations (e.g. contract cleaning, security services).
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number of individuals working in various informal services sectors, especially
in wholesale and retail trade. Finally, in constituting close to a quarter of all
new jobs generated in South Africa since 2000, the public sector has become
possibly the key generator of jobs in the economy—ensuring that much of the
country’s first-order services employment is shaped by national and provincial
government practices.
2.1. Structural Transformation and the Services Sector
Structural transformation involves the shift of resources from low-
productivity activities towards high-productivity activities. Using a method
of analysis in line with that applied by McMillan et al. (2014), we examine the
extent to which services has played a role in structural transformation in
South Africa over the period 2000–14. Figure 14.1 shows the correlation bet-
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Figure 14.1. Correlation between sectoral productivity and change in employment
shares in South Africa, 2000–14
Notes: 1. Size of circles represents employment shares in 2014. 2. Coefficient of fitted is 0.97 (t-stat
0.23, p-value 0.82). 3. AGR = agriculture; MIN = mining; MAN = manufacturing; PU = utilities;
CON= construction;CAT= catering andaccommodation;WRT=wholesale and retail trade; TRANS=
transport and storage; COMM = communication; FIN = finance and insurance; BUS = business
services; OTHCSP = other community, social and personal services; GOV = government services.
4. Total productivity is defined as GDP divided by total employment (formal plus informal). Sectoral
productivity is defined as sectoral contribution to GDP divided by sectoral employment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Quantec (2016).
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employment by industry. The market size for each industry represents the
industry’s share of total employment in 2014. The linear regression line
indicates whether structural transformation has been growth inducing (posi-
tively sloped) or not (negatively sloped). Given that structural transformation
is the shift of resources from low-productivity activities towards high-
productivity activities, one would ideally want to see declining employment
shares in low-productivity industries (bottom left quadrant) and rising
employment shares in high-productivity industries (top right quadrant).
The positively sloped linear regression line points to, albeit weak, growth-
inducing structural transformation. There is a shift in employment away from
relatively low-productivity industries, such as agriculture, and catering and
accommodation, towards relatively higher-productivity activities in business
services, transportation services, and government services. The slope of the
regression line is slightly positive and the estimated coefficient of the slope is
not statistically significant, thus pointing to, at very best, a marginal growth-
inducing structural transformation.
Based on Figure 14.1, one could argue that the structural transformation
that has taken place has been services-led rather than manufacturing-led.
Structural transformation following the East Asian model would depict manu-
facturing in the top right quadrant (i.e. growing employment in a high-
productivity industry). In South Africa’s case, manufacturing appears in the
top left quadrant, suggesting a shift of resources (labour) away from this high-
productivity industry. One does observe that there has been a decline in the
employment share in low-productivity industries, such as agriculture, and
catering and accommodation services (bottom left quadrant). Concurrently,
there has been a shift of resources toward relatively high-productivity indus-
tries in the services sector—in particular, transportation services, business
services, and government services. This does point to services-led structural
transformation over the period 2000–14. However, it is worth noting that
there is no shift of resources toward the modern high-productivity communi-
cation and financial services industries.
We also see a shift of labour resources towards the relatively low-productivity
wholesale and retail industry, which now comprises a substantial share of
employment in South Africa. As mentioned above, the concern with this
growth in wholesale and retail trade, as expressed by McMillan et al. (2014)
regarding structural transformation in Africa and Latin America, is that a large
share of it may be in low-productivity informal sector activities.
As in McMillan et al. (2014), we decomposed South Africa’s productivity
growth. Productivity growth can be realized along two dimensions: Firstly,
growth can occur within economic sectors through capital accumulation
or technological change. Secondly, growth can occur as labour moves
across sectors from low-productivity activities to high-productivity activities.
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The decomposition of South Africa’s productivity growth over the period
2000–14 indicates that productivity growth within sectors grew by 1.7 per
cent per annum,while productivity growth across sectors grewby 0.06 per cent
per annum. Therefore, 97 per cent of the growth of productivity in South
Africa took place within sectors. This suggests that there is a shift of resources
within industries toward high-productivity firms.
There are also some cautionary tales regarding this services-led structural
transformation. Firstly, it is evident that government services is a large and
growing employer in South Africa. The economic sustainability of an expand-
ing public sector is cause for concern. It is highly questionable of course,
whether sustained long-term economic growth and development can be
achieved via a growing public sector. Secondly, and as discussed inmore detail
in the previous section, the positive aspects of growth in the relatively high-
productivity business services industry needs to be tempered by the fact that a
large share of employment in this sector is through the use of TES providers.
Therefore, one does need to exercise caution about the notion that growth in
the South African economy is being driven by a high-productivity services
sector, that will be a significant long-run job generator for the economy.
2.2. Segmentation of the Services Sector
To gain further insight into the services sector, we seek to understand the skills
profile of these industries. This allows one to identify which sub-sectors can be
identified as future growth drivers and sources of employment. It is also
important to consider the skills profile of these various sub-sectors in relation
to the endowment structure of the South African economy. For instance, the
extent to which services industries are skill-intensive, may be a constraint on
growth given the abundance of unskilled and semi-skilled labour in the South
African labour market.
An analysis of the proportions of unskilled, semi-skilled and highly-skilled
workers in each services sub-sector provides a clear delineation of the services
economy. Unskilled workers are disproportionately located in traditional ser-
vices industries, such as CSP services (20 per cent), catering and accommoda-
tion (18 per cent), transport and storage (17 per cent) and wholesale and retail
trade (17 per cent). Conversely, the share of unskilled workers in modern
services industries, such as business (5 per cent) and financial (6 per cent)
services is relatively low. Semi-skilled workers are also well represented in trad-
itional services industries, such as catering and accommodation (71 per cent),
transport and storage (70 per cent), wholesale and retail trade (67 per cent),
and government services (61 per cent). Modern services industries tend to be
much more skill-intensive than traditional services industries. Highly-skilled
workers are particularly prevalent in the business services (61 per cent),
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finance (55per cent), and communications (42 per cent). The lowest proportion
of highly-skilled workers are in catering and accommodation (11 per cent), and
transport and storage (13 per cent).
Along with occupational differentiation and scarcity in skills, earnings are
accordingly differentiated. We detail in Bhorat et al. (2016), the importance of
individual occupations in predicting average earnings in the labour market.
Bhorat et al. (2016) find that the earnings estimates across the various
services sub-sectors suggest an interesting segmentation of the services sector
of the South African economy. Firstly, individuals located in modern skill-
intensive services industries, namely business, finance, and communication
services, experience wage premiums. Secondly, a wage premium is also evi-
dent in government services, which Bhorat et al. (2015) argue is a result of
strong public-sector unions that regularly secure above inflation wage
increases for their members. Thirdly, there is evidence of negative earnings
premia in services industries characterized by relatively lower skill require-
ments. These include the wholesale and retail trade industry (restricted to
formal sector employees), the TES component of business services, and ser-
vices workers in the informal sector. The lower skills requirements associated
with these industries allow for easier entry into employment, but they are
associated with lower levels of productivity and lower returns.
The preceding analysis concerning the segmentation of the services sector
provides an analytical lens through which we can understand and character-
ize this sector in South Africa. Firstly, the high-wage premium sectors of
modern business, finance, and communication services, serve as the potential
platform for a growth and development strategy. However, for these modern
service industries to continue to grow, the proportion of skilled labour
must also grow. However, South Africa faces a skills shortage (Rasool and
Botha 2011), which suggests growth in these industries may be constrained
in the future. Secondly, while the public sector is skills-intensive, the wage
premium offered to these workers suggests the formation of a new labour
elite (Bhorat et al. 2015), which is both fiscally unsustainable, and not an
optimal route to long-run economic growth. Thirdly, the informal sector—
although small in South Africa in comparison to other developing countries
(Kingdon and Knight 2004)—can act as a potential avenue for immediate job
creation. Between 2000 and 2014, the informal non-agriculture sector grew
from 1.8 million jobs to 2.4 million jobs—an increase of 600000 jobs over
fourteen years.3 The low barriers to entry for this sector—specifically, the low
level of skills required—are particularly suited to a labourmarket such as South
Africa, where there is a persistent skills shortage amidst an excess supply of
3 An individual is regarded as part of the informal sector if he or she is working for a business that
is not registered for tax purposes.
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labour. Finally, as perhaps the source for a large numbers of jobs within the
cohort of semi-skilled workers, the formal retail and communication services
sectors—under specific conditions such as suitable export opportunities and
competitive wages—do serve as a key opportunity for positive growth and
employment opportunities for the South African economy.
Ideally then, the burden of job creation would fall on the relatively highly-
skilled and high-productivity segment of the services sector. In the South
African context, this can be broadly located within the financial and business
services sectors together with communications, and the formal component of
the retail services sector. However, South Africa’s current labour endowment is
a constraint on the ability of these sectors to act as drivers of employment
growth. This leads us to consider TES and the informal sectors that, despite
being low-productivity sectors, may be a potential medium-run conduit for
immediate forms of economic activity and income generation.
3. Export Potential of Service Industries
In order to generate sustained long-term economic growth, it is important
that service industries exhibit export potential. This is crucial in the South
African case, where the combination of relatively low global commodity prices
and weakmanufacturing sector export growth have lowered foreign exchange
earnings. Services have traditionally been considered inputs into the produc-
tion and trade of goods, or as outputs produced mainly for domestic con-
sumption. Over the last two decades, however, globalization, coupled with
advances in technology, have facilitated a rapid rise in the trade of services—
driven largely by trade in modern services, such as business, finance, and
communication services, as opposed to traditional services such as transport
and travel (tourism) services (Mishra, Lundström, and Anand 2011). Services
exports have thus become increasingly important not only as a source of
export diversification and global competitiveness (Saez et al. 2014), but also
as a key driver of economic growth (Mishra et al. 2011).
Given the large and growing role of domestic services in the South African
economy, South Africa appears relatively well positioned to reap the growth
benefits from the export of services. This section presents a discussion on the
export potential evident across the services sector.
3.1. The Export of Services
In this section, we firstly examine broad trends in services exports using data
from the South African Reserve Bank and theWorld BankWorld Development
Indicators. Both data sets report aggregate measures of services exports for the
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Understanding and Characterizing the Services Sector in South Africa
283
period 1960–2014, where services exports for Modes 1, 2 and 4 are covered.
Secondly, we examine the composition of services exports. This is aided by
using the World Bank Trade in Services Database (TSD) that covers Modes
1 and 2 for the period 2005–10.
TRENDS IN SERVICES EXPORTS
In terms of growth, services exports have outstripped goods exports in the
post-1994 period. This is evident in Figure 14.2. Over the period 1994–2014,
services exports have grown at more than double the pace of goods
exports. Services exports grew at an average annualized rate of 6.7 per cent,
while goods exports grew at 2.7 per cent per annum. This relatively rapid
growth must also be considered in context of broader historical performance,
where services exports declined steadily in the 1970s and stagnated in the 1980s.
This was likely a result of economic sanctions, and the reversal of foreign capital
flows, during the final years of apartheid, which appears to have had a dispro-
portionately negative impact on services exports vis-à-vis goods exports (Levy,
1999). However, in the 1990s, South Africa’s reintroduction into the global
economy, through trade liberalization and the removal of economic sanctions



































































Figure 14.2. Trend in growth of goods and services exports in South Africa, 1994–2014
Note: Services and goods export values based on constant 2010 Rand values.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SARB (2016).
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As a result of this relatively robust growth, services exports have increased in
relative importance, albeit from a low base. Over the period 1994–2014,
services exports as a share of total exports more than doubled from 8 to
17 per cent. Nevertheless, despite the growing relative share of total exports,
the tradability of South Africa’s services sector remains low. Between 2000 and
2014, South Africa exported an average of only 7 per cent of services value
added, despite services making up slightly over 60 per cent of GDP. When
compared to peer countries on the continent and beyond, South Africa
appears to be lagging behind. For instance, with services in Turkey making
up a similar share of GDP, the average share of services exports in services
value added was relatively higher, at 11.7 per cent.4 In Ethiopia, where
services made up an average of only 42 per cent of GDP, the average share of
services exports in services value added was 17.9 per cent.5
Therefore, the overall trend suggests that while recent growth in ser-
vices exports has exceeded that of goods exports, services comprise a
rather small portion of South Africa’s total exports. This is despite the
services sector contributing the most value to the domestic economy. This
outcome may be a reflection of several bottlenecks—including low skill
levels in the labour force, trade protection in specific services industries
(such as telecommunications), and lower productivity in the services
sector—in comparison to other emerging markets such as India and
China (Freytag 2011).
However, the composition of South Africa’s services exports may also be
a factor determining its expansion. As Mishra et al. (2011) argue, the com-
position of services exports matters. In addition to increasing the volume
of services exports, increasing the sophistication and quality of services
exports is essential to unlocking sustained and rapid economic growth
(Mishra et al. 2011).
COMPOSITION OF SERVICES EXPORTS
Figure 14.3 shows the change in composition of South Africa’s services exports
between 2005 and 2010. Travel and commercial services constitute the bulk of
services exports over the period. However, the share of commercial services
exports relative to travel services exports declined between 2008 and 2010.
Specifically, in 2005, commercial services exports were valued at US$8,064
million compared to US$2,004 million for travel services exports. Yet by 2010,
commercial services exports had declined to US$3,906 million, compared
with travel services exports which increased to US$9,071 million. This
4 Authors’ calculation using World Development Indicators (2016).
5 Authors’ calculation using World Development Indicators (2016).
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suggests that rather than a shift from traditional to modern services, South
Africa’s services exports appear to have shifted in the opposite direction.
The rapid growth in travel services exports between 2008 and 2010 is likely a
reflection of increased tourism in the run up to the 2010 FIFA Football World
Cup.Historically though, South Africa has been a popular tourist destination on
the continent given its diverse natural environment and culture, as well as its
relatively well-developed infrastructure (Fourie 2011). The decline in commer-
cial services export growth may be a reflection of several factors: The protection
of domestic services industries such as telecommunications, which stifles innov-
ation and motivation for international competitiveness; and a lack of sufficient
skills in the labour force, which creates a constraint on expansion and also raises
the cost of labour and ultimately the cost of services (Freytag 2011).
Further examination of the composition of commercial services exports, based
on calculations from the Trade in Services Database (TSD) (World Bank 2016)
provides a number of insights. Firstly, the share of high-productivity modern
services exports related to finance (2 per cent), communications (2 per cent), and
ICT (3 per cent) constitute a marginal share of commercial exports. This indi-
cates that the current composition of South Africa’s services may not be suffi-
cient to generate the levels of growth seen by its middle-income country peers,
like India and China. However, given the sophistication of South Africa’s
financial services sector, and its rapid expansion into the rest of the African
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Figure 14.3. The composition of services exports, 2005–10
Note: Service exports are total exports to the world (‘WLD’).
Source: Author’s calculations based on Trade in Services Database (TSD)(World Bank, 2016).
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of South Africa’s insurance and financial services exports.6 In particular, one of
the country’s leading financial institutions—Standard Bank—was noted to
have a presence in seventeen countries on the African continent in 2010,
with several subsidiaries in other countries around the world.
Secondly, ‘other business services’ constitutes the largest portion of com-
mercial services exports (87 per cent), and this is almost exclusively comprised
of merchant and trade-related services, and miscellaneous business services.
The implication being that South Africa’s services exports remain largely
geared toward supporting the exports of goods. In 2010 these exports were
made up of legal and accounting services, followed by research and develop-
ment, architectural and engineering services, and services between related
parties. Despite limited exports of high-technology services, further special-
ization within these businesses services exports, particularly in R&D and
engineering services, can still yield considerable gains for economic growth.
An important data omission, however, is that South Africa’s services trade,
particularly with African countries, is largely through FDI and therefore not
captured in the TSD.7 South Africa has a large presence of banks and other
financial institutions, as well as retail companies, such as clothing and
Fast-Moving Consumer Good retailers, on the African continent. Therefore,
without accounting for these operations, the value and sophistication
of South Africa’s services exports, particularly in financial services, may be
underestimated.
3.2. South African FDI: Dynamic Firms Entering
Global and Regional Markets
There are a number of South African companies that have successfully entered
the global market. The Forbes Global 2000 list of top companies in 2017
contains the following South African firms that are services orientated (rank-
ing in brackets): Standard Bank Group (421), FirstRand (423), Naspers (655),
Sanlam (838), MTNGroup (1020), Shoprite Holdings (1,454), Remgro Limited
(1,786), Bid Corp. (1829) and MMI Holdings (1,910). In addition, there are a
number of South African companies that are listed in other countries, such as:
Old Mutual (409), Steinhoff International (456) and Investec (1085). An
investigation of outward bound FDI from South Africa, particularly that
derived from service-orientated firms, allows for a more complete picture of
the export potential of South African firms.
6 In addition, given that much of this expansion has been through the setting up of branches
and local subsidiaries in other countries, this will not be captured in the TSD as it covers only
services exports in Modes 1 and 2, which do include exports via a commercial presence (Mode 3).
7 Mode 3, which measures FDI, is not captured in the SARB and World Development Indicators
data sets.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Understanding and Characterizing the Services Sector in South Africa
287
South African companies have become bold in investing in newmarkets. In
2001, South African companies had assets worth US$17,751 million overseas,
and this increased six-fold to US$111,780million by 2012. This translates into
an average annual growth rate of 16.6 per cent. This might also indicate the
desire for South African companies to diversify their revenue streams, given
saturation in the domestic market.
The regional composition of South African FDI outflows is depicted in
Figure 14.4. It is evident that between 2001 and 2005, more than 90 per cent
of FDI outflows were directed toward countries outside Africa and Asia. The
bulk share of these outflows was directed toward developed economies, par-
ticularly in Europe. Many established South African companies have access to
networks and capital in various European economies, hence the shift into
Europe is not surprising.
However, this has not prevented many other corporates from entering into
emerging markets in Africa and Asia, particularly from 2006 onward. The
share of FDI into Asia has expanded from 2 per cent in 2001 to 21 per cent
in 2012. This is evident in companies such as Naspers investing heavily in the
Chinese technology company, Tencent, and Sanlam partnering with the
Shriram Group to create a life insurance company in India. South African
companies have increasingly turned to Africa. The proportion of FDI in
2001
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Figure 14.4. FDI stock outflow by 2001–12
Source: Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD (2014).
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Africa tripled from 7 to 21 per cent over the period 2001–12. This indicates
that an increasing number of South African companies see Africa as a key
growth frontier.
In 2001, Southern Africa comprised 47 per cent of South African FDI in
Africa, that rose to 73 per cent in 2002, and declined slightly to 69 per cent
in 2003. However, that proportion declined rapidly to 29 per cent, in 2012.
The big investments in Southern Africa in 2001–3 are a reflection of the
proximity of these markets to South Africa. The relative decline since 2003
is not due to disinvestment from Southern African countries—absolute
investment has increased by 12 times in Southern Africa—it is simply that
other regions, particularly East Africa, have grown at a faster rate over the
same period.
In 2001, 53 per cent of South African FDI in Africa was invested in East
Africa. However, between 2002 and 2005, this dipped to a low of 26 per cent.
In 2006, it increased substantially to 65 per cent, and in the last five years has
stabilized at between 50 and 53 per cent. The majority of FDI in East Africa is
due to investment in Mauritius, which accounts for 91 per cent of investment
from South African firms. The attractiveness of Mauritius as an investment
destination is due to political stability, a low corporate tax rate (15 per cent
compared to 28 per cent in South Africa), and an abundance of professionals
(Stones 2015).
Overall, South African companies have become increasingly globalized,
primarily in order to increase revenue streams. This points to a dynamic set
of South African firms that are able to successfully compete in the global
marketplace.8
3.3. Tourism Energizes South Africa’s Economy
The services industries associated with high export potential, such as finance,
communications and business services, are typically skill-intensive. These
industries are at odds with South Africa’s endowment structure, which is
characterized by an abundance of unskilled and semi-skilled labour. Thus,
the employment potential of these modern services industries is curtailed by
the scarcity of skills in the South African economy. As such, the question arises
whether there is a source of export growth with labour demands better aligned
to the composition of South Africa’s labour market. It could be argued that the
answer may lie in tourism. This section considers the economic contribution
and potential of tourism services.
8 In the earlier working paper version of this chapter, we provide a case study analysis of two
South African firms—Shoprite and Netcare—that have successfully entered developing and
developed country markets.
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As the world has becomemore inter-connected, tourism has emerged as one
of the pivotal service export sectors for many countries; and particularly
developing countries. Tourism is an important driver of economic growth
around the world, accounting for approximately 277 million jobs, and con-
stituting some 10 per cent of global GDP in 2014 (Daly and Gereffi 2016).
South Africa, with its multitude of cultural, historical, and scenic sites, has
been well placed to take advantage of this rise in demand for tourism (Phiri
2016). South Africa has a well-developed tourism industry when compared
with other African countries. In 2014, 9.5 million tourists visited South
Africa—by far the biggest volume in Sub-Saharan Africa, and third only to
Morocco (10 million) and Egypt (9.6 million) (UNWTO 2015). In terms of
total tourism spend, Daly and Gereffi (2016) show South Africa to be the
second largest tourism market in Africa, behind Egypt.
It is worth noting that measuring the economic contribution of tourism
services to a country’s economy is difficult since industry data does not
typically attempt to classify economic activities according to whether they
are related to tourism. Statistics South Africa’s Tourism Satellite Accounts
2005–2012 and Tourism Satellite Accounts 2013–14 attempt to address this
data shortcoming. The discussion in the remainder of this section draws on
this data source.
Tourism services account for a fairly modest share of GDP, but have
shown strong employment growth potential over the period 2004–14.
Tourism services account for approximately 3 per cent of South Africa’s
GDP, and this has remained constant over the period 2004–14. The sector’s
contribution is in line with that of Agriculture. In terms of employment,
tourism services account for approximately 4 per cent of total employment.
In 2005, the number of jobs dependent on tourism was approximately
475,000. This rose to 680,000 in 2014, representing an annual average growth
rate of 4 per cent. In contrast, aggregate employment grew at 3 per cent in the
same period.
Tourism-reliant jobs are spread across a variety of industries, which are
characterized by relatively lower skills requirements. Four industries—road
passenger transport, food and beverage, retail and trade, and accommodation
for visitors—are responsible for 83 per cent of tourism-related jobs. Interest-
ingly, only the accommodation sector is heavily reliant on tourism, while the
other three sectors have a moderate reliance on tourism.
The key challenges facing South Africa’s tourism industry relate to security
and regulation. Although the probability of a terrorist attack in South Africa is
low, common crimes against tourists such as theft and the perception that
crime is pervasive, impacts negatively on the country’s brand image as a
tourist destination of choice. As in any industry, regulation plays an import-
ant role. For example, in mid-2014, the Department of Home Affairs
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introduced new visa regulations to reduce child trafficking (Oxford Business
Group 2015). The regulations were onerous in that they required all children
whowere under the age of 18 and entering South Africa to have an unabridged
birth certificate. In addition, for countries in which a visa is required to enter
South Africa, parents had to appear in person during the application process to
obtain the new biometric visa (Oxford Business Group 2015). It was estimated
that the immediate impact of the regulations would see South Africa losing
R4.1 billion in service exports and 9,300 tourism-related jobs (Oxford Business
Group 2015). Furthermore, business bookings went down by between 40 and
70 per cent. This is indicative of the important impact regulation can play,
both positive and negative, in influencing industry performance.
South African tourism is a key services sector, as its contribution to GDP and
employment show. Although employment is somewhat volatile, it is a key
contributor in three aspects. Firstly, the industry provides jobs for individuals
across the skills distribution, and in many senses, is a key generator of
unskilled employment, and possibly small, micro, and medium enterprise
jobs. Secondly, tourism has a unique spatial component, where employment
can be generated in economically under-developed, but pristine and tourist-
friendly areas. Thirdly, the industry’s propensity to generate employment
opportunities for women and youth indicates its ability to promote a more
inclusive form of economic growth. In order to grow, however, challenges
such as security and regulations must be addressed.
4. Conclusion
Employment and GDP shares show that the South African economy can de
facto be classified as a services-based economy. However, a key issue is
whether the services sector can act as an engine for growth, while also
being a source of employment in a high labour surplus economy such as
South Africa. A more detailed analysis of the services sector reveals an inter-
esting segmentation of services industries, which has varying implications
for the nature of economic growth and its possible impact on employment
generation.
Firstly, we observe modern high-productivity export-orientated services
industries, such as business, finance, and communication services. These
industries are characterized by high levels of productivity, high skill require-
ments and corresponding wage premiums. Although the potential exists for
these industries to serve as a node for long-run employment and growth
expansion, they are constrained by the supply of an adequately skilled work-
force. There is the possibility that growth of these industries may be accom-
panied by second round effects that impact positively on employment and
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growth in less skill-intensive sectors. However, it could be argued further that,
although these multiplier effects are likely to materialize, it will certainly not
be sufficient to increase employment to the levels required by the extraordin-
arily high unemployment numbers found in South Africa.
Secondly, there has been significant employment growth in government
services. Government services are, on average, characterized by relatively
high-productivity activities, high skill intensity, and thus relatively high
wage levels. The high wage levels are in part explained by strong public-
sector unions. However, this industry cannot act as a driver of growth, given
that a bloated public sector is not fiscally sustainable, and never a positive
contributor to long-run economic development.
Thirdly, we observe a set of low productivity industries with relatively low
skill requirements. These include the wholesale and retail industry (which is
characterized by high levels of informality), the informal sector, and the TES
component of business services. The lower skill requirements associated with
these industries allow them to better absorb the abundance of inadequately
skilled workers. There is a high productivity element to the wholesale and
retail trade industry that exhibits export potential, with multi-national South
African firms such as Shoprite and Steinhoff, which invest strongly in foreign
markets, providing evidence of this.
There are two key elements to the export potential of the services sector.
Firstly, modern commercial services, such as finance, communications, and
ICT, do not show strong growth or presence in cross-border trade. However,
the export potential of these industries is revealed by the strong presence of
dynamic South African firms investing in both regional and international
markets. The key constraint to firms within these typically skill-intensive
industries is the supply of a suitably skilled workforce. Secondly, there is
evidence of strong potential in tourism services. Tourism services account
for shares of GDP and employment akin to agriculture, which while small,
offer much in terms of export potential. Most importantly, industries falling
under tourism are characterized by relatively low skill requirements, which
points to an industry with export potential that is better aligned to South
Africa’s labour market.
The services sector can contribute to a sectoral-based strategy for growth and
employment. Focus however should not necessarily be placed on any single
industry, but rather on a selection of different industries that allow for the
realization of different economic policy objectives. High productivity skill-
intensive industries, such as finance, communications, and business services,
have export and thus growth potential, but their employment potential is
constrained by the composition of the labour market. The public sector is not
a driver of long-term growth and temporary employment services is not a
viable employment strategy. Formal semi-skilled activities in transport, retail
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and communications offer employment potential. Tourism is possibly best
aligned as an industry with both growth and employment potential, given
that it is driven by export growth, and the industry is a source of employment
for less-skilled workers. It is worth noting that the informal sector, which is
predominantly characterized by service activities, offers a possible avenue
for employment creation that aligns to the composition of South Africa’s labour
market. It is at the low-productivity end of the services sector, and thus does not
offer long-term growth potential. However, the barriers to entry into the infor-
mal sector are low for the unemployed, and it is thus a critical economic
channel for immediate forms of economic activity and income generation.
The services sector constitutes the majority share of GDP, and as such is a
significant cog in South Africa’s economic engine. The question then, is
whether South Africa can exploit the large existing share of GDP constituted
by the services sectors—ranging fromwholesale and retail, communication, to
financial services and tourism across the entire product market, customer,
productivity, and employment spectrum—in order to build a set of globally
competitive services firms, which not only continue to create local employ-
ment, but also serve to provide the impetus for South Africa’s longer-run
economic development trajectory.
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Employment and Productivity Growth
in Tanzania’s Service Sector
Mia Ellis, Margaret McMillan, and Jed Silver
1. Introduction
Between 2002 and 2012 Tanzania’s economy grew more rapidly than at any
other time in its history: average annual GDP growth was 6.5 per cent and
average annual labour productivity growth was 4.1 per cent. More than three-
quarters of this labour productivity growth is accounted for by structural
change; the remainder is largely attributable to within-sector productivity
growth in agriculture. The growth attributable to structural change is almost
entirely explained by a rapid decline in the agricultural employment share and
an increase in the non-agricultural private sector employment share. How-
ever, only 11.4 per cent of employment growth in the private non-agricultural
economy is due to the expansion of the formal private sector; the remaining
88.6 per cent occurred in the informal sector (Diao et al. 2016).1,2
This chapter assesses the role that services—both formal and informal—
have played in Tanzania’s recent growth and the role that they could play
in its economic future. Section 2 examines the current pattern of structural
change in Tanzania and estimates the contribution of the services sector
to employment and productivity growth. Section 3 provides a snapshot of
the formal services sector and highlights strategies for accelerating its growth.
Section 4 presents new data on the size, structure, and productivity of
micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in the services sector.
These data reveal large numbers of firms in the right-hand tail of the MSME
1 Our definition of informality is based on that of the Tanzanian government, whichdistinguishes
formal from informal firms based on licensure status and size.
2 For details of these calculations, see Diao et al. (2016).
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productivity distribution, with output per worker exceeding the economy-
wide average for manufacturing, and show that this ‘in-between’ sector (Lewis
1979) offers the potential for growth and job creation, if policies are better
targeted at firms with the greatest potential to grow. Section 5 is devoted to the
tourism sector, which has significant development potential. Section 6
concludes.
2. Employment and Productivity Growth in Services:
The Big Picture
To place the services sector in the context of the larger economy, we employ
the growth decomposition methodology developed by McMillan and Rodrik
(2011). To this end, we divide the economy into tenmain sub-sectors and split
economy-wide labour productivity into that which can be attributed to
within-sector productivity growth and that which is attributable to structural
change. For the purposes of this chapter, we define within-sector productivity
growth as growth in labour productivity in any of the ten sub-sectors and
define productivity growth attributable to structural change as the productiv-
ity growth that occurs when employment is reallocated across these ten sub-
sectors as a result of different levels of average labour productivity.
Table 15.1 highlights themain results of this exercise. Our analysis confirms
that close to 80 per cent of Tanzania’s recent growth in labour productivity is
attributable to structural change. Employment shares have declined in
agriculture—the sector with the lowest average labour productivity—and
increased in various non-agricultural sectors, most of which are significantly
more productive than agriculture.
The growth decomposition presented in Table 15.1 does not tell us whether
structural change in Tanzania was the result of job creation or simply labour
reallocation across sectors. Like many African countries, Tanzania has had
high population growth over the past decade, leading millions of young
people to enter the job market. To this end, Table 15.2 links the growth in
employment with the change in the economic structure by displaying ‘new’
employment opportunities across all non-agricultural sectors.
We define new employment by sector as the net increase in the number of
employees in each sector between 2002–12, computed using the population
censuses. For these calculations we exclude agricultural employment, prima-
rily because it has not played an important role in job creation: the net
increase in agricultural employment accounted for only 11 per cent of the
total increase in employment between 2002–12; almost 90 per cent of the jobs
created over this ten-year period were in the non-agricultural sector. Consid-
ering that agricultural employment made up more than 80 per cent of total
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Table 15.1. Tanzania’s economy-wide labour productivity growth decomposition, 2002–12
Value added per worker
(constant 2005 in TZS billion)
Labour productivity
growth in 2002–12 (%)
Sector GDP share Sector labour
share
Labour productivity growth
decomposition, 2002–12 total (%)
2002 2012 2002 2012 2002 2012 Within Between Total
Agriculture 351 509 44.8 34.2 27.0 81.7 65.8 15.5 9.7 5.7
Mining 4,057 1,581 61.0 2.4 3.3 0.5 2.6 1.5 4.0 2.5
Manufacturing 3,575 3,706 3.7 8.2 9.6 1.8 3.2 0.3 6.2 6.5
Utilities 6,467 1,792 72.3 2.3 1.9 0.3 1.3 1.7 2.2 0.5
Construction 5,560 5,119 7.9 7.3 9.9 1.0 2.4 0.5 8.6 8.1
Trade services 1,607 1,760 9.5 14.9 16.0 7.5 11.3 1.4 8.0 9.4
Transport services 5,968 5,442 8.8 6.5 7.5 0.8 1.7 0.5 5.9 5.4
Business services 35,298 20,860 40.9 12.1 13.5 0.2 0.8 3.5 15.0 11.6
Gov’t services 3,178 3,762 18.4 11.2 10.7 4.1 3.5 2.9 2.6 0.3
Personal services 213 114 46.4 0.8 0.7 2.1 7.4 0.2 0.7 0.5
Total private economy 761 1,148 50.1 88.8 89.3 95.9 96.5 9.2 41.0 50.1
Total 832 1,240 50.4 100 100 100 100 12.1 38.3 50.4
Contribution to total economy’s labour productivity growth (total economy’s labour productivity growth in 2002–12 = 100)
Agriculture 30.7 19.3 11.4
Mining 3.0 7.9 5.0
Manufacturing 0.6 12.4 12.9
Utilities 3.3 4.3 0.9
Construction 1.1 17.1 16.0
Trade services 2.7 15.9 18.7
Transport services 1.0 11.7 10.7
Business services 6.9 29.8 22.9
Gov’t services 5.7 5.2 0.5
Personal services 0.5 1.4 0.9
Total 23.9 76.1 100.0


























Table 15.2. Contribution to new employment by sector, non-agricultural formal and informal, 2002–12
Total Formal Informal
Number of increase Share in total
increase (%)
Number of increase Share in total
increase (%)
Number of increase Share in total
increase (%)
Mining 404,212 11.4 9,021 0.3 395,192 11.1
Manufacturing 313,882 8.8 103,049 2.9 210,833 5.9
Utilities 194,960 5.5 194,960 5.5  0.0
Construction 281,864 7.9 521 0.0 281,343 7.9
Trade services 966,807 27.2 1,304 0.0 965,503 27.2
Transport services 182,383 5.1 18,497 0.5 163,886 4.6
Business services 105,871 3.0 56,924 1.6 48,947 1.4
Personal services 881,053 24.8 0 0.0 881,053 24.8
Public sector 224,579 6.3 224,579 6.3 0.0
Total private non-agriculture 3,331,032 93.7 384,275 10.8 2,946,757 82.9
Total non-agriculture 3,555,611 100.0 608,855 17.1 2,946,757 82.9


























employment in 2002 (Table 15.1, first panel, column 6), it is remarkable that
almost all of the new jobs were created outside the agricultural sector.
Two key facts need to be highlighted in the ‘new employment’ decompos-
ition presented in Table 15.2. First, a majority of new jobs were created in the
private sector; almost 94 per cent of increased non-agricultural employment
between 2002–12 is in the private sector (Table 15.2, column 2). Second,
83 per cent of these private-sector jobs were created in the so-called ‘informal
economy’ by micro and small firms (Table 15.2, column 6).
This trend in private-sector job creation by micro and small firms is often
seen as a distressing phenomenon, as firms in the informal economy, or small
firms in general, are often associated with low productivity and a lack of
dynamism. However, once we link the trend in private-sector job creation
with the results of the growth decomposition analysis shown in Table 15.1,
the following stylized facts become evident. First, structural change accounted
for almost 80 per cent of economy-wide labour productivity growth in Tan-
zania between 2002–12 (Table 15.1, last row). Second, structural change was
primarily achieved by growth in employment in small firms in the informal
economy. These two facts together raise the possibility that some of Tanza-
nia’s growth in labour productivity is linked to the growth in employment in
small firms.
There are two sectors that stand out as having contributed significantly
to job creation in Tanzania over the period 2002–12. These are manufacturing
and trade services. Average labour productivity in Tanzania’s manufacturing
sector ismore than seven times that of the agricultural sector. Although the sector
is still relatively small, its extremely high productivity compared with the rest
of the economy means that increased employment in this sector contributed
12.4 per cent of economy-wide labour productivity growth (Table 15.1, second
panel, column 2). Notably, more than two-thirds of this increase in employ-
ment is accounted for by small, mostly informal, firms.
Likemanufacturing, trade services productivity is relatively high in Tanzania.
While labour productivity in this sector is only half that of manufacturing,
it is still 3.5 times that of agriculture (Table 15.1, first panel, columns 1 and 2).
More importantly, more new jobs were created in this sector than in any other
sector between 2002–12. As Table 15.2 highlights, amongst the nearly one
million new jobs created in trade services, more than 99 per cent were created
by the informal economy. Further, although these jobs were created by small
firms in the informal sector, productivity in trade services did not fall. As the
growth decomposition analysis of Table 15.1 shows, within-sector productiv-
ity actually increased modestly in the trade services sector between 2002 and
2012 (Table 15.1, comparing row 1 with row 2). As a result, job creation in
Tanzania’s trade services sector accounted for more than 18 per cent of
economy-wide productivity growth between 2002–12.
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Trade services includes retail, wholesale, and the food and beverages trade,
and in Tanzania makes up the biggest share of the informal sector: about
55 per cent of informal businesses (FSDT 2012). In the last few years, it has
been transformed into a competitive and private market and, though it is
generally considered an unproductive industry, trade services is not without
potential (FSDT 2012; McMillan and Rodrik 2011; NBS 2010; NBS 2014b). As a
labour-intensive industry, trade services offers jobs to large groups of unskilled
workers, including youth and those coming from agriculture, and the industry
is already an important source of employment in Tanzania.
The business services industry in Tanzania is much smaller, accounting for
only 0.8 per cent of total employment in 2012. It consists of financial and
insurance activities, and the split between informal and formal firms in this
sector is roughly 50/50. The numbers in Table 15.1 indicate that, although
labour productivity in the business services sector is still quite high, it declined
between 2002–12, perhaps on account of the entry of more informal firms.
However, the importance of business services comes from its impact on other
industries rather than on employment. Financial and business development
services are crucial for making other industries, such as manufacturing, more
efficient, in turn creating more jobs and production (Jensen et al. 2008).
Mobile money services and firms providing business development services
exemplify how business services can improve the functioning of other firms.
All of the major telecommunications companies in Tanzania offer mobile
money services, which makes it easy for businesses—most importantly, for
MSMEs—to send and receive payments.
A number of firms, large and small, provide business development services
to other businesses, mainly MSMEs. For example, Match Maker Associates is
an impact investment fund that works closely with MSMEs, providing them
business development services (BDS) and making loans to the ones that prove
their viability; e.g. through its SME Impact Fund. A number of BDS providers
help their clients in a variety of areas, such as registering and formalizing their
businesses, developing written business plans, and providing general advice.
The transport and communication industries also provide essential services
for other industries. Transport and communication services and business
services are not especially labour-intensive, but can be skill-intensive, with
about 60 per cent of firms in both transport and ICT being classified as high-
skill (Tan et al. 2016). Therefore, their biggest contribution to the economy is
realized in their impact on other industries, rather than in their contribution
to employment or their direct output. For example, improving the transpor-
tation infrastructure and increasing the capacity of maritime ports may result
in more jobs in manufacturing. Just as the financial infrastructure for business
services is lacking, so too does Tanzania currently suffer from poor transport
and ICT infrastructure.
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Tourism is an important services sector in Tanzania but it does not neatly
fit into any of the categories described in Tables 15.1 and 15.2. This is because
it is made up of parts of several other industries, including: accommodation;
food and beverages; transport; and, culture, sports, and recreational services.
Because of the important role that tourism plays in Tanzania, with its natural
wonders and game parks, we include a detailed discussion of tourism in
Section 5 of this chapter. However, it is worth pointing out that a unique
feature of the tourism industry relative to most other services industries in
Tanzania is its potential for foreign exchange generation. Tourism brought in
over US$1 billion in direct annual revenues and over US$4 billion in total
(direct and indirect) contributions—amounting to approximately 14 per cent
of GDP (WTTC 2015).
3. Employment Growth in Formal Services
This section presents data on the contribution of formal services to employ-
ment and productivity growth in Tanzania using data from the Formal
Employment and Earnings Survey (FEES). It then addresses some of the con-
straints that explain the slow growth of formal services, and examines the
prospects for formal services growth in the near future, while considering
some approaches the government could take.
As mentioned above, the vast majority of private employment growth has
occurred in the informal sector, while the private formal services sector has
remained quite small, accounting for just 7.6 per cent of total employment
growth. Nearly three-quarters of this growth occurred in the utilities sub-sector,
while formal business services contributed 1.6 per cent, transport services
0.5 per cent, and trade services a fraction of a per cent to total employment
growth. This may be explained by the fact that the formal services sector
comprises relatively skilled jobs, but employee skills and education levels are
still low in Tanzania in comparison with other countries. Although mainland
businesses withmore than four employees are required to pay a 5 per cent Skills
Development Levy, which is used to finance VETA, the government-run voca-
tional training institute, the infrastructure in place to train workers appears to
be largely ineffective. Tan et al. (2016) find that workers with secondary or
vocational education do not make a greater contribution, on average, than
workers with only primary education. They also find that firms may lack the
capacity to conduct adequate in-house training, as this is found to have no
association with better firm performance. Instead, firms appear to be bridg-
ing the skills gap by outsourcing professional services or hiring expatriate
workers (Tan et al. 2016).
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Further opportunities for formal servicesmay lie in tradable services. Tanzania
has consistently been a net services exporter since 2005, although 81.4 per cent
of its exports come from travel and transport services (UNCTAD 2015). While
most of the available analysis focuses on private firms, public services such
as health and education may also be important sources of skilled employment
growth. Tanzania’s rapidly increasing population and its health and education
initiativesare likely to lead to increased jobcreation in these sectors. For example,
the ratio of teachers to students (1:45.6 for primary and 1:26.4 for secondary
in 2012) is decreasing despite increasing enrolment (World Bank 2016). This
suggests that more jobs are being and will continue to be created here.
4. Services Firms in the MSME Sector
We have shown in Table 15.2 that 82.5 per cent of the increase in services-
sector employment in Tanzania between 2002 and 2012 took place in the
informal sector. To understand the nature of these firms, we used Tanzania’s
first nationally representative survey of MSMEs, conducted by the Financial
Sector Deepening Trust in 2010. While this survey is not without its limita-
tions, it provides the only comprehensive data we have for assessing the role
of small (and particularly informal) firms in Tanzanian services.3 The survey
covers about three million formal and informal businesses, with a total of
around five million employees. These firms accounted for almost 30 per cent
of national private non-agricultural GDP in 2010. For detailed statistics
describing the MSMEs in the survey, see Ellis et al. (2017: tables 4–6).
As shown in Ellis et al. (2017: table 7), MSMEs contributed 99.6 per cent of
total trade services value added in 2010. These smaller firms were mostly retail
shops and hotels/restaurants, and their total value added was TZS5.14 trillion.
4.1. Productivity and the In-Between Sector
The literature on firm-level productivity commonly argues that firms in the
MSME sector are unproductive (see, for example, La Porta and Shleifer 2014).
3 The sampling frame is households and the selection of households is based on the 2002 census.
This poses at least two problems. First, because the survey is household-based, it is representative of
households and not businesses. Thus, since Tanzania is still a very poor country, the survey is likely
to have missed some of the more productive businesses. Indeed, an analysis of the data reveals that
mid-sized firms are under-represented in this dataset (FSDT 2012). Second, because the sampling
framework is 2002 and there was a significant reduction in rural activity between 2002–12 (Diao
et al. 2016), the survey oversamples rural households. Therefore, readers should keep in mind that
our analysis is likely to understate the contribution of small businesses to economy-wide
productivity and employment and also to understate the importance of small businesses in
urban areas.
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However, it misses the enormous heterogeneity amongMSMEs. We show this
heterogeneity in Tanzania in Figure 15.1, which plots the distribution of the
log of monthly value added per worker for all firms in the MSME sector in
2010. The vertical lines in Figure 15.1 represent economy-wide average prod-
uctivity in agriculture, trade services, and manufacturing.
Figure 15.1 shows that the majority of MSMEs have average productivity
levels higher than that among agricultural firms. This is consistent with
evidence presented in McMillan and Rodrik (2011) and McMillan et al.
(2014): that structural change outside agriculture in Tanzania has been
growth-enhancing since about 2000. A large share of these firms have prod-
uctivity levels higher than economy-wide trade services productivity, and a
smaller but still sizeable chunk of firms have productivity greater than economy-
wide manufacturing productivity. This is important because it means that a
good number of MSMEs contribute to raising labour productivity (and
growth) in Tanzania’s economy. In the process, they provide jobs for a large
number of Tanzanians, especially youth.
Arthur Lewis (1979: 219) was among the first to identify the subset of firms
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.4500
12 14 16
Figure 15.1. Productive heterogeneity of small firms
Notes: Dashed line = average ag productivity; dotted line = average services productivity; solid line =
average manufacturing productivity.
Source: Authors’ calculations using MSME survey 2010 (FSDT 2012).
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. . .units of production of all sizes, and in particular a great number of one-to-five-man
undertakings in manufacturing, transport and a wide range of services—often
nowadays called the informal sector. Some of this activity belongs in the modern
sector as we have defined it; i.e., it will expand with economic development;
the rest—e.g., some of the handicrafts and some of the services—belong to the
traditional sector in that they will contract.
He called these ‘small- to medium-scale’ firms with the potential to grow the
‘in between sector’—neither completely formal and modern, nor traditional.
Following Lewis, we define firms in the in-between sector as MSMEs whose
value added per worker is greater than the economy-wide value added per
worker in manufacturing.4 This is because the exceptional performance of
these firms strongly indicates that, as the economy grows, their owners will
acquire the skills needed to stay in business and the potential to grow with it.
This is consistent with recent writing on the importance of ‘managerial cap-
ital’ in economic development (Bruhn et al. 2011), a concept closely linked to
that of ‘firm capabilities’ (Sutton 2012). These are the subset of high-capability
firms in the MSME sector.
Ellis et al. (2017: table 3) report output per worker and the number of in-
between firms by sector. The leading in-between sub-sector is food retail
shops, followed by some manufacturing sub-sectors. Although trade services
firms in the in-between sector are not as productive as their manufacturing
counterparts, with about 78 per cent of their value added per worker, the gap
between trade services and manufacturing is much smaller in the in-between
sector than overall (according to the 2012 Census data presented in
Table 15.1, trade services has about 47 per cent of the value added per worker
of manufacturing overall). Moreover, services accounts for over 90 per cent of
firms and 85 per cent of employment in the in-between sector, with over
800,000 workers. The fact that there is a subset of service sector firms that are
more productive than ordinary manufacturing firms and almost as productive
as the top-performing small manufacturers suggests that service firms can
contribute highly to productive employment.
4.2. MSME Policies
Tanzania implemented its first national MSME sector policy in 2003, when
the Ministry of Industry and Trade published the Small and Medium Enter-
prise Development Policy (SMEDP). The SMEDP is one of several programmes
designed to help Tanzania realize ‘Vision 2025’,5 an important part of which is
4 See Diao et al. (2016) for an analysis of a different definition of the in-between sector.
5 Vision 2025 is a national long-term development strategy adopted in 1999 by the Mkapa
government that focuses on livelihoods and economic growth, among other issues.
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focused on facilitating productivity growth in agriculture, manufacturing, and
MSMEs. The policy commits the government to supporting MSME develop-
ment by addressing the constraints specific to MSMEs. Two other policy
initiatives of the early 2000s also address the development of MSMEs. The
National Microfinance Policy of 2001 aimed to achieve widespread access to
finance by MSMEs in urban and rural areas, while the Economic Empower-
ment Policy of 2004 sought to empower Tanzanians to participate actively in
the economy by creating a favourable business environment, improving the
legal and regulatory framework, and facilitating access to finance, skills, tech-
nology, premises, and information.
A wide range of MSME programmes are in place in Tanzania and they are
executed by an equally wide range of government institutions, donors, and
NGOs. The rationale for most of these programmes is to contribute to job
creation and growth, but assistance to the MSME sector by government,
donors, and NGOs has been fairly ad hoc and certainly not targeted at firms
with growth potential. A UNIDO (2012) report evaluating Tanzania’s MSME
policies found that inadequate coordination, weak synergies among stake-
holders, insufficient resources to implement programmes, a lack of prioritiza-
tion, and inconsistencies in legislation had hampered Tanzania’s efforts to
foster productivity growth in MSMEs.
4.3. Targeting the In-Between Sector
One clear implication of our work is that not every owner of a micro or small
firm is an entrepreneur. As illustrated in Figure 15.1, more than half of MSMEs
have extremely low productivity. These businesses help families to survive
and so are important. But unlike the owners of the businesses in the
in-between sector, many of these business owners report that they would
prefer to have a wage-paying job. In other words, they are what Banerjee
et al. (2015) have dubbed ‘reluctant entrepreneurs’.
We have found a surprisingly large number of firms in the in-between
sector. There is a significant right-hand tail of firms in the MSME manufactur-
ing sector that have productivity levels equal to or greater than those in the
formal manufacturing sector. The total number of employees operating in
the in-between sector in all activities falls slightly short of 1 million, and
average monthly value added per worker for these firms is US$351. These are
the firms that are most likely to have the capability to grow into medium-scale
manufacturing enterprises.
Sutton and Olomi (2011) provide a ‘map’ of Tanzania’s firm capabilities in
manufacturing. One of their conclusions is that in Tanzania, as in several of
the other African economies where they carried out enterprise mapping exer-
cises, few business owners were capable of managing a medium-sized firm
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effectively. The scarcity of ‘organizational capital’ (Sutton and Olomi, 2011)
suggests thatpublicpolicies aimedatgrowthand jobcreationshouldbeattempt-
ing to identify and assist those micro and small firms that are in the right-hand
tail of the productivity distribution—those with organizational capital.
A logical place to begin is by talking to the owners of these small businesses.
There is no substitute for face-to-face dialogue between business owners
and government officials, but such structured engagements between the public
sector and private firms, especially small enterprises, are rare in Tanzania.6 An
important lesson that the government of Tanzania can learn from China is that
Chinese officials had and still have regular meetings with ordinary business
owners. As a result of thesemeetings, officials often take concrete steps to remove
constraints on profits and growth. An example is provided by Zhang and Hu
(2014), who recount the story of one province’s journey to becoming the largest
potato growing region in China and eventually an exporter of potato chips.
The survey that we have been using to identify firms in the in-between
sector (FSDT 2010) asks MSME owners to identify the three most important
things that the government (or other partners) could do to facilitate small
business growth in Tanzania. The results were as follows: 45 per cent of the
firms in the in-between sector reported that providing access to finance was
the most important thing. The second and third most important actions were
to provide information aboutmarket opportunities and to ease the regulations
controlling business. It is telling that access to credit was repeatedly singled
out as a severe obstacle, since the ratio of domestic credit to GDP in Tanzania is
one of the lowest in the world (te Velde 2015).
The survey findings are consistent with the evolving literature on micro-
finance. The assumption that breaking financing constraints will boost busi-
ness start-ups or allow micro and small business owners to scale up their
operations and grow into larger firms appears to be true only when business
owners have the skill and resources to profit from the investment (Banerjee
et al. 2013; Bauchet et al. 2011). In India, for example, Banerjee et al. (2015)
found that while microfinance on average had no effects on firm performance,
it did have a significant positive impact on firms with high growth potential.
Similarly, in Nigeria, a business plan competition was launched in order to
identify high-potential entrepreneurs. The winners were given a substantial
amount of money—on average US$50,000—to implement their business plans.
Three years after the implementation, a follow-up survey of these businesses
showed that the programme had been successful in helping the winning firms
6 The Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC) is the organization that acts as Tanzania’s
forum for public–private dialogue. Its membership consists of representatives drawn equally from
the business community and the public sector. The TNBC has attempted to represent the interests
of small firms, but it has a strong large-firm bias in its membership, and it meets infrequently.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Employment and Productivity Growth in Tanzania
307
to achieve higher survival rates, acquire more capital and employ more workers
(McKenzie 2015).MSME-financing programmes in Tanzania, on the other hand,
make no attempt to screen firms for their growth potential.
Many programmes implemented in Tanzania focus on MSME training.
Recent research from other countries suggests that microenterprise training
initiatives have been largely ineffective (McKenzie and Woodruff 2012).
A review of impact evaluations of training programmes revealed that few of
the evaluations found any significant impacts of training on sales or profit-
ability; this was due to a combination of small changes in business practices
and low statistical power (Fafchamps and Woodruff 2016). Although it is not
clear from the existing evidence whether the training was ineffective because
the trainers themselves were ineffective or because training is not what the
business owners required, it is relevant that none of the programmes evalu-
ated addressed gaps in market information, the second most important con-
straint identified by in-between sector business owners. Significantly, none of
the MSME owners in the 2010 survey reported a need for training.
One resource that provides services to MSME owners in Tanzania is the
Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO), which is a government
organization specifically geared to small business development. It is present in
all regions of mainland Tanzania, where it provides business training, tech-
nology development, market facilitation, and small loans to entrepreneurs.
However, its training programmes are mostly geared towards basic skills for
micro-entrepreneurs and its loan ceiling of TZS6 million (US$2,750) is con-
sidered to be far too small by both clients and staff. Many loans go to petty
traders because the demand for loans of that size from SIDO’s target clients
(especially those that can be considered in-between sector firms) is not
enough to utilize the full portfolio; these firms are seeking loans ranging
from TZS5 million to TZS50 million.
5. The Tourism Sector
Tourism is one of the most important industries in Tanzania, which has the
resources to attract those interested in adventure trips, hiking, beach holidays,
and cultural history tours. Since the late 1990s, Tanzania has been taking
advantage of its tourism assets in the hope of growing into one of the world’s
premier tourism destinations. By all indications, its efforts are paying off, but
there is still much unrealized potential. In this section, we reference informa-
tion from the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) as well as the 2015
Travel & Tourism Report (World Economic Forum 2015) to examine the
characteristics and potential of the tourism sector, comparing it to other
sectors in Tanzania as well as tourism industries in similar countries.
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It is worth noting that government estimates put tourism’s contribution
significantly higher than theWTTC; however, theWTTC has more recent and
more consistent data. It is also important to note that the tourism data used
in this chapter include only tourism’s direct contributions to the economy
(ignoring indirect contributions), and do not necessarily include the informal
sector; thus, the numbers discussed likely under-represent tourism’s import-
ance in the overall economy.
5.1. Economic Contribution
While we cannot exactly compare tourism with the other services industries,
looking at its economic contribution over 2002–12 gives us some idea of its
relative importance. As Ellis et al. (2017: table 8) shows, tourism’s real contri-
bution to GDP has grown consistently since 2002, and recently has been
worth more than US$1 billion annually. Its share of GDP in 2012, however,
was only about 4.5 per cent, which is a small share of the services sector as a
whole. However, its indirect contribution to GDP is estimated to be much
higher, suggesting that, like business, transport, and communication services,
tourism has wide-ranging economic benefits. Ellis et al. (2017: table 8) also
show that the number of jobs in tourism has steadily increased. Tourism’s
share of employment was about 3.15 per cent in 2012, putting it above both
transport and business services, and indicating that tourism may have the
potential to account for a significant portion of employment in the country.
Productivity in tourism grew by approximately 50 per cent from 2002–12,
and the value added perworker in 2012wasUS$4,381 (Ellis et al. 2017: table 8).
Tourism is therefore more productive than trade services, and similar to trans-
port. However, while tourism performs relatively well in terms of its economic
contribution, it is important to note that its contribution to both GDP and
employmenthasnot increased over the period 2002–12. This sectionwill go on
to examine the factors restricting further growth in the tourism industry, and
consider its potential if those restrictions are removed.
We first want to better understand the tourism market in Tanzania, includ-
ing the products it offers, who its primary clients are, and where most con-
sumption takes place. Tanzania is dominated by foreign and leisure tourism,
with most foreign tourists coming from Europe and the United States (Ellis
et al. 2017: table 9). These tourists travel a great distance to reach Tanzania,
often at a very high price, and are only likely to do so for longer holidays.
Residents of East African Community (EAC) countries represent a great source
of potential. TheEAC ishome to approximately140millionpeople,whowould
be able to travel to Tanzania cheaply and on short holidays (Rugimbana 2016).
Further research is needed to identify this market, and more marketing and
promotion should be aimed at this group.
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Ellis et al. (2017: table 9) also shows that domestic tourism has risen.
According to an interview with the Executive Director of the Tourism Con-
federation of Tanzania, Richard Rugimbana (2016), it is generally understood
that domestic tourism is composed primarily of Tanzanians travelling for
business meetings or to see friends and family. Developing domestic tourism
would be fruitful for Tanzania, as the benefits of foreign tourism tend to
be repatriated to foreign firms. The World Bank (2015) suggests that almost
30 per cent of tourist spending leaks into foreign markets, through the con-
sumption of imported goods or services from foreign-owned businesses, while
domestic tourism revenue may be more likely to remain in-country. While
there is major potential for domestic tourism development in Tanzania, fur-
ther research is needed to identify its current structure and value contribution,
and the products consumed by domestic tourists.
5.2. Restrictions and Solutions
Though tourism appears to be doing well in terms of performance, Ellis et al.
(2017: table 8) show that it made essentially the same contributions toGDP and
employment in 2012 as it did in 2002. There are several remaining challenges in
the industry, which are preventing it from unlocking its full potential. Accord-
ing to a report completed by the Tourism Task Force in 2016, these challenges
include the destruction of wildlife and natural resources, overregulation and the
heavy burden of taxation, poor infrastructure, lack of human capital in the
tourism industry, insufficient investment in and diversity of tourism assets, and
insufficient marketing, promotion, and branding (Tourism Task Force 2016).
The issue of wildlife depletion is especially concerning, as Tanzania’s com-
petitive advantage in tourism comes from its natural resources. Poaching,
deforestation, interference with water sources, and dynamite fishing all serve
to devalue Tanzania’s tourism assets (Tourism Task Force 2016). Additionally,
high-density tourist flows in areas such as the Serengeti and Kilimanjaro
contribute to wildlife erosion (World Bank 2015). If drastic action is not
taken to preserve its wildlife, Tanzania could lose its competitive edge in less
than 20 years (Rugimbana 2016). Already, Tanzania’s global rank for natural
resources has dropped from 2nd in 2011 to 7th in 2015, thanks primarily to
poaching decimating the elephant population (Blanke and Chiesa 2011;
Crotti and Misrahi 2015; Tourism Task Force 2016).
To address the impact of high-density tourism, the government has imple-
mented a ‘high-value low-density’ (HVLD) tourism policy, attempting to make
Tanzania a ‘high-end’ tourist destination that caters to a verywealthy population
(World Bank 2015). This strategy aims to conserve Tanzania’s tourism assets,
while attracting high-spending tourists. However, the quality of tourism
services in Tanzania is currently too low to make this HVLD policy feasible,
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and it does not depict the reality on the ground. Moreover, costs for tourism
in Tanzania are currently high relative to its competitors (Rugimbana 2016).
These high costs are partly due to overregulation and taxation, which force
tour operators and other service providers to charge higher prices in order to
break even. The environment for tourism investment in Tanzania is harsh, and
the number of licences required, taxes to be paid, and other regulatory burdens
ranges from 10 to 115 per provider. These regulations are levied by the central
government as well as local officials, and it becomes very expensive for tourism
operators to meet all of the requirements (Tourism Task Force 2016).
The overriding fact remains, however, that Tanzania does not offer a level of
service quality commensurate with its HVLD policy. A major issue is the
shortage of high-quality hotel accommodation; if Tanzania hopes to increase
its international tourist arrivals significantly, it will need more quality accom-
modation. Additionally, there are not enough well-trained people working in
the tourism industry. Tanzania lacks training options for those in the tourism
industry, and those that it does have provide a low quality of instruction
(Tourism Task Force 2016). Even if Tanzania were to improve its service
quality, the HVLD policy would be viable only for certain tourism packages,
such as safaris (World Bank 2015).
Tanzania’s tourism strategy also lacks an emphasis on diversifying the
products it offers. Currently, about 80 per cent of tourism goes to the North,
largely because of a lack of infrastructure in the South and West (Rugimbana
2016). To make these corridors attractive to tourists requires the development
of infrastructure, accommodation, and differentiated tourism products (World
Bank 2015). Developingmore circuits will also result in job creation, in addition
to helping Tanzania keep pace with its regional competitors.
The final major concern for Tanzania in tourism is its marketing. The
country does not go far enough to promote its tourism products abroad, and
the government should direct more of its budget towards this goal. As of now,
Tanzania may be considered indistinguishable from its competitors. However,
it boasts some of the most iconic tourist sites in the world—the Serengeti,
Kilimanjaro, Ngorongoro Crater, and Zanzibar. If Tanzania amplifies its inter-
national branding and advertising efforts, it will likely increase the number of
international tourist arrivals (Tourism Task Force 2016; World Bank 2015).
5.3. Potential (Country Comparisons)
If Tanzania were to successfully address these restrictions, it would unlock
great potential. To better understand how the tourism industry might con-
tribute to Tanzania’s economy, we refer to Ellis et al. (2017: table 10). Tanza-
nia’s tourism industry currently ranks ninety-third in the world, suggesting
that there is significant room for improvement (Crotti and Misrahi 2015).
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Ellis et al. (2017: table 10) compares Tanzania with South Africa and Kenya
(both with populations similar to Tanzania) to get a better idea of how it is
faring regionally. Kenya is a major regional competitor of Tanzania, offering
similar services but with a higher level of service quality and lower prices.
South Africa is also a regional competitor, but provides a better example of an
industry to emulate, offering even higher-quality tourism services and intro-
ducing new types of products, such as lifestyle tourism.
As shown by Ellis et al. (2017: table 10) Tanzania’s tourism industry is
ranked significantly lower than South Africa or Kenya. Its share of GDP is on
par with its regional competitors, but tourism accounts for a lower employ-
ment share in Tanzania than in the similarly-sized South Africa, indicating
that tourism could contribute more to employment growth in Tanzania in
the future. Value added per worker is significantly lower in Tanzania than in the
other countries, suggesting that more could be done to improve productivity.
The direct GDP contribution of the tourism industry is significantly lower
in Tanzania than in the comparison countries, which, notably, is due to the
lower number of visitors and not to their level of spending. In fact, visitors to
Tanzania spend significantly more than visitors to either of the comparison
countries, as would be expected with the HVLDmodel. While this is a positive
factor for conservation and would benefit the industry if it could increase
tourist numbers without lowering prices, it is likely that costs are currently
prohibitive to large numbers of tourists.
If Tanzania were to address the major restrictions to growth of its tourism
industry, specifically investing in infrastructure development in the South
and West, reducing taxes and regulations, and improving the quality of
services, this sector could achieve higher productivity and might double its
contribution to GDP and employment (Rugimbana 2016).
6. Conclusion
Services, both formal and informal, have been extremely important to the
Tanzanian economy in recent years, accounting for the bulk of employment
growth while positively affecting overall labour productivity by absorbing
labour from agriculture. However, different sub-sectors contribute in different
ways. Trade services is not extremely productive but contributes significantly
to employment. Meanwhile, business services and transport and communica-
tion services do not have high employment densities but provide valuable
services enabling other firms to function. Tourism, which spans the formal
and informal segments of different service sub-sectors, has played a major role
in the growth of services in Tanzania but still has much untapped potential,
despite its efforts to transform the country into a high-value destination.
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The growth of formal services in Tanzania has been slow in recent years,
possibly due to the skills deficit of the Tanzanian workforce. The current
educational system and vocational training programmes have not been doing
enough to endow workers with the skills their employers need. An alternative
model to promote vocational skills could be similar to the one used by Malay-
sia, where a 1 per cent levy is used to finance in-house employee training for
MSMEs run by private providers (Tan and Gill 2000). This enables the training
provided to be demand-driven and directly relevant to specific firms’ needs.
However, there is a subset of MSMEs within the informal sector that resemble
formal firms, in that they are more productive than economy-wide manufac-
turing averages and have significant potential to grow. Targeting these firms
with support to overcome the obstacles they face in formalizing and growing
may have a substantial impact on employment and productivity growth.
To support the growth of in-between sector firms, the government needs to
develop more targeted interventions designed to identify small firms with the
potential for growth and address the constraints they face. For example, rather
than providing subsidized loans or training to an untargeted range of micro
and small firms determined mainly by the availability of resources, the gov-
ernment could use existing institutions, such as SIDO, to develop programmes
better targeted at in-between sector firms. By adapting its training pro-
grammes and advisory services to its higher-potential clients and by offering
larger loans to such clients rather than the current practice of providing small
loans to petty traders, SIDO could have a greater impact on businesses with
growth potential despite its limited resources.
Heavy regulation and multiple taxation are citied by services firms as major
obstacles to growth, especially in the tourism sector. In addition to the easing of
theseburdens, targetedpublic investment,both inhard infrastructureand insoft
business and worker skills, could go a long way towards strengthening the
services sector. Such investments could include improving roads and power
supplies and reworking the vocational training model in line with those that
have succeeded in Asian countries, as well as targeting high-potential firms with
relevant business development services and affordable credit programmes.Over-
all, Tanzania will require a broad-based approach if it is to transform its services
sector from the sector of last resort for labour into an engine of growth.
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From Devastation to Services-First Transformation
Kasim Munyegera Ggombe and Richard S. Newfarmer
1. Introduction
Rwanda has undergone an astounding transformation in the two decades
since a civil war and massive genocide destroyed a large segment of the
country’s population, left its government and political institutions in tatters,
and its economy in ruins.1 Growth rates since 1995—the year after the
genocide—have averaged 8 per cent annually over this period, more than
four times the decade before. Poverty rates have fallen, maternal health has
improved, and infant mortality has plummeted. Investments in infrastructure
have produced transport systems, widened access to power, and provided
cheap telecommunications. Once shattered institutions of government—the
customs services, standards agencies, telecoms regulation, andwholeministries—
have been rebuilt and gained a reputation for efficiency and probity in adminis-
tration that is today the envy of Africa.
To be sure, the country has not yet established political institutions com-
monly associated with Western democracies. It is a society still struggling to
overcome tribal divisions and to forge a genuinely national Rwandan identify.
Even so, the government has sought to create other forms of citizen feedback
and accountability that facilitate some policy adjustments. These include the
annual ‘national dialogue’, citizen report cards, and a fairly open public
discussion of aspects of economic policy. A wide literature has documented
the post-genocide transitions, their success and shortcomings (see Behuria
1 The authors would like to thank Phil English, John Spray, Victor Steenbergen, Sebastian Wolf
for their thoughtful comments, as well as other colleagues at the Helsinki conference on ‘Industries
Without Smokestacks’. The authors wish to pay special thanks to Victor Steenbergen for his
generous comments and help.
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and Murray 2017, Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Crisafulli and Redmond
2012; Kinzer 2008). The bottom line is the transformation in people’s lives
and living standards has been remarkable.
How was it that a country could go from utter devastation into a high-
growth economy?What were the building blocks of policy that contributed to
this success—and what was the role of structural transformation? And, look-
ing forward in a new era of globalization, what economic activities can drive
growth in Rwanda into the next decade? The answers can be found in exam-
ining the growth path of the Rwandan economy. Four features stand out.
First, the government has played a leading role in recovery and reconstruction
period, and continues to do so today. Second, labour is indeed moving
from low-productivity jobs into higher productivity activities—structural
transformation—but Rwanda has inverted the normal sequence of structural
change in the development process; labour is moving from agriculture first to
services and only now beginning to develop its manufacturing sector. Third,
the government succeeded in establishing an impressive partnership with the
international community thatallowedthe latter toprovidefinanceandexpertise
to drive growth, but foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent years is beginning
to play a more central role—particularly in industries without smokestacks.
Finally, these industrieswithout smokestacks—servicesexports, agro-processing,
information and communication technology (ICT) as well as selective labour-
intensivemanufactures—arebecomingincreasinglyimportantdriversofgrowth.
To elaborate these points, the first section of this chapter describes briefly the
pre-1994 policy regime and political economy to illuminate the difficulties of
reconciling a country torn apart by civil and tribal war. The second section
reviews economic policy and outcomes in the two decades after 1995. It argues
that policy coherence emerging from unusually capable leadership lies at the
foundation of Rwanda’s success. The third section analyses the patterns of
growth peculiar to Rwanda—and finds that Rwanda is indeed engaged in struc-
tural transformation, but mainly by releasing labour from low-productivity jobs
into higher productivity jobs in the services sector, and mainly in cities and
much of it financed through development assistance. The final section focuses
on the future, outlining the new industrial policies undertaken by the govern-
ment and ways it is dealing with the challenges of diversification.
2. Laying the Foundations for Growth
over the Ashes of Genocide
2.1. From Reconstruction to Economic Expansion, 1995–2000
The four-year civil war that culminated in genocide left in its wake a country
annihilated and destitute. Because of the vast destruction of physical capital
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and infrastructure, disintegration of social capital, and the loss of human
skills, reconstruction was an ambitious and complex task, arguably as difficult
as that Europe confronted after the Second World War. Elements included
establishing social peace, providing emergency relief, and rebuilding and
staffing the institutions of government, particularly fiscal capacity. Central
to these efforts was putting in place a coherent macroeconomic programme
genuinely owned by the government. Even though it involved a greater
degree of state leadership than many donors would have preferred, the
absence of large private companies and paucity of wealthy entrepreneurs led
them to accept a large role for government, and they provided substantial
development finance and technical assistance. Rwanda was to become a
textbook case of how to orchestrate a successful post-conflict reconstruction.2
The government undertook several measures to revive the economy and
restore industrial production. Foreign exchange markets were liberalized,
allowing exchange bureaus and commercial banks to exchange foreign cur-
rencies at market-determined rates, a move partly aimed at easing access to
foreign currencies by the emerging private exporters. The government also
pursued liberalization of coffee marketing, processing, and export, removed
export taxes and improved the export regulatory framework to allow for
market-based transactions and revive the coffee sector, a major source of
foreign exchange. Price controls were terminated and state enterprises
adjusted relative prices to phase out subsidies.
While the fifteen years before 1995 had averaged less than 1 per cent in
economic growth, the five years to 2000 produced a rapid recovery and
averaged more than 10 per cent. Much of this growth was a simple peace
dividend associated with the reconstitution of agricultural markets and
internal trade.
Political leadership was crucial. The provisional government of the RPF,
buttressed with a monopoly on force and little tolerance for dissent, launched
new efforts to build national unity, focusing on supressing tribal identities,
equal representation in parliament and elimination of ethnic identity cards
that had been used since colonial times. Ethnic rehabilitation of social norms
and eventual reconciliation were necessary to build incipient legitimacy for
the minority and mostly Tutsi-led government, and this laid the foundation
for economic recovery, which had become an immediate priority as massive
destruction of farms, livestock and economic infrastructure during the civil
strife had decelerated the country’s economic growth. The government imme-
diately began to work for the eventual repatriation of some 2 million ethnic
Hutus who had fled into the DRC in the wake of the RPF takeover.
2 The IMF, in its paper on post-conflict reconstruction, uses Rwanda as a key example
illuminating best principles; see Gelbhard et al. (2015).
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The strong leadership under the RPF and sound policies attracted donor
support and eventually revived investor confidence in the reconstruction
agenda. In the aftermath of the civil war and genocide—mid-1994 to late
1995—donor assistance largely focused on emergency humanitarian needs;
approximately US$300 million was directed to humanitarian relief efforts in
Rwanda and refugee camps in neighbouring Uganda, Congo, Tanzania, and
Burundi, where Rwandan refugees had fled during the civil conflict. As the
emergency subsided, donors worked with the government to help gradually
reconstruct economic and social institutions. Foreign aid shifted from
humanitarian relief to reconstruction and development assistance to rebuild
a strong economic and institutional base, with focal attention on addressing
the country’s needs in education, health, water, energy, transport, and com-
munication infrastructure. These paved the way for policy reforms that
included revamping the public investment programme, streamlining admin-
istrative structures, and compiling economic statistics.
The government, even while taking a leading role in economic activity,
encouraged the growth of private investment. A new investment code and
one-stop investment promotion centre were also established in 1998 to pro-
vide a conducive investment environment for both local and foreign invest-
ors. Forms of technical and financial assistance were also initiated, including
loan guarantees and liberalization of selected economic sectors to attract
private investment. The government launched a partial sell-off of state-
owned enterprises that had largely dominated industry in the years before
the civil war. The privatization campaign reached its peak in the period
1998–2000, when fifty-five state enterprises were earmarked for privatization;
among these were coffee and tea factories, public utilities, and the state-owned
telecommunications company, Rwandatel. Private investment in the mining
sector culminated in tremendous increases in the production of cassiterite and
coltan, with the latter increasing from 147 tonnes in 1999 to 1,300 tonnes in
2000, constituting the country’s largest single export at the turn of the cen-
tury. However, the government—and the RPF and the military—retained
ownership of selected enterprises designed to play a pivotal role in reconstruc-
tion and subsequent growth; see Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012);
Behuria (2016).
The financial policy measures taken by the government during the recovery
process were remarkably successful; GDP, which had declined by half in 1994,
grew by over 35 per cent in 1995 and sustained an average growth above
10per cent per year in the subsequentfive-year period.During the sameperiod,
inflation reduced substantially from 64 per cent in 1994 to 9 per cent in 1996,
before food demand from returning refugees and insecurity in some food-
producing regions caused inflation to skyrocket to 17 per cent in 1997. Foreign
aid had financedmuch of the recovery and development agenda, posing a risk
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to its stability and sustainability. In partial response to this challenge, the
government pursued a prudent fiscal policy to raise domestic revenue through
the adjustment of tax rates and reforms to tax and customs administration,
ultimately raising the revenue-to-GDP ratio from 4 per cent in 1994 to 10 per
cent in 1997. As part of the efforts to reduce the prevailing large budget deficit,
public spending was cut by banning purchase of government vehicles, and
limiting budget allocations for ministerial travels, among other measures.
The enhanced revenue performance was partly responsible for the increase in
government savings in the 1998–2000 period.
3. From Recovery to Sustained Growth: Politics,
Policy, and Performance, 2000–15
In 2000, Paul Kagame, then Vice President and head of the army since
1994, became President after the resignation of Pasteur Bizimungu. Fol-
lowing the adoption of a new constitution in 2003 that established a
parliament and presidential system, Kagame, in carefully controlled elec-
tions, won subsequent victories to serve seven-year terms in 2003, in
2010, and, after a controversial constitutional change permitting him to
run for subsequent terms, again in 2017. The government suppressed
political opposition and relied on rising incomes and social peace to
establish its legitimacy. Further political developments were undertaken,
including improvements in the gacaca system (public hearings for alleged
genocide perpetrators), with the aim of achieving faster reconciliation and
restoring Rwanda’s social fabric that was torn apart by the civil war and
genocide. There was also progress in decentralization up to the sector level
in order to bring services closer to the people and improve the service
delivery channel.3 The country ensured equal political representation for
women; female representation in the parliament has been over 60 per cent
since 2003, one of the highest in Africa. Although the government has
eschewed OECD-style democratic institutions, the country has made strides
in forging a national Rwandan identity out of two formerly warring ethnic
groups, and has created opportunities for all ethnic groups in governance,
actively promoted gender equality in governance, has created one of themost
corruption-free countries in Africa (see Transparency International various
years), and established a highly ranked legal and regulatory environment (see
World Bank 2016b).
3 Sector (sub-district) is the third smallest unit of administration after village and cell.
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3.1. Economic Growth Accelerates . . . and Improves People’s Lives
Stable politics, prudentmacroeconomicmanagement, and a sound investment
climate laid the groundwork for a dramatic turnaround in economic and social
performance. Economic growth accelerated to a new plateau (Figure 16.1).
Rwanda has been cited among top performers in the World Bank’s Doing
Business indicators. For example, the number of days it takes to register a
business reduced substantially from forty to sixteen between 2003 and 2008.
Economic growth from 1995 to 2015 averaged 8.2 per cent annually, substan-
tially higher than the 1.5 per cent a decade earlier. Per capita incomes rose
dramatically—in effect giving the average Rwandan an average annual pay
raise of more than 5 per cent year for two decades.
Even discounting the rebound effects immediately after the devastation of
1994, Rwandan growth has been substantially better compared to many
comparator countries in the region, including long-running star performers
like Botswana, to say nothing of Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.
The proportion of people living below the national poverty line declined
steadily from 60.6 per cent in 2001 to 56.7 per cent in 2005, further reducing
to 44.9 per cent in 2010 and 39.4 in 2014. Other social indicators also
improved. A national effort to provide universal access to health care has cut
maternal mortality from 1,558 per 100,000 live births to 253 between 2000
and 2014. Infant mortality was cut in half. Besides poverty reduction, the
Growth 1981–1993 = 1.5%
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Figure 16.1. Rwanda’s GDP growth 1981–2015
Source: Authors’ illustration based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI).
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government of Rwanda pursued inclusive growth policies, resulting in a
modest reduction in inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, from 0.52
in 2006 to 0.49 in 2011. Growth in agricultural production contributed 35 per
cent of the poverty reduction between 2004 and 2014, while 10 per cent of the
reduction came from increased commercialization (World Bank 2015).
3.2. Policy, Planning, and Public Investment: The Centrality of Government
From the early days of the reconstruction, the government has played a
central role in the economy. Public investment typically comprised half or
more of all investment in Rwanda in this two decades of growth—andmore so
than in other countries (Figure 16.2). Several reasons explain this pattern: the
extremely limited initial capacity of the private sector, which is populated
mostly with household enterprises and small firms; poverty-constrained low
domestic savings and the absence of a financial system; and a reliance on
donor savings to finance investment.
The government took the lead in investing in roads, electric power, fixed-
line telecommunications, and later the internet backbone, as well as schools
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Figure 16.2. Public investment is a leading source of growth
Source: World Development Indicators, NISR, World Bank staff calculations as calculated in World
Bank (2015).
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internet backbone that would link up virtually the whole country—and lay
the basis for access to the global lines connected up via the EASSy (Eastern
Africa Submarine Cable System) cable through Uganda and Tanzania. Aside
from these large projects, the government has provided a steady flow of public
investment in urban infrastructure, particularly in Kigali, and in agriculture,
notably in irrigation and terracing. It has used two state-affiliated companies—
Crystal Ventures and Horizon—to invest in productive activities to develop
the market.4 Some activities, such as the Serena Hotel in Kigali, have later
been privatized, but these state-affiliated companies maintain a portfolio of
commercial activities, including, for example, dairy.
Recently, the government has devoted resources to expanding the electrical
grid, built a large convention centre to tap into the MICE (meetings, incentives,
conferences, and events) business tourism, invested in new aeroplanes to make
RwandAir into a regional carrier, and substantially upgraded and renovated the
existing airport. It has continued to push forward plans to build a railroad
connection through Uganda and Kenya to the coast, and bought land to
eventually build a new airport. In recent years, the government has turned its
attention to leveraging its investments through public–private partnerships. For
example, the government has signed several memoranda of understanding
(MOUs) with private power developers to build generation capacity. In sum-
mary, these investments have been a driving force in economic growth.
To a large extent, public investment explains the substantial growth in
industry, particularly construction. Whether it was road construction, urban
infrastructure, or digging trenches for internet cables, all were labour-
intensive activities that have contributed to growth and productivity gains.
3.3. The Critical Role of Foreign Savings
Foreign savings have been an important source of investment finance
(Figure 16.3). Over the period 2000 to 2015, foreign savings amount accounted
for about 78 per cent of investment finance, a share that was only slightly less
at the end of the period (Figure 16.3).5 Of these foreign savings, the greatest
percentage originated in ODA. In the wake of the genocide, the international
community provided about US$400 million annually for the rest of the
decade; the number rose steadily to average US$629 million in 2001–10;
and then to US$1.1 billion in 2011–14.
4 Behuria (2016) sketches out three categories of state-affiliated enterprises: informal investment
groups comprising regional companies, Petrocom (petroleum and minerals), and the Rwanda
Investment Group; RPF-controlled companies subsumed in Crystal Ventures (active in dairy,
construction, and coffee); and military enterprises including the Horizon Group, some
agricultural entities, and a diverse portfolio spanning pharmaceuticals, transport, and ICT.
5 The numbers in this paragraph are calculated from the World Development Indicators.
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What differentiates Rwanda frommost other aid recipients is how well the
country has used development assistance. Because of its low levels of
corruption—Rwanda ranks fourth best in Africa on the Transparency Inter-
national Corruption Index behind only Botswana and the two island
states of Cape Verde and Seychelles, and just ahead of Mauritius—and its
capacity to implement a public investment programme, Rwanda has man-
aged to channel virtually all of foreign savings into productive investment.
One IMF-sponsored study created an index of public investment efficiency.6
Rwanda ranked in the top quartile worldwide, and received the third
best score among sub-Saharan African countries (behind South Africa
and Botwana) (Dabla-Norris et al. 2012). A detailed case study of Rwanda’s
use of aid for trade illuminates the process of public investment and imple-
mentation (Newfarmer et al. 2013). That said, no system is perfect, and
in late 2016 early signs of strains in excessive investments, particularly in
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Figure 16.3. Foreign savings finance a large share of investment
Source: Authors’ illustration using data from IMF (2017).
6 The index is comprised of four major consecutive phases associated with public investment
management: strategic guidance and project appraisal; project selection; project management
and implementation; and project evaluation and audit. Under each of these stages, the emphasis
is on capturing the basic processes and controls that are likely to yield efficient public
investment decisions, while recognizing the role of institutions, capacity, and incentives.
Each of these stages is made up of several individual components (17 in total). See Dabla-
Norris et al. (2012).
7 Overly rapid addition of four- and five-star hotel rooms have led to near term excess capacity,
and led the government to intervene to stave off bankruptcies.
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4. Patterns of Growth: Services Before Manufacturing
These circumstances gave rise to three patterns of growth that shape Rwandan
development: first, the recovery of agriculture provided a major growth
impulse during the immediate years after the genocide, and recovery of con-
sumption provided greater impetus than investment; second, the country
invested in services in advance of manufacturing, and services became a
leading sector in growth for much of the last two decades; and, finally,
exports, though not a principal source of growth in the early period, have
become more diversified and more important in the latter period.
In the period of reconstruction in the late 1990s, it was logical that rising
private consumption would be one driver of growth. Even though, after 2000,
investment and exports began to assume a new importance, rising private
consumption remained important. In a way this is to be expected because of
the high levels of subsistence poverty prevalent in Rwanda.
But the composition of GDP changed dramatically relative to 1990. Indus-
try, exclusive of manufacturing, led the growth dynamic, with services not far
behind (Figure 16.4). Non-manufacturing industry reflected growth in min-
ing, electricity and construction. These sectors stimulated services inputs
such as engineering, architectural and legal services. Services also provide
inputs into other activities as the economy expanded—particularly high
value-added services such as telecommunication and finance. Retail trade
and informal employment in urban services have absorbed many low skilled
workers. Only later has the export of services become important, notably
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Sectoral contribution to GDP 
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Figure 16.4. Agriculture gives way to services and industry as drivers of growth
Source: World Bank, WDI (accessed November 2016).
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increased substantially. Finally, service growth also reflects the steady growth
of government itself.
Steady increases in agricultural yields among domestic and export crops
facilitated the sector’s expansion. Tea and coffee grew relatively rapidly—at
times aided by high prices after 2003 and until 2015. There were also
increases in domestic yields of food crops, in part powered on the supply
side by increased investments in fertilizer and on the demand side by greater
integration of the domestic market. The implementation of the National
Agriculture Policy since 2004 and the Strategic Plan for the Implementation
of Agriculture in Rwanda resulted in massive increases in yields for the main
food crops; 225 per cent for maize, 129 per cent for wheat, 90 per cent for
cassava, 66 per cent for potatoes, 62 per cent for beans, and 34 per cent for
rice. In order to accelerate poverty reduction, especially among the rural poor,
government priorities were centred on the diversification of rural incomes
into non-farm activities, which contributed 16 per cent of the poverty reduc-
tion achieved in the past decade (World Bank 2013).
Manufacturing receded in importance in GDP. This was the result of a surge
in growth in the other sectors that simply out-distanced the small manufac-
turing sector, but no doubt too the unwinding of the very high levels of
protection at the end of the import substitution period in the early 1990s
also contributed to its relative contraction.8
4.1. Structural Transformation: Labour Moves
out of Agriculture, into Services
The dominant structural transformation was to occur in agriculture and in
services growth. As the process of urbanization and growth has accelerated
over the two decades since 1995, a conventional picture of agriculture releas-
ing employment to industry and services (Figure 16.5a). The urban wage and
non-wage sectors began to absorb a large amount of labour. Many of the new
jobs were in the self-employed sector, amounting to 13 per cent in 2011, up
four-fold from 2001 (World Bank 2016a) (Figure 16.5b).
Of the 8 per cent annual growth in the 2006–11 period, the World Bank
calculated that about half was due to increases in output per worker (4 per cent)
and about half due to increases in employment (3.9 per cent). The increase in
labour productivity, according to World Bank calculations, was virtually all
associated with these inter-sectoral shifts—structural transformation. Some 90
per cent of the total gain in labour productivity during this periodwas associated
with movement out of agriculture (World Bank 2016a).
8 See the discussion of Gathani and Stoelinga (2012) for a concise but comprehensive discussion
of the pre-1995 policy regime.


















































































Figure 16.5a. Sector contribution to employment, 1995–2015
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Employment categories as a share of total 
employment: 2001–14
Agriculture Non-farm wage Non-farm non-wage Other
Figure 16.5b. Workers moving out of agriculture into urban activities
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from Rwanda Integrated Household Living Standards
Survey (EICV).
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This increase in labour productivity has been accompanied by a change in
employment patterns. Particularly striking was the proliferation of off-farm
part-time employment. In 2006, only 9 per cent of farmers had secondary
employment outside of agriculture; that figure a mere five years later had
jumped to 21 per cent. By 2011, 45 per cent of all workers—farmers and
non-farmers—had moved completely out of agriculture, up from 30 per cent
in 2006 who at least had a secondary job in agriculture (see World Bank 2016a).
Services productivity has generally outpaced productivity growth in the rest
of the economy. The Overseas Development Institute, decomposing annual
productivity growth from 1991 to 2013, calculated that services were respon-
sible for more than 90 per cent of the annual growth in labour output during
that period.9 Services were clearly a driving force of growth during this period.
This is also evident in the sample of firms studied by Spray and Wolf (2016).
They found that average output per worker was 21 per cent higher in services
than in agriculture (9,855 versus 8,166). Manufacturing productivity, inter-
estingly enough, was less than both agriculture and services (5,729).
4.2. Exports Become Progressively More Important in Services’
First Transformation
Exports played a small role in the post-genocide recovery period, and only
began to take off after 2000 (Figure 16.6). Even though Rwanda succeeded
growing its exports by about 20 per cent annually from 2000 to 2014, this
performance was built on a very low base—and exports were not a driver of
growth. By 2016, total exports reached 15 per cent of GDP, still less than half
of the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, since 2000, the country
has undergone three transitions.
First, the country has become less dependent on a few traditional
commodities—notably tea and coffee—and, though these are still important,
today Rwanda embarks on its future with a more diversified portfolio of
exports. In 2003–5, the top five merchandise exports, coffee, tea, tin, coltan,
and tungsten, accounted for 79 per cent of the total for formal exports.10 By
2013–15, their share had dropped to 71 per cent (excluding re-exports and
cross-border trade). However, if one takes the top ten exports, the situation has
not changed much—80 per cent in 2003–05, 79 per cent in 2013–15. None-
theless, several exports have become important, such as hides and skins, live
cattle, beer, and maize flour.11
9 Calculated from Figure 5 in Balchin et al. (2016).
10 This section draws on English et al. (2016).
11 Unfortunately, beer exports were on the decline in 2015 as DRC slapped on new taxes.
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Rwanda has undergone a second transition besides diversification: it is
rapidly becoming a services-exporting economy. Today, about half of its
total export earnings come from services. In 2016, for example, tourism
constituted 23 per cent of foreign exchange earnings, while government
services (mainly participation in peace keeping) and transport accounted for
another 20 per cent.12 This does not count services associated with the large
volume of re-exports.
By 2016, earnings from tourism rose to US$390 million from very low levels
a mere decade earlier. Overall tourism receipts have grown by over 20 per cent
annually over the last ten years. However, they appear to have been levelling
off since 2012. The Ebola epidemic in West Africa impacted Rwanda in 2014.
The main driver of tourism, gorilla trekking, is reaching full capacity and the
country needs to develop additional attractions to keep the sector growing.
Conference tourism (MICE) is doing well, increasing by 24 per cent in 2014
and helping to offset the decline in other business travel. This is the harbinger
of a future driver of growth, but requires a high level attention to the efficiency
of services (Table 16.1).
A third transition is the expansion of trade to regional markets. There was
considerable diversification in markets and products associated with regional
trade. After 2007, when Rwanda joined the EAC customs union, the country
saw a considerable increase in intra-regional exports of goods. Better access to























































Merchandise and service exports 1995–2016 (million, current US$) 
Merchandise exports Services exports
Figure 16.6. Rwanda’s services-led export growth
Source: World Bank, WDI (accessed January 2018).
12 These percentages exclude re-exports of US$178 and US$224 million from the totals for 2015
and 2016, respectively. For accounting purposes the net value addition to re-exports ought to be
counted as an additional services exports, but numbers are unavailable.
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exports. Other non-EAC neighbouring markets also have become important.
While conflict in the DRC limited trade prior to 2007, it has increased over the
last decade, and by 2016 exceeded exports to the EAC. Today, the two largest
export destinations for Rwandan goods are the DRC and the EAC. Informal
cross-border trade, is particularly important to the DRC. In 2015, their value
was roughly the same as that of formal non-traditional exports. All told, the
DRC accounts for some 40 per cent of total merchandise exports. By 2016,
Rwanda exported more goods to the DRC than the EAC. The main formal
exports to DRC include livestock and crops, but there is also an important
source of (informal) cross-border trade in services such as finance, transporta-
tion and wholesale trading.
4.3. The Role of FDI in Services: First Structural Transformation
Because of its links to global value chains and services, foreign investment is
central to Rwanda’s export future. For most of the first decade and a half after
1995, Rwanda received relatively low amounts of FDI. However, the country’s
reputation for solid growth performance, sound economic policies, and
political stability became attractive to multinational companies, and FDI
began to take off after 2005 (Figure 16.7). Much of the new investment went
into services, particularly finance, telecommunications, and eventually
tourism. During this period, ECO Bank, MTN, and later TIGO entered the
Table 16.1. Exports by broad category, 2005 and 2016
Type Sub-Sector 2005 2016
US$ Million Share (%) US$ Million Share (%)
Services Services Total 120 39 848 50
Tourism 49 16 390 23
Government goods and services 38 12 254 15
Transport 33 11 91 5
ICT 0 0 41 2
Construction 0 0 37 2
Financial services 0 0 28 2
Maintenance and repairs 0 0 7 0
Industry Industry Total 88 28 447 27
Minerals 65 21 282 17
Light manufacturing 23 7 94 6
Agro-processing 1 0 72 4
Agriculture Agriculture Total 62 20 174 10
Coffee and Tea 61 20 133 8
Other agriculture 0 0 32 2
Horticulture 1 0 9 1
Re-Exports 41 13 216 13
Total 311 100 1685 100
Source: Authors’ calculations, COMTRADE 2017 data.
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Rwandan market. In the case of telecommunications, new entrants competed
directly with the state enterprise; in other cases they entered by acquiring state
assets, such as the Serena Hotel. Only towards the end of the period did
Rwanda experience incipient entry into manufacturing. China has become a
leading investor, with such apparel firms as C&H. Agro-processing has also
began to grow of late. Perhaps more indicative, Rwanda’s share of all global
FDI going to developing countries has gone up some six-fold—from an annual
average of 0.35 per cent in 2000–1 to 2.1 per cent in 2014–15.13
Compared to other countries in the region, Rwanda had neither an abun-
dance of mineral and petroleum riches to attract resource-seeking invest-
ment, nor a large market to attract market-seeking FDI, nor a particularly
skilled labour force to attract investment seeking cheap labour. Nor does it
have easy access to coastal ports that would otherwise give it a transport cost
advantage. On the contrary, transport costs are high. This makes its recent
performance relative to other countries in the region all the more remark-
able. Though FDI was low at the turn of the century, Rwanda, alongside
Uganda and Tanzania, has now surpassed regional averages in its share of
FDI of GDP.
This new surge in FDI comes at a time when ODA, though still high, has
levelled off as a share of GDP. Though still larger than FDI in total flows and
important in financing public investment, development assistance has begun
to fade just as FDI is increasing. Because ODA flows remain substantially larger
than FDI flows, the government has made it a priority to reduce its depend-
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Figure 16.7. FDI picks up in the last decade
Source: World Bank, WDI (accessed January 2018).
13 Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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5. Policies to Promote Exports: The Centrality
of Industries without Smokestacks
To stay on its high growth plateau, Rwanda has to expand its exports. Industries
without smokestacks will play an increasingly important role. This means
promoting growth of services, connecting to local value chains in light manu-
factures, and adding value to its commodity exports as well as developing new
exports. This, in turn, requires both economy-wide policies and industry-
specific policies.
5.1. General Policies to Expand Trade
The government has developed programmes to reshape the domestic product-
ive environment. First, power is unreliable in supply and expensive. Power
costs of US$0.20 per kilowatt hour (kWh) constitute a notable cost disadvan-
tage to the manufacturing sector. In response, the government has developed
a medium-term expansion programme for domestic generation that includes
more than doubling installed capacity in the next five years. Second, trans-
portation costs are a huge tax on competitiveness. Transport costs fromMom-
basa port to Kigali add roughly 50 per cent to prices for imports and exports.
Investing in inland cargo transportation facilities would reduce the cost of
cross-border trade and increase the competitiveness of Rwanda’s exports by
reducing transport costs for export products and the cost of imported inputs
for the manufacturing sector.
Already, Rwanda has made exceptional progress in improving the business
environment. Its ranking has progressively improved on the World Bank’s
Doing Business scale from 139 in 2009 to 56 in the 2016 rankings (it is one of
the top three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the top-ranked low-income
country). However, this effort has yet to be rewarded with large private invest-
ment inflows. Rwanda’s low ranking on the ‘trading across borders’ sub-index
(87 in 2017), partly because of high transportation costs, is a clear manifest-
ation of the constraints (World Bank 2017).14
Finally, the government (along with other EAC members) should revisit
trade policies that inadvertently disadvantage exports. Suchmeasures include:
 Reducing the costs of trading and removing non-tariff barriers in the EAC.
Despite the removal of tariff barriers within the EAC, non-tariff barriers
(NTBs) shackle trade growth (see Cadot et al. 2012). Progress on removing
the 35 NTBs that EAC ministers agreed on has been halting.
14 This paragraph and the one that follows draw on Newfarmer et al. (2013).
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 Improving incentives for private investors to export. The tariff regime shapes
relative price incentives to private producers, and high tariffs tend to
make it more profitable to produce for the domestic market than for
export, biasing productive capacity towards import substitution, usually
with a cost penalty in growth.15 Frazer (2012) calculated that when
Rwanda lowered its tariffs on intermediate inputs from an average of
about 12 per cent to 7 per cent, exporting firms increased their sales
abroad by 5–10 per cent.
 Liberalizing trade in services. Even though Rwanda is among the most open
of the EAC countries in services trade and has benefitted from that open-
ness, markets with the EAC are still highly segmented. The lack of com-
petition in EAC telecommunicationsmarkets in the past, for example, has
conferred a dominant position on MTN in Rwanda, mirrored by that of
dominant producers in other EAC countries, and this has led to restrictive
pricing that has impeded the expansion of the competitive fringe of
operators (Argent and Pogorelsky 2011). Similarly, lingering EAC restric-
tions on professional services are a regional brake on technological
absorption and growth in the region and derivatively on Rwanda
(Brenton and Gözde 2012). The recent efforts of the government to
eliminate roaming charges has reportedly led to greater cross-border com-
munication at lower cost.
5.2. Trade and Industrial Policy Toward Industries without Smokestacks
At the centre of the government’s industrial and trade strategy is an effort to
diversify the economy, create new activities, and add value to traditional
products. The government is pursuing an ambitious programme of industrial
policies over the next two years, with the objective of reducing the current
account deficit through a more rapid growth of exports and greater import
substitution. Medium-term policies are designed to promote exports and
reduce imports in several sectors: textiles, garments, and leather industry;
agriculture export crops; agri-business; construction; livestock; wood indus-
try; minerals; tourism; and ICT.16 In agriculture, it seeks to reduce imports
through increasing sugar and rice production. It has amajor objective of increas-
ing the proportion of fully washed coffee, which increased to 50 per cent in 2015
from 21 per cent in 2010, to rise gradually and reach about 80 per cent over
the next two years. In construction, it seeks to expand cement production.
15 See Newfarmer and Sztajerowska (2012) for a literature review of some 15 recent econometric
studies dealing with tariff liberalization and economic growth.
16 Plans and numbers in the section are taken largely from Government of Rwanda (2016),
‘Letter of Intent’ for an IMF Standby Arrangement, 25 May 2016.
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Plans are in place to raise the production of the national cement company
six-fold to 600,000 tonnes per year. To stimulate manufacturing exports, the
government has set up a Special Economic Zone in Kigali and designated sites
in other cities to follow suit (see Steenbergen and Javorcik 2017). It has set up
an export growth facility in the Rwanda Development Bank (BRD) to promote
exports. Moreover, it has set up an export promotion fund. Targeted areas
include processed food, and the development of textiles, garments, and lea-
ther industry, as well as beginning to export cut flowers soon. It also has plans
to export laptops assembled in Rwanda. The objective is to accelerate the
move towards high value sectors. The most successful and promising of
these are services exports, notably tourism, horticultural products and agro-
processing, ICT, and labour-intensive light manufactures.
SERVICES EXPORTS
Services is an area where Rwanda could generate new activity. Rwanda, like
many other African countries, has benefited from a leapfrog from the
twentieth-century fixed-line technology directly into the twenty-first century
mobile technology. Mobile phone subscriptions rose 63 per cent in 2013 to
70 per cent in 2014 while 4G LTE (long-term evolution) was rolled out in
November 2015, with an ambitious target of connecting 95 per cent of the
population by mid-2017. In the financial services sector, the digitization
agenda has seen tremendous modernization of service delivery and the
emergence of pro-poor and efficiency-augmenting financial innovations.
Between 2011–14, mobile payments subscriptions increased from 639,673
to 6,480,449 between 2011–14, and the value of transactions increased from
51 million to 691 million Rwandan francs (RWF). Mobile money—a financial
product that allows users to make financial transactions via the mobile
phone—was introduced in February 2010 and has since revolutionized finan-
cial inclusion and payments efficiency; mobile money users shot up from
nearly 200,000 in 2010 to over 1.4 million in 2012. Partnerships between
mobile network operators (MNOs) and commercial banks have taken place to
leverage market potential among people formerly without access to the finan-
cial system, especially in rural communities. Unexploited opportunities still
exist for Rwanda to expand its export of ICT services in the region, and
increase the competitiveness of its exports.
TOURISM
Tourism is proving to be one of Rwanda’s highest potential export-oriented
service sectors, generating about a quarter of the total export of goods and
services earnings. It is a sector in which Rwanda’s strengths are the safety,
comfort, and stability of the country. The government has adopted a MICE
strategy aimed at making Kigali a hub for major regional and international
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conferences. The opening of the Kigali Convention Centre and, together
with new upscale hotels being built, has provide high-quality rooms for up
to 6,000 guests. Revenues from MICE tourism were US$39 million in 2015
and projected to increase significantly in 2016–17, as more than twenty
international events are expected to be hosted in Rwanda (Government of
Rwanda 2016: 13). To promote tourism, it has invested heavily in the national
airline, RwandAir—including the purchase of two airbuses. With new routes
to India and China, RwandAir is also part of these plans to bring guests from
afar, as well as stimulate trade.
Recently, priorities have focused on medical tourism, with the aim of
making Rwanda the medical tourism hub of the EAC region. Investment in
high-class and specialized hospitals like the Rwanda Military Hospital
(RMH), where patients from the EAC region and beyond could come for
high-quality medical services, is expected to boost medical tourism in par-
ticular, and generally increase tourist arrivals and revenue. Notwithstanding
numerous challenges in realizing this goal, Rwanda has the potential to
attract medical tourists from the DRC, where health services are relatively
less efficient. Improved digitization of tourist services and marketing of
tourist attractions to potential regional and international tourists is still
missing and holds great value-addition potential.
HORTICULTURE, CUT FLOWERS, AND AGRO-PROCESSING
The National Export Strategy (2010–15) highlighted export diversification
as a key priority, focusing on agro-processing in non-traditional sub-sectors,
including horticulture. Horticultural products have increased in importance,
leaping from 13,700 metric tonnes in 2008 to 25,600 metric tonnes in 2012
(World Bank 2015). Investment incentives targeted to horticulture in particu-
lar, and export development in general, include dedicated land sites for
investment, cold chain development—including a Kigali pack house at the
National Agricultural Export Development Board (NAEB)—and access to
finance, notably through the export growth facility managed by BRD. The
six months of rainfall is ideal for horticulture farming; the wet and cool
climate in the high-altitude north and west are convenient for temperate
fruits, big-headed roses and herbs, while avocadoes, beans, chillies, and
Asian vegetables thrive well in the sunny and warm south and east.
The government plans to expand revenue from horticulture from the
US$3 million it produced in 2009 to US$9 million in 2015. There are, how-
ever, no major horticulture exporters in the country, partly because of the
difficulty in maintaining optimal quantities and standards. Besides, the high
cost of obtaining an organic licence implies that the majority of horticulture
farmers are not licensed organic farmers—even though an estimated 85 per
cent of them use organic inputs and practices. Limited land for expansion and
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inadequate knowledge among value chain players on proper crop cultivation,
fertilizer, and pest management, post-harvest handling, and export proced-
ures further plague the horticulture sector. In order to bridge the knowledge
and skill gap, the government has stepped up efforts to train farmers on
agricultural and agronomic practices through the One Acre Fund. There is
potential for Rwanda to maximize revenues from horticulture by reducing the
costs of airfreight between Kigali and international markets, which are among
the highest in the region. With airfreight costs substantially reduced, Rwanda
would be in a position to serve the increasing demand for fresh fruits and
vegetables in the EAC region and the DRC. Physalis are grown in the high-
altitude regions of Rwanda and present potential to feed the high demand
from Europe and the Middle East—currently supplied by Colombia. Avocado,
an oil fruit grown by over 500,000 smallholder farmers, has potential for agro-
processing into avocado oil.
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
ICT has expanded greatly in recent years, attracting 47 per cent of FDI between
2008 and 2011, according to data from the National Bank of Rwanda, and
contributing 3 per cent of GDP in 2014. The sector has received policy
focus under the multi-phase National ICT Strategy and Plan: the first phase
(2001–5) focused on institutional, legal, and regulatory reforms, liberalization
of the telecom market and reducing entry barriers. The second phase
(2006–10) was centred on establishing world-class communications infra-
structure as a backbone for the country’s communication needs. The major
goal in the third phase (2011–15) was to develop ICT for improved service
delivery in both the private and public sectors.
ICT continues to grow rapidly and drive innovations in several sectors,
offering great growth potential for the economy. The government is a major
consumer of ICT services through its line ministries and authorities. One of
the main landmark digitization initiatives was the establishment of electronic
and mobile declaration (e-declaration and m-declaration) of tax returns in the
Rwanda Revenue Authority in 2011. The success of this initiative was backed
by the recently (2015) introduced mobile payment for taxes, both initiatives
ultimately saving tax payers time and transport costs that would be incurred
in declaring and paying taxes. The regulatory agency, the Rwanda Develop-
ment Board (RDB), has worked closely with technology solutions companies
to earmark the digitization of a hundred services, including application for
birth certificates, registration, and school examination fee payment, among
other key services. The education sector has also embraced ICT by designing
online learning platforms and the creation of a private–public partnership
between the government of Rwanda and technology company Postivo BGH,
in 2014, to set up a laptop factory in Kigali and sell laptops to schools.
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The development of mobile apps such as RapidSMS, and e-Diagnosis in the
health sector, have eased knowledge sharing and patient tracking by health
service providers. In the agriculture sector, the Fertilizer VoucherManagement
System helped to smooth the distribution of fertilizers to farmers; farmer
uptake rose by 11 per cent between 2013 and 2014. Other market
platforms like e-Soko help farmers to access real-time price information for
agricultural produce.
Tomeet its ambitious objectives, the government will have to invest heavily
in education and in importing professional services to develop fully its ICT
and financial sectors. In the short run, the availability of skills in the local
market is likely to be the main brake on rapid growth.
LABOUR-INTENSIVE LIGHT MANUFACTURES
Manufactured exports can be divided into two categories according to the
markets they target: regional or international. The vast majority fall into the
former group and, as already described, focus primarily on DRC, followed by
Burundi. There are only seventeen companies which export at least 2 per cent
of their output (Frazer 2016). Of the fourteen for which market information
is available, only one of them had its primary market outside the region.
For eleven, the primary market was DRC or Burundi, and these two markets
plus Uganda were the secondary market for eleven as well. Most companies
have one principal export product, and these products are generally relatively
low value and based on local or regional inputs. Maize flour, beer, and other
beverages, plastic shoes, cement, rebar (reinforcing bars), and other construc-
tion materials are among the main exports. As explained above, Rwanda is
well-positioned to access the DRC and Burundi markets. This has attracted
investment from companies based in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
Past growth in this trade has been impressive and there remains much
untapped potential. That said, it is a very complex, indeed difficult, environ-
ment to work in and recent events are not encouraging. Corruption is
endemic, many rebel groups remain active across the border in DRC, and
Burundi is in a state of political turmoil. Business leaders in Rwanda often
refuse to travel out of concern for their personal safety, preferring to let buyers
come to their factories if they wish. Recently, authorities in Burundi have
closed the border, blaming Rwanda for the political problems they face at
home. DRC has raised taxes on beer and other beverages, and imposed new
licensing requirements for cement, wheat flour, and alcoholic beverages. It is
difficult to knowwhat to expect from these twomarkets, and howmuch effort
to place on expanding this trade.
In contrast, very few manufactured products are exported beyond the
region, yet the government has high hopes for the future. In particular, it
plans to expand labour-intensive manufactures through participation in
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global value chains. Chinese wages have been rising fast and China is now
seeking to relocate low value production overseas. Rwanda has attracted inter-
est due to the high productivity of its labour force relative to its low cost,
although the size of its non-farm labour force is small. The establishment of
one Chinese clothing exporter in the Special Economic Zone is indeed prom-
ising. However, Rwanda’s landlocked status poses a major challenge, since
competitive clothing exports are likely to depend on imported textiles from
China. The transport time required to import raw materials and then export
the finished product leaves insufficient time to complete actual production
and meet the deadlines for seasonal apparel. Thus, the current operator’s
exports are focused exclusively on uniforms for the time being, along with
production for the domestic market.17 One other company is exporting home
design products, which are also not seasonal. In general, this type of trade is
highly competitive and Rwanda does not seem to be an obvious candidate.
However, industry sources claim that Rwandan productivity relative to its
labour costs offsets disadvantages of distance. The question remains whether
the new textile factory will prove viable and sustainable over the long run.
6. Conclusions
Rwanda has achieved remarkable rates of socioeconomic transformation since
the end of the civil war and genocide that tore apart its economy and social
fabric in the early and mid-1990s. Recovery and development processes have
for long been based upon building sound political and institutional structures
to foster unity and reconciliation in a once highly fragile state. An effective,
pragmatic, and corruption-intolerant political system has provided a condu-
cive platform for the success of public policy and a conducive investment
climate attractive to both local and foreign investments. The government of
Rwanda has exhibited a strong commitment to poverty-reducing economic
growth by initiating pro-poor policies to raise the income and productivity of
the poor, registering a tremendous decline in poverty and inequality. Donor
support has also been an invaluable source of funding throughout Rwanda’s
recovery and development phases. Going forward, measures will have to be
devised to reduce the economy’s over-reliance on foreign aid and its associated
exposure to external growth shocks. Strategies to diversify the export base,
improve domestic revenue collection, and lower the costs of energy and trans-
port would increase the robustness of the country’s economy and aid in the
realization of a middle-income status envisaged in the country’s Vision 2020.
17 C&H Garments currently employs 300 workers for export production while training another
550 to respond to increased domestic demand given recent decisions to reduce used clothing imports.
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Growth of exports and imports have become increasingly important to
Rwanda’s future growth strategy. If the country can continue to push reforms
for the economy as a whole, and in these particular sectors, Rwanda will likely
maintain its growth momentum in coming years. Industries without smoke-
stacks will play a central role.
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in Uganda and Rwanda
John Spray and Sebastian Wolf
1. Introduction
Consensus among many development economists and policy makers is that
the development of the manufacturing sector is requisite for wider economic
development (Rodrik 2016; Chang et al. 2016). However, in Africa the initial
conditions for structural transformation and productivity growth driven by
the manufacturing sector are largely absent (Newman et al. 2016). After sev-
eral decades of lack of growth and failed government attempts to stimulate
themanufacturing sector (Isaac et al. 2014; Söderbom and Kamarudeen 2013),
it is time for African countries to consider ‘industries without smokestacks’ as
potential engines for the transformation of their economies.
In this chapter, we exploit a novel firm-level data set derived from Ugandan
and Rwandan tax records to present a set of growing, high-productivity indus-
tries in the service, and service-enabled agriculture sectors in the two coun-
tries. We study the characteristics of firms active in these industries, and
analyse their buyer and supplier networks to gauge whether these types of
industries without smokestacks have potential to transform the two countries’
wider economies by driving growth across sectors.
In 2017, Uganda and Rwanda can look back at more than two decades of
relatively stable economic growth and diversification. Trade has played a key
role in this development. Largely due to the governments’ trade-friendly
policies and the regional integration of markets in the EAC, exports grew
from 5 per cent to 15 per cent of GDP in the case of Rwanda, and from
12 per cent to 20 per cent of GDP in the case of Uganda. Behind this stand a
large number of new export entrepreneurs, supported by a growth of annual
FDI inflows from 0.2 per cent to 3.7 per cent of GDP in Rwanda and 2 per cent
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to 4.2 per cent of GDP in Uganda. Exports to the East African Community
(EAC) made up a roughly constant share of total exports throughout this
twenty-year period, so the deepening EAC integration has not led to an over-
reliance on regional markets. While unprocessed commodities (mainly coffee
and tea) and mineral exports (in the case of Rwanda) still dominate the two
countries’ export portfolio, the importance of resource-based value addition
products, as well as services, has grown substantially in both countries. Services
made up less than 25 per cent of exports in the two countries twenty years ago,
but in 2014made upmore than 40 per cent (all data from theWorld Bank 2016).
Despite relatively strong export growth, pressures persist to further increase
exports to drive growth and alleviate current account deficits, which averaged
8.5 per cent of GDP over the last five years in Uganda and 9.5 per cent of GDP
in Rwanda (World Bank 2016). In this chapter, we suggest that industries
without smokestacks will be central in this endeavour.
Our analysis relies on two unique data sets that cover the full population of
formal sector firms of the two economies on a monthly basis and hold
information on their characteristics and their business networks. This enables
us to study industries at the micro level and compare their development over
time, features that survey data sets do not hold at a similar level of detail.
We utilize the data sets to explore two dimensions of structural economic
transformation: within sector productivity growth and across sector product-
ivity spillover. First, we study the characteristics of firms in industries that
have driven within-sector productivity growth, and are now productivity
leaders. Sorting industries by their average labour productivity, we look at
their firms’ average size, their wage levels, their participation in and connect-
edness to the external sector, and their export destinations. Second, we study
across-firm and across-sector spillovers by using the Ugandan data to analyse
the connectedness of firms in the different sectors and by exploring correl-
ations of output and productivity growth as a function of network distance.
Our analysis shows that industries without smokestacks are already among
the productivity leaders in Uganda and Rwanda. To further understand these
industries, we single out three firm characteristics that most high-productivity
industries without smokestacks in our data sets share, and that present clear
policy lessons. First, we find that firm size seems to matter for productivity not
only in the traditional manufacturing industries, but also in services and agri-
processing. The creation of an environment that supports firm scale-up is
therefore an important policy tool across sectors. Second, we find that service
and agri-processing industries that have strong connections to the external
sector are more productive, re-emphasizing the importance of a liberal trade
regime, and encouraging further service trade liberalization. Importantly, the
data also shows that, to realize the productivity gains from external sector
engagement, firms need not necessarily be actively importing or exporting
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themselves, but can realize these gains indirectly through their network by
dealing with suppliers and buyers who are directly engaged in the external
sector. Third, firms in industries without smokestacks rely relatively heavily
on imported inputs, but less so than industries in the manufacturing sector.
Hence, expanding high-productivity industries without smokestacks could
indeed alleviate current account pressures.
Finally, in our analysis of industry networks, we find that service industries
make up six of the top ten most interconnected industries of the economy in
Uganda and five in Rwanda, confirming that the service sector is vital in
knitting the economy together. We show that productivity growth in these
industries is strongly associated with the performance of the whole economy.
The chapter is structured in five main sections. The second section reviews
the fundamentals of the data set. The third section looks more closely at the
distinctive features of industries without smokestacks. The fourth section ana-
lyses the potential of sector-level spillover effects. The fifth section concludes.
2. The Data
We analyse transactional level data from the value-added tax (VAT), pay-
as-you-earn1 (PAYE) and customs declarations submitted to tax authorities
to study industries without smokestacks at the firm level in Uganda and
Rwanda. The data covers the period 2010–14/15, and includes the full popu-
lation of formal enterprises in the economy.2
The data sets cover only formal firms that report to the tax authorities. We
consider this an acceptable limitation for our analysis, since we are interested
in the type of high-productivity firms that interact with the external sector
and are more likely to be formal. Because it is more difficult to avoid customs
duty than domestic tax, the coverage of the external sector of the economy in
the data set is much better than that of the domestic sector. All information in
the declarations is self-reported and only in a subset of cases verified by audits,
with the exception of customs declarations where verification is standard.
A recent IMF report estimated that the URA collects only 60 per cent of the
potential VAT (Hutton et al. 2014), and we expect similarly large compliance
gaps in other tax heads in Uganda and Rwanda. The report finds the highest
level of tax avoidance in the service sector, particularly construction, hotels and
restaurants, wholesale and retail trade. We therefore expect that our estimates
of output, input and wages are biased downwards particularly for the service
sector, although we do not anticipate this to alter results substantially.
1 Pay-as-you-earn tax is personal income tax withheld by the employer.
2 See Spray and Wolf (2017) and Spray (2017) for a more detailed description of the data set.
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While the data sets hold a wide array of variables, we focus our analysis on a
sub-set of key variables for which we have enough observations to exploit
overlap between the different data sources. Our analysis relies as much on the
numerical variables as on the categorical variables derived from the business
register, and the connections between firms implied by transactions in the
VAT declarations.We use VAT declarations to extract information about firms’
input use and outputs, as well as their supplier and client network. We then
supplement the resulting network structure with details on firms’ staffing
(from PAYE) and their relationship with the external sector (from customs).
After cleaning, the Ugandan data set contains information submitted by
100,428 firms between 2010 and 2015, and the Rwandan data set contains
information submitted by 65,193 firms submitted between 2009 and 2014.
The numbers of actively declaring firms per year are lower as firms enter or exit
the data sets. In 2010 the data sets contained 29,274 and 18,714 actively
declaring firms in Uganda and Rwanda, respectively. In 2009 and 2012 the
Ugandan and Rwandan tax authorities, respectively moved to electronic dec-
laration systems for domestic taxes which decreased tax reporting transaction
costs for firms and helped the tax authorities expand their tax base gradually.
The numbers of actively declaring firms have since risen to 41,578 in Uganda
and 32,330 in Rwanda in 2014.
We use four-digit International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC)3
codes to classify firms into industries and, at a higher level, into five sectors:
agriculture, manufacturing, mining, ‘other’4 and services. The standard ISIC
groups agriculture, manufacturing and mining industries into single sectors,
but splits the service sector into 16 smaller subsectors, which we combine into
one sector for the purpose of this study.
The service sector is the biggest in terms of the number of firms covered,
making up 80–93 per cent of all declaring firms in the different data sets. This
figure by itself does not accurately represent the sector’s share of the economy,
as the mean service sector firm is considerably smaller both in terms of
employees and output than firms in the other sectors. The manufacturing
sector has the second highest number of firms, making up 9–13 per cent
of firms in Uganda and 4–9 per cent of firms in Rwanda. The agriculture
and mining sectors have many fewer formal firms, making up fractions of
0.5–3 per cent of the datasets. Overall, the distribution of industries in our data
sets closely resembles the distribution of business established by the Ugandan
Bureau of Statistics in the 2010–11 Census of Business Establishments (COBE)
3 International Standard Industrial Classification of economic activities (ISIC) is the standard
classification unit used in the data. We use four digit sectors which yields disaggregated detail.
4 The ‘other’ sector includes two subsectors that do not count towards the private economy:
extraterritorial organizations and public administration.
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and the 2014 Establishment Census (EC) produced by the National Institute
of Statistics of Rwanda. See Spray andWolf (2017) for a comparison, as well as
a description of firm characteristics across sectors.
3. What Does an Industry without Smokestacks
Look Like in Uganda and Rwanda?
In answering the question posed in this section’s title, we are interested in
high-productivity industries that have the potential to modernize the Ugandan
and Rwandan economies, both through sector-level growth and economy-wide
spillovers. Traditionally, only the manufacturing sector has been credited with
the potential to increase both sector level and economy-wide productivity.More
recently there has been a shift of themainstream focus towards industries in the
service and service-enabled agriculture sectors that can play a lead role in struc-
tural transformation.This recognizes the fact thatmanyAfrican countries donot
feature the initial conditions necessary to become competitive in manufactur-
ing, and that new global opportunities have evolved in services trade and from
participating in global value chains. These industries are coined ‘industries
without smokestacks’ in the project that this study contributes to. This section
focuses on the first dimension of economic transformation: sector-level growth.
Growth within a sector is driven by industries with high productivity, particu-
larly industries where productivity is high enough to compete internationally.
In this section, we compare the productivity performances of all four-digit
ISIC industries in our data sets, and find that industries without smokestacks
feature prominently among the top thirty most productive industries in
Uganda and Rwanda. To learn more about these productivity leaders and
what sets them apart, we study their average firms’ labour productivity
relative to firm size in terms of output and employees, wages paid, connec-
tion to the external sector and direct participation in the external sector.
Before beginning our analysis at the industry level, we present sector-level
averages of our variables of interest in Table 17.1. For Uganda it shows that
average labour productivity of formal firms5 is highest in the agriculture sector,
where it is almost 33 per cent higher than in the manufacturing sector and
58per cent higher than in the service sector. In Rwanda, the picture is different.
There, labour productivity among formal firms is highest inmining, where it is
60 per cent higher than in services and twice as high as in agriculture.6
5 It is important to re-emphasize that our data sets only contain formal firms that report to the
tax authorities; i.e. the agricultural sector as a whole would not be considered the sector with
the highest productivity in Uganda.
6 For the mining sector we expect that the labour productivity values presented here are biased
upwards by the high capital intensity characteristic of this sector.
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The difference in sectoral productivities for formal firms between Uganda
and Rwanda confirms expectations regarding the two countries’ comparative
advantages and target sectors.7 In Uganda, industrial policy in recent years has
been focused on agricultural value chains such as maize and sugar, while
Rwanda has focused on mining as well as high value services such as tourism
(Daly et al. 2016).
However, the sector-level averages cover up important productivity differ-
entials within sectors, and hide the importance of industries without smoke-
stacks. In Tables A17.1 and A17.2 in the Annex we thus present our variables
of interest at the industry level. More specifically, we present the 30 most
productive industries in the Ugandan and Rwandan formal economies in
terms of labour productivity, and report firm-level averages of our variables
of interest. 17 out of the top 30 industries in Uganda, and 21 out of the top 30
in Rwanda are service industries. This by itself emphasizes the importance of
the service sector and its industries without smokestacks in the two countries’
productivity performance. However, in both Uganda (9 of top 30) and Rwanda
(4 of top 30) traditional manufacturing also still represents a high productivity
sector that has not yet become obsolete. Remarkably, in Uganda three and in
Rwanda one agricultural industries also form part of the high-productivity
group. They can broadly be classified as service-enabled agri-business indus-
tries. We now turn to study productivity leaders one sector at a time.












Agriculture 10,802 2.46 0.21 0.08 0.13
Manufacturing 8,125 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.04
Mining 6,128 0.14 0.18 0.05 0.10
Other 569 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02
Services 6,856 0.29 0.03 0.01 0.01
Rwanda
Agriculture 8,166 3.20 0.12 0.06 0.08
Manufacturing 5,729 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.02
Mining 16,080 16.76 0.21 0.02 0.13
Other 942 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.00
Services 9,855 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.01
Note: 1Output per worker is calculated on the yearly firm-level average, then averaged at the industry level.
2 Export/imports is calculated by summing all exports in an industry and dividing by the sum of imports in the industry.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
7 See Isaac and Othieno (2011), Hausmann et al. (2014) and Hausmann and Chauvin (2015) for
analysis of Uganda and Rwanda’s revealed comparative advantages, and opportunities for
diversification.




Three agriculture industries in Uganda are among the top tenmost productive
industries in the economy in terms of labour productivity: Marine aquacul-
ture, post-harvest crop activities, and marine fishing. The industries dealing
with aquaculture and fishing are on average larger in terms of output than in
post-harvesting, yet all three have higher output than the sector average,
emphasizing the importance of scale. The proportion of firms in these indus-
tries exporting directly is also high, ranging from 27 to 67 per cent and
accounting for 35 to 65 per cent of output. Most of their exports go to OECD
markets, suggesting that firms in these industries manage to meet rigorous
phytosanitary standards, an essential skill that other agri-business industries
in both countries are still lacking. All three industries rely on complex value
chains that are service-heavy and produce products that are of comparatively
high value-added. All three also seem to rely on high-skilled labour as they pay
wages well above the sector average. However, neither industry features more
than15 companies, andonaverage thenumber ofworkers per company ranges
between 22 and 103, so the firms in these industries are not very numerous and
their employment creation impact as of now is limited.
Rwanda has fewer success stories in agri-business than Uganda. The only
agriculture industry that joined the top thirty industries is animal production.
Yet, with seventy firms, and an average of 168 workers per firm, the industry is
relatively large and employs relatively many people. But its mean firm output
and its number of exporters are only slightly larger than in other industries, so
its characteristics differ from agri-businesses in Uganda. It appears that while
the high-productivity industries of Ugandan agri-business have managed to
join global value chains, Rwandan agri-business is still mainly serving the
domestic market with the exception of coffee and tea. This suggests that
regional value chain integration with high-productivity industries in Uganda
could serve as a stepping stone for Rwandan agri-business companies towards
joining global value chains.
3.2. Mining
Uganda’s mining sector is very small, so we don’t study it further. Rwanda’s
mining sector in turn is large, though a high number of mining firms in
Rwanda are small, informal and use artisanal miningmethods. Unfortunately,
our data only allows us to observe the formal side of this important sector,
which is made up of large-scale firms that use modern techniques, have access
to capital and are highly productive.
Two of the top five most productive industries in Rwanda are in the mining
sector, making up 72 per cent of companies in the sector. Mining of metal ores
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is characterized by high labour productivity, high wages, and exports to the
OECD.While integrated in a global value chain, the industry as a whole is still
very small. The larger of the two is ‘Other mining and quarrying’, which
includes quarrying of stones, sand, clay, mining of chemical and fertilizer
mineral, extraction of peat and salt, as well as further unclassified mining
and quarrying. Firms in this industry are large, with an average of 52 employ-
ees and US$212,198 output, but the pay is lower than the economy-wide
average, which suggest that this sector relies heavily on productivity gains
from capital equipment, rather than high-skilled labour. 16 per cent of all
companies in the industry are direct exporters, and 7 per cent export to OECD
economies. Clearly there is scope for within-industry learning to expand the
percentage of directly exporting firms, and to increase the number of firms
linked to OECD economies where higher value-added exports are demanded
than in non-OECD markets. A market opportunity lies in the construction
industry, which currently relies on a high percentage of imported construc-
tion materials that could be produced using raw materials from the domestic
mining industry, especially given Rwanda’s extraordinarily high transport
costs, the heavy nature of construction materials, and the level of protection
offered by the EAC Common External Tariff.
3.3. Manufacturing
The manufacturing industries that feature in the top thirty ranking of labour
productivity in Uganda are, in decreasing order, producing building material
such as cement, agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, beverages, plastic goods,
pharmaceuticals, fats and oils, leather goods, as well as pumps. None of
them features more than twenty-five companies, and the average number of
workers reaches up to eighty, bracketing the sector average of thirty-eight.
The proportion of firms that are directly involved in the export market is
considerably higher than in the rest of the sector: with the exception of one
outlier, all industries feature a share of at least 32 per cent active exporters.
Some industries have managed to penetrate the OECD market, testimony to
their mastering minimum standard requirements. Particularly notable in this
regard is the tanning and dressing of leather and fur products industry, in
which five out of nine companies export to the OECD. Five out of nine
companies also supply exporters. However, when considering volume of
exports, it appears that most of the industries, except for the leather and fur
industry, sell by far the biggest share of their output on the domestic market,
while relying relatively heavily on imported inputs, even in comparison with
sector averages. This shows that the value-addition potential differs widely
among these industries, and that the fraction of firms that achieve high value
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addition is small. Given its success on the external market and relatively low
reliance on imported inputs, the leather and fur industry can be singled out as
a very promising infant industry deserving closer attention by policy makers.
While the cement industry has the highest labour productivity in the sector,
we cannot proclaim it as the productivity miracle that it appears to be. Since it
is a highly capital intensive industry, the high labour productivity value
proxies the effect for capital, as well as the high degree of protection enjoyed,
which gives companies in this industry market power and disincentive to
become competitive globally; see Dihel et al. (2013) for more details on the
cement industry in the EAC.
In Rwanda only three manufacturing industries made it into the top thirty
ranking of labour productivity. In decreasing order they are manufacture of
tobacco products, non-classified manufacturing, and manufacture of commu-
nication equipment. While the tobacco product industry is small in size, it has
very high average output, and sells products both domestically, in the EAC,
and to the OECD. Wages in this industry are high, which suggests a high
degree of automation and the use of skilled labour to run machines, logistics
and related high value added activities. However, the industry relies relatively
strongly on imported inputs; its output is only 180 per cent of its import.
There might be a case to work with the companies in the industry and find
ways to encourage import substitution, which could also trigger cross-
industry and cross-sectoral learning. The communication equipment industry
offers a different story. The industry does not seem to be adding much value
in-country, having a high import/output ratio, and given its companies’ very
small sizes in terms of employees. Rather, the industry seems to profit from
Rwanda’s location as a hub for re-exports to Burundi and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). This emphasizes the importance of transport
and logistics services in Rwanda.
3.4. Services
Service sector firms make up most of the top thirty industries in both coun-
tries. We find that these are in general made up of a large number of relatively
small companies. Wages are mostly lower than in the top thirty agriculture
and manufacturing industries, with the exception of telecommunications,
wholesale, air transport, specialized construction, holding companies, and
electricity services in Uganda, and other retail, reservation services, leasing
of personal and household goods in Rwanda. None of the industries has an
average staff number higher than forty-eight employees, which is on average
considerably smaller than in the manufacturing and agriculture businesses
in the top thirty (at least in Uganda), yet bigger than the sector average.
The proportion of firms dealing directly in the external sector (at least as per
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the customs declarations)8 are small, and so are average export volumes,
but the proportion of firms acting as direct supplier to exporters is higher
than the sector average. Professional services play an important role in
Uganda, with medical practices, holding companies, and ICT featuring prom-
inently.9 In Rwanda, it is travel agency and tour operator activities, inland
water transport and other reservation service and related activities that can be
singled out. They are the industries with the highest average wages in the
sector, and examples for Rwanda’s recent success in stimulating the travel and
tourism market in the country.
3.5. Key Lessons Regarding Productivity Leaders in Uganda and Rwanda
In this section we confirm that industries without smokestacks are already
important productivity leaders in the Ugandan and Rwandan economies.
Three main important patterns emerge from our analysis of firms in these
industries. Firstly, industries with high labour productivity feature, on aver-
age, larger firms in terms of output than the sector average. This suggests that
scale is not only important in the manufacturing sector, but also in industries
without smokestacks in the agri-business and service sectors. Secondly, highly
productive firms do not need to be exporters, but they are connected to the
external sector as suppliers more often than not. This is consistent with
the notion that external sector firms require firms in their supply chain to be
competitive enough to compete with other regional or global supply chains,
and it is true for all sectors that made it into the top thirty. Thirdly, all
industries with high levels of labour productivity rely on imported inputs.
This is particularly noticeable in the manufacturing sector and it highlights
the importance of a liberal trade regime to raise firm productivity, but it also
points to windows of opportunities for domestic companies that can aspire to
substitute these inputs. It also suggests a positive impact of industries without
smokestacks in improving external sector balance, at least relative to the
manufacturing industry.10
Considerable skills development will be required if domestic firms are to
substitute the inputs that are essential in making the top thirty industries as
productive as they are. The question how these skills might be grown is closely
related to our analysis in Section 4, which looks at the role of industries
without smokestacks as economic hubs that allow knowledge and productiv-
ity to spill from industry to industry and firm to firm.
8 Most service sector exports are not covered in customs declarations.
9 See also Dihel et al. (2010) for a review of the state of professional services in the EAC and their
role as pivotal inputs in other sectors.
10 Refer to Spray and Wolf (2017) for a discussion of the role of the Common External Tariff
(CET) and the sensitive item list for industries in the top 30.
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4. Spillover Effects of Industries without Smokestacks
Structural change remains one of the central pillars of development economics.
The argument in favour of this approach rests on the assumption that a
country’s economy can be partitioned into low growth traditional sectors
and high growth modern sectors. One rationale for this distinction is that
modern sectors require better technology and higher skilled workers than
more traditional sectors. This creates the opportunity for learning by doing
and the space for substantial productivity growth. Another rationale is that
the modern sectors provide higher potential for knowledge transfer from
abroad given the simple observation than machines can be moved between
countries much more easily than farming techniques (Rodrik 2013).
Economic growth in this context, is simply a matter of equipping your
economy with the skills and technologies to gradually replace old sectors
with new modern sectors (McMillan et al. 2014). Equipped with higher-
value factors of production, the economy can experience virtuous cycles
both within the modern sector and spilling-over to other more traditional
sectors and consequently access higher growth paths. By contrast, traditional
sectors can be characterized asmore isolated with fewer spillovers to the rest of
the economy. In this section, we consider whether these dynamic linkages
exist in industries without smokestacks in East Africa.
We look to identify the role of hub sectors, which knit together the rest of
the economy. By combining Ugandan firm-level input-output data and firm-
level productivity data, we correlate output and productivity across different
sectors. Using this approach we identify whether there is something special
about industries without smokestacks in their relationship to the output and
productivity of other connected sectors.
4.1. Output and Productivity Spillovers
We first consider how central industries without smokestacks are to the rest of
the Ugandan and Rwandan economies by looking at sectoral input-output
linkages. We then consider the correlation of output and productivity
between different sectors in Uganda.
In Figures 17.1 and 17.2 we present a graphical representation of the sectoral
input-output matrix for Uganda and Rwanda. Each node represents an indus-
try classified at the ISIC four digit level. This partitions the Ugandan economy
into 275 different industries and the Rwandan economy into 136 industries.
Each edge shows a directed input-supply connection between the industries—
i.e. a flow of inputs from supplier to customer. An edge is only shown if
trade between the two industries exceeds 5 per cent of the industries’ total
trade over the period. This restricts the analysis only to the observation of
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trade between industries with substantial interactions. The spatial location of
nodes is driven by a force-directed layout known as ForceAtlas2. This layout
works like a physical system: nodes repulse each other like charged particles,
while edges attract their nodes, like springs. These forces create a movement
that converges to a balanced state (Jacomy et al. 2014).
Finally, nodes are differentiated in colour or pattern by sectoral groups
(manufacturing, services, agriculture, mining), and scaled by the number of
industries which are connected to each node. This helps the reader to observe
hub industries. An industry is considered to import (the import node is
Figure 17.1. Graphical representation of Uganda sectoral input-output matrices for
2009–15
Source: Author’s calculation using tax declaration data from the Ugandan and Rwandan revenue
authorities.
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indicated with an ‘I’) if more than 5 per cent of its inputs are imported.
An industry is considered to export (the export node is indicated with an ‘E’)
if more than 5 per cent of its sales are exported.11
These graphs reveal some immediate and salient points about the Ugan-
dan and Rwandan economies. First, notice that in both Uganda and Rwanda
some industries are far more interconnected to the rest of the economy than
Figure 17.2. Graphical representation of Rwandan sectoral input-output matrices for
2013 and 2014
Source: Author’s calculation using tax declaration data from the Ugandan and Rwandan revenue
authorities.
11 For firm-level graphs and considering the role of firm exporters, see Spray (2017).
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others. The average number of connections for each industry is just 3.8 in
Uganda and 5.3 in Rwanda, suggesting most industries are relatively special-
ized with few linkages across the economy. However, as is clear in the graph,
the top ten inter-connected industries have far more linkages across the
economy. These industries can be classified as hubs which either provide
inputs or serve as buyers to numerous other industries. This phenomenon is
often referred to as the small world property of networks: despite most
sectors being unconnected it only takes a few moves along the directed
network to get from any one node to another. Indeed, the maximum dis-
tance in this network is just eleven steps in Uganda and nine in Rwanda. This
is important when we consider questions of output and productivity spill-
overs, and highlights the importance of hub sectors for spreading know-
ledge, output, and productivity shocks.
Second, in both countries imports and exports play a crucial role in the
functioning of the economy. This can be observed in the large size and high
centrality of these nodes.
The top ten most interconnected industries are shown in Table 17.2. The
constellations in Uganda and Rwanda are remarkably similar. Immediately
obvious is the presence of six service industries in the top ten in Uganda, and
eight in Rwanda. This includes construction services, telecommunication
services, accounting services, and cargo handling services. These are essential
inputs to all other sectors, without which other sectors could not function.
This supports the notion of service industries serving as essential inputs into
Table 17.2. Sectors with most connections
Rank Uganda Rwanda
1 Construction of buildings Other service activities
2 Manufacture of plastics products Retail sale in non-specialized stores
3 Real estate activities with own or
leased property
Wholesale of food, beverages, and tobacco
4 Wired telecommunication activities Other retail sale of new goods in specialized stores
5 Manufacture of other fabricated
metal products
Manufacture of other chemical products
6 Cargo handling Non-life insurance
7 Manufacture of corrugated paper and
paperboard and of containers
Construction of buildings
8 Manufacture of basic iron and steel Wholesale of construction materials, hardware,
plumbing and heating equipment, and supplies
9 Accounting, bookkeeping, and
auditing activities
Manufacture of beverages
10 Short term accommodation activities Telecommunications
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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the production process. For instance, we know that employing a cargo hand-
ling service is a necessary requirement for exporting. Consequently, we might
expect a larger impact from a productivity increase in cargo handling, than
from other more specialized industries.
The remaining most interconnected industries are from the manufacturing
sector. This is consistent with manufacturing industries purchasing inputs
from numerous other sectors of the economy. Together, this confirms the
opening hypothesis that the manufacturing and service sectors are distinct in
their interconnectivity to the rest of the economy.
Much smaller in size are the mining and agricultural sectors which are also
relatively unconnected to the rest of the economy. Firms in the mining sector
primarily trade with other mining firms or with general service support firms
such as transport and logistics. This is consistent with the specialized nature of
the mining sector and supports a long-held belief that mining companies
work in silos. In the agricultural sector, linkages are often with the manufac-
turing sector. This is consistent with the manufacturing sectors’ purchase of
agricultural produce such as maize converted into flour.
4.2. Co-movement of output and productivity
We now turn to the question of co-movement of output and productivity
across sectors. So far, we have observed that some industries are more inter-
connected than others, and that this varies by the type of sector. We add to
this the observation that industries which are connected are likely to be highly
correlated in terms of output and productivity. This is due to (a) covariate
shocks across similar sectors and (b) idiosyncratic shocks which propagate
through the supply-network (Acemoglu et al. 2012). Industries which are more
isolated or further apart should have a smaller correlation. Indeed, we would
expect this effect to decay with network distance.
To test this hypothesis, following Carvalho (2014), we calculate average
output growth in all 275 ISIC 4-digit industries between 2009 and 2015. We
then calculate the pairwise correlation in output growth between each of the
275 industries. Finally, we take an average of these correlations across different
network distances and disaggregate the results by sectoral groups. Results are
shown in Figure 17.3. The vertical axis displays the average pairwise correl-
ation in output while the horizontal axis displays the network distance
between the industries. The average correlation between industries which
are distance one apart (i.e. sectors that are directly trading) is 0.38. However,
as network distance decreases, so does the correlation in output growth. This is
consistent with results in Carvalho (2014) for the USA. We can interpret this
result as saying that (a) the network structure of the economy matters for
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economic growth and (b) that more connected industries are likely to influ-
ence economic growth more than isolated industries.
Some industries see a faster decay in correlation to others. This is evident in
the agriculture sector group which decays very quickly with network distance,
whereas the correlation in the manufacturing sector group decays much less
quickly. This is consistent with Figures 17.1 and 17.2 which showed that the
agriculture sector was relatively unconnected.
Finally, we look at the contribution of hub industries to output growth in
the rest of the economy. As shown in Figures 17.1 and 17.2, some industries
are more connected to the rest of the economy than others and serve as hubs.
If we believe that these hubs have a disproportionate impact on aggregate
output we would expect changes in their output and productivity to explain a
large proportion of aggregate output.
In Figure 17.4, we present the quarterly change in output growth in the top
ten most interconnected industries alongside the quarterly change in output
growth in the whole economy. The graph indicates the strong relationship
between the two series indicating that hub industries are disproportionately




















Figure 17.3. Correlation of output and network distance, disaggregated by sector
Source: Author’s calculation using tax declaration data from the Ugandan and Rwandan revenue
authorities.
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the two series is 0.83. By contrast, the equivalent correlation coefficients
for the 10 industries in the middle of the interconnectedness distribution
is just 0.51.
In Figure 17.5, we present the trajectory of labour productivity growth12 in
the top ten most interconnected industries next to the output growth of the
whole economy. Clearly, there is a positive correlation between the two series
although less strong than the correlation in output shown in Figure 17.4. The
correlation coefficient in top ten sectors (0.49) again exceeds the correlation
score in the average ten sectors (0.29).
One concern one might have with these graphs is that we are double count-
ing: the top ten most interconnected industries are also the largest. To address
this, we do two things. First, we select the larger sectors in the middle of the
interconnectedness distribution such that theoverall volumeof transactions in
the top ten sectors and average ten sectors is equal. Second, we re-estimate the
correlation coefficients with the influence of the top ten sectors removed.
















top 10 connected sectors all sectors
Figure 17.4. Output Growth top ten most interconnected sectors and all sectors
Source: Author’s calculation using tax declaration data from the Ugandan and Rwandan revenue
authorities.
12 Here productivity is simply output per worker.
13 For output correlation we find 0.76 and for productivity correlations we find 0.49.
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Interpreting these results causally would be a mistake, given the simultan-
eity bias between the series being discussed. However, they do provide sug-
gestive evidence that some of the sectors identified as high growth industries
without smokestacks are also crucial to driving growth in the rest of the
economy and provide government with a list of the most important intercon-
necting sectors of the economy.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we utilized transaction level tax-administration data to study
firm networks with a specific focus on industries without smokestacks in
Uganda and Rwanda. We first turned to the characteristics of firms in the
most productive industries in the two economies to conclude what type of
firms and industries can be engines for within-sector growth. Using data on
labour productivity we ranked the 275 ISIC industries and compared the top
thirty across sectors. Industries without smokestacks feature prominently



























Productivity Growth—top 10 connected sectors
Output Growth—all sectors
Figure 17.5. Output Growth and productivity growth in top ten connected sectors
Source: Author’s calculation using tax declaration data from the Ugandan and Rwandan revenue
authorities.
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Uganda.We then studied their firm characteristics. Firstly, we found that scale
matters not only in the manufacturing sector, but also in industries without
smokestacks, such as select service sector and agri-business industries. This is
true for utility services providers or air transport providers that rely on large
capital investments, but it also holds for retailers andwholesalers, who need to
build up logistics chains and systems to exploit savings that come with scale.
Secondly, the data shows that firms need not be first-hand actors in the
external sector in order to benefit from the competitive pressures and learning
that this can provide, but that nonetheless it is common among highly
productive firms to have at least second-degree connections to the external
sector. Service sector firms that act as intermediaries between the domestic
and external economy are a strong case in point to exploit this property.
Thirdly, the industries we study highlight that cheap imports are crucial for
productivity, as imports make up large fractions of high-productivity firms’
input use. This points to the importance of a liberal import regime, but also
opens the window of opportunities for domestic companies that can aspire to
substitute these inputs.
After studying firms that have the potential to lead to sector-level growth,
we turn to consider whether industries without smokestacks also have the
potential for spillover effects across firms and industries. First we show that
some services industries play an absolutely crucial role as hubs of the econ-
omy, and that the average number of connections with other firms in the
economy is highest in the services sector, followed by the manufacturing
sector. We then show that growth in output and productivity in these indus-
tries is a strong indicator of overall economic growth, which indicates that
these industries do have substantial spillover or pull-effect on the remaining
economy.
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Annexe
Table A17.1. Ranking of top 30 Ugandan industries by labour productivity, at ISIC level


















1 Marine aquaculture Agriculture 3 64 103 1,570,713 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.00 10.93
2 Manufacture of cement, lime, and plaster Manufacturing 4 49 80 7,129,316 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.01
3 Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen Manufacturing 1 334 12 487,294 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01
4 Other telecommunications activities Services 13 315 6 52,651 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
5 Wholesale of solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels Services 106 252 23 565,767 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.31 0.01
6 Post-harvest crop activities Agriculture 15 133 22 130,088 0.60 0.60 0.53 0.40 6.01
7 Activities of holding companies Services 2 284 2 79,134 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
8 Marine fishing Agriculture 15 172 24 451,096 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.00 35.60
9 Manufacture of malt liquors and malt Manufacturing 12 73 52 2,223,659 0.42 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.14
10 Wholesale on a fee or contract basis Services 67 118 29 233,772 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.19 0.45
11 Wholesale of waste and scrap etc Services 54 213 12 84,916 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.35 0.37
12 Retail sale of beverages Services 44 158 21 154,863 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.25 1.18
13 Medical and dental practice activities Services 81 83 19 218,558 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.39
14 Retail sale of automotive fuel Services 158 108 22 277,667 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.02
15 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs, etc Manufacturing 3 143 13 246,699 0.67 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.03
16 Retail sale of hardware, paints, and glass Services 531 172 5 30,909 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.63
17 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals Manufacturing 10 100 65 558,610 0.60 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.09
18 Passenger air transport Services 21 228 19 388,441 0.33 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.16
19 Manufacture of veg and animal oils and fats Manufacturing 25 103 60 1150981 0.32 0.32 0.16 0.24 0.18
20 Manufacture of refined petrol products Manufacturing 8 193 29 281,205 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.50 0.04
21 Extraction of natural gas Mining 7 265 50 155,324 0.29 0.14 0.29 0.43 0.03
22 Electric power generation, transm., and dist. Services 147 219 23 253,193 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.09
23 Tanning and dressing of leather and fur Manufacturing 9 119 39 473,625 0.67 0.44 0.56 0.56 3.73
24 Manufacture of pumps, compressors, etc Manufacturing 1 608 1 22,678 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 .
25 Wholesale of construction materials Services 448 176 10 62,497 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.31 1.04
26 Wireless telecommunications activities Services 8 183 48 559,512 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.38 0.76
27 Wholesale of food, beverages, and tobacco Services 493 137 15 67,611 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.14 5.06
28 Retail sale of second-hand goods Services 137 159 5 59,815 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.34
29 Other specialized construction activities Services 45 316 26 25,004 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.00
30 Sale of motor vehicles Services 827 201 7 36,947 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.55



























Table A17.2. Ranking of top 30 Rwandan industries by labour productivity, at ISIC level


















1 Retail sale of second-hand goods Services 17 128 3 34,627 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.12
2 Mining of metal ores Mining 1 906 12 778,460 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 419.24
3 Inland water transport Services 4 1,185 8 232,508 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
4 Other mining and quarrying Mining 124 201 52 206,323 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.04 17.39
5 Manufacture of tobacco products Manufacturing 2 1,047 78 371,149 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.24
6 Activities of households as employers Services 2 831 1 16,582 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
7 Other specialized wholesale Services 1,689 294 7 39,709 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.55
8 Leasing of personal and household goods Services 7 717 1 21,495 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 .
9 Wholesale of metals and metal ores Services 44 878 6 18,117 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.20 29.54
10 Other reservation service and related act. Services 15 2,454 4 21,975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 .
11 Retail sale of food, beverages, and tobacco Services 818 191 10 36,672 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.67
12 Retail sale of automotive fuel Services 57 180 16 168,470 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.26 0.05
13 Telecommunications Services 91 648 22 80,457 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.23 0.27
14 Manufacturing Manufacturing 29 240 12 93,699 0.21 0.14 0.03 0.10 1.77
15 Animal production Agriculture 70 168 16 24,983 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.04 5.44
16 Wholesale of household goods Services 79 135 8 18,731 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.04
17 Public administration and defence Other 4 2,595 12 17,102 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
18 Retail sale of textiles, clothes Services 2,157 189 5 13,751 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.68
19 Retail sale in non-specialized stores Services 9 842 6 31,992 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 .
20 News agency activities Services 175 115 4 12,552 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.13
21 Other retail sale of new goods Services 916 214 4 17,288 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.46
22 Wholesale of fuels Services 110 184 8 30,518 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.15
23 Wholesale of textiles, cloth., etc Services 28 225 43 252,275 0.18 0.11 0.04 0.18 0.01
24 Extraction of crude petrol. and nat. gas Mining 5 6,040 2 27,605 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.41
25 Wholesale of food, beverages, and tobacco Services 53 165 22 104,851 0.25 0.13 0.19 0.02 12.88
26 Travel agency and tour operator activities Services 71 354 11 26,651 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.10
27 Manufacture of comm. equipment Manufacturing 144 234 6 14,407 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.04
28 Building completion and finishing Services 52 539 27 44,622 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.06
29 Manufacture of refined petrol. products Manufacturing 147 221 5 22,204 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.23 0.35
30 Wholesale of construction materials etc Services 7 305 30 182,762 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.27
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Regional Opportunities in East Africa
Stephen Karingi, Ottavia Pesce, and Lily Sommer
1. Introduction
This chapter assesses how a well-integrated economic bloc, the East African
Community (EAC), has supported industrialization, in particular through
smokestack-free industries.1
The key objectives are to assess the impact of the EAC Customs Union (CU)
and regional integration efforts more broadly on the:
 volume and type of intra-EAC trade;
 development of regional value chains (RVCs), particularly in smokestack-
free industries; and
 development of competitive smokestack-free industries.
After looking at how regional integration has contributed to trade, RVCs,
and industrial performance in the region, the chapter describes some
examples of smokestack-free industries that have recently emerged in the
EAC. It then delves into a case study of the dairy industry in Uganda, which
expanded significantly over the last decade, partially thanks to tariff protec-
tion and export opportunities within the EAC.
1 The authors wish to sincerely thank representatives of the Dairy Development Authority, the
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry, and Fisheries, Jesa Farm Dairy Limited, and Brookside
Limited, who participated in the field visit meetings in Uganda. The information and experiences
shared during this exercise provided very valuable input into the case study on the Ugandan dairy
industry presented in Section 5.
The views expressed in this chapter are the authors’ own and may not necessarily reflect the
position of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. Any mistakes or omissions are the sole
responsibility of the authors.
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The chapter focuses on the CU as an instrument as it has been in full
operation for over five years, whereas implementation of the CommonMarket
(CM) Protocol has been slow and the EAC Monetary Union is yet to be
established. Analysis is centred on the five ‘established’ EAC partner states.
Smokestack-free industries are taken as industries that display firm character-
istics similar to traditional manufacturing industries, but are more modern
and do not have the drawbacks associated with heavy polluting industries.
Examples include agro-processing and tradeable services.
2. Overview of the EAC
The EAC came into force on 7 July 2000, following ratification by the original
three founding partner states—Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Rwanda and
Burundi entered seven years later, on 1 July 2007; on 2 March 2016 South
Sudan was admitted as the sixth member of the regional bloc. The EAC object-
ive is to deepen economic, political, and social cooperation among members.
The EAC CU became operational in 2005 and initially covered Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda. Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2008 and started to
apply its instruments in 2009. It intends to liberalize intra-EAC trade and
promote efficiency in production through facilitating the free movement of
goods within the community. The EAC CM entered into force in 2010 follow-
ing ratification by all five partner states. The CM aims to achieve the free
movement of services, labour and capital, in addition to the free movement of
goods. The key aspects of the CU are:
1. a common external tariff (CET) on imports from third countries;
2. duty-free trade between partner states; and
3. common customs procedures.
Significant progress has been made in the implementation of the CU. Trade
between members is now free from import duties.2 Members adopt the three-
bandCET shown in Table 18.1. Themaximum tariff under theCET is 25 per cent,
although the EAC allows higher tariffs for a list of sensitive products, which are
analysed in Section 3.2.
Based on its linear progress towards full economic union, the EAC is often
considered the most advanced and ambitious regional economic community
in Africa. Quantitative exercises by the International Growth Centre find
significant trade promotion and security gains from the EAC (Mayer and
Thoenig 2016). However, the EAC, and indeed Africa as a whole, trades less
2 With the exception of a few instances in which disagreements between partner states
have arisen.
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as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) than other developing regions
such as East Asia and Latin America—this holds for both world trade and
intraregional trade.
A reason for this is the high prevalence of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the
region, which create considerable obstacles to trade. This is reflected in the
extremely high average costs in ad valorem equivalent for EAC countries to
trade within the region, which were 118.8 per cent in 2013.3 Prominent NTBs
include high transport costs, bureaucracy, corruption, and expensive settle-
ment of payments (Karingi, Pesce and Sommer 2017).
3. EAC Performance
3.1. Growth and Investment
During the past decade, economic growth in the five established EAC partners
was consistently strong and above that of previous decades. In 2015, East
Africa was the continent’s fastest-growing region, growing at 6.5 per cent
compared to 3.7 per cent for Africa as a whole. Although the region still
produces and exports predominantly low-value primary products such as
coffee and tea, the level of economic diversity and the number of
smokestack-free industries in the EAC is increasing. Success stories cover
sectors as diverse as cut flowers, dairy, textiles, financial services, information
technology, and tourism.
The EAC CU presents opportunities for firms to locate within the large EAC
market and benefit from the single market. Annual FDI inflows to the region
increased from US$680 million in 2004 prior to the CU to US$4,577 million
in 2014. Intra-EAC FDI exists in smokestack-free industries such as financial
Table 18.1. Structure of EAC CET band rates
EAC most-favoured nation








Raw materials, capital goods, agricultural inputs,
certain medicines, and certain medical
equipment, etc.
0 2,003 37.1
Intermediate goods and other essential industrial
inputs
10 1,152 21.4
Finished products 25 2,176 40.3
EAC sensitive items 35–100 64 1.2
Source: World Bank et al. (2014).
3 Authors’ calculation based on the ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database.
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services, tourism, and manufacturing (ILEAP 2012), and also in cement
production, which is a crucial input to some smokestack-free industries.
3.2. Trade in Goods
Intra-EAC exports registered a considerable upward trend following the imple-
mentation of the CU in 2005, increasing from US$911 million in 2004 to
US$2,491 million in 2014. Kenya exports the most value to the EAC (US$1,326
million), followed by Uganda (US$605million) and Tanzania (US$425million).
Rwanda and Burundi have seen exports to EAC partner states increase, but this
has been from a much lower base—the two countries exported US$112 million
and US$22 million to the EAC respectively in 2014.
The value of total intra-EAC imports is also on an upward trend, having
increased from US$1,223 million in 2005 to US$2,875 million in 2014. Imports
are, however, less integrated within the EAC than exports. In 2014 intra-EAC
exports as a share of total EAC exports were 18 per cent, whereas intra-EAC
imports as a share of total EAC imports were just 7 per cent. This is less than the
figure of 10 per cent for 2005, reflecting EAC partner states’ growing reliance on
imports from the rest of the world to meet their structural transformation
agendas. Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania import the most from within the
EAC, while Kenya, the group’s most advanced economy, relies more on imports
from the rest of the world.
On average, intra-EAC exports as a share of total EAC exports remained




























Rwanda Burundi Uganda Tanzania Kenya
Exports to the EAC Exports to the rest of Africa Exports to the rest of the world
Figure 18.1. Exports shares before and after accession to the CU, by partner state, %
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD statistics.
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Kenya reduced its exports to the EAC as a share of total exports after joining
the CU. This reflects the significant expansion of Kenya’s trade with other
African countries outside the EAC. On the other hand, Uganda is the country
that expanded its EAC share of total exports the most after joining the CU.
Increased regional integration has helped EAC partner states to diversify
and structurally transform their economies. In 2014, EAC exports to the rest of
the world were largely food items (48 per cent) and other non-manufactured
goods—fuels, pearls, precious stones and non-monetary gold, agricultural raw
materials, and ores andmetals (32 per cent). Intra-EAC exports are muchmore
diversified than EAC’s global exports, with a larger share of manufactured
goods (55 per cent compared to 19 per cent). For example, in 2015 US$73
million worth of lime, cement, and other construction materials were exported
from Uganda to Rwanda. Coffee, tea, and spices contribute 20 per cent of EAC’s
exports to the rest of the world, but only 5 per cent to internal exports.
In 2014, 65 per cent of EAC’s imports from the rest of the world were
manufactured goods compared to 62 per cent for intra-EAC imports. The
two percentages are very close, suggesting that EAC partner states have com-
petitive import opportunities for manufactured goods within the region,
despite still importing the majority of manufactures from outside.
3.2. Free Trade Area and CET Structure
The introduction of the three-band CET tariff structure differentially impacted
EAC partner states. At the onset of the CU, Kenya adopted a ten-band tariff
structure ranging from 0 to 100 per cent; Tanzania adopted a five-band
tariff structure ranging from 0 to 25 per cent; and Uganda adopted a four-
band tariff structure ranging from 0 to 30 per cent.
Table 18.2 shows the estimated effects on the three EAC partner states of
implementing the CU 0–10–25 three-band CET structure. The CET resulted in
a large reduction in Kenya’s protection vis-à-vis the rest of the world, which
helps to explain the growth and reorientation of Kenya’s trade with countries
outside of the EAC, as shown in Section 3.1. The majority of tariff lines were
raised in Uganda. This increased the country’s average costs from importing
Table 18.2. Estimated effects of CET tariff changes on EAC partner states
Kenya Tanzania Uganda
Number of tariffs lowered 3,216 2,364 1,353
Number of tariffs increased 1,144 1,224 3,066
Number unchanged 753 1,525 694
Source: McIntyre (2005).
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outside the EAC and helps to explain why Uganda imports the most from
within the region.
Over time, EAC partner states progressively reduced internal tariffs.
Table 18.3 shows that in 2003 Kenya imposed much higher tariff rates on
imports from EAC partner states than did Tanzania and Uganda. The intro-
duction of free trade between the three countries in 2005 therefore required
the largest tariff reductions in Kenya, which already had relatively easy access
to other EAC markets. The CU took into consideration the differing levels of
development among partner states: it permitted Tanzania and Uganda to
eliminate tariffs on all imports excluding an agreed list of commodities, for
which tariffs on Kenyan imports would be gradually reduced to zero over a
five-year period. This temporary protection mechanism was designed to allow
Tanzanian and Ugandan producers sufficient time to restructure operations in
the face of increased competition from Kenyan imports. The asymmetrical
opening up to EAC imports—with significant opening up of the previously
relatively closed Kenyan market—helps to explain why the share of Ugandan
and Tanzanian exports to the EAC increased following the introduction of the
CU,while the share of Kenyan exports to the EACdeclined. Burundi and Rwanda
only joined the CU in 2009. As the two smallest economies in the region, this
significantly opened up export opportunities to the larger EAC markets.
The overall decline in tariffs in the EAC was strongest for capital goods,
where the weighted average tariff dropped from almost 9 per cent in 2003 to
about 4 per cent in 2014. Apart from those listed as sensitive items, capital
goods imports are not protected. This encourages industrial production by
reducing the costs of machinery and other capital inputs for producers.
Table 18.3. Evolution of intra-EAC tariff regimes, %
2003 2007 2010
Burundi
Weighted average 5.9 2.0 0.0
Maximum rate 40.0 30.0 0.0
Kenya
Weighted average 16.7 0.0 0.0
Maximum rate 60.0 0.0 0.0
Rwanda
Weighted average 2.1 2.4 0.0
Maximum rate 60.0 30.0 0.0
Tanzania
Weighted average 1.8 1.6 0.0
Maximum rate 25.0 50.0 0.0
Uganda
Weighted average 3.3 1.1 0.0
Maximum rate 7.0 9.0 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data.
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Intermediate goods imported into the EAC still face a tariff rate of 10 per cent,
however, which affects firms that rely on imported inputs. Due to limited local
availability, themajority of intermediates are imported into the EAC—in 2014
only 6 per cent (US$1,594) of the EAC’s imported intermediates were sourced
from within the EAC, compared to 14 per cent for consumption goods.4 This
indicates that RVCs are only emerging slowly. Imports of intermediates within
the EAC are particularly weak in fuels and lubricants and in parts and acces-
sories of capital goods and transport equipment.5
In 2014, 57 per cent of EAC’s imported intermediates from outside were
industrial-related (industrial supplies, parts and accessories of capital goods,
transport equipment, and other industrial), indicating limited value chains of
industrial inputs. Some exceptions exist. For example, 34 per cent of primary
industrial supply products such as cement are sourced within the EAC. As
expected, the least developed EAC partner states, Burundi and Rwanda,
import larger shares of intermediate inputs from within the region and export
fewer intermediates to the EAC. Kenya is the leading exporter of intermediates
within the EAC (44 per cent) followed by Uganda (22 per cent) and Tanzania
(21 per cent).
The protection imposed by EAC partner states on imported intermediate
goods currently limits their use in production processes and possibilities for
the export of transformed products. This constrains the development of
smokestack-free industries such as agro-processing and textiles, which rely
heavily on imported machinery and other inputs. A review of the CET struc-
ture is needed to ensure consistency with industrial frameworks and promote
competitiveness based on comparative advantage. Frazer recently estimated
that a 5 percentage point tariff reduction on inputs used by Rwandan export-
ers would result in a 5–10 per cent increase in their exports (Frazer 2012).
EAC partner states have in fact recently resolved to review existing CET rates
and the basket of sensitive goods. Each partner state appointed an expert team
to participate in negotiations from July 2016 to inform the finalization of
a comprehensive CET review by December 2016 for implementation from
July 2017 (East African 2016). This provides an opportunity to reduce the
tariffs on imported intermediates. Conversely, tariffs on intermediates for
which regional production already exists could be increased (e.g. steel and
iron products), possibly through updating the sensitive items list. This would
increase the protection provided for local producers, help to prevent prema-
ture de-industrialization and encourage intra-EAC trade in intermediates and
the development of new RVCs.
4 Authors’ calculations using 2013 data for Kenya.
5 With the exception of Burundi importing 100 per cent of its primary fuels and lubricants from
the EAC.
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The classification of products under the three-band CET structure has
caused concern among producers within the EAC, who argue that some
items that are imported as finished products are actually used as inputs in
industrial production. This reduces the competitiveness of manufacturers who
are required to pay duty rates of 25 per cent as opposed to 0 or 10 per cent.
For example, palm oil is imported as a finished product under the CET regime,
but is used as a raw material in the manufacture of soap. Similarly, clinker is
imported as a finished product but used as an intermediate input in the
manufacture of cement. The CET review should therefore also consider updat-
ing the classification of products under the three-band structure to reflect the
primary use of imports (EastAfrican 2016).
3.3. Sensitive Items
The EAC allows a list of sensitive items to have higher tariff lines than the
maximumCET rate of 25 per cent. Reaching agreement on the classification of
the 1.2 per cent of tariff lines defined as sensitive items was not easy. EAC
partner states indicated that they wanted to protect subsidized exports
(mainly agricultural products from industrial countries) and second-hand
items from import competition (McIntyre 2005).
Fifty-nine tariff lines are designated as EAC sensitive products, of which 31
are agricultural lines (at HS8 level). Table 18.4 shows the goods categorized as
sensitive. The names of product categories are simplified for ease of reading.
Fully detailed product names can be found in the link provided in the table
source. Sugar is the most highly protected, with a tariff rate of 100 per cent for
some types of sugar products. Rice is also heavily protected, with a 75 per cent
tariff rate, followed by wheat, meslin flour, and dairy products at 60 per cent.
Data show that the EAC does not have the supply capacity needed to fulfil
demand for the majority of sensitive items (see Table 18.5). In 2012, over
90 per cent of EAC demand was met by imports from the rest of the world
for 65 per cent of the sensitive tariff headings. These include important
consumer and industrial products such as woven fabrics of cotton and syn-
thetic staple fibres, wheat and meslin, sugar, linens, and primary cells and
batteries. The high CET rates attached to these products negatively impact
consumer welfare and raise the costs of industrial development. EAC partner
states imported about US$217 million worth of sugar from outside the region
in 2012, at tariff rates as high as 100 per cent. This seems to show that such
high tariffs, while protecting nascent local industries, may be excessive. Taking
the example of sugar, high tariffs increase costs for consumers, but also constrain
the development of agro-processing smokestack-free industries that rely on
sugar as a key production input (e.g., soft drinks, biscuits, and candy).
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Intra-EAC trade in sensitive items is relatively high for a limited number of
products. These include dairy products, maize, cigars and cigarettes, cement,
sacks and bags, and packaging accessories. Although these industries were
already relatively strong before the CET, the high sensitive item tariff rates
have supported their expansion. For example, 85 per cent of the EAC’s
imports of cigars and cigarettes originated from the region (largely Kenya) in
2012, compared with 30 per cent in 2005.
Some industries, such as steel and iron, have been competitive without
sensitive item status, both in the EAC and internationally. The EAC exported
about US$73 million of coated iron and non-alloy steel flat-rolled products
within the region in 2014, and about US$59 million to the rest of the world—
protection of these products ranges from 0 to only 25 per cent. The boom in
construction in the region is driving the steel and iron industry. In Uganda
and Kenya, where ore deposits have been discovered, governments are encour-
aging investments in iron ore (Construction Review 2013). The EAC Secretariat
has banned exports of scrap metal, which has led to more accessible and
cheaper inputs for steel processors in the region. This highlights that com-
petitive industries can be achieved through other means than protective
tariffs, and points to the need for supportive industrial policies and interven-
tions to address supply-side constraints (African Review 2012).
Table 18.4. List of EAC tariffs for sensitive items
Items Rate
Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure
sucrose, in solid form
35% for jaggery; 100% or US$200/metric ton (MT)
for other, whichever is higher for industrial sugar
and other types
Rice 75% or US$200/MT, whichever is higher
Wheat and meslin flour 60%






Various types of woven fabrics of cotton or
synthetic staple fibres
50%
Tracksuits, ski-suits, and swimwear; other
garments
50%
Bed linen, Table 18.linen, toilet linen, and
kitchen linen
50%
Sacks and bags of a kind used for the packing
of goods
From 35% or US$0.20/kg, whichever is higher, to
45% or 45¢ per bag, whichever is higher
Stoppers, caps, and lids; capsules for bottles,
bungs, seals, and other packing accessories
40%
Primary cells and batteries 35%
Tobacco products 35%
Wheat and meslin 35%
Source: EAC sensitive items list (http://tradehelpdesk.eac.int/documents/Sensitive_List.pdf).
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Table 18.5. Intra-EAC import share of total EAC imports of sensitive items by tariff heading, %
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Milk and cream, not concentrated 51.2 4.8 52.9 41.2 38.6 54.9 77.4 84.8 70.5 95.6
Milk and cream, concentrated 11.3 3.6 4.5 34.9 42.7 37.2 28.5 41.4 13.6 36.1
Other milk products 23.1 34.4 47.0 54.9 34.9 56.2 46.9 50.9 19.8 45.5
Wheat and meslin 2.1 2.0 2.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
Maize (corn) 27.2 4.4 19.1 9.8 87.1 9.5 3.1 18.1 29.0 41.3
Wheat or meslin flour 60.2 0.2 71.4 79.6 5.0 10.9 9.4 7.6 2.8 0.7
Sugar 1.2 0.0 5.6 3.4 4.1 2.1 4.1 2.7 6.4 3.9
Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos, and cigarettes 74.0 37.5 29.6 60.3 76.7 83.8 84.9 77.3 92.5 85.5
Other manufactured tobacco 46.0 1.3 55.9 31.7 0.2 0.3 2.7 0.0 0.1 0.0
Cement 52.3 46.6 54.9 47.7 31.1 35.0 47.7 32.1 61.8 35.5
Matches 2.4 0.0 0.1 2.8 0.2 0.3 6.7 4.1 4.1 4.2
Woven fabrics 5208 0.1 6.6 1.3 3.4 1.8 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1
Woven fabrics 5209 7.0 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.9 2.6 3.4 34.5 0.1
Woven fabrics 5211 0.0 1.0 1.9 0.6 9.6 11.7 11.6 6.7 17.6 0.1
Woven fabrics 5212 0.4 0.0 1.4 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5 4.2 1.8
Woven fabrics 5513 4.8 7.5 2.4 1.9 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.7 12.0 0.6
Woven fabrics 5514 2.0 2.6 2.7 1.4 1.1 2.4 4.2 3.5 7.5 4.2
Garments 1.8 3.2 14.0 2.5 4.4 2.7 2.6 4.0 4.7 3.7
Linens 1.1 3.2 3.3 2.2 1.8 3.6 2.4 1.2 17.2 1.8
Sacks and bags 45.7 21.0 18.4 24.5 29.8 25.5 17.9 20.0 26.5 23.2
Worn clothing 0.5 1.7 1.5 1.7 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.4
Packaging accessories 40.3 30.6 25.4 29.3 21.2 36.9 40.4 40.1 78.6 43.8
Primary cells and batteries 2.8 2.0 2.4 3.5 5.2 2.3 3.0 1.7 2.2 0.4
Note: for details on the breakdown of woven fabrics, see the sensitive items list at: http://tradehelpdesk.eac.int/documents/Sensitive_List.pdf.


























Tobacco, maize, and sugar are the most widely exported sensitive products
in the region, with total EAC exports at US$500 million, US$140 million, and
US$130 million, respectively. The dairy industry, on which the chapter’s case
study focuses, has benefited from sensitive item tariff protection—EAC
exports of milk, cream, buttermilk, yoghurt, and most other dairy products
totalled US$41 million in 2014. Uganda and Tanzania export the highest
number and greatest value of sensitive products. The sensitive product share
in the value of exports is 12 per cent for Tanzania, 11 per cent for Uganda,
6 per cent for Rwanda and Burundi, and only 2 per cent for Kenya.
A breakdown of EAC exports of sensitive products by partner state is provided
for in Karingi, Pesce and Sommer (2017).
The benefits of high protection of sensitive items are unequally distributed
among partner states. 30 per cent and 23 per cent of intra-EAC exports from
Tanzania and Uganda respectively are of sensitive products. Sensitive products
account for 30 per cent and 23 per cent of intra-EAC exports from Tanzania
and Uganda respectively, and only 11 per cent, 4 per cent and 3 per cent from
Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi’s intra-EAC exports respectively. This unequal
distribution, which penalizes Burundi and Rwanda, reflects their delayed
entry into the CU, by which time the sensitive items list had already been
drawn up.
Table 18.6 provides export shares for sensitive products that appear within
the top five exports of EAC partner states. These items represent a large share
of the goods traded within the region, most notably cement, maize, textiles,
Table 18.6. Trade in sensitive products within the EAC considering only the top five
exports for each trading partner (share of a partner states exports to the trading
partner), 2014
Sensitive product Rwanda Kenya Uganda Tanzania Burundi
























Source: ECA analysis of UNCTAD data. Classification of products available at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/
regcs.asp?Cl=14&Lg=1&Co=658.
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rice, and dairy. For example, in 2014 rice contributed 13 per cent of Tanzania’s
exports to Uganda and construction materials including cement contributed
12 per cent of Kenya’s exports to Uganda. Other sensitive items are, however,
much less widely traded within the region due to inadequate supply. The EAC
also relies significantly on imports from the rest of the world for some of the
sensitive items that are widely traded within the region. For example, imports
of sugar into the EACmore than doubled between 2005 and 2012, even with a
100 per cent tariff.
The total value of sensitive products imported from the rest of the world
grew from approximately US$700 million in 2005 to US$1 billion in 2012.
The products that recorded the highest level of imports from outside the EAC
were wheat and meslin (US$221 million), sugar (US$217 million), cement
(US$113 million), and used clothing (US$161 million). Given the large tariff
costs this imposes on importers, the proposed review of the CET structure and
sensitive items list is very much needed to ensure that the CU remains
consistent with EAC consumption and industrial demands, as well as with
the region’s productive capabilities. CET revenues from sensitive products
account for only 4.6 per cent of total CET revenue for all partner states
(Government of Uganda n.d.)—reducing tariffs on certain sensitive tariff
lines therefore should not hit CET revenue significantly, but would instead
likely bolster other taxes linked to the size of the economic base. An updated
sensitive items list would also ensure a more balanced list reflective of the
priorities of all EAC partner states, including Burundi and Rwanda, the late
joiners to the CU.
Since 2005, EAC partner states have continually made amendments to the
CET and the 2004 Customs Management Act, including general exemptions
on various tariff headings, tariff rates, stay of application of the CET, and duty
remission. Such discretionary action erodes the CET (Kitenga 2012). The June
2016 EAC Gazette published a 46-page new round of stay of applications and
duty remissions (EAC Gazette 2016).6 This long list suggests that the economic
and welfare impacts of the CET were not fully considered when designing the
schedule of sensitive item tariff lines. The productive capacity of partner states
to supply the majority of sensitive items was inadequate when the CU started.
High tariff rates have therefore reduced the competitiveness of EAC firms that
rely on imported inputs, and have raised consumers’ costs.
The continual granting of ad-hoc annual remissions should not serve as a
substitute for a comprehensive CET review—remissions create unpredictabil-
ity, distort the value chain planning of producers within the region, and create
6 This included Rwanda’s stay of application of the CET on wheat and application of a duty rate
of 0 per cent instead of 35 per cent for one year, and duty remission for Kenya on raw sugar for
manufacture of sugar for industrial use at a duty rate of 0 per cent for one year, amongmany others.
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uncertainties for third parties with trade and investment interests in the
EAC. In order to be effective, the proposed EAC CET review must be informed
by evidence-based studies that consider partner states’ industrial development
needs and existing supply capacities. In particular, the review should consider
which sensitive goods local industries need to import as inputs for production.
The CET structure could be reviewed every five years—this would still provide
a relatively predictable regime that can also reflect changing development
needs and emerging regional production capabilities.
Tariff rates should be reduced for key industrial inputs (e.g. sugar and woven
fabric) and basic necessity consumption goods (e.g. wheat) with limited
regional availability. High sensitive item tariff rates on dairy, maize, cement,
cigars and cigarettes, sacks and bags, and packing accessories should be
maintained—EAC production in these areas is significant and current rates
can support further growth and intra-EAC trade in these products.
3.4. Beyond the CU
Although the CU has helped to increase the value of intra-EAC trade, the share
of intra-EAC trade in total EAC trade remains low. One of the main reasons is
the high level of border barriers in the region, including significant transport
costs for landlocked EAC partner states and high ad valorem equivalents for
NTBs. High costs of trading services also constrain trade in goods within the
region as services are key inputs into the production and distribution of goods
for export. For further discussion on this, readers can refer to Karingi, Pesce,
and Sommer (2017).
4. Structural Transformation in the EAC
4.1. Sectoral Analysis of Structural Change
The composition of output in the EAC changed markedly over the last two
decades. The region registered a significant decline in the GDP shares of
agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing from an unweighted average of
38.9 per cent in 1995 to 32.7 per cent in 2014. The majority of the EAC’s
decline in agriculture’s share of GDP, however, took place in the 10 years prior
to the introduction of the CU in 2005. Rwanda was the only country that saw
a significant reduction in the share of agriculture, hunting, forestry, and
fishing following the CU, from 41.3 per cent in 2005 to 35.0 per cent in
2014. Manufacturing shares remained fairly constant across the EAC follow-
ing 2005. At the same time, all countries saw growing shares for construction
driven by large public investment programmes. Services’ contribution to GDP
increased marginally after the CU (Karingi, Pesce, and Sommer 2017).
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Theminimal change in GDP compositions following 2005 indicates limited
structural change at the sectoral level over the last decade. Structural change is,
however, a long-term process that requires fundamental changes to the supply
side of the economy. The significant growth of the construction sector in the
EAC, from an unweighted average of 5.4 per cent in 2005 to 7.9 per cent in
2014, reflects an expansion of public investment and infrastructure pro-
grammes to enhance connectivity and productive capacity. This should pro-
vide an impetus to positive structural change in the medium term. Moreover,
implementation of the CU has been gradual, with supportive interventions
such as implementation of the CM and trade facilitationmeasures moving at a
slower pace. Fast-tracking such complementary regional integration efforts
would maximize positive impacts of the EAC free trade area on production
structures. The significant structural change that had already taken place
across partner states has also left less scope for additional immediate restruc-
turing following the CU.
Overall, industrial activity in the EAC remains lacking. Manufacturing in
the region still faces massive obstacles such as large overheads, expensive
borrowing, high costs for imported inputs, skill deficiencies, and infrastruc-
ture gaps such as energy and transport. Regional cooperation should be
strengthened to ensure effective policy coordination towards eliminating
the binding constraints to firm upgrading and the creation of new productive
industries.
4.2. Industry Analysis of Structural Change
Over the last decade, EAC partner states have seen a number of new industries
grow and emerge—most notably agro-processing, tourism, cement production,
pharmaceuticals, and textiles. Many of these industries are smokestack-free
and are increasingly associated with greater value addition, processing, and
innovation. Below, we provide some examples of important smokestack-free
industries in the region.
AGRO-PROCESSING
Given the importance of agriculture to output and employment in the EAC,
it makes sense to add value to the region’s agricultural produce. Smokestack-
free agro-processing is indeed the lead manufacturing industry in the EAC.
Table 18.7 highlights important agro-processed products that have recorded
significant growth in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania in recent years.
TEXTILES
Although the EAC still largely sources its textiles from outside the region, the
production of textiles in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda has increased
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in recent years. All EAC countries, excluding Burundi, which lost its access to
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) on 1 January 2016, qualify
to export textile products free of duty to the United States (US). This has
helped to attract investors into the industry.
Tanzania’s textile industry has performed particularly well. It is the second
largest employer in Tanzania’s manufacturing industry. In 2014, 16,692 per-
sons were employed in the manufacture of textiles at establishments with ten
ormoreworkers—this is almost13per centof the totalnumberofpeople engaged
inmanufacturing establishments. The gross output of these textiles manufactur-
ing establishments increased from TZS235,782 in 2011 to TZS272,947 in 2014
(NBS 2014). Tanzania is the second largest exporter of textiles in the EAC after
Kenya. The country has around 22 textile factories. In 2014, textiles repre-
sented 16 per cent, 6 per cent, and 3 per cent of Tanzania’s exports to the EAC,
the rest of Africa, and the rest of the world, respectively.7 Tanzania’s exports
of textiles reached approximately US$283 million in 2013 compared to only
US$51 million in 2000.
The government of Tanzania has actively supported the textile industry and
highlighted the performance of the industry as crucial to achieving middle-
income status by 2025. Tanzania aims to upgrade textile production to higher
value-added cotton products for export, build the right supporting institu-
tions, and improve the policy and business environment to tackle constraints
in the industry.
TOURISM
Tourism is emerging as an important sector in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Rwanda. For example, Kenya received 1,143,722 holiday and business visitors
in 2014 and parks and game reserves had 2,164,625 visitors (KNBS 2015).
International arrivals to Uganda increased from about 1.3 million in 2010 to
Table 18.7. Important agro-processed products produced in EAC partner states
Agro-processed products
Uganda Edible oils and fats production, dairy production, grain milling, bakery production, sugar
processing and coffee processing, fruit and vegetable juices, beer production (UBOS 2015)
Kenya Vegetable and animal oils and fats, dairy products, starches and starch products, prepared
animal feeds, sugar, cocoa, chocolate and confectionary sugar, tobacco, cut flowers (KNBS
2015)
Rwanda Milk production, beer production, fish and honey production, bakery products,
manufacture of sugar, processing of meats, fruit and vegetables (NISR 2015)
Tanzania Biscuits, bottled beer, tobacco products, instant coffee, sugar, milk products (NBS 2014)
Source: Statistical abstracts of respective partner state (sources noted in the table).
7 These figures were computed by the authors using UNCTAD data.
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1.7 million in 2014, whereas arrivals from the EAC increased from 550,000 to
807,000 (UBOS 2015). The sector is expected to receive an additional boost
from the recently introduced Single EAC Tourist Visa.
Given the obstacles to developing competitive manufacturing in Rwanda,
the government is targeting services subsectors for growth, including tourism.
The tourism sector has been the main foreign exchange earner since 2007.
In 2013, exports of travel were 77 per cent of commercial services exports and
the Rwandan Tourism Board reported that the country had received 1,137,000
visitors, generating US$294 million, up from just US$62 million in 2000.8
Tourism receipts were 29 per cent of total exports in 2013,9 and are expected
to grow at a compound annual rate of 25 per cent until 2017.10
Although gorilla tourism remains one of Rwanda’s main tourism marketing
points, the government is now also trying to diversify the tourism products on
offer. Thanks in part to improved infrastructure and telecommunication ser-
vices, Rwanda is becoming increasingly attractive for Conference Tourism.
In 2014 the country hosted both the African Development Bankmeetings and
the World Export Development Forum, among other events. The develop-
ment of a competitive aviation sector is part of the government’s strategy to
develop the tourism sector (Republic of Rwanda 2013).
5. Smokestack-Free Case Study: The Dairy Industry in Uganda
5.1. Background
The dairy industry in Uganda provides an interesting case study of how
existing productive knowledge in agriculture can be used to produce more
sophisticated and higher value-added products to serve the domestic and
regional markets.11
Dairy is an important economic activity across East Africa, which is now the
leading milk-producing region in Africa, representing 68 per cent of the
continent’s milk output (Bingi and Tondel 2015). The large EAC market and
the existing high levels of dairy production in the region have also attracted
8 The figures were sourced from www.rwandatourism.com/index.php/destinations-and-
activities/nyungwe-national-park/96-media-centre/press-releases.
9 This figure is computed from World Bank data.
10 This projection is from Rwanda Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
2013 targets.
11 This case study is informed by the authors’ findings from a field visit to Uganda to meet with
key players in the dairy sector in July 2016. Themeetings were geared towards hearing views on the
factors contributing to the success of the dairy industry in Uganda and East Africa; the role
integration within the EAC has played in promoting this success; and the opportunities and
challenges faced in the Ugandan dairy sector. Authors met with the Dairy Development
Authority, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, Jesa Farm Dairy Limited,
and Brookside Limited.
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the attention of private international players in the industry, many of which
are facing weak growth in Europe and China—for example, Nestlé and
Danone Dairy investments in Kenya.
EAC exports of dairy products (milk, cream, and milk products) to both the
region and the world increased significantly following the establishment
of the CU in 2005. The value of intra-EAC exports of dairy products jumped
from US$281,445 in 2005 to US$18.3 million in 2014, a 6,402 per cent
increase. The share of intra-EAC exports in total EAC exports of dairy products
increased from only 5 per cent to 39 per cent over the same period.
Less than 10 years ago, the Ugandan dairy industry was still in its infancy.
Uganda was a huge importer of dairy products (mainly from Kenya), despite
the abundance of milk in the country. Today, Uganda is one of the major
dairy-producing countries in Africa and the lead exporter of dairy products
in the EAC. In 2014 Uganda contributed 48 per cent and 60 per cent to total
EAC dairy product exports and total intra-EAC exports of dairy products,
respectively. In 2010 the country became a net exporter of dairy products.
Uganda’s exports of dairy products totalled approximately US$22.4 million in
2014, compared to only US$288,730 in 2005. Uganda’s dairy processing
capacity increased from 330,000 litres per day in 2004 to 1,454,480 litres
today (Bingi and Tondel 2015). The major players in milk processing are
Brookside Limited (formerly Sameer Agriculture and Livestock Limited),
Amos Dairies, Pearl Dairy, and Jesa Farm Dairy Limited.
Uganda actively participates in dairy RVCs in the EAC. This includes
formal cross-border trade of processed milk products; informal cross-border
trade of Uganda’s exports of raw milk to Kenya for conversion into powder,
pasteurized milk, and cream; imported inputs from Kenya such as packaging
materials and spare parts; and cross-border mergers of East African dairy
companies. In 2015, Kenya’s Brookside Dairy Limited acquired Ugandan
dairy company Sameer Agriculture and Livestock Limited. Kenyan proces-
sors previously largely imported powdered milk from European countries.
However, with the introduction of the CU it is now cheaper to source milk
locally from Uganda, process it into powder, and export it regionally (Daily
Nation 2016).
Uganda also exports dairy products to markets beyond the EAC, including
the US, India, and the Middle East. The country’s farming systems are pre-
dominantly organic, which means that its dairy exports can pass stringent
safety requirements in the US.
5.2. The Role of Domestic Policy
Uganda’s agro-ecological conditions and large number of cattle favour dairy
production inmost parts of the country and throughout the year. The country
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is also well-placed within the region to tap into the growing demand for dairy
products associated with higher incomes. The government of Uganda has
actively supported dairy production to take advantage of this potential.
The success story first started in 1993 when the government of Uganda,
with assistance from the Danish International Development Agency, devel-
oped a Master Plan for the Dairy Sector. The plan delivered three key
recommendations:
1. milk marketing should be liberalized
2. a dairy board should be created to oversee the liberalized industry
3. the dairy corporation of Uganda that was established in 1967 should be
privatized.
All of these recommendations were successfully implemented. The 1998
Dairy Industry Act created the National Dairy Development Authority (DDA),
which is responsible for the development and regulatory functions of the
dairy industry. The Dairy Corporation of Uganda was privatized in 2006 and
taken over by Sameer Agriculture and Livestock Limited, now Brookside
Limited. The liberalization of the dairy industry brought the monopoly of
the Dairy Corporation to an end and opened up opportunities for private
investment in the industry.
Since liberalization, the state has continued to promote the dairy sector
through a number of programmes and policies. The Agriculture Sector Devel-
opment Strategy and Investment Plan 2010/11–2014/15 identifies dairy cattle
as a commodity to be promoted to support the development of value chains.
The operations of the DDA are funded by the government of Uganda. Gov-
ernment financing is also channelled to the dairy sector through the National
Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), which was created in 2001 to address
the constraints of lack of access to agricultural information, knowledge, and
improved technology among rural farmers. NAADS provides dairy farmers
with extension services and supports the sector’s shift from the use of rudi-
mentary tools to modern tools.
The National Agricultural Research Organisation was established in 2005 to
guide and coordinate agricultural research activities in Uganda. The organiza-
tion has supported the development of the dairy sector through spearheading
the commercial production of fodder. At a more micro level, the Entebbe
Dairy Training School builds productive capacities through providing free
practical training on how to meet standards and pass quality-assurance tests.
Domestic policy has also focused on reducing the costs of engaging in dairy
production. The provision of milk coolers and collection facilities has helped
to enhance the safety of milk production and ensure that more milk reaches
the final market. Public investment in rural infrastructure development such
as rural feeder roads and the Rural Electrification Programme has contributed
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to improvements in milk quality through facilitating the quick delivery of
farmers’ milk to cooling centres. Costs to dairy investors have been reduced
through the provision of free land (e.g. Amos Dairies) and tax holidays.
5.3. The Role of Regional Integration
Regional policies and increased integration with the EAC have provided Uganda
with opportunities to upscale production and serve the EAC dairy market.
Although the EAC does not have a specific regional policy for the dairy
industry, partner states, in collaboration with the dairy regulatory authorities,
have made significant progress in identifying areas and opportunities for
cooperation and growth in the sector. The East Africa Dairy Regulatory
Authorities Council (EADRAC) was established in 2006 under the framework
of the EAC CU Protocol as a platform to facilitate the harmonization of dairy
product regulations and standards in the region. The EADRAC comprises all
EAC dairy regulatory authorities. Key areas of successful collaboration include
trade in dairy products and conflict resolution, regional dairy industry sanitary
standards, and regional dairy industry product standards. The harmonized
standards are currently undergoing review to assess whether they are achiev-
ing the intended results.
Dairy products receive one of the highest levels of protection under the EAC
CU sensitive items list, with a tariff rate of 60 per cent. This has helped to
shelter the Ugandan dairy industry from excessive competition from trading
partners outside the EAC, supported the expansion of dairy production in
the country, and encouraged intra-EAC trade in dairy products. 82 per cent of
Uganda’s dairy exports were destined for trading partners within the EAC
in 2014.
Cross-border collaboration to improve regional infrastructure also played a
crucial role in supporting trade and investment in the dairy sector, particu-
larly for dairy products with a short shelf-life. Efforts to improve trade
facilitation have also been an important support. The Electronic Single
Windows in the EAC have significantly reduced the time and documenta-
tion requirements of cross-border trade. EAC members provide trade facili-
tation laboratory space at borders to test whether products meet the required
standards.
5.4. Challenges
Despite the significant transformation of the Ugandan dairy industry over the
last decade, continued success is not without challenges. The hygiene and
handling practices at farm level in Uganda are generally poor, and despite a
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significant expansion in processing capacity, the majority of the country’s
milk still goes unprocessed. This reflects the still infant status and structure of
the industry, but also offers significant scope for growth and upgrading (New
Vision 2013).
Milk processing plants are currently underutilized due to the uneven distribu-
tion of plants, which are concentrated in Mbarara and Central Uganda. The
country is investing heavily in processing plants to extend shelf-life and produce
at higher levels of the value chain. This should help to rectify the uneven
distribution of plants and boost the production of processed dairy products.
The DDA is supporting the drive for increased processing. The authority
encourages smallholder farmers without access to pasteurizers to contact
dairy processing companies to pasteurize their milk at a cost of US$25 per
tonne, before delivery to coolers. However, this fee is considered too high to
allow profit, particularly when some businesses and individuals still do not
understand the health risks of raw milk and so prefer it over pasteurized
products. There exists a significant price differential for local producers sell-
ing raw milk to the local market collection points (about UGX700 per litre)
and selling to pasteurizers (only about UGX400 per litre), which further
reduces incentives for pasteurizing. The authorities are planning to enhance
the user-friendliness of negotiations between traders and processors to make
processing options more accessible and cheaper for smallholder farmers. To
avoid negative welfare impacts, it is crucial for this to be done before the
government of Uganda bans the sale of rawmilk, a provision that has been in
the pipeline for years.
Elements of the domestic and external tax structures are holding back
efforts to transform the dairy sector. In FY2014–15, the government of
Uganda introduced a value added tax (VAT) of 18 per cent on processed
milk, which was previously zero-rated. This has increased the price of pro-
cessed milk and reduced incentives to produce and consume processed milk
products. Raw milk sales are increasing, particularly in low-income house-
holds in urban areas. Dairy industry stakeholders organized by the Drink
Milk Campaign have requested that the government remove VAT on pro-
cessed milk on the grounds that milk belongs to a category of essential food
and nutrition items that should not be taxed. The government of Uganda,
however, remains in strong support of this use of VAT, arguing that the tax
contributes significantly to revenues while only resulting in marginal price
increases for locally packed and fresh milk; there is unlikely to be a reversal in
policy. This places the Ugandan dairy industry at a disadvantage compared to
Kenya, which has backtracked on plans to implement VAT on dairy products.
Although the EAC CET of 60 per cent on dairy products helps to protect
Ugandan dairy producers, the high costs of importing key inputs into the
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dairy industry reduces the competitiveness of the sector. Uganda relies on
imports of key inputs such as packaging materials, spare parts, and generators,
the prices of which are increased by high taxes and high transport costs from
the ports of Mombasa and Dar Es Salam.
6. Conclusion
Over the last decade a number of smokestack-free industries have emerged as
important sources of export revenues and growth in the EAC. These include
non-traditional manufactured products such as dairy products, pharmaceut-
icals, cigars and cigarettes, beverages, textiles, and horticulture, but also mod-
ern tradeable services such as tourism, financial services, and information and
communications technology.
Integration within the EAC has helped to provide a supportive environ-
ment for the development of these industries. The CET provides for capital
goods to be imported duty free, and the sensitive items list has helped to
provide protection for regional producers of, for example, dairy products and
cement, helping these industries grow over time. Regional bodies, policies,
and projects have also supported the harmonization of practices in the
region and helped to promote the EAC as an attractive destination for
business and investment activity. Intra-EAC trade expanded significantly
following the establishment of the CU. This trade is more diversified and
embodies more manufactured products than the EAC’s trade with the rest of
the world.
That said, significant opportunities in smokestack-free industries still exist
within the region that have not been fully exploited. The EAC regional
integration project should be used to take advantage of these opportunities
and position the region as a competitive economic bloc in the global trading
system. The current CET structure means that some crucial intermediate
inputs face very high tariff rates even though they are not sufficiently avail-
able locally. The CET structure needs to be reviewed to ensure that essential
inputs can be sourced at rates that allow regional producers to operate com-
petitively. Implementation of the CM Protocol should be fast-tracked.
Although the free trade in goods within the region has contributed to the
development of new RVCs, intra-EAC trade is still significantly hindered by
NTBs and the slow liberalization of trade in services and capital markets. The
Ugandan dairy industry highlights the importance of supportive domestic
policies in order to harness potential comparative advantages and opportun-
ities provided by increased regional integration.
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Integration Along the Abuja Road Map
A Progress Report
Jaime de Melo, Mariem Nouar, and Jean-Marc Solleder
1. Background: A Diversity of Integration Agreements
Regional Integration Arrangements (RIAs) in Africa (but particularly in
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)) have their roots in the political forces determined
by the colonial legacy, which resulted in a configuration of highly heteroge-
neous states along multiple dimensions (ethno-linguistic, religious, biological)
and artificial boundaries (splitting tribes, disregarding natural boundaries like
rivers ormountains)—a great challenge for countries wishing to integrate.1 These
heterogeneities, documented in the chapter, indicate the extent of the challenge
and point to an implementation conundrum.On the one hand, because of these
diversities—e.g. landlocked and coastal countries—potential gains from closer
economic integration are large. On the other hand, realizing these gains requires
policy coordination and the scarce financial resources necessary for compensa-
tion among countries with large differences in expected gains from closer inte-
gration. The establishment of supranational entities to carry out this integration
requires a delegation of authority which in turn requires trust and implemen-
tation capabilities. Trust is difficult to build under any circumstance but
particularly so in Africa’s landscape of great diversity. This progress report
documents these obstacles and recognizes that African RIAs take place in an
1 The authors thank Olivier Cadot, Céline Carrère, Phil English, Richard Newfarmer, Olga
Solleder, and participants at the UNU-WIDER workshop on ‘Industries without Smokestacks’ in
Helsinki, 19–20 July 2016, for comments on an earlier draft. Opinions and errors are our own.
A longer version of this chapter is available as WIDER Working Paper 2017/103. Mariem Nouar
gratefully acknowledges support from the French National Research Agency under program ANR-
10-LABX-14-01.
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environment of weak implementation capabilities and over-stretched
scarce human resources.
The proposed approach towards pan-African unity and continental indus-
trialization was to be by the division of the continent into Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) that would, through closer economic and political ties,
constitute a united economy—the African Economic Community (AEC).
In Africa as a whole, but in SSA in particular, the RECs were to be the ‘building
blocs’ of the hoped-for African Union (AU) in the immediate post-colonial era
and now they are central to implementing the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development. In short, the RECs were to be, and continue to be, the glue
that will cement African unity. For this reason, we examine progress towards
integration at the REC level even though there is widespread overlap
across RECs (the eight RECs are indicated in bold in Table 19.1). On average,
each country belongs to two RECs with several countries belonging to three
RECs and Kenya belonging to four. Moreover, integration has not always
taken place at the REC level (i.e. members of the francophone West African
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and Economic and Monetary
Community of Central African States (CEMAC) monetary unions are mem-
bers of RECs but are not considered as RECs by the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA) so they are not included here).
In some cases, RIAs have focused on promoting regional cooperation (security,
humanitarian issues, agricultural research, and other issues) rather than on an
exchange of preferences (see the earlier working paper for a list). By and large,
however, RECs were built around a reciprocal reduction of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers (NTBs), so the terms preferential trade agreements (PTAs), free
trade areas (FTAs), regional trade agreements (RTAs), and RECs are used inter-
changeably to describe the exchange of preferences, and the term RIA covers
all aspects of integration agreements.
Here we review the ambitious objectives and the slow progress of integra-
tion by comparing the eight African RECs with three other South-South RIAs
(ANDEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), andMERCOSUR)
to assess whether conditions and progress have differed across the RECs (see
the working paper version for the departure from other reviews). Throughout,
the focus is on manufactures since industrialization is the overarching chal-
lenge facing Africa. The chapter emphasizes two dimensions of regional inte-
gration that have been largely neglected: the role of services and the related
issue of breadth (large membership) versus depth (deeper integration among a
smaller membership).
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the two phases of inte-
gration across the RECs set up by the Organization for African Unity (OAU).
Section 3 contrasts economic, cultural, and institutional indicators that have
been shown to be important in the outcomes of RIAs and explores the
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Table 19.1. Characteristics of Africa’s regional integration agreements
Col (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(RECs in bold) Type of agreement
[year originated, year signed]
(Total) [LL] {LDC} Indicators: Economic, biological, culture, institutions
Natural Capitala TCIb GDPa GDP per capita Gen. Dist. ELF POL WGId
Fuelsc TCI Cur. US$ bil. Cur. US$ Fsw ELF POL
(AMU), FTA [1988, 1989] (5) [0] {1} 51.4 (0.82) 15 377.5 (0.78) 4,930 (0.83) 0.03 0.27 0.44 0.69
(COMESA), CU [1965, 1993] (19) [8] {11} 22.1 (1.05) 17 542.3 (1.77) 2,485 (1.45) 0.08 0.55 0.51 0.64
(EAC), CU [1999, 1999] (5) [3] {4} 17.3 (1.12) 19 93.6 (0.70) 630 (0.51) 0.01 0.56 0.15 0.59
(ECOWAS), CU [1965, 1975/1993] (15) [3] {11} 35.5 (0.97) 22 486.6 (2.88) 961 (0.88) 0.03 0.77 0.46 0.62
(SADC), FTA [1980, 1986] (15) [6] {2} 32.2 (0.72) 17 607.2 (2.34) 3,393 (1.00) 0.07 0.63 0.47 0.34
(CEN-SAD), FTA [n.a., 1998] (29) [6] {20} 31.0 (0.95) 20 1,037.7 (2.04) 1,574 (1.46) 0.07 0.67 0.50 0.84
(ECCAS), CU [1983, 1985] (11) [3] {7} 44.9 (0.70) 16 184.15 (1.29) 4,268 (1.62) 0.02 0.72 0.333 1.14
(IGAD), EPEU [1986, 1996] (7) [1] {5} 4.0 (0.62) 16 159 (0.92) 862 (0.53) 0.05 0.68 0.51 1.01
Andean Com., CU [n.a., 1987] (5) [1] {0} 74.0 (0.21) 18 917.5 (0.84) 6,298 (0.69) 0.10 0.28 0.39 1.00
ASEAN, FTA [n.a., 1992] (10) [1] {3} 25.6 (1.22) 25 1,984.6 (1.15) 10,508 (1.55) 0.04 0.60 0.53 0.11
MERCOSUR CU [1985, 1991] (4) [2] {0} 39.0 (1.02) 21 2,695.1 (1.54) 9,154.3 (0.43) 0.08 0.23 0.34 0.69
Notes: See the list of acronyms and abbreviations of regional agreements. LL= Landlocked; FTA (Free Trade Area), CU (Customs Union), CMU (Customs andMonetary Union), CPU (Customs and
Political Union), EPEU (Environmental, Political and Economic Union). a/All averages are simple averages. Coefficient of variation in parenthesis, GDP at market prices, current USD billion (2010);
b/Trade Complementarity Index. TCImax=100 indicates ideal partners. Low score indicates countries export similar products. TCI of the EU= 41.7 in 1962. c/Fuels, ores, and metals. d/Rule of
law from the WGI indicators (2012).
Variables and sources: Genetic distance (Fs): Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016). A higher value means further distance. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF); Polarization (POL). For both indices, a
higher value indicates greater cleavages (Desmet et al. 2009). Fuel, ores, and metals (share of merchandise exports in 2013 GDP (in billion) and GDP per capita in current US$. Rules of law (WGI


























correlations of trade patterns with these indicators. The remaining sections
report on evaluation. Section 4 reports on the evolution of trade patterns and
trade costs. Section 5 discusses design: the trade-off between ‘breadth’ (large
membership) and ‘depth’ (small membership with deeper integration).
Section 6 concludes.
2. Progress at Integration: A First Look at Overly Ambitious RECs
An early phase of integration started during the first decades of independ-
ence under the Lagos Plan of Action, an initiative of the OAU (the AU since
2002) adopted in 1980. This early phase of integration largely failed as the
leaders of these young independent states, still establishing independence
from their former colonial masters, were reluctant to encourage the erosion
of national sovereignty. As reviewed by Melo and Tsikata (2015: Table 19.1),
with the exception of integration in the franc zone, implementation never
reached FTA status, let alone deeper integration. Absence of compensation
funds at the regional level was a major reason for this lack of implementa-
tion (see Foroutan 1992).
2.1. Objectives under the Abuja Treaty
Regional cooperation began in earnest with the Abuja Treaty (operational in
1994), which created the AEC. This was to culminate in an AU through
variable geometry whereby the RECs would integrate at different speeds fol-
lowing a ‘Minimum Integration Program’ along six stages for the eight RECs
listed in Table 19.1.2 All RECs have ambitious and wide-ranging objectives
that reflect the desire to accommodate the heterogeneity of interests across
members. The working paper version gives examples of the wide range of
objectives across these 8 RECs. The Tripartite FTA (TFTA) involving twenty-
six countries in the East African Community (EAC), Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and Southern African Development
Community (SADC), which is supposed to culminate in a Continental FTA
by 2017 completes the tour of initiatives at integration across the continent.
Its objectives are: (i) removing tariffs and NTBs, and implementing trade
facilitation measures to include a harmonization of Rules of Origin (RoO);3
2 The six successive stages (number of years in parenthesis) set up at the Abuja Treaty are:
(i) strengthen the RECs (5); (ii) eliminate tariffs and NTBs (8); (iii) FTA and customs union (CU)
in each REC (10); (iv) continental CU (2); (v) continental common market (4); (vi) continental
economic and monetary union (5), with stage (iv) to be reached in 2017.
3 RoO are necessary to prevent ‘trade deflection’ in FTAs—i.e. importing from the low-tariff
partner and selling in the high-tariff partner. Everywhere, RoO have been unnecessarily complex
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(ii) applying the subsidiarity principle to infrastructure to improve the
transport network; and (iii) fostering industrial development. However, to
keep momentum going and to accommodate the diversity of interests
among partners, negotiations to set up a ‘single undertaking’ to establish a
proper FTA veered towards a ‘variable geometry’ to allow the co-existence of
different trading arrangements. Initiated in 2008, the TFTAwas signed in 2015
and was to be launched in July 2016 after a twelve-month period to complete
the negotiations, during which period agreement was to be reached on the
removal of duties on between 65 per cent and 85 per cent of the tariff lines.
The parties failed to reach an agreement in their negotiations in June
2016. Although the blocs reached a common position on the proportion
of tariff lines to be liberalized, they failed to agree on the common external
tariff (CET) to be applied on sensitive products (e.g., maize, wheat, sugar,
textiles, and cement) that were all viewed as essential for the development of
domestic industries. Under the ‘variable geometry’ approach, the EAC has
agreed to liberalize 37 per cent of its 5,600 tariff lines and the SADC CU is to
liberalize 60 per cent of its 7,000 tariff lines. COMESA has 5,000 tariff lines,
but, since it is not really a CU, those members that are not part of the EAC or
SADC have been allowed to negotiate individually. Among the sticking
points at the negotiations was South Africa’s reluctance to open its markets
to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) members for a number of
products (maize, wheat, electronics). In the end, the negotiators differed on
the treatment to be given on a ‘sensitive list’ of products for protection
(maize, cement, sugar, second-hand clothes, spirits, plastics, electronic
equipment, etc.).
2.2. Implementation Difficulties
This ‘big development’ agenda across RECs, recalls the European Union (EU)
integration model. This linear integration model is in fact imported from the
European model of integration where the bet was that creating similar insti-
tutional bodies focusing on consensus decision-making would lead to a reduc-
tion in ‘heterogeneity costs’ across the different European populations
(Spolaore 2015). This integration process over a fifty-year period involved
the creation of thirteeen institutions (and an institution regrouping four
inter-institutional bodies). This building of institutions rested on a high
implementation capability.
and to the benefit of the strong lobbies in the inefficient industries in the strongest partner in the
FTA. (Erasmus et al. (2006) show how the RoO in SADC were largely imposed by South African
protectionist lobbies).
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African RIAs have copied the European model, setting up a large number of
institutions at early stages of integration. The Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) has six institutions, ten specialized agencies, and
two private sector organizations. COMESA has eleven institutions and EAC
has eight institutions. This attempt at accelerated integration via transplanted
best practices appears symptomatic of a ‘capability trap’ ‘where [systems]
adopt organizational forms that are successful elsewhere to hide their dys-
function’ (Pritchett et al. 2013: 2).
Two examples illustrate implementation difficulties. When adopting Sup-
plementary Protection Measures (SPM) (C/REG.1/09/13) to allow for tempor-
ary duty (up to five years) above the corresponding five-band CET rate adopted
by the ECOWAS CU in 2015, the directive specified that SPMs were for (most
favoured nation) MFN tariffs that were above the CET rate. The directive did
not envisage that SPMs could also apply to MFN tariffs below the CET rate.
As shown by Melo and Laski (2014), in addition to this omission in an official
directive (even assuming this was an omission), for a country like Liberia
where three-quarters of tariffs outside the CET band are on the low side,
applying the conditions in the directive would force a substantial increase in
applied tariffs during the transition period for key intermediates (e.g. zinc) and
consumer goods (e.g. rice).
A second example of an implementation capability trap is provided by the
conclusions of the report of the 2014 meeting of the Council of Ministers of
the nineteen COMESA members that took stock of progress in implementing
the CU adopted in 2009 (COMESA 2014). Taking a tally of the 217 decisions
reported in the Common Market gazette from 2009 to 2012, the report notes
that 13 per cent of decisions were not addressed to any party. Regarding the
signing and ratification of COMESA instruments that were to be carried out
from 2009 to 2012, 75 per cent (of the twelve instruments) had been signed by
the majority but only five instruments had been ratified, and only nine of
nineteen members had signed the COMESA Treaty (COMESA 2014: Tables 1
and 2). Likewise, the report notes little progress in enacting the key Common
Market legislation (Common Tariff Nomenclature, Common External Tariff
and Common Market Customs Management Regulations). As an example of
implementation difficulties, Malawi reported that adopting the CET would
result in a large loss of tax revenue (trade taxes account for 35 per cent of tax
revenue) while other states with more than 50 per cent of tariff lines at zero
rate, some of which are bound at that level at the World Trade Organization
(WTO), were concerned about the possibility of eventual negotiations at the
WTO for adopting the envisaged CET.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that the RECs have been overly ambitious
in relation to implementation capabilities. The next section gives indicators of
the difficulties in realizing this integration agenda.
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3. The Landscape: Economic, Cultural,
and Institutional Indicators
African RECs displaymuch diversity across economic, cultural, and institutional
dimensions. Indicators of this diversity are summarized in Table 19.1. As a
benchmark, the bottom rows of the table also report these indicators for three
other South-South RTAs: MERCOSUR, a CU that could be compared to the
EAC; ASEAN, an FTA with large membership that might serve as a comparator
for COMESA or ECOWAS; and ANDEAN also a CUwith a smaller membership
that could also serve as a benchmark for the EAC.
Table 19.1, column 1 gives the name, type of agreement, year of initiation of
negotiations, and year of signature (the year of signature is used as the break
point for the before–after comparisons reported in section 4). Column 2 gives
membership broken down along coastal (C), landlocked (LL), and least devel-
oped countries (LDC) and non-LDC membership. These three indicators cap-
ture difficulties at implementation. A large membership requires more
coordination for implementation. Diversity of membership involving coastal
and landlocked countries indicates conflicts of interest. Venables (2011)
shows that an FTA between an LL and a C country can give rise to trade
creation for LL and to trade diversion for C if both are price-takers on world
markets and LL does not have access to the world market. In this set-up, the
wage is lower in LL because of diminishing returns that are absent in C which
has access to world markets. The FTA gives LL access to C so its terms-of-trade
improve. With labour mobility under deep integration, labour would migrate
from LL to C, closing the wage gap. Mixed LDC and non-LDC membership is
another type of diversity that results in conflicting interests in negotiations for
reciprocal FTAs. During the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) involv-
ing the EU and former colonies, non-LDCs had an interest in maintaining
market access while LDCs already had full market access under the everything
but arms (EBA) scheme; see Melo and Régolo (2014).
The remaining columns give average values at the RIA level (coefficient of
variation in parenthesis) for the proxy indicators capturing economic, cul-
tural, and institutional characteristics. Large values for a coefficient of vari-
ation for gross domestic product (GDP) are suggestive of gains from scale
economies (e.g. Paraguay and Brazil in MERCOSUR) and large values for per
capita income are an indicator of the need for compensation (e.g. Laos and
Singapore in ASEAN).
3.1. Economic Indicators
Table 19.1, columns 3 to 6 display economic indicators used in describing the
RIAs. Column 3 gives an indicator of the importance of natural resources in
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exports. With the exception of the EAC and ASEAN, on average, fuels, ores,
and metals account for between one-third and one-half of merchandise
exports in all RIAs, including the comparators. Since minerals are exported
outside the region, regional integration would not be expected to elicit a
strong supply response unless it is in the form of new products (see evidence
in section 4.2). Table 19.1, column 4 shows low scores for the Trade Comple-
mentarity Index (TCI) values for all RIAs including those in the comparator
group (a low average score in a regional grouping indicates that countries are
exporting similar baskets, hence lack complementarity). The scores are low
especially when compared with the corresponding value of 41.7 when the EU
started to integrate in 1962. With higher values, ASEAN and MERCOSUR
appear to have displayed greater complementarity. To sum up, along these
dimensions, the RECs have similar characteristics with the comparator groups.
Excluding the large twenty-nine-member Community of Sahel-Saharan
States (CEN-SAD) group that includes Egypt, Nigeria, and other resource-
rich countries, the RECs stand out by their small economic size (Table 19.1,
column 5). GDP is about one-third to one-fifth that of its comparators in spite
of a usually large membership. As a benchmark, excluding CEN-SAD, the GDP
of ANDEAN (US$917.5 billion) is only 50 per cent larger than SADC, the largest
REC. High coefficient-of-variation values for GDP are observed for ECOWAS,
SADC, COMESA and MERCOSUR compared with the other groups. This sug-
gests that deep integration would likely be accompanied by strong agglomer-
ation effects towards the larger members. Size dispersion also suggests that the
interests of small countries will not carry the day in formulating external trade
policy when integration moves beyond FTA status, with external trade policy
becoming more protectionist as was the case when ECOWAS became a CU.
Relative to the comparators, African RECs stand out as a result of their lower
average per capita income (Table 19.1, column 6)—in most cases around one-
thirdor less than that of the comparator group.ASEANstands outwithahighper
capita income but also large dispersion. Together with the dispersion in eco-
nomic size, these large dispersions in per capita income suggest that any deep
integration will necessitate large within-REC transfers. Barring budgetarymeans
to do so, countries will naturally try to find ways to avoid deep integration.
High dispersion in indicators of geography and economic size combined
with a low average per capita income across most RECs suggest limited imple-
mentation capability.
3.2. Indicators of Trust and Institutions
Recent contributions have established that trust and institutions are two other
important characteristics in explaining trade patterns. Proxies for these char-
acteristics are summarized in Table 19.1, columns 7 to 10. Starting with trust,
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the literature on the roots of development, reviewed by Spolaore andWacziarg
(2016), gives support to the importance of the inheritance transmission
mechanisms via biological factors (genetic distance) and cultural factors (shar-
ing a language, a religious faith) in explaining current performance (i.e. GDP)
and hence indirectly trade, which is co-determined with GDP. They also
report suggestive evidence that these characteristics matter more than loca-
tion (geography) as determinants of current levels of development.
Table 19.1, column 7 reports the population weighted average genetic dis-
tance, FsW, between country pairs within each PTA. The measure captures the
length of time since two populations became separated from each other.4
Genetic distance is negatively correlated with trust which, in turn, is positively
correlated with bilateral trade.5 The FsW values are low for EAC, ASEAN, and
ECOWAS but high for COMESA, CEN-SAD (where conflicts are widespread),
and MERCOSUR. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) in column 8 and
polarization (POL) in column 9 also serve as proxies for trust. ELF is maxi-
mized when each individual belongs to a different group while POL measures
political cleavages by comparing the relative size of different groups. POL takes
a maximum value when groups are of the same size. In general, with the
exception of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the African RECs have higher
average ELF values than comparators, suggesting less trust. High average
values are also observed for the POL indicator across most RECs.
These proxy indicators of trust are very rough. Values within and across RIAs
generally do not reveal clear patterns suggestive of the importance of trust for
the success of regional integration. As mentioned above, Spolaore (2015)
notes that the European project of integration was built on the expectation
that different European populations and policymakers, by learning to interact
and cooperate on economic and institutional matters, would generally con-
verge in values, norms, and preferences leading to an ‘endogenous’ reduction
in ‘heterogeneity costs’ to facilitate further integration in more sensitive
political areas. This was certainly among the objectives of African RECs,
sometimes explicitly in the objectives of the agreement. For example, ECO-
WAS has brought together Francophone WAEMU with two Lusophone and
five Anglophone countries in a common REC. This involved three different
4 The greatest genetic distance in the Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) sample is 0.4573, between
Mbuti Pygmies and Papua New Guineans, while the smallest is between Danish and English
(0.0021). Genetic distance provides no effect of genes on productivity (i.e. a ‘genetic effect’).
Rather, it is a measure of the importance of inter-generationally transmitted traits including
traits that are transmitted culturally across generations; see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016: 18).
5 Guiso et al. (2009) show that somatic distance (height, cephalic index, and hair colour) is
negatively correlated with bilateral trust which, in turn, is positively correlated with bilateral trade.
Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) separate the preference channel from the trade cost channel on
European bilateral trade and find that one-third of the trade cost effect is due to the preference
(affinity) effect.
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legal and linguistic colonial traditions, which, according to some have
fomented what Metzger (2008: 25, cited in Engel and Jouenjean 2015) has
described as ‘the well-known antagonism between the English-speaking and
French-speaking West Africa’. Whether or not the antagonisms were reduced
by integration, according to the indicator values in columns 8 to 9, ECOWAS
has below-average trust, and difficulties in making progress at integration are
amply documented (see e.g. Engel and Jouenjean 2015).
Domestic institutions also matter for comparative advantage. Traditional
indicators of comparative advantage used in evaluating RTAs (e.g. the TCI in
Table 19.1, column 4) implicitly assume that the gains from trade (and inte-
gration) are reflected in comparative advantage measures captured by tech-
nology, innovation, and capital accumulation in the tradition of Ricardo
and Hecksher-Ohlin. Evidence is now accumulating that current-day trade,
at least for sophisticated manufactures (and some agricultural products), is
now considered to be largely co-determined by the quality of contracting
institutions and technology and factor endowments. Countries with better
domestic institutions (as captured by the rule of law) have a revealed com-
parative advantage in ‘institutionally dependent’ goods (e.g., surgical appli-
ances, packaging machinery).6
Finally, Table 19.1, column 10 reports average values for the rule of law
component in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The index, an
average of indicators, summarizes people’s perceptions about the ensemble
of variables capturing the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
and the courts, all of which are generally viewed as important for countries
wishing to integrate. Taken as another indicator of implementation capabil-
ity, African (and other South-South (S-S)) RIAs would have below-average
implementation capability. With a score of –0.11, close to the mean for all
countries within the agreement, ASEAN stands out as the grouping with the
highest implementation capability.
3.3. Correlates of Bilateral Trade in Manufactures
A key feature of trade data is that bilateral exports [imports] rise approximately
proportionately to the economic size of the importing [exporting] country,
especially so for middle- and high-income countries. Economic size (usually
6 Summarizing the literature, Nunn and Trefler (2014) conclude that countries with good
governance indicators have revealed comparative advantage in contract-intensive manufactures.
They also note that trade patterns have an impact on the long-run development of institutions.
During the three-corner Atlantic trade from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, Africa was
exchanging slaves for manufactures, a pattern of trade that led to a deterioration of domestic
institutions and property rights. Repeated interactions and kin- and ethnic-based networks can
only be poor substitutes for more formal institutions needed for contract-intensive manufactures.
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captured by GDP) is a proxy for the ‘capabilities’ of exporting countries to all
destinations and import ‘characteristics’ of the destination market from all
sources (Head andMayer 2014). When distance is included as a proxy for trade
costs along with the traditional gravity variables, cross-section estimates
return coefficient estimates for GDPs and distance close to unity (Head and
Mayer 2014: Table 19.4) and estimates of the elasticity of trade flows to
distance in the range (–0.8, –1.4). Table 19.2 checks the robustness of these
estimates for 144 low-income countries by restricting the sample to S-S trade
flows.7 Estimates are only reported for bilateral trade in manufactures where
trust and the quality of institutions are likely to matter most.8
Estimates in equation (1) include fixed effects (FEs) for origin (β0) and
destination (βd) countries. These FEs control for all country-specific omitted
variables (e.g. island, landlocked, or the quality of physical infrastructure and
logistics, or one country is a WTO member). The FEs also control for the
variables in Table 19.1 that are not dyadic (e.g. ELF, POL, andWGI indicators).
Genetic distance, Fs, serving as a proxy for trust is included along with two
trade policy variables (both countries in the same RTA and members of the
WTO). The sample is for manufactures only, since this is the main focus of the
chapter and, unless mentioned, results are for S-S trade only. Estimates are
carried out under ordinary least squares (OLS) and with the Eaton-Kortum
Tobit (Eaton and Kortum 2001) which includes zero value observations that
are omitted under OLS.
ln Xo,d ¼ αþ βo þ βd þ
Xj¼1
4
GRAVj þ β1RTAo,d ð1Þ
þ β2WTOo,d þ β3lnFso,d þ ϵo,d
Results are reported in Table 19.2. Coefficients of interest are the coefficient on
distance which serves as a proxy for all trade costs and on the trade policy
variables. As a benchmark, column 1 reports coefficients from the ‘naïve’
gravity model. Coefficient signs and significance levels are as expected, with
the GDP coefficient estimates close to unity. These estimates do not control
for the multilateral resistance terms that belong in the theory-based gravity
equation. Starting with column 2, all estimates include country FEs. The
column 2 estimate for distance is higher as would be expected if the multilat-
eral resistance terms are the only source of bias (see the Monte Carlo experi-
ments in Head and Mayer (2014)). Column 3 introduces weighted bilateral
genetic distance, Fs, the proxy measure for trust. The coefficient is significant
7 The S-S sample uses the same definition as in WTO (2011) i.e. a ‘South’ country is a country
with lower, lower-middle or upper-middle income, as defined by the World Bank.
8 This amounts to imposing unitary income elasticities restrictions which have no effect on the
estimated RTA coefficient (Baier and Bergstrand 2007: Table 5). Results similar to those reported in
Table 2 obtain when estimations are carried out for all trade.
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Table 19.2. Correlates of bilateral trade 2012 (manufactures, south-south)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS with GDP OLS with FE OLS with FE EK Tobit with FE OLS with FE OLS with FE EK Tobit with FE
Ln(distance) 1.390*** 1.743*** 1.620*** 2.897*** 1.619*** 1.471*** 2.828***
(0.0450) (0.0424) (0.0476) (0.0834) (0.0477) (0.0509) (0.0881)
Common language 1.349*** 1.472*** 1.406*** 2.096*** 1.405*** 1.352*** 2.082***
(0.0847) (0.0815) (0.0852) (0.145) (0.0853) (0.0846) (0.144)
Common border 1.681*** 1.338*** 1.256*** 0.290 1.255*** 1.083*** 0.103





Ln(Genetic dist.) 0.258*** 0.357*** 0.258*** 0.238*** 0.347***
(0.0359) (0.0611) (0.0359) (0.0357) (0.0607)




Constant 26.60*** 28.56*** 28.42***
(0.684) (1.060) (1.184)
Observations 10,798 11,328 10,176 16,277 10,176 10,046 16,022
R-squared 0.528 0.672 0.679 0.679 0.687
Fixed Effects (FE) importer no yes yes yes yes yes yes
exporter no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at country-pair level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EK Tobit: Eaton-Kortum Tobit.


























with the expected negative sign and its inclusion reduces the coefficient
value of the distance coefficient since Fs is correlated with distance (ρ=0.40).
Column 5 adds the WTO dummy which is insignificant. And in column 6,
partnership in an RTA is associated with a significantly higher volume of
bilateral trade, a result that holds when estimation is on panel of 8 five-year
periods which also controls for omitted time-invariant bilateral variables (see
table 19.4 in the working paper). In conclusion, the trust proxy estimate is
stable and remains significant across these cross-section estimates.
Before interpreting the distance coefficient estimates as a rough guide to
trade costs, onemust deal with the importance of zero observations (43 per cent
of observations are omitted under OLS) and the possibility of heteroskedasti-
city. To deal with zero flows, Table 19.2, columns 4 and 7 report estimates with
the Eaton-Kortum Tobit estimator (Eaton and Kortum 2001) which includes
zero trade flows. Both columns return much larger estimates for the distance
coefficient. These estimates capture the observation that far-away partners do
not trade. Other coefficients retain their sign and significance levels, except for
the common border. When we use the Poisson-Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) which also corrects
for heteroskedasticity, similar patterns are obtained across the North-North
(N-N) and S-S samples.9
It is instructive to contrast these results with the corresponding one for N-N
trade (full results not reported here to save space). In spite of a sample a quarter
in size, the overall fit is tighter and, while the PTA coefficient is of similar size
and significance, genetic distance is not significant and the distance coeffi-
cient estimate is stable and in the range (–1.3, –1.5) a much lower estimate
than for the S-S sample in Table 19.2 (–1.4, –2.8). Thus a doubling of trade
costs (as proxied by the distance coefficient estimate) would reduce bilateral
trade to 35 per cent [14 per cent] of its value at the mean distance for (N-N)
[S-S].10 These high estimates probably capture omitted unobservables,
including the gains from the reduction in uncertainty provided by an agree-
ment (see Limaõ (2016)) and the importance of depth of agreements (see
Table 19.5), but these very rough estimates capture the observation that the
low volume of bilateral trade for S-S countries reflects significantly higher
trade costs in S-S trade PTAs.
To sum up so far, the discussion around the indicators in Table 19.1 and the
correlation results in Table 19.2 give support to the importance of indicators of
9 Results are similar with the same pattern of signs and significance levels, but coefficient values
are lower than those obtained with the Eaton-Kortum Tobit estimator reported in Table 19.2.




where θ is the estimated coefficient elasticity of distance at the
mean (7009) [8389]. So doubling distance reduces trade to (35 per cent) [14 per cent] for (N-N) [S-S]
sample.
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culture, trust, and institutions in bilateral trade as well as economic indicators
as co-determinants of bilateral trade. These have been overlooked in progress
reports on integration in low-income countries.
4. Detecting the Effects of RECs on Trade Costs and Trade
We now check for evidence of changes in the intensity of bilateral trade
among the RECs following implementation with comparisons for five-year
and ten-year periods after the signature of the agreement relative to an average
of two years before the agreement to take into account the fact that it takes
time for a reduction in barriers to intra-regional trade to show up in the data.
A look at intra and extra regional trade patterns (these are reported in figure 1
of the working chapter) reveal several patterns. First, ASEAN stands out as the
most open bloc with an average openness to trade of over 50 per cent of
GDP. The share of intra-regional trade grows after integration but the extra-
bloc share also increases—an indication of open regionalism. By contrast, the
share of intra-bloc imports remains very low throughout for all RECs in spite
of increases for SADC and ECOWAS. For all African RECs, ten years on, intra-
bloc imports hover in the 2 to 4 per cent range, a pattern also observed for
ANDEAN and MERCOSUR. Globally, the data indicate an increase in overall
openness, a reflection that, worldwide, the elasticity of trade to GDP rose from
around 2 in 1960 to 3 until the financial crisis of 2008/9, but it gives no
evidence that this rise was driven by rising intra-bloc trade.
4.1. Trade Cost Estimates
Another way of apprehending progress is to compare observed trade flows
with those predicted by a frictionless gravity world in which each good would
have the same price everywhere. Comparing the value of the average distance
ratio (ADR) among RTA members, ADRRTA, before and after integration is a
first proxy measure of changes in trade costs induced by the ensemble of
integration measures. The ADR is the ratio of the observed average distance
of trade, ADOTRTA to the potential ADR, ADRRTA,P given by the ratio of the





If trade costs among partners are falling more rapidly than trade costs with
non-partners, then RTA partners entering a trade agreement would trade more
with each other after integration so one would expect ADOTRTA to fall after
integration while potential trade would not be expected to change much.
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Figure 19.1 reports the values of these ratios for the intensive margin of trade
(i.e. across partners) with positive bilateral trade around the time of the
agreement and ten years after signature (similar results not reported here
obtain for five years after signature). As in Figure 19.2, to iron out fluctuations,
each point is a two-year average, two years before the signature of the agree-
ment, and a two-year average, ten years after the signature of the agreement.11
Since the ADRs prior to integration are on the horizontal axis, if (3) holds,
then points would be below the 45° line.
Figures 19.1a and 19.1b reveal several patterns. First, confirming the esti-
mates in Table 19.2, trade costs are important as shown by the departure of the
IGAD
ASEAN
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Figure 19.1a. Average distance of trade by RTA before and ten years after integration:
Agriculture
Note: ADR is the ratio of the average observed distance for existing trade flows before integration to
the average distance predicted under frictionless trade. Maximum ADR value is 1. Observations
below (above) the 45° line, represent a shift towards geographically closer (further away) partners
after integration.
Source : Authors’ estimates.
11 When there is expansion in membership during the period (e.g. Burundi and Rwanda joined
the EAC in 2008), calculations are restricted to the original members in the group.
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ADRs from unity (which would correspond to a frictionless world according to
the gravity model). The ADR across RIAs is in the (0.5–0.8) range for agricul-
ture and for manufactures. Second, rather surprisingly at first (because reduc-
tion in barriers to trade in agriculture are often left off the agenda of reduction
in trade barriers), all the ratios are below the diagonal for agriculture but are
scattered around the 45° line for manufactures suggesting that trade costs
among RTA partners fell more for agriculture than for manufactures. However,
this pattern could reflect the slow progress of trade liberalization for agricul-
tural products multilaterally during the Uruguay round, where there was no
reduction in trade barriers in agriculture especially for high-income countries,
leaving room for progress on a preferential basis for low-income countries.
Third, the patterns for manufactures are generally plausible. For example,
MERCOSUR and the EAC are below the 45° line signifying—according to the
gravity model—that the distance of trade among RIA partners is falling after
integration. This would be the case if, under cost-minimizing trade, trade costs
among partners are falling more rapidly than trade costs with non-members.
19.1(b): Manufactures


































Figure 19.1b. Average distance of trade by RTA before and ten years after integration:
Manufactures
Note: As for 19.1(a).
Source: As for 19.1(a).
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4.2. Destination of Trade in New Products
Table 19.3 carries out a similar before–after ‘event analysis’ for newly exported
manufactures at the (harmonized system) HS-4 level (new products exported
for at least three years over the 2000–8 period relative to manufactures
exported throughout 1995–9). Table 19.3 shows that the average number of
traded goods in the RECs is about half that in the three comparator groups.
The data also show that RIAs comprising countries with higher per capita
income are, on average, more diversified.12 Table 19.3 shows some catching
up as the percentage increase in new goods is over twice as large as the three
comparators. The data also show that all new manufactures are shipped to
closer destinations than the traditional goods, a confirmation of the observed
pattern of regionalization of trade among developing countries. This might
reflect characteristics of the products, knowledge of demand, trust, or similar
institutions, all of which could translate into lower trade costs. This small
increase in number of products is consistent with the very low levels of intra-
industry trade in African PTAs reported by Brülhart (2009).13
Table 19.3. New goods traded by RIA over 2000–8
Averages by REC and Year over the 2000–8 Period
Country Number new Number traded % new goods
ECOWAS 21.6 347.9 6.2%
EAC 24.3 491 4.9%
SADC 21.6 381.3 5.6%
COMESA 15.6 355.6 5.1%
IGAD 19.29 339.8 5.6%
AMU 21 471.6 4.4%
CEN-SAD 18.8 360.2 5.2%
ECCAS 14.2 187.2 7.6%
ANDEAN 21.8 740.2 2.9%
ASEAN 15.6 720.1 2.1%
MERCOSUR 15.5 705.2 2.2%
Notes: Authors’ calculations from HS-4 level (1,084 products) using COMTRADE data (mirrored).
At this level of aggregation, high-income countries exported an average of around 1,000 (out of a
possible 1,052 products) during the period. Averages by REC over the 2000–8 period.
Source : Authors’ estimates.
12 The correlation coefficient GDP-number of products is 0.71 and the correlation GDP p.c. and
number of products exported is 0.74.
13 Intra-industry trade shares (internal, external) as a share of trade: EU-15(46.6;24.5); CEMAC
(1.2;0.1) WAEMU (0.9;0.4); EAC (0.3;0.4); SACU (0.3;9.0).
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5. Building the RECs: Breadth versus Depth
If RTAs have an important function by increasing the opportunity cost of
conflicts (Martin et al. 2008, 2012) from an economic standpoint, serious
integration agreements are attempts between sovereign states to reciprocally
renounce on some states’ rights while confronting lobbying activities. As
emphasized by Melo and Tsikata (2015, p. 231), common decision-making
internalizes cross-border spillovers but at the cost of moving the common
policy away from its preferred national policy (i.e. a loss of national sover-
eignty). In Africa, spillovers are important as transport and communications
infrastructure are under-provided, but the ethno-linguistic diversity across
‘artificial’ borders documented in Table 19.1 suggests strong differences in
policy preferences. This heterogeneity hinders the supply of public goods
through the adoption of common regional policies. How have the RECs
opted between emphasis on the ‘depth’ of integration (deeper provisions)
and ‘breadth’ (larger membership)? Opting for more breadth requires more
compromises because of heterogeneity of membership. Greater depth is con-
ducive to the provision of public goods while expanded membership (greater
‘breadth’ through expanded membership) tackles the tyranny of small mar-
kets that has always faced African countries.14
5.1. How Deep Are African RTAs?
From 2000 to 2015, 194 PTAs notified to the WTO have come into force, of
which 64 per cent also include provisions on services trade, whereas 90 per
cent of the eighty-one PTAs in force prior to 2000 featured provisions dealing
exclusively with trade in goods (Egger and Shingal 2016). This extension of
coverage to services reflects the increasing importance of services as comple-
mentary inputs into production and of the slow progress at trade liberalization
in services at the multilateral level. Here we compare the depth of integration
measures in SSA RTAs relative to other S-S RTAs following the tally in Horn
et al. (2010) who classify coverage into two broad categories: those that are
covered by the WTO negotiations, for which the issue is how much further
does the RTA go beyond WTO negotiations (the WTO+ category); and those
that are not covered in theWTO negotiations (the WTO-X category). For each
category, when the provision is covered (denoted AC for area covered), the
14 At purchasing power parity prices, the combined GDP of SSA countries (including South
Africa), is about 85 per cent of Germany’s GDP. Reviewing case studies of regional power markets,
Oseni and Politt (2016) conclude that regional power markets should start with few members. The
discussion paper contrasts the experience of ‘deep integration’ in the EAC with ‘shallow
integration’ in ECOWAS comparing the plight of small countries in these RTAs (Rwanda and
Liberia).
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provisions are further categorized according to their degree of legal enforce-
ability based on the wording in the provision (e.g. ‘parties shall cooperate’ is
deemed not legally enforceable while ‘neither party may expropriate or
nationalize a covered investment . . . ’ is deemed legally enforceable (i.e. indi-
cated by LE in Figure 19.2). This approach has been extended by Hoffman
et al. (2017) to include 279 RTAs over the 1985–2015 period.
Figure 19.2 summarizes a tally of the provisions for the 117 S-S RTAs,
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19.2(a) Average coverage of WTO + provisions by category of obligations
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RECs (7) South-South (108) RECs LE (7) South-South LE (108)
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Percentage of REC and South-South agreements covered by WTO-X 
provisions
Figure 19.2. A comparison of coverage of provisions across South-South RTAs: African
RTAs vs. other South-South RTAs
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(108) S-S RTAs. Not surprisingly, legal enforceability is much higher forWTO+
than for the WTO-X provisions that are not covered in the WTO. Lumping all
the WTO+ provisions, the aggregate coverage ratio (across all categories) is
only slightly lower (58 per cent vs. 64 per cent) in SSA RTAs than in other S-S
RTAs, but the legal enforceability is significantly lower. As to the WTO-X
provisions (not covered by WTO negotiations), coverage is more than twice
as high in African RTAs, but, at 5 per cent, the legal enforceability is as low as
in other S-S RTAs. Interestingly, on average, legal enforceability is always lower
for African RTAs than for other S-S RTAs. The high coverage ratio of WTO-X
provisions in SSA RTAs could reflect a combination of three factors: (i) high
coverage inspired by coverage in EU agreements where RIAs are the main
diplomatic arm of the EU which does not have a foreign policy so to
speak;15 (ii) a way to build trust by including the preferences of all partici-
pants; and (iii) a sign of diplomacy among countries with large differences in
preferences. This is akin to the ‘universalism’ problem in the politics of rent-
sharing in RTAs where every government wants a share of the spoils when
voting on protection so that all countries vote for measures that are not in
their interest in exchange for getting the support of other members for meas-
ures they benefit from (Schiff and Winters 2003: 87).
Producer services (transportation, accounting, information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT), consulting, financial) are all complementary inputs
in the production function and hence necessary to expand the production of
intermediate and final goods. Many are specialized inputs. Access is needed to
a wide range of varieties from domestic and foreign suppliers. In Figure 19.2,
regulations fall under the following categories: investment-related obliga-
tions, domestic trade-related regulations, and capital and labour regulations.
For all these categories, on average, the African RTAs have lower enforceability
than in other S-S agreements. This is particularly so for the investment-related
obligations (General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)) which have lower coverage
and lower enforceability.
As a check of the potential importance of depth of integration for participa-
tion in supply chain trade, Table 19.4 reports panel regressions of bilateral trade
in parts and components that are exchanged in supply chains for our sample of
S-S RIAs over the 1980–2014 period. To control for omitted variables, the full set
of FEs is included in all regressions with three measures of depth: all provisions,
core provisions (WTO+ provisions plus competition and movement of capital),
15 In their comparison of WTO-X areas in EU and US FTAs, Horn et al. (2010) note that 75 per
cent (of 310 provisions) in EU agreements are non-enforceable while 85 per cent (of 82 provisions)
are enforceable in US agreements.
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Table 19.4. Depth of integration and trade in components and parts: panel 1982–2012a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS EK Tobit EK Tobit EK Tobit
PTA 0.832*** 0.827*** 0.832*** 1.182*** 1.103*** 1.182***
(0.0446) (0.0460) (0.0446) (0.0867) (0.0919) (0.0867)
WTO 0.398*** 0.399*** 0.398*** 1.393*** 1.391*** 1.393***
(0.0695) (0.0694) (0.0695) (0.0442) (0.0442) (0.0442)
Ln(distance) 1.920*** 1.920*** 1.920***
(0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0366)
Com. border 0.376* 0.382* 0.376*
(0.218) (0.218) (0.218)
Com. language 2.056*** 2.058*** 2.056***
(0.0662) (0.0661) (0.0662)
Ln(GDP exp.) 2.273*** 2.272*** 2.273***
(0.00953) (0.00952) (0.00953)
Ln(GDP imp) 1.372*** 1.371*** 1.372***
(0.00980) (0.00979) (0.00980)
WTO+ and WTO-X 0.0106*** 0.00821**
provisions (sum) (0.00145) (0.00397)
WTO+ provisions 0.0238*** 0.0317***
(sum) (0.00376) (0.0104)
Nb. of prov./Max. 0.552*** 0.427**
nb. of provisions (0.0753) (0.207)
Constant 62.80*** 62.76*** 62.80***
(0.496) (0.496) (0.496)
Observations 149,469 149,469 149,469 323,777 323,777 323,777
R-squared 0.842 0.842 0.842
Fixed Effects (FE)
importer*year yes yes yes no no no
exporter*year yes yes yes no no no
bilateral yes yes yes no no no
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at country-pair level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EK Tobit: Eaton-Kortum Tobit
a Three-year panel. Components and parts defined as sections 42 (parts and components of capital goods) and 43 (part and accessories of transport equipment) of the BEC and code 65 of the
SITC (textiles).


























and the percentage of provisions covered. The estimates in columns 1 to 3
indicate that all three measures are significant along with the WTO and PTA
dummies. The results are robust to the inclusion of zero observations with the
Eaton-Kortum Tobit estimator reported in columns 4 to 6. While the inclusion
of dummies controls for omitted variable bias, the results could also reflect that
it is participation in supply chain trade that has pushed countries to integrate
more deeply. In any case, the results suggest that deep integration, including
WTO membership, is important for supply chain trade.
6. Conclusions
The RECs have been the driving force of integration across the African
continent where small fragmented and isolated economies with a very unequal
distribution of economic resources and geographic characteristics make a com-
pelling case for integration on a regional basis to exploit scale economies, reap
efficiency gains, and reduce the thickness of borders. This review started by
documenting the obstacles to progress resulting from the large heterogeneity
across the continent. We looked for signs of integration in producer services
which are complementary for manufacturing and key for the prospects of
industrialization without ‘smokestacks’ emphasized in the project.
The review suggests three takeaways. First, progress has been slow towards
meeting overly ambitious objectives suggestive of an implementation capabil-
ity trap. Second, since their inception, reorganization in the pattern of trade in
manufactures towards REC partners has been small, suggesting that regional
trade costs have not fallen, at least relative to non-regional trade costs. This
persistence of high trade costs has been accompanied by few new manufac-
tures destined to geographically close markets. Third, compared with other
South-South RIAs, the RECs have moved towards deeper integration by
including a high number of provisions not covered in WTO negotiations.
However, these provisions have low legal enforceability. Reasons for this
slow progress are explored in the chapter.
From a broader perspective, this progress report questions Africa’s ‘old
regionalism’ approach where the building of RECs still continues to be built
around an exchange of market access seeking to build vertically integrated
production chains on a regional basis rather than participating in the growth
of trade in tasks where integration takes place on a horizontal basis. The
worldwide reduction in trade costs and the subsequent horizontal fragmen-
tation of production has meant that logistics and services activities have
become necessary for participation in the rapidly expanding exchange of
intermediate goods (i.e. trade in tasks). Participation in ‘value chains’
requires not only access to imported intermediates at world prices, but also
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access to the services (transportation, accounting, ICT, consulting, financial)
that are essential in the production of intermediate and final goods. Econo-
metric estimates indicate that participation in the RECs has contributed to
intensifying bilateral trade in manufactures; deep integration covering ser-
vices contributes to intensifying the trade in parts and components that are
part of the worldwide delocalization of tasks. Tackling the removal of bar-
riers to trade in goods and trade in services remains a challenge for successful
integration in the RECs.
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Implications for Public Policy
Richard S. Newfarmer, John Page, and Finn Tarp
1. Introduction
While structural change is taking place in Africa, it is at a pace and with a
pattern that is distinct from both the historical experience of today’s indus-
trialized countries and from more recent transformations in East Asia. These
differences reflect the impact of technological change and a changing global
marketplace interacting with policy, a rapidly growing labour force, and
natural endowments. Some African countries—perhaps those favoured by
coastal locations—will be able to transform their economic structures through
manufacturing. The essays in this book also suggest quite strongly, however,
that it would be surprising if the successful African economy of the future
closely followed the export-oriented manufacturing-led path that has charac-
terized East Asia’s structural transformation. Africa’s growing economies are
likely to have economic structures that contain high value added agriculture,
agro-industry, and tradable services in addition to a more robust manufactur-
ing base. New global realities will force Africa’s economic policy makers to
think of ways to promote structural transformation into activities beyond
manufacturing.
To transform their economies, African governments need to attract new
firms able to compete in regional and global markets in services, tourism, and
agro-industry in addition to other manufactures. At the same time they must
boost the competitiveness of existing firms in these same sectors. While much
of the effort to transform the region’s economies will need to come from
African governments themselves, the essays in Parts I and III of this book
point to the crucial changes needed in global economic policy and in Africa’s
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regional economic communities (RECs). This chapter sets out new directions
for public policy—at global, national, and regional levels—to widen the
options for structural transformation.
2. Global Policy Reforms
The US retreat from leadership on multilateral issues, apparent since early
2017, has created a vacuum that, left unfilled, could impede progress on
multilateral initiatives that would otherwise promote structural change in
Africa. TheWTOnegotiations on trade in agricultural products, manufactures,
and e-commerce in the Doha round were already moribund, foundering from
complexity and multi-polar divisiveness. The new US administration imme-
diately withdrew from negotiations on the Trans Pacific Partnership, a group-
ing of some twelve Pacific Rim countries. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the
British vote to leave the European Union in June 2016 constituted another
earthquake threatening a former pillar of multilateralism. For Africa, clearly,
the first order of business is resisting the rising tide of protectionism.
2.1. Collective Action on Goods and Services Trade
The international community can assist African governments to defend the
global trading system bymore forthrightly addressing the uneven distribution
of gains and losses through trade. A joint publication of the World Bank,
IMF, and WTO undertaken for the G20 Sherpas meeting in March 2017
wrote: ‘ . . . recent experience shows that too many individuals and communi-
ties, notably also in the advanced economies, have been left behind by trade:
there are legitimate reasons for discontent’.1 The thrust of that report was a
recommendation to strengthen the multilateral rules keeping markets open
and to undertake serious country-based programs to mitigate trade adjust-
ment costs. Of particular importance is portable access to health care, retire-
ment programmes and education. It remains to be seen whether politicians
and their societies in the OECD will adopt this view.
The current headwinds notwithstanding, several other global initiatives can
support trade-led structural transformation. Reducing trade costs has an
immediate and powerful effect on trade, and so one priority for multilateral
collective action is to implement the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) fully.
Ministers were able to rescue the TFA at the Bali Ministerial in 2013, and it took
effect in February 2017, when two-thirds of the WTO membership completed
1 See IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (2017).
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their individual ratification of the arrangement. The TFA includes largely
voluntary provisions to expedite the movement, release, and clearance of
goods, and protection of goods in transit. It also outlines ways for customs and
other appropriate authorities to cooperate on trade facilitation and customs
compliance, alongwithmodalities for technical assistance and capacity building.
By reducing both the variable and fixed costs of exporting, trade facilitation
increases the exports of those firms already involved in international trade,
while enabling new firms to export for the first time. The WTO (2015) esti-
mates that full implementation of the TFA could reduce trade costs by an
average of 14.3 per cent, and that African countries may benefit from reduc-
tions in trade costs in excess of 16 per cent. Full implementation of the TFA
can reduce time to import by over a day and a half (a 47 per cent reduction
over the current average) and time to export by almost two days (a 91 per cent
reduction over the current average). While these estimates are necessarily
sensitive to assumptions and model structures, they do convey the import-
ance of agreements to reduce trade costs.
Greater market access can also boost Africa’s exports. Trade policy in Africa’s
main trading partners—especially those in Asia—has an important role to play
in easing the entry of non-traditional African exports. Although Asia’s tariffs
on African exports are gradually declining, the trend is weak, especially for
Africa’s least developed countries. As Fukase and Martin argue in Chapter 5,
an essential step is to reduce escalating tariffs directed at higher stage process-
ing of commodity exports. These discourage the development of agro-
industrial value chains. China could play a leading role here by shifting its
preferential trading agreements with Africa from country by country bilateral
deals to a single well publicized Africa-wide initiative. This might push its
Asian trading partners to offer similar tariff reductions.
Unilateral preferential trade programmes such as the US Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the EU’s ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) pro-
grammes have contributed to an expansion of manufacturing and other
exports from Africa. AGOA now covers forty countries, and nearly all of
Africa’s exports to the US. Launched in 2000, it was renewed in 2015 and
now extends to 2025. The EBA also grants duty-free, quota-free access to the
EU market. As a result, as Fukase and Martin point out, tariffs on Africa’s
exports to these major markets on average are less than 1 per cent, substan-
tially less than in other markets. The only pall of uncertainty is the withdrawal
of the UK from the EU—and with it prospectively the 17 per cent of the
European market that it represents.
The Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), launched in 2012, may eventually
have consequences for Africa. Negotiations are on-going and involve twenty-
three negotiating parties, including the EU and US as well as a handful of
developing countries (mainly from Latin America) and one African country,
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Mauritius. The agreement would provide access to foreign services suppliers
on the same terms as domestic suppliers in areas such as transport, health, and
finance. Its short-run fate, however,may be similar to othermultilateral accords.
Domestic politics in the US and Europe appears to have stalled progress.
Support for open world trade may be shifting, but not solely toward protec-
tion. While the US did withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agree-
ment in early 2017, a year later in January 2018, the eleven remaining
countries announced broad agreement on a new trade pact, christened the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Meanwhile, China, India, and Brazil have begun recently to play much more
prominent roles in world trade talks, moving from participants in blocking
coalitions, to new proponents of change. Perhaps reflecting its position as a
capital exporting country, China has recently advocated a new ‘investment
facilitation agreement’ that would cover foreign direct investment, and is
pressing its ideas in the G20. India, a major exporter of services, tabled a
paper on ‘services facilitation’ at the WTO in February 2017. While it is too
soon to draw definitive conclusions, these actions may constitute the first
steps toward a new multilateralism.
2.2. Development Assistance and Infrastructure Finance
In the past, Official Development Assistance (ODA) was a key element pro-
moting structural transformation in Africa. Infrastructure, particularly electric
power, roads, and railways, is essential to trade-led structural transformation,
and financing from external sources has enabled much investment of this
type. After a slow start, the aid-for-trade initiative of the WTO has contributed
to mobilizing additional resources for trade-related infrastructure and trade-
related economic activities (see Lammerson and Roberts 2015). These funds
have mainly gone to countries that are trading less than key indicators would
predict and have contributed to positive results in trade creation (Gamberoni
and Newfarmer 2014).
In recent years, as finance through the concessional windows of the World
Bank (the International Development Association, IDA) and other MDBs has
become constrained, governments in Africa have mobilized new sources of
finance, including private borrowing. Countries from Angola to Zambia have
issued sovereign bonds. Borrowing on private markets has grown rapidly.
Steady global market conditions and the potential for higher returns for
investors have helped pave the way for more access to international markets,
where the average return for these bonds is about 6.6 per cent, with an average
maturity of ten years. Sovereign bonds and borrowings from commercial
banks now amount to more than 40 per cent of outstanding public debt for
Ghana, Senegal, and Zambia (Vellos 2016).
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Because sovereign borrowing can involve high costs and short maturities, a
better alternative would be for the international community to allow credit-
worthy countries to borrow from the non-concessional windows of theWorld
Bank and other multilateral development banks. Terms are far less onerous—
typically less than 1 per cent over Libor compared to 5–7 per cent in private
debt markets with longer grace and repayment periods, up to 15–17 years.
Moreover, using blend financing—concessional and non-concessional loan
packages—as well as guarantees of private lending to finance infrastructure
would yield a higher social benefit-cost ratio than recourse to private markets
alone (E15 2016). Greater cooperation and coordination between DAC donors
and non-traditional donors, perhaps through the international financial insti-
tutions to which they both belong, could also improve the focus and effi-
ciency of resource use.
3. Country-Level Strategy for Structural Transformation
The literature on industrialization in developing countries suggests that three
factors have largely shaped the global distribution of smokestack industry by
attracting new investment and raising the productivity of existing firms
(UNIDO 2009; Newman et al. 2016). The first is conventionally termed the
‘investment climate’—the policy, institutional, and physical environment
within which firms operate (Stern 2001, 2002). The second factor is exports.
A third factor is agglomeration—manufacturing and services firms tend to
concentrate geographically.
These determinants of locational choice are mutually reinforcing. Invest-
ments in infrastructure and skills raise the potential productivity of all
firms, making some of them more likely to succeed in external markets.
Industrial exports help to build firm capabilities which are then transferred
through agglomeration. Agglomerations raise firm-level productivity.
In poorer countries they also generate competitive pressures that reduce
the incentives to cluster, unless the clusters are export-oriented. Thus, a
strategy that encompasses each of these factors is critical to the success of
any industrialization drive.
Because they share many firm characteristics with smokestack industries,
the industries without smokestacks analysed in this book respond largely to
the same drivers of locational choice. This makes it possible to sketch out a
strategy for structural transformation that is broadly applicable to manufac-
turing, tradable services, agro-industry and horticulture. It is important to
keep in mind, though, that each activity has unique characteristics. Generic,
‘one size fits all’ policy-making will be ineffective. Complementary sector
specific public actions are also required.
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3.1. The Investment Climate
The investment climate has come to be broadly and somewhat vaguely
defined.2 Herewe focus on three areas that emerge from the essays in this volume
as particularly relevant to industries without smokestacks—infrastructure, skills
and competition. Reliable electrical power, lower costs of transport and workers
better able to perform their jobs make countries more attractive to investors (IMF
2014). Promoting competition by reforming trade policy and domestic regula-
tions can boost competitiveness.
INFRASTRUCTURE
The productivity penalty that African firms pay as a result of poor infrastruc-
ture and skills has been extensively documented.3 Sub-Saharan Africa lags at
least 20 percentage points behind the average for low income countries on
almost all major infrastructure measures. In addition, the quality of service is
low, supplies are unreliable, and disruptions are frequent and unpredictable
(Newman et. al 2016). By one estimate, the current infrastructure deficiencies in
Africa contribute to a loss of about 2 percentage points per year inGDPgrowth.4
Reliable electrical power may be the greatest single issue. The quality of electri-
city service is ranked as a major problem by more than half of the firms in more
than half of the African countries in theWorld Bank’s Investment Climate Assess-
ments. Transport comes a close second to power across the region. Road infra-
structure has received little attention, as until recently have the region’s ports.
Not surprisingly, ICT-based services may be the most sensitive to infrastruc-
ture constraints. As Frishtak notes in Chapter 3, backbone infrastructure is
essential to exploit opportunities in what he characterizes as first generation
IT-enabled services. The cases of Kenya, Rwanda, and Senegal show that high
speed data transmission is critical to exporting a wide range of services and
especially to IT-intensive exports. Success depends on the ability to attract
providers of cable and other links. Most African countries lack adequate
backbone services because they went straight to mobile networks, without
investing in connectivity first. Rwandamay be the exception; the government
laid an internal backbone fibre optic cable throughout the country to connect
virtually all regions.
A necessary condition for fully leveraging the tourism potential is to have
adequate tourist-related infrastructure and high-quality services. Daly and
Gereffi (see Chapter 4) point to the constraints to tourist development associ-
ated with air travel and road quality. Connectivity to the internet and com-
munication infrastructure is also an important consideration for travellers
2 See Newman et al. (2016) for a discussion.
3 See for example Escribano, Guasch, and Pena (2010).
4 See NEPAD, AU, and AfDB (2011).
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to Africa. Such logistical challenges restrict end-market upgrading opportun-
ities. The country studies indicate that quality of infrastructure constrains
Tanzania’s and Uganda’s ability to access luxury customers. In Rwanda, on
the other hand, a drive from Kigali, to see the mountain gorillas in the
Volcanoes National Park takes less than three hours on well-maintained high-
ways. A recent spate of airport building, serves as a reminder that it is import-
ant to be rigorous in the evaluation of public investments targeted at the
tourism sector. While terminal space can run out as traffic grows, and many
countries aspire to develop passenger or logistics hubs, neither is a rationale
for building a new airport. Bowfinger argues in Chapter 6 that there is no
shortage of runways in Africa, given the current traffic levels. A properly run
existing airport will often serve the business and tourism industry, and ter-
minals can be developed with private sector participation.
Investments to improve trade logistics are essential to export success in
agro-processing and horticulture. Fukuse and Martin note that the unbund-
ling of global value chains is much more demanding of logistics than trad-
itional approaches to the processing of agricultural commodities. Costs
associated with customs clearance and domestic transport maymake it uneco-
nomic for firms to process agricultural goods. Vulnerability to excess costs is
particularly acute for processing activities because these frequently operate on
small margins relative to production of traditional exports such as coffee,
which frequently embody a large share of rents. Horticultural exports are
perishable and particularly vulnerable to delays in shipping. As Bofinger
points out, the underlying infrastructure in getting cut flowers to the airport
is critical to success. He notes that Kenya’s flower-growing region is well
connected by road to Kenya’s international airport, whereas Ethiopia’s
flower-growing region in the past has had poor road connectivity to Bole
International Airport in Addis Ababa, resulting in a 40 per cent spoilage rate.
SKILLS
Although Africans have more schooling today than in any previous gener-
ation, nearly 60 per cent of 15–24-year-olds have only completed primary
school and only 19 per cent have gone beyond lower-secondary (Filmer and
Fox 2014). Educational quality is an issue at all levels. Learning assessments in
Africa show that most primary students lack basic proficiency in reading at the
end of second or third grade. Employer surveys report that African tertiary
graduates are weak in problem solving, business understanding, computer use,
and communication skills.5 Increasing access and improving the quality of
education at all levels remain high priorities.
5 See World Bank (2007) and Filmer and Fox (2014).
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The IT-enabled services industry is potentially constrained by its very source
of competitive advantage. Both the Kenya and Senegal country studies iden-
tify the ability to hire university graduates at a fraction of the cost in Europe or
the Arab Gulf as the initial impetus for IT-enabled startups. In Kenya attempts
to expand the industry have rapidly encountered manpower constraints.
Muchai and Kimuyu note in Chapter 11, for example, that an evaluation of
IT skills in Kenya showed that there remains a substantial supply-demand gap
in the high-end talent pool in the IT workforce. There is, in particular, a lack of
software development and project management skills. They argue that this
gap is particularly binding inmobile money, where collaboration between the
private sector and institutions of learning is key to ensure the skills of gradu-
ates match the skills required to operate mobile money transfer services.
English notes in Chapter13 that Senegal ranks among the top fifty potential
suppliers of outsourcing services according to the AT Kearney Global Services
Location Index. However, it lies near the bottom—in forty-fifth place—and
has fallen significantly in the last five years. The greatest weakness appears to
be in the quality and quantity of human resources. English illustrates this in a
case study of Senegal’s PremiumContact Centre International (PCCI), a major
call centre operator. In its early days, the company faced a severe skills short-
age and labour turnover was high due to stiff competition for skilled workers.
Today, the entry of the large French company, Atos, into Senegal is increasing
the competition for IT engineers.
Hoekman argues in Chapter 8 that a workforce that has the skills needed to
interact with tourists and to provide the many ‘back office’ services that are
inputs into the production of high-quality tourism is essential to further
development of the industry. Lack of skills consistently emerges from the
country studies as a constraint to higher quality tourism. Daly and Gereffi
note in Chapter 4 that management, organization, communication, and com-
puter skills are critical for tourism distribution intermediaries and service
providers seeking to upgrade their position in the tourism value chain.
While there are international programmes designed to teach these skills,
Africa only has two schools that have earned certification from the UN
World Tourism Organization’s Tedqual Programme.
COMPETITION
Chapters 15 and 17 by Ellis, McMillan, and Silver, and Spray and Wolf, respect-
ively, document large differences in productivity across firms in services and
agro-industry.6 Similarly, Ggombe and Newfarmer calculate that many services
sectors have productivity levels several multiples of agriculture—and often
6 These differences in labour productivity surely reflect major differences in products produced
and capital intensity in addition to efficiency in production across firms.
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higher than manufacturing. Because productivity in services has an important
impact on productivity levels across the economy, encouraging an environment
where firms are compelled to search out productivity improvements is essential.
This is where competition becomes important. It affects productivity through
the exit of less efficient firms and the entry or expansion of their more efficient
counterparts (Syverson 2011).
Lack of competition in transportationmarkets, emphasized by deMelo et al.
in Chapter 19 and Karingi et al. in Chapter 18, represents a significant barrier
to integrating markets within countries and in regional groupings. Atkin and
Donaldson (2015) show that within countries the farther a product travels
from its source, the higher the price. This is partly because of transport costs
and partly because of regional monopolies in distribution. Raballand et al.
show in Chapter 7 how lack of competition is associated with higher trucking
costs and undermines competitiveness in the EAC. Bofinger argues in
Chapter 6 that the great majority of air transport routes in Africa are near
monopolies. In East Africa, many services markets, notably telecommunica-
tions and finance, are tight oligopolies dominated by a handful of firms.
Daly and Gereffi point in Chapter 4 to an important anti-competitive aspect
of the structure of Africa’s tourism industry. The ‘Package Booking’ distribu-
tion channel is particularly prominent in Africa, with foreign visitors often
accessing safari, eco-tourism, and surf and sand products through entrenched
networks of actors that have strong ties to one another. Lead firms assemble
and package individual services into cohesive travel experiences. Low domes-
tic demand for African tourism strengthens the position of these global lead
firms because the entry of local tour operators is constrained by low levels of
domestic demand for tourism. Notably, the country studies reveal that few
governments have strategies designed to promote tourism at either the
regional or national level.
These issues underscore the importance of competition policy in several
dimensions. First, import competition—including from within regional eco-
nomic communities—is extremely important to discipline local manufactur-
ers and service providers in their pricing, investment and technology
decisions. Second, removing barriers to foreign entry can increase competi-
tion, reduce costs and extend access to a broader range of differentiated
services. Hoekman argues in Chapter 8 that FDI is a particularly important
channel for the transfer of know-how and technology, as foreign firms intro-
duce new types of services that may be better suited to the needs of clients.
Boefinger notes that reducing barriers to airline entry by adopting ‘Fifth
freedom rights’ can pave the way for eventual competition. Third, although
African countries have experienced an increase in competition for the provi-
sion of telecom services, efficient regulation remains important where a single
dominant firm—as in the telecoms sector in Ethiopia or Senegal—effectively
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controls the price level. Finally, because it is likely that many companies in
Africa will enjoy a degree of market power for some time, it is imperative that
tax and investment policies encourage private investment so that any mon-
opoly rents are reinvested in expanded production.
3.2. Tilting Towards Exports
For most countries in Africa, the regional and global export market represents
the best option for rapid growth of horticulture, agro-industry, and tradable
services. Exports permit firms to realize economies of scale and in low-income
countries the act of exporting raises firm productivity through learning (Harrison
and Rodriguez-Clare 2010). Because individual firms face high fixed costs of
entering export markets, there is a risk that countries will export too little
unless public policies are put in place to offset the costs to first movers. To deal
with these externalities, African governments need to develop a consistent
package of trade and exchange rate policies, public investments, regulatory
reforms, and institutional changes to increase the share of non-traditional
exports in GDP.
The structure of protection and the exchange rate have an important role to
play in ensuring that exporting is as attractive as producing for the local
market. For this reason, proper measurement of these incentives is essential.
Tariffs may steer investment toward production for the domestic market, and
tariffs on intermediates and capital goods can place exporters at a disadvantage
relative to global competitors. Fukase and Martin even suggest that high tariffs
and other charges on intermediate inputs result in negative value added at
market prices in some agro-processing activities, giving one possible explan-
ation for the region’s lagging performance in this sector. One option to
address any anti-export bias, is to create an effective ‘free trade regime for
exporters’ through various mechanisms to eliminate or rebate tariffs on inter-
mediate and capital inputs used in export production. While duty drawback,
tariff exemption and VAT reimbursement schemes exist in many African
countries, they are often complex and poorly administered, resulting in sub-
stantial delays. Export procedures—including certificates of origin, quality
and sanitary certification and permits—can be burdensome.7 One approach
that has succeeded elsewhere is to streamline the trade regime first in special
economic zones.
The exchange rate is arguably the most important price in the economy. It
influences the relative attractiveness of producing for the domestic or foreign
market. A competitive real exchange rate has underpinned most prolonged
7 See Clarke (2005); Yoshino (2008); Farole (2011).
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episodes of rapid export growth, whether in Chile or China (Hausmann et al.
2004), and Rodrik (2008a), among others, has argued for countries at early
stages of structural transformation to attempt to undervalue the exchange rate
over the medium to long term. Maintaining an undervalued exchange rate is
difficult (and costly) in countries with small bond markets and large capital
inflows, including aid. At a minimum, macroeconomic policy should strive to
avoid overvaluations that stifle non-traditional exports over time.8
Trade in tasks has greatly increased the importance of trade logistics.
According to WTO estimates, trade costs in developing countries are equiva-
lent to applying a 219 per cent ad valorem tariff on international trade (WTO
2015). For this reason, investments in infrastructure and institutional
reforms to improve trade logistics are essential to export success. Limao
and Venables (2001), for example, find that an improvement in communi-
cation and transport infrastructure from the median score on the World Bank
trade logistics index survey to the highest 25th percentile is associated with
a decrease in transport costs of 12 per cent and an increase in trade volumes
of 28 per cent. One study of port efficiency in APEC found that bringing
below-average countries up to the APEC average level of port efficiency
would produce US$117 billion in additional trade within APEC alone (Wilson,
Mann, and Otsuki 2005).
Market structure and inappropriate regulations can also impede exports.
Senegal provides an example of the costs to IT-based services providers of a
monopoly controlling the price and quality of access to the backbone infra-
structure. The high cost and limited flexibility of air transport constrains
both horticulture and tourism. The aviation industry is heavily protected,
with a plethora of small and uneconomic national airlines. As Bofinger
points out, Africa is under-served by major airlines. Senegal has relied on
scheduled flights for tourism, and with limited airline competition in its
main French market, costs have been high. High costs of air transportation
have prevented Mozambique and Tanzania from competing in the regional
tourism market. While adopting an open skies policy might endanger some
national airlines, it would introduce greater competition and reduce the cost
of air freight through the development of competing, specialized, charter
airfreight companies.
3.3. Spatial Policies
The studies of agro-processing, horticulture, and ICT-based services in this vol-
ume offer evidence that, like manufacturing, they benefit from agglomeration,
8 See Eichengreen (2008).
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including thick labour markets, information and knowledge spill overs, and
the ability to share overhead expenses and services. Geography also plays an
obvious role in tourism: tourist facilities tend to cluster close to the tourism
resource. Agglomerations pose a collective action problem: if a new location
can attract a critical mass of firms, each firm will realize productivity gains
from clustering. Yet, until the location reaches critical mass, there is no incen-
tive for individual firms to move.
Governments can foster agglomerations by concentrating investments in
high-quality institutions, social services, and infrastructure in a limited area,
such as a special economic zone (SEZ) or an industrial park (UNIDO 2009;
Farole 2011). While most first-generation SEZs have been focused on manu-
facturing, they are relevant to services and agro-based industries as well.
Services export companies look for customized facilities such as IT parks
with modern office space, high-speed broadband links, reliable power supply
and ancillary infrastructure. The Software Technology Parks of India Initiative
(STPI), launched by the Indian government to attract potential IT investors,
proved essential to the growth of the software industry (Dongier and Sudan
2009). In agro-industry and horticulture, Indonesia and the Philippines have
established agro-industrial SEZs, near growing areas to promote processed
agricultural exports.
Most African countries are relative latecomers to the promotion of SEZs.Many
SEZ programmes began only in the late 1990s or early 2000s. Globally, SEZs
rarely experience rapid growth in their first 5–10 years of operation, and it may
be too early to judge their success in Africa. In any case, evidence suggests that,
in many countries—such as Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania—
zones are struggling (Newman and Page 2017). One reason for the lack of
dynamism is that most African SEZs have failed to reach the levels of infrastruc-
ture and institutional performance needed to attract global investors.
A number of countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania are
giving SEZs another go. Most of these countries have zones that include
agriculture-related sectors such as agri-business, agro-processing, livestock,
and dairy products. Zones focused on high-end service sectors are less com-
mon. Some examples include the East London IDZ in South Africa and ITC
and Biotechnology focused zones in Benin and Cote d’Ivoire (Newman and
Page 2017). A critical challenge will be to bring the physical, institutional and
management quality of these zones up to a level that is sufficiently attractive
to investors with global alternatives. In Rwanda, for example, Steenbergen and
Javorcik (2017) have shown that firms in the SEZ in Kigali are substantially
more productive, in part because the government offered business facilitating
services, including more efficient import procedures.
Spatial policies can be used to encourage the formation of value chain
relationships. Daly and Gereffi note in Chapter 4 that underdeveloped
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linkages between tourism and sectors such as agriculture and construction can
inhibit industry development and limit the economic benefits associated with
tourism.Where foreign tour operators, hotel companies, and investors control
supply chain decisions and procurement opportunities, linkages between
tourism and domestic supporting industries often remain underdeveloped.
In Senegal, English reports that a 2003 study estimated the import content of
tourism spending at 30 per cent. The Tanzania country study suggests that
almost 30 per cent of tourist spending leaks into foreign markets, through
consumption of imported goods or services.
South Africa is attempting to use spatial policies to increase local participa-
tion in the tourism value chain. Its Department of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism sets guidelines for responsible sourcing—purchases that are made
from businesses within 50 kilometres. Daly and Gereffi argue that while
adherence to the targets has been uneven, the initiative provides a basis to
address the poor communication and mistrust that sometimes characterize
food-supply value chain relationships. They also suggest that national or
regional investment departments can create databases of qualified construc-
tion contractors, sub-contractors, and suppliers that investors can access
before projects commence.
3.4. The Role of Industrial Policy
Many of the conventional public actions outlined above—the structure of
protection, exchange rate policies, investments in trade facilitation, and
reform of regulations—fall under the rubric of industrial policy. That is,
policies designed to promote selected industries or activities. Perhaps no
other term in economics has generated more heat with less light. Fortunately,
industrial policy is finally moving away from the fruitless debates on ‘picking
winners’ versus ‘levelling the playing field’ towards the policy mainstream.
There is broader agreement that information, learning, and geography com-
bine to make a strong case for industrial policy (Stiglitz 1996, 2001; Rodrik
2008b). Arkebe Oqubay in a sophisticated discussion of Ethiopia’s industrial
policy argues that ‘the state in Africa must play an activist and developmental
role beyond beingmerely a “facilitating actor”; that is, being little more than a
servant of comparative advantage’.9 The lesson he derives is that policy has to
be strategically driven and consistent, a proposition reflected in the strategy
set out above.
9 Oqubay (2015: Chapter 1).
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Todaymany countries are integrating industrial development strategies that
use various policy instruments into major development efforts.10 Rodrik
(2004) lays out ten principles of an industrial policy for the twenty-first
century. These include: (a) target only new activities, not sectors, and only
those with clear potential for spillovers; (b) build in sunset clauses and feed-
back loops so mistakes can get corrected; (c) establish clear benchmarks of
success; and (d) ensure that implementing agencies are competent and can be
held accountable. It is important to note that few governments actually
adhere to these principles.11
For this reason, while a strategy is essential, governments could raise the
probability of successful results by adopting five best practices. The first is to
avoid adopting policies that protect incumbents and restrict competition.
In the EAC, for example, several governments are considering adopting per-
formance requirements, market reservations and preferences for domestic
firms in government procurement, among other policies, including export and
import bans. Competition from imports is an important driver of productivity
growth (Newfarmer and Sztajerowska 2012); competition from new entry in
services markets can drive down prices and improve services (Hoekman and
Mattoo 2008); intra-industry competition within regions can help create larger
firms and, by driving out marginal uncompetitive firms, raise industrial prod-
uctivity throughout the region. Second, transparency in granting direct and
indirect subsidies is essential to ensuring that they can be curtailed if ineffective
or phased out when no longer needed. One option, following the New Zealand
practice, is to report tax and other incentives as ‘tax expenditures’ or fiscal
outlays that could be reviewed annually as part of the budget process. Third,
an important, and often overlooked, practice is to ensure that the performance
of firms receiving tax breaks in exchange for particular commitments, such as to
invest or export certain amounts, is monitored adequately to ensure they actu-
ally fulfil their promises. Fourth, programmes designed to promote selected
activities should incorporate periodic reviews and be evaluated against pro-
jected achievements. Requiring that an incentive expire unless a review recom-
mends that it be extended places the burden on advocates to show why it
remains relevant. Finally, at the outset of devising a national strategy, it is
helpful to begin by analysing the cumulative effects on resource allocation of
existing industrial policies. All governments have industrial policies, so under-
taking a comprehensive review can surface activities that may be underserved
and ones that perhaps are receiving too much public support.
10 See, among others, ‘Kenya’s Industrial Transformation Programme’ (July 2015); ‘Made in
Rwanda’ (draft January 2017); ‘Buy Uganda, Build Uganda’ (December 2016) and ‘Made in Sierra
Leone’ (draft March 2017).
11 See Page and Tarp (2017).
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4. The Role of Regional Agreements
The small size of Africa’s economies and the fact that many are landlocked
make regional approaches to infrastructure, customs administration, and
regulation of transport in trade corridors imperative. Moreover, neighbouring
markets can provide the needed access and preference margins to jumpstart
a wide variety of exports; and in an era of value chains, they offer the oppor-
tunity to develop local value chains that could be a spring board to the
global market.
4.1. Uneven Progress Toward Deeper Integration
Ever since the Abuja Treaty was signed in 1991, African governments have
looked to regional economic integration to expand intra-African trade, to
harmonize regulations and policies, to establish coordinated monetary pol-
icies, and even to achieve political union. As de Melo et al. point out in
Chapter 19, these goals have proven elusive. They find that reductions in
tariffs and non-tariff barriers have been implemented only slowly, that other
aspects of policy and regulatory harmonization have lagged and that efforts to
integrate in services trade have by and large been ignored. Growth in regional
trade has barely kept up with exports to the rest of the world, and the
introduction of new products in the RECs, a key indicator of export dyna-
mism, has only accounted for a small percentage of trade growth.
They argue that one reason for the minimal impact of these agreements is
that even when ambitious regulatory reform measures are enacted, they lack
enforcement. Trade costs have come down relative to pre-agreement levels,
but more for agriculture than for manufactures—and in only a few of the
RECs. De Melo and his colleagues suggest that the key to unlocking more
vigorous regional trade is to abandon the old approach of negotiating over
increasing market access in the context of an effort to build vertically inte-
grated regional value chains and instead focus on reducing trade costs and
liberalizing services markets in order to develop horizontally organized pro-
duction chains.
In Chapter 18, Karingi and others give a somewhat more upbeat interpret-
ation of the effects of integration in the East African Community. They find
that the combined share of EAC members’ intra-regional exports remained
about the same (at 18 per cent) before and after the community was launched.
That said, some countries gained market share—notably Uganda and, to a
lesser extent, Burundi and Tanzania—and, together with Kenya, have bene-
fitted from substantially more exports to other countries in Africa. In fact, for
the EAC as a whole, exports to Africa outside the EAC amount to about the
same share of exports as intra-EAC exports.
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Karingi et al. argue that the EAC has been a springboard for manufactured-,
services-, and agro- exports to other parts of Africa. They note that intra-EAC
exports are much more diversified than the community’s global exports.
Manufactures, for example, comprise 55 per cent of intra-EAC exports and
only 19 per cent of exports to the rest of the world. Moreover, exports of EAC
countries to other African countries mirror the intra-EAC pattern of greater
diversification with over half of the exports in manufactures. The authors
showcase the dairy industry as an example where intra-EAC exports from
Uganda have flourished—albeit behind a common external tariff of 60 per cent
on imports.
4.2. The Way Forward: Regional Initiatives Promoting Transformation
Using the regional economic communities to propel trade integration and the
development of regional value chains can occur through threemain channels:
reforming price incentives, strengthening trade facilitation and services regu-
lation, and investing in interconnected physical infrastructure.
REFORMING PRICE INCENTIVES
Price incentives in Africa, despite the complex system of regional preferences,
still tend to discourage production for the external market and inhibit the
emergence of regional and global value chains. Karingi and his colleagues
observe that tariffs facing exports to the rest of Africa from the EAC are
substantially higher than to other regions and much higher than to high-
income regions. Fukase and Martin suggest that average protection against
African exports is 1.7 per cent in the rest of the world compared to 6.1 per cent
within Africa itself. Tariff escalation in agriculture is particularly notable within
Africa. Processed agricultural products are taxed on entry to other African mar-
kets at a rate nearly four times higher than bulk agricultural exports. Progress
toward the Africa-wide Continental Free Trade Area, as de Melo and his col-
leagues note, could help reduce these distortions.
Regional forums and agreements can help curtail the adoption of ‘beggar
thy neighbour’ policies that are emerging in many countries. Fiscal incentives
are becoming an increasingly popular export promotion instrument among
African governments. According to new data assembled by the World Bank,
sub-Saharan Africa enacted more tax incentives to attract firms—typically
multinational companies—to invest in export-oriented production than any
other region between 2009 and 2015. These included tax holidays and pref-
erential tax rates. Because competition among governments in granting tax
incentives is intense, themarginal effect from an aggregate African perspective
may be lost tax revenue with little benefit in export expansion (Von Euxkull
et al. 2017).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/10/2018, SPi
Industries without Smokestacks
426
TRADE FACILITATION AND SERVICES REGULATION
As noted above, regional institutions have alreadymade significant progress in
reducing trade costs. Although de Melo and others only partially attribute these
declines to the regional agreements per se, there is little doubt that increased
coordination has played a role. Trade costs are falling sharply—and in the EAC
the results in terms of expanded firm level exports have been tangible (see Spray
2017; Karingi et al. in Chapter 18). In addition, the regional agreements have
facilitated rapid growth in the export of transport services. Within the EAC
transport services can amount to a sizable portion of services export earnings.
In Uganda for example, transport services have averaged nearly 10 per cent of
services exports in the period 2014–15 (Shepherd 2016). In Rwanda, transport
earnings were 11 per cent of services exports in 2016 (Ggombe and Newfarmer).
Services regulation is the area where regional institutions have done the
least and where the gains are possibly the highest. In the EAC, efforts in
telecoms deregulation have integrated markets in long-distance services.
The virtual elimination of roaming charges through collective regulatory
action by the Northern Corridor countries (Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya)
has lowered prices, expanded consumer volume, and at the same time
increased firm profitability.12 Similarly, introducing a joint visa programme
in the Northern Corridor countries has facilitated tourist travel among the three
participating countries. Replicating these initiatives in finance, mobile money,
education, and professional services, as well as in labour mobility generally
would go far toward unleashing the potential for regional integration.
INVESTING IN INTERCONNECTED INFRASTRUCTURE
While interconnection of physical infrastructure is underway it could be
accelerated. The Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System has installed some
10,000 kilometres of fibre optic cable that links most of Eastern Africa, includ-
ing the landlocked countries to the global internet. This effort involved the
coordination of various governments and their telecom regulators, and its
completion offers new access at low cost for millions of East Africans. As both
Frischtak andMurray note in their Chapters, access to low cost, fast internet can
be transformative.
The development of IT infrastructure may bode well for interconnecting the
power grid, where new installations can lower the cost of power from the
current very high rates and improve reliability. The problems associating with
power, however, are substantially more complex than for telecommunica-
tions. Road interconnections may be easier. In 2012, African ministers of
transportation adopted a region-wide plan that included network routes,
12 See Karingi et al. in Chapter 18.
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design standards and harmonization of safety, social, and environmental
norms. These should facilitate completion of the gaps in the Trans-African
Highway. Similar efforts are underway in rail and air transportation (UNECA
2013). The EAC’s Northern Corridor has been coordinating on a standard
gauge railway project (US$13.5 billion) and a single airspace arrangement
(All Africa News 2015).
5. Conclusions
The research in this book gives some good news for Africa. Structural trans-
formation is taking place. In contrast to traditional historical patterns—and
in sharp contrast to East Asia—though, the movement of labour has gone
less into manufacturing than into services. In some countries, industries
without smokestacks—agro-processing and horticulture, tourism, and busi-
ness and trading services—have provided a substantial portion of new high-
productivity jobs. At the same time, the region’s structure of trade is also
changing. Although many countries still depend on commodity exports,
Africa’s export portfolio has become more diversified and less concentrated
than it was two decades ago. As a result, the region is less vulnerable to the
sharp swings in commodity prices than at any time in its post-colonial history.
The news is not all good, however. Africa faces challenges that differ from
other region’s historical experiences. One set of challenges is demographic.
Rapid population growth interacting with extremely low productivity in trad-
itional agriculture has led to a wave of urbanization at unprecedentedly low
levels of average per capita income. This necessarily implies that high prod-
uctivity jobs will be accompanied by low-productivity jobs, and the dispersion
of productivity in cities will be large. It also means that governments have to
pay as much attention to increasing within-sector productivity as reallocating
labour into new sectors (Jones and Tarp 2017). Another challenge will be the
changing global outlook and a possible retreat from multilateralism in rich
countries. While recent forecasts point to stronger world economic growth
than in most of the post-Great Recession period, political developments por-
tend at least a pause in the trend toward greater openness and in the evolution
of the rule-based system that provided a favourable climate for East Asia’s
rapid development.
We began this chapter by asserting that the successful African economy of the
future will have to find its own path forward. It will, however, have transformed
from a mainly agricultural economy into one characterized by a range of trad-
able, high value-added industries—with and without smokestacks. Policy
changes at the global, national and regional level will be needed for that trans-
formation to take place. If they can be achieved, Africa will have some new lions.
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